GERMANY'S WAR

THE ORIGINS, AFTERMATH & ATROCITIES OF WORLD WAR II

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Dedication

This book is dedicated to the all-but-forgotten memory of the millions of Germans murdered by the Western Allies after the end of World War II.

Introduction
• War Is Hell

My father was a pilot in 50 bombing missions for the U.S. Eighth Air Force during World War II. When I was a boy I asked him if he had killed anyone during the war. He replied, "I hope I didn't kill anyone." In regard to his participation in the Normandy invasion, he said: "You cannot imagine how big of an operation that was. People on the ground were being killed!" My father repeatedly stated he hated war and that "War is hell." He also expressed his opinion that the Germans had fought extraordinarily hard during the war.

I have always wondered how wars have continuously existed throughout history when virtually everyone agrees with my father that "War is hell." In regard to the origin of World War II, a fascinating discussion occurred during the Nuremberg trials between American psychologist Dr. Gustave Gilbert and former German Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering. On the evening of April 18, 1946, in Goering's jail cell, Dr. Gilbert expressed his belief that the common people are not very thankful for leaders who bring them war and destruction. Goering responded:

Why, of course, the people don't want war. Why would some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war when the best that he can get out of it is to come back in one piece? Naturally, the common people don't want war; neither in Russia nor in England nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But, after all, it is the leaders of the country who determine the policy and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a Parliament or a Communist dictatorship.[1]

Dr. Gilbert told Goering that there is one difference. Gilbert said: "In a democracy the people have some say in the matter through their elected representatives, and in the United States only Congress can declare war."

Goering responded: "Oh, that is all well and good, but, voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same way in any country." [2]

Hermann Goering was speaking the truth to Dr. Gilbert. The common people of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, Germany, Japan and all other countries in the world were strongly against war. World War II was instigated only because the leaders of some countries had wanted war and brought the people to their bidding. The question is: Which countries had leaders who wanted to bring about World War II?

Dr. Gilbert stated that the leaders of Germany were the ones who had wanted war.[3] Goering emphatically denied that he and Adolf Hitler had wanted war. Most historians would agree with Dr. Gilbert's statement and reject Goering's denial as self-serving, absurd, and irresponsible. However, as we will discuss in Part 1 of this book, the historical record clearly shows that Goering was right. Hitler had wanted to free Germany from the Treaty of Versailles, but had never wanted to plunge Germany into World War II.

This book discusses the origins, aftermath, and atrocities of World War II from a German perspective. It is in essence Germany's side of the story. This book is designed to counteract the one-sided bias of establishment historians against Germany in regard to World War II. Most establishment historians, for example, state that it is self-evident that Adolf Hitler and Germany started World War II. However, an objective review of the origins of World War II reveals that the Allied leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain were primarily responsible for starting and prolonging the war.

Part I of this book documents that: 1) Adolf Hitler was forced to invade the Soviet Union to preempt a Soviet takeover of Europe; 2) U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt repeatedly told the American public he was committed to peace while making every effort to involve the United States in war; and 3) Germany was forced to fight Great Britain even though Hitler had always wanted peace with Britain and regarded the two countries as natural allies. The leaders of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain were all committed to the complete destruction of Germany. The Allied leaders purposely sacrificed the lives of tens of millions of people and practiced uncivilized warfare to accomplish their goal.

The Allies also intentionally allowed the Soviet Union to gain control of Eastern Europe. Thus, a war allegedly fought for freedom and democracy turned into a totalitarian nightmare for the people of the Eastern European nations.

Part II of this book reports the Allied mass murder of the German people after the end of World War II. Although denied by almost all historians, the Western Allies murdered approximately 1 million German prisoners of war through intentional starvation and exposure to the elements. The Allies also carried out the largest forced population transfer in history by expelling approximately 16 million ethnic Germans from their homes after the end of the war. Probably a minimum 2.1 million of these German expellees died in what was supposed to be an "orderly and humane" expulsion. Finally, the Allies murdered millions of additional Germans through starvation after the end of World War II.

Allied soldiers also raped an estimated 2 million German women during and after World War II. This represents more rapes against a defeated enemy than any other war in history. The Allies conducted a brutal denazification program designed to make the German people feel guilty about their war effort. Hundreds of German scientists were also compelled to emigrate by the victors, and German patents, technological advances, and other property were confiscated by the Allies. Millions of Germans were also sent to the Soviet Union and other Allied nations to be used as slave labor. Large numbers of these German slave laborers did not survive their captivity. The Allied postwar treatment of Germany is surely one of the most criminal, murderous, and unreported atrocities in world history.

The real and alleged atrocities committed by Germany during World War II are discussed in Part III of this book. Germany engaged in vicious anti-partisan activity and conducted an extensive euthanasia program against its own people during the war. Illegal medical experimentation and executions were also committed by Germany in its concentration camps. However, National Socialist Germany did not have a policy of genocide against the Jewish people during the war. Although hundreds of thousands of Jews died of disease and other natural causes in the German concentration camps, Germany did not murder millions of Jews as claimed by most historians. Also, while almost never reported by establishment historians, the Allies murdered tens of thousands of Germans in former German concentration camps after the end of World War II.

This book does not pretend to be a definitive or comprehensive history of the origins, aftermath and atrocities of World War II. The subject matter is far too broad for one book. Instead, it is written to summarize in an objective manner the highly successful Allied plan to

conquer, control, and mass murder the German people. This book also exposes the Allied falsification and exaggeration of German atrocities during World War II. My hope is that this book will open up a debate concerning these historical events and perhaps stimulate others to investigate more deeply into these long-suppressed subjects.

Footnotes

[1] Gilbert, Gustave M., Nuremberg Diary, New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1947, p. 278.

[2] Ibid., pp. 278-279.

[3] Ibid., pp. 282, 364.

Part I

The Allied Conspiracy to Originate World War II

Chapter One

• The Chief Culprit: Josef Stalin & The USSR

Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, is widely interpreted by historians as an unprovoked act of aggression by Germany. Adolf Hitler is typically described as an untrustworthy liar who maliciously broke the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact he had signed with the Soviet Union. Historians usually depict Josef Stalin as an unprepared victim of Hitler's aggression who was foolish to have trusted Hitler. Many historians think the Soviet Union was lucky to have survived Germany's attack.

This standard version of history does not incorporate information obtained from the Soviet archives. The Soviet archives show that the Soviet Union had amassed the largest, most powerful, and best equipped army in history. As we shall see in the following discussion, the Soviet Union was on the verge of launching a massive military offensive against all of Europe. Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union was a desperate preemptive attack that prevented the Soviet Union from conquering all of Europe. Germany was totally unprepared for a prolonged war against an opponent as powerful as the Soviet Union.

Viktor Suvorov is a former Soviet military intelligence operative who defected to the United Kingdom in 1978. Suvorov joined the Soviet army as an 11-year-old, and for the next seven years attended the extremely tough Military Boarding School. After graduation, Suvorov was chosen for the Frunze High Command Army School in Kiev, where he graduated in three years with honors. Suvorov's work as an intelligence operative was noticed. He was sent to the Soviet Army Academy, which was the Soviet Union's most secret military academy. The curriculum at the Soviet Army Academy was extremely intense and was designed as a test; those who excelled would get the most interesting intelligence assignments.

Suvorov had been taught to notice strange occurrences, anomalies, and exceptions to the rules. Suvorov noticed that no matter what happened in the Soviet Union, the government and media always tried to conceal the negative aspects and show the positive. You could not find any negative news about the Soviet Union. Everything was always fine, culture was flourishing, the quality of life was getting better and

better, the Soviet Union would soon surpass the United States. A magnitude 7.3 on the Richter scale earthquake that leveled the city of Ashkhabad was not reported; those who spoke about the earthquake were arrested and put into prison for spreading false rumors. Even catastrophes such as the Chernobyl disaster were not reported. After an international investigation exposed the Chernobyl disaster, the Soviets claimed that the Chernobyl accident was completely insignificant and no one should pay any attention to it.[1]

Suvorov noticed one exception to these rules: June 22, 1941, the day Germany attacked the Soviet Union. All Soviet sources talk about the blatant unpreparedness of the Red Army for military action. Soviet sources said that the Soviet army had no good commanders, that Soviet tanks and airplanes were outdated, that the Soviet Union was totally unprepared for war, and that Stalin was stupid to have trusted Hitler. Suvorov was taught by his intelligence training to look for incoherence. He asked: Why was it that the Soviets, who would hide all other mistakes, accidents, and catastrophes, make such a tremendous effort to emphasize the mistakes of the Soviet Union in June 1941?

Suvorov soon realized that Communist historians and propaganda masters had gone out of their way to hide any details that would enable an outsider to construct the reality of what was happening in the Soviet Union at the beginning of the German invasion. Suvorov found a way to re-construct this reality. While a student at the Academy, Suvorov wrote an independent research paper entitled "The Attack of Germany on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941." Suvorov explained his interest in the subject by saying to his professors that he wanted to study how Germany prepared for the attack so that a horrible tragedy of this kind would never happen again. The topic of Suvorov's research was approved and he was given access to closed archives. Suvorov was extra careful not to reveal the real interest of his research. [2]

Suvorov discovered that the Soviet version of World War II history is a lie and that it conceals the Soviet Union's responsibility for planning the start of the war. The Red Army in June 1941 was the largest, best equipped army in the history of the world. The concentration of Soviet troops on the German border was frightful. If Hitler had not invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union would have easily taken over all of Europe. German intelligence correctly saw the massive concentration of Soviet forces on the German border, but it did

not see all of the Soviet military preparedness. The real picture was much graver than Germany realized.

Suvorov first published his findings in English in 1990 in the book Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War? The book quickly sold out, but the publisher refused to print further editions. It quickly became apparent that the Western academic community was as reluctant as the Communists to accept Suvorov's new interpretation of World War II. However, with the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union, Icebreaker and Suvorov's later books sold in large quantities. Beginning in 1990, Suvorov began to receive a flood of letters from all over the world. People provided Suvorov with their unique insights and sent him copies of documents in support of his theory. Many of these insights, as well as evidence from newly published materials, are incorporated in Suvorov's latest book The Chief Culprit: Stalin's Grand Design to Start World War II.

Before summarizing the evidence in Suvorov's book, I want to mention that Suvorov does not believe that traditional methods of historical science are needed to understand the Soviet Union. Suvorov regards the Soviet Union as a criminal conglomerate. The Soviet leaders have committed innumerable acts of atrocity against their own people and people of other countries. This is why for Suvorov the history of the Soviet Union should be studied using methods of criminology and intelligence rather than classical historical research. The first rule of intelligence is: do not believe what is demonstrated to you; seek what is hidden. Suvorov states that Soviet leaders were demonstrating the unpreparedness of the Soviet Union for war. What Soviet leaders were hiding was a massive military offensive designed to take over all of Europe.[3]

Industrialization, Collectivization of the Soviet Economy

The Soviet Union adopted a Five Year Plan in 1927 for developing industry. The main focus of the first Five Year Plan was not the production of arms, but rather the creation of an industrial base which was later used to produce armaments. The military emphasis was not so noticeable in these first five years. The Red Army had 79 foreign-made tanks at the beginning of the first plan; at the end of the first plan it had 4,538 tanks.[4]

The second Five Year Plan that began in 1932 in the Soviet Union was a continuation of the development of the industrial base. This meant

the creation and purchase of furnaces, giant electricity plants, coal mines, factories, and machinery and equipment. In the early 1930s, American engineers traveled to the Soviet Union and built the largest and most powerful enterprise in the entire world—Uralvagonzavod (the Ural Railroad Car Factory). Uralvagonzavod was built in such a manner that it could at any moment switch from producing railroad cars to producing tanks. In 1941, an order was issued to produce tanks, and Uralvagonzavod without any delays began the mass production of tanks. Uralvagonzavod produced 35,000 T-34 tanks and other weapons during World War II. [5]

The third Five Year Plan that began in 1937 had as its goal the production of military weapons of very high quality in enormous quantities. The Soviet Union under Stalin was highly successful in achieving its goals, and produced superior military weapons on a grandiose scale. For example, the Chelyabinsk tractor factory was completed in the Urals, and similar to Uralvagonzavod this factory was built in such a way that it could begin producing tanks at any time. The Chelyabinsk tractor factory was called Tankograd during the course of the war. It built not only the medium T-34 tanks, but also the heavy IS and KV tank classes. [6]

A third gigantic factory, Uralmash, was built not far away in Sverdlovsk. This factory is among the top 10 engineering factories in the world. The Soviet net of steel-casting factories was greatly expanded in order to supply these three giant factories in the Urals. Magnitogorsk, a city of metallurgists, was built in addition to a huge plant the main output of which was steel armor. In Stalingrad, a tractor factory was also built that in reality was primarily for producing tanks. Automobile, motor, aviation, and artillery factories were also erected at the same time.[7]

The most powerful aviation factory in the world was built in the Russian Far East. The city Komsomolsk-na-Amure was built in order to service this factory. Both the factory and the city were built according to American designs and furnished with the most modern American equipment. The American engineers sent to Komsomolsk to install the equipment were astounded by the scope of the construction.[8]

One secret of Soviet success in building its military was the use of terror to control the Soviet population. Communists shut down the borders of the Soviet Union, making it impossible to leave the country. Secret police also unleashed a fight against “saboteurs.” Any accident, breakage, or lack of success in a production line was declared to be the

result of an evil plot. The guilty and innocent alike were sentenced to long prison terms. Those who were named “malevolent saboteurs” were executed.

The terror improved worker discipline and eliminated any need to fear strikes and demands for higher wages on the part of workers. Also, the terror caused millions of people to be sent to concentration camps. Concentration camp inmates constituted a slave labor force that could be sent anywhere in the country without having to be paid. The development of the remote regions of Siberia and the Far East would have been impossible without the millions of inmates deported to work in these regions. The Soviets planned in advance the number of prisoners that would be needed for the next year, and would place an order in advance with the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) to obtain the needed workers.[9]

The second secret of Stalin’s industrialization success was the vast resources available in the Soviet Union. Valuables amassed over the centuries such as paintings, statues, icons, medals, precious books, antique furniture, furs, jewelry, gold, platinum, and diamonds were all mercilessly confiscated and sold abroad. The Soviet Union also had every sort of resource in almost inexhaustible quantities. Timber exports, gold mining, coal, nickel, manganese, petroleum, caviar and furs were all used to pay for Soviet industrialization. Western technology was the main key to success. The Soviet Union became the world’s biggest importer of machinery and equipment in the early 1930s.[10]

Stalin also sent large numbers of prominent tank, aviation, and artillery engineers to prison, accusing them of being spies. The task assigned to the engineers was straightforward: create the best bomber, tank, cannon, engine, or submarine in the world and you will receive your freedom. Fail and you will work in a gold mine where inmates did not live too long. The engineers did not have to be paid, but were still highly motivated to create the best weapons in the world to obtain their freedom. Stalin’s spies also supplied these talented engineers with the best American, German, British, and other designs in the given field. The engineer could choose the best design, and based on it create something even more outstanding.[11]

The lives of the people in the Soviet Union were not improved with the Soviet industrialization. Basic necessities such as pots and pans, rubber boots, plates, furniture, cheap clothing, nails, home appliances, matches and other goods all became scarce. People had to wait in long

lines outside the stores to obtain these items. Stalin let his people's standard of living drop extremely low to focus practically all of the Soviet Union's industrial production on military expansion.[12]

Stalin also began his bloody war against peasants, which was called collectivization. Units of the Red Army would herd peasants and their families into railroad cattle cars and transport them to Siberia, the Urals, or Kazakhstan, where they were thrown out into the cold on the bare steppes. This operation was ordered by Stalin and executed by his deputy Molotov. Many years later, when Molotov was asked how many people were transferred during collectivization, Molotov answered: "Stalin said that we relocated 10 million. In reality, we relocated 20 million."[13] The Soviet collectivization of 1932-1933 is estimated to have resulted in 3.5 to 5 million deaths from starvation, and another 3 million to 4 million deaths as a result of intolerable conditions at the places of exile.[14]

Stalin's Preparations for War: Tanks

Tanks were planned to be the spearhead for the Soviet offensive against Europe. Stalin built and mass-produced the best tanks in the world as he built Soviet industry. The Red Army produced the T-28 tank in 1933. Not a single German, British, American, French, or Japanese tank from the 1930s could match the T-28 in terms of weapons, armor, engine power, or the ability to cross water barriers underwater.[15]

The Germans started producing the Pz-IVA, the most powerful German tank of the first half of World War II, at the end of 1937. The T-28 tank was superior to the German tank in all respects except one: the T28 fired shells with an initial speed of 381 m/s, while the German PzIVA tank fired shells with an initial speed of 385 m/s. In response, starting in 1938, the Soviet T-28 tanks were produced with a new L-10 gun that fired shells with an initial speed of 555 m/s. The L-10 Soviet tank gun was unrivaled in Germany or anywhere else in the world. Despite being outstanding in comparison with all foreign tanks, after the war Soviet historians and generals called the T-28 tank obsolete.

On Dec. 19, 1939, the Red Army introduced the T-34 tank. Entire volumes of rave reviews of the T-34 tank have been published; its debut caused a sensation at the beginning of the war. The T-34 surpassed any German tank in all parameters: speed, acceleration ability, cross-country

ability, tank gun, ideal body shape, powerful diesel engine, and wide caterpillar tracks. In addition, unlike other tanks, the T-34 could be easily mass produced. Any large-scale automobile factory could be converted to produce this tank. Also, the production of the T-34 tank did not require a highly qualified workforce.[16]

Communist historians acknowledge the remarkable qualities of the T-34, but attempt to show the unpreparedness of the Soviet Union by stating that only 967 T-34s existed in June 1941 at the time of the German invasion. However, Suvorov shows that the Soviet Union had 1,400 T-34s at the time of invasion. During the second half of 1941, Soviet industry produced another 1,789 T-34 tanks. More importantly, in 1942 the Soviet Union produced 12,520 T-34 tanks, while in Germany the production of an analogous tank had not begun. The mass production of the T-34 provided the Soviet Union with major advantages over Germany in tank warfare during World War II.

The German equivalent of the T-34 was the Panther, which first appeared in the summer of 1943 during the tank battle at Kursk. The Panther had design flaws compared to the T-34. First, the T-34 had a diesel engine, while the Panther had a carburetor engine. A diesel engine is more economical and less susceptible to fire. Second, the Panther did not have the engine and transmission located in the rear of the tank. As a result, the Panther was too large and weighed 44.8 tons when it was supposed to weigh 30 tons. With its dimensions and weight, the Panther was easier to hit, had weaker armor protection, and could not compete with the T-34 in anything related to mobility. The T-34 surpassed the Panther in maneuverability, acceleration, and cross-country mobility, which are all parameters needed for offense.[17]

The Panther's main flaw, however, was that its complex design made it unfit for mass production. Only 5,976 tanks of this model were produced during the war. The Soviet Union produced nine T-34s for every Panther Germany produced. In fact, the Soviet Union produced more T34 tanks during World War II than tanks of all types were produced in Great Britain, Germany, and Japan put together.[18]

The Soviet Union was the first country in the world to produce a heavy tank. The first Soviet heavy tank, the T-35, was produced in series and entered the ranks of the troops in 1933. In 1941, no other tank outside the Soviet Union could even approximately compare with the heavy T-35. The T-35 surpassed every other tank outside the Soviet Union in terms of weapons, armor, and engine power. Moreover, the T-35

exerted much less pressure on the ground than the German tanks, which meant that it had greater mobility and did not sink in snow, mud, or soft ground. Despite being in a class by itself compared to all other foreign tanks, Western and Soviet historians declared the T-35 tank to be obsolete and did not mention it in statistics.[19]

The T-35 tank was replaced by the KV-1 and KV-2 heavy tanks, which weighed 47 and 52 tons, respectively. The KV was the first tank in the world with a true anti-shell armor. The wide caterpillar tracks of the KV allowed it to fight on almost any terrain in any weather condition, and its 600-horsepower diesel engine surpassed all foreign tanks in power, reliability, and economy. The tank guns of the KV far exceeded the capacity of any other tank produced outside the Soviet Union. The KV later turned into the IS-1 and then the IS-2, the most powerful tank of World War II.

Designers of the Soviet heavy tanks accomplished a technological feat: they almost doubled the thickness of the armor and installed a gun that was three times more powerful, while staying in the same weight class of the heavy tank. Stalin had a remarkable pair of tanks: the most powerful heavy tank by far in the world, and an excellent mass-produced medium T-34 tank. The availability of tens of thousands of T-34 tanks allowed them to be used anywhere. The availability of the heavy tanks supported the battle capabilities of the medium T-34 tanks. The crews of the T-34 could fight confidently, knowing that they had the support of a powerful KV or IS tank behind them.[20]

The German failure to design a good tank for mass production inevitably led to defeat in World War II. Gen. Heinz Guderian wrote after the war: "…The Russians would have won the war even without the help of their Western allies and would have occupied the whole of Europe. No power on earth could have stopped them."[21]

The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 resulted in the destruction or abandonment of thousands of Soviet tanks. The Communist historians explained this catastrophe very simply: the tanks were obsolete and therefore useless. Suvorov states that this explanation is nonsense. The "obsolete" Soviet medium T-28 and heavy T-35 tanks far surpassed every other tank outside of the Soviet Union. The Soviet T-34 tank is widely regarded as one of the best tanks of all time. The Soviet KV tank was the most powerful tank in the world during the first half of World War II. [22] How can tanks be obsolete when there is nothing else of comparable quality anywhere else in the world?

The Soviet Union also built an entire family of BT tanks—the BT-2, BT-5, BT-7, BT-7A, and BT-7M. BT stands for bystrokhodnyi (high-speed) tank. At the beginning of World War II, the Red Army had 6,456 BT tanks, as many as all other operational tanks in the rest of the world. The BT tanks were well designed, heavily armed for their times, had standard bullet-proof armor, and used a diesel engine which made the tanks far less vulnerable to fires. The first BTs had a speed of 69 mph; today most tanks would still be envious of such high speeds. Nevertheless, Soviet historians categorized these tanks among the obsolete models, so obsolete that until 1991 they were not even included in statistics.[23]

The disadvantage of BT tanks is that they could only be used in aggressive warfare on good roads such as the autobahn in Germany. The BT tank's most important characteristic—its speed—was achieved through the use of its wheels. The wheels of the BT tank made it impossible to use the BT tank successfully off the roads, or on the bad roads of the Soviet Union. In the battles fought on Soviet territory, thousands of BT tanks were abandoned. Historians say that Stalin's BT tanks were not ready for war. This statement is not true. The BT tank was ready for an offensive war on German territory, but not for a defensive war fought on its own territory.[24]

The Soviet Union also built an outstanding family of amphibious tanks: the T-37A, T-38, and T-40. By June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union had over 4,000 amphibious tanks in its arsenal. By comparison, to this day Germany has never built any amphibious tanks. Amphibious tanks are useful in offensive operations to cross rivers and seize bridges before the enemy can blow the bridges up when threatened with a takeover. If there are no remaining enemy bridges, amphibious tanks allow an army to cross the river and establish a bridgehead on the other side of the river. Amphibious tanks are useful in offensive operations; they are of little use in a defensive war.

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, it had a total of 3,350 tanks on the Eastern Front, all of them inferior to the Soviet tanks and none of them amphibious. Yet historians called the Soviet amphibious tanks obsolete.[25]

The Soviet amphibious tanks in 1941 became unnecessary and played no role in the war. But the question remains: Why were the amphibious tanks developed and built? Why did Stalin need 4,000 amphibious tanks which could not be used in a defensive war? The

obvious answer is that Stalin planned to use the amphibious tanks in a massive military invasion of Europe.

Soviet Aviation and Airborne Assault Troops

Stalin could have averted World War II by developing large quantities of the heavy high-speed, high-altitude TB-7 bomber. This bomber had a strong defense system consisting of 20-mm cannons and 12.7-mm heavy machine guns. The TB-7 was the most powerful bomber in the world; bombs of the largest caliber could fit in its large bomb compartment. However, the TB-7's most remarkable quality is that it could fly at altitudes between 10,000 and 12,000 meters, where it was untouchable by anti-aircraft artillery and could not be reached by the majority of existing fighters. A Soviet delegation headed by Molotov in the spring of [1942] was able to fly over Germany in a TB-7 without being detected by German anti-aircraft defenses.[26]

Stalin needed only to produce 1,000 TB-7 bombers and announce to selected countries that the Soviet Union would use these untouchable TB-7 bombers to destroy any country that attacked it. Suvorov says that Stalin signed the order to produce the TB-7 four times, and four times he canceled the order. Stalin was advised to direct all efforts of the Red Army not toward undermining the military and economic capabilities of the enemy, but toward taking the enemy over. The Red Army's objective was to destroy the opponent's armies. Soviet aviation was designed to open the road to Soviet armies and support their rapid advancement.[27]

If Stalin was preparing for a defensive war, he should have ordered his plane designers to create the best fighters in the world, capable of defending the skies over the Soviet Union. But fighters did not interest Stalin. Stalin ordered his fighter designer to drop all his work on the creation of a fighter and start developing a light bomber, named the Ivanov originally, and later the Su-2 in honor of its creator, P.O. Sukhoi.

The ideal combat plane Stalin developed was a light bomber designed to operate free of enemy resistance. Record-breaking characteristics were not required; Stalin demanded only simplicity, durability, and firepower. Stalin planned to create a plane that could be produced in numbers exceeding all warplanes of all types of all countries in the world. Literally, Stalin planned to build as many light bombers as there were small but mobile horsemen in the hordes of Genghis Khan.

Germany carried out a preemptive strike on Soviet air bases when it invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Hitler's preemptive strike did not permit the Su-2 to do the work it was primarily designed to do. The Su-2 was ineffective and not needed in a defensive war. Production of 100,000 to 150,000 Su-2 planes had been planned for conditions in which the Red Army would deliver the first attack, and nobody would hinder production of the plane. Hitler's invasion ruined Stalin's plan. Production of the Su-2 was stopped, but the Soviet Union produced tens of thousands of planes later in the war that were much more complex in terms of production than the Su-2.[28]

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union it could only send 2,510 airplanes, including many outdated planes and assorted aircraft used for transport, communications, and medical purposes. The Soviet Union had 2,769 of the newest models Il-2, Pe-2, MiG-3, Yak-1, and LaGG-3. The Soviet Union also had seven additional new types of planes: the Ar2, Er-2, Su-2, Pe-8, Yak-2, Yak-4, and Il-4. Aside from the 12 newest models, the Soviet Union also had the "obsolete" TB-3 and SB bombers, and the I-16 and I-153 fighters.

The Soviet air force exceeded that of Germany both in plane quantity and plane quality at the start of the war. Suvorov asks: Why then in the first stage of the war did the Soviet air force lose air superiority from day one? The answer is that the majority of Soviet pilots, including fighter pilots, were not taught dogfighting. Soviet aviation was designed to conduct one grandiose, sudden, aggressive operation to crush the enemy's air force on the ground in one raid and obtain air superiority. Hitler's preemptive strike prevented Soviet aviation from accomplishing its planned aggressive operations of unheard-of dimensions.[29]

Airborne assault troops were also part of Stalin's plans. According to the official Communist Party newspaper, Pravda, on Aug. 18, 1940, the Soviet Union had more than 1 million trained parachutists at the beginning of the war. Airborne assault troops can only be used in the course of offensive operations and only in conjunction with regular troops advancing against the enemy. In light of declassified documents, it is clear that Pravda lowered the number of Russian paratroopers to 1 million to calm fears of Soviet aggression. The actual number of trained parachutists in the Soviet Union at the beginning of the war was arguably closer to 2 million. Never before had the world seen such large-scale preparations for offensive war.[30]

The Red Army needed an air armada of transport planes and gliders to deliver hundreds of thousands of paratroopers. Soviet factories started the mass production of cargo gliders beginning in the spring of 1941. On April 23, 1941, Stalin and Molotov signed an order to accelerate the production of an 11-seat glider with a deadline of May 15, 1941, and of a 20-seat glider with a deadline of July 1, 1941. The gliders that were produced in the spring of 1941 had to be used by the latest in the early fall of 1941. Gliders had light and fragile bodies and wings and could not be parked outdoors. Keeping a huge cargo glider outdoors during fall winds and rains would harm it beyond repair. Since all available hangars were already full with previously produced gliders, the mass production of gliders in the spring of 1941 meant that they had to be used either in the summer of 1941 or early fall at the latest.[31]

Cargo warplanes are used to deliver assault forces with parachutists to the enemy's rear. Soviet war-transport aviation used the American Douglas DC-3, which was considered to be the best cargo plane in the world at the start of World War II, as its primary cargo plane. In 1938, the U.S. government sold to Stalin the production license and the necessary amount of the most complex equipment for the DC-3's production. The Soviet Union also bought 20 DC-3s from the United States before the war. In 1939, the Soviet Union produced six identical DC-3 aircraft; in 1940, it produced 51 DC-3 aircraft; and in 1941, it produced 237 DC-3 aircraft. During the entire war 2,419 DC-3s or equivalent planes were produced in Soviet factories.[32]

The Soviet gliders and transport planes would be easy prey for enemy fighters if the Soviet Union did not secure complete air superiority. The Red Army had to begin the war with a massive air attack and invasion against the enemy's air bases. Tens of thousands of paratroopers could then be dropped to seize and control key bases and strategic sites. Any other scenario was not viable. Instead, it was Hitler who carried out a preemptive strike, and Stalin's strategy to strike the first blow was aborted. The Soviet Union's carefully designed plan to mount a massive air offensive followed by an assault of airborne troops had to be abandoned in the desperate rush to fight a defensive war.[33] Suvorov discusses what happened to the Soviet airborne forces that could no longer be used in an offensive war. Ten air assault corps, approximately 100,000 to 150,000 men, had been originally sent to the trenches to help stop the German troops. The rest of the over 1 million paratroopers were kept in reserve and used as needed as regular infantry soldiers. These reserves were used to help stop German advances in the

direction of the Caucasus, at Stalingrad, in the violent battle at Kursk, and in other crisis situations during the war.[34]

Soviet Preparations for Offensive War

In the years 1937-1941, the Soviet army grew five-fold, from 1.1 million to 5.5 million.[35] An additional 5.3 million people joined the ranks of the Red Army within one week of the beginning of the war. A minimum of 34.5 million people were used by the Red Army during the war.[36] This huge increase in the size of the Soviet army was accomplished primarily by ratification of the universal military draft in the Soviet Union on Sept. 1, 1939. According to the new law, the draft age was reduced from 21 to 19, and in some categories to 18. This new law also allowed for the preparation of 18 million reservists, so that the Soviet Union continued to fill the ranks of the Red Army with many millions of soldiers as the war progressed.[37]

Several age groups were drafted into the Red Army at the same time; in essence, all of the young men in the country. The duration of army service for the majority of the draftees was two years, so the Soviet Union had to enter a major war within two years. If war did not start by then, all of the young people would have to go home on Sept. 1, 1941, and then there would be almost nobody left to draft. It is extremely difficult to maintain an army of this size without a war; the army does not produce anything and consumes everything produced by the country. Stalin knew when he established the draft that in two years, in the summer of 1941, the Soviet Union must enter into a major war.[38]

On Jan. 11, 1939, in preparation for war the Soviet Union created four new People's Commissariats: one for the shipbuilding industry, one for weapons, one for the aviation industry, and one for ammunition. The Shipbuilding Commissariat undertook strictly military projects from the moment of its founding. Also, on May 25, 1940, the following numbers of civilian ships were handed over to the military: 74 to the Baltic fleet, 76 to the Black Sea fleet, 65 to the North Fleet, and 101 to the Pacific fleet. By June 22, 1941, the Soviet Union also possessed 218 submarines in its ranks and 91 more in shipyards, all of which matched up to the best world standards.[39]

Stalin's more than 200 submarines and the rest of his navy were ineffective at the start of the war because it was an attack fleet. Stalin's

navy was built for aggressive war and could not be used effectively in a defensive war. Entirely different ships with entirely different characteristics are needed for defense: submarine hunters, picket boats, minesweepers, and net-layers. The armament of the Soviet ships was also designed exclusively for participation in a war of aggression. While armed with powerful artillery, mine, and torpedo equipment, Soviet ships had quite weak anti-aircraft armament and defenses.

Soviet generals had planned to begin the war with a crushing surprise attack against the enemy's air bases that annihilated his aviation. When Germany attacked first, the Soviet navy's lack of anti-aircraft defenses was a major liability. The Soviet war effort was also hurt by the fact that all of the navy's reserves of shells, mines, torpedoes, and ship fuel had been transported to the German borders and were quickly seized by the Germans when they invaded the Soviet Union.[40]

The Ammunition Commissariat was created as a separate ministry to take care exclusively of the production of ammunition. This ministry had to determine where to locate all of the new factories that would be producing shells, gunpowder, cartridges, missiles, and other weapons. If Stalin had planned to conduct a defensive war, the new ammunition factories would have been built either behind the Volga River or even farther inland in the Ural Mountains. But no defensive options were ever discussed. Since Stalin planned to conduct an offensive operation into a war-devastated and weakened Europe, all of the new ammunition factories were built near the western border regions of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union lost almost all industry capable of producing new ammunition at the beginning of the war. From August to November 1941, German troops took over 303 Soviet ammunition factories as well as mobilization reserves of valuable raw materials located in those factories. These factories produced 85% of all output from the Ammunition Commissariat. All of these resources went to Germany and were used against the Red Army. The Red Army also lost an unthinkable amount of artillery shells in the border regions of the Soviet Union at the start of the war. However, Stalin's prewar potential was so great that he was able to rebuild his ammunition factories behind the Volga River and in the Urals, and produce all of the ammunition needed to defeat the German army.[41]

The seizure of Stalin's supplies was a tremendous benefit for Germany, but Hitler needed to shift Germany's own industry to a wartime

regime. Hitler waited until January 1942 before he made the decision to gradually begin the shift of industry from a peacetime to a wartime regime. Stalin, on the other hand, began setting Soviet industry on a wartime regime back in January 1939. Despite losing 85% of the ammunition of the Ammunition Commissariat, the Red Army used 427 million shells and artillery mines and 17 billion cartridges during the war. To this one can add innumerable hand grenades, land mines, and air bombs. Imagine what the outcome of World War II would have been if Stalin had been able to use 100% of his ammunition arsenal.[42]

In the summer of 1940, Stalin brought Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet Union, and concentrated his forces in that region on the border of Eastern Prussia. The occupation of these Baltic countries by the Red Army made sense only if there were plans for an aggressive war against Germany. The Red Army transferred its air bases to the very front edge of the German border. From the air bases in Lithuania the Soviet air force could support the advance of Soviet troops to Berlin. The Soviet navy also transferred primary forces and reserves to naval bases established in Tallinn, Riga, and Liepaja. Since it was a short distance from Liepaja to the routes taken by German vessels carrying ore, nickel, and wood to Germany, a strike from this area could be sudden and devastating.[43]

The Soviet Union annexed Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in 1940. From Bessarabia the Soviet air force could keep the Romanian oil industry, which was the main supplier of oil to Germany, under constant threat. Northern Bukovina was needed because it had a railroad of strategic importance that had a narrow gauge track which enabled it to be used by railroad cars from all over Europe. The Soviet Union used a broad gauge track. Soviet locomotives and trains could therefore not be used on the narrow gauge tracks of Central and Western Europe. In a Soviet invasion of Europe, Stalin would need many locomotives and trains with a narrow gauge to supply his troops that were quickly moving westward.

During the course of the Bessarabia campaign, the Soviet Union captured 141 locomotives, 1,866 covered train cars, 325 half-covered train cars, 45 platforms, 19 cisterns, 31 passenger cars, and two luggage cars. But this was not enough for Stalin. At the Soviet-Romanian talks in July 1940, Soviet representatives demanded that Romania return all captured mobile railroad units.

On July 31, 1940, Romania agreed to transfer 175 locomotives and 4,375 cars to the Soviet Union by Aug. 25, 1940. None of these trains would have been needed in a defensive war. Stalin needed these trains seized in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in an offensive war designed to take over all of Europe.[44]

In the summer of 1941, the Red Army began using the new multiple-launcher rocket weapons BM-8 and BM-13. These unusual weapons were called "Stalin's Pipe Organs" or "Katyusha." In August 1941, the Red Army added the BM-8-36 multiple-launcher rocket artillery system, and in the summer of 1942, the BM-8-48 rocket artillery system was added. A salvo from one BM-13 was 16 rocket-propelled rounds of 132mm caliber, while a salvo from the BM-8 was 36 rocket-propelled rounds of 82-mm caliber. One battery consisted of four to six BM-8s or BM-13s. Usually one target was fired upon by a group of batteries or regiments. Hundreds or even thousands of missiles covered a huge territory almost simultaneously, creating an avalanche of fire accompanied by a wild roar and noise. The devastating psychological impact of these terrible weapons was a highly unpleasant memory for any German soldier who was on the Eastern Front.[45]

Despite losses sustained in the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the Red Army continued to expand its use of the multiple-launcher rocket weapons BM-8 and BM-13 during the war. On June 1, 1941, the Red Army had seven BM-13 rocket launcher vehicles. By Sept. 1, 1941, the Red Army had 49 of these weapons. By Oct. 1, 1941, the Red Army had 406 BM-8s and BM-13s. The count would eventually mount into the thousands, and this weapon became a weapon of mass destruction. The Soviet Union managed to quickly supply its army with the new system of multiple-launcher rocket weapons despite heavy losses in its industrial and raw material bases.[46]

The Soviet Union in 1941 was preparing for an offensive war against Europe. In the first half of June 1941, the Soviet 9th Army was the most powerful army in the world. The 9th Army appeared on the Romanian border on June 14, 1941, in the exact place where a year ago it had "liberated" Bessarabia. If the Soviet 9th Army had been allowed to attack Romania, Germany's main source of oil would have been lost and Germany would have been defeated. Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union prevented this from happening. The unjustified concentration of Soviet troops on Romanian borders presented a clear danger to Germany, and was a major reason for the German invasion of the Soviet Union.[47]

On May 5, 1941, Stalin made it clear to his generals that the Soviet Union would be the aggressor in a war with Germany. At a banquet a Soviet general toasted Stalin's peaceful foreign policy. Stalin intervened:

Allow me to make a correction. A peaceful foreign policy secured peace in our country. A peaceful foreign policy is a good thing. For a while, we drew a line of defenses until we rearmed our army [and] supplied it with modern means of combat. Now, when our army has been rebuilt, our technology modernized, [now that we are] strong [enough] for combat, now we must shift from defense to offense. In conducting the defense of our country, we are compelled to act in an aggressive manner. From defense we have to shift to a military policy of offense. It is indispensable that we reform our training, our propaganda, our press to a mindset of offense. The Red Army is a modern army, and the modern army is an army of offense.

The general who made the toast to Stalin's peaceful foreign policy was discharged a few days after the banquet.[48]

On June 13, 1941, TASS broadcast that "Germany was following the conditions of the Soviet-German pact as flawlessly as the Soviet Union," and that rumors of an impending German attack on the USSR "were clumsily fabricated propaganda by the enemies of Germany and the USSR, interested in broadening and prolonging the war." The TASS announcement also stated, "Rumors that the USSR is preparing for war against Germany are false and provocative…." However, the reality is that Soviet troops were already traveling to the western border. June 13, 1941, marked the beginning of the biggest organized movement of troops, arms, ammunition, and other military supplies in history.

For example, the First Strategic Echelon of the Red Army had 170 tank, motorized, cavalry, and rifle divisions. Fifty-six of them were already located right on the border and could not move any farther ahead. All of the remaining 114 divisions began to move toward the border in the wake of the reassuring TASS announcement on June 13, 1941.

This massive troop movement could not have been defensive. Troops preparing for defense dig themselves into the ground, close off roads, establish barbwire barriers, dig anti-tank trenches, and prepare covers behind the barricades. The Red Army did none of these things. Instead, the additional Soviet divisions began to hide in the border forests

just like the German troops preparing for invasion. The TASS announcement was made solely in an attempt to falsely allay German fears of a pending Soviet invasion of Europe.[49]

Suvorov also dismisses claims that the Soviet Union did not have qualified military leaders in 1941. Stalin did conduct a purge of the military from 1937-1938, but reports that 40,000 military commanders were executed are an exaggeration. Soviet documents show that 1,654 military commanders were either executed or died in prison while awaiting trial during 1937-1938. Since the officer corps of the Red Army in February 1937 numbered 206,000, less than 1% of the Soviet Union's officers died in Stalin's purge. Soviet military commanders in 1941 were well-qualified to lead Stalin's war of aggression against Europe.[50]

Suvorov also mentions that Soviet soldiers and officers were issued Russian-German and Russian-Romanian phrase books as part of their preparations for an invasion of Europe. Thousands of Soviet troops did not think to get rid of this compromising evidence when they were captured in the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The Russian-German phrase books were composed very simply: a question in Russian, followed by the same question in German written in Russian letters, then in German in Latin letters. If the Soviet soldier did not know how to pronounce the needed German phrase, he could point to the corresponding lines in the book and the Germans could read the lines themselves. The phrases indicated that the Soviets were planning to conduct an offensive war in Europe. For example, some phrases asked: "Where is the burgermeister? Is there an observation point on the steeple?" There were no burgermeisters or steeples in the Soviet Union. These questions are relevant only if the Soviet soldiers were in Germany. Here are other examples: "Where is the fuel? Where is the garage? Where are the stores? Where is the water? Gather and bring here [so many] horses [farm animals], we will pay!" These questions and phrases would not be relevant on Soviet soil. Other revealing phrases are the following: "You do not need to be afraid. The Red Army will come soon!" These phrases are also not relevant for a war conducted on Soviet soil.[51]

Soviet Military Operations Prior to June 22, 1941

The Soviet Union engaged in a number of military operations prior to Germany's invasion on June 22, 1941. All of these operations showed substantial military strength that the Soviet Union was able to hide from most of the world.

In the beginning of May 1939, an armed conflict occurred between Soviet and Japanese troops on the border between Mongolia and China near the river Khalkhin-Gol. The Soviet Union controlled Mongolia. Japan occupied the adjoining Chinese territory. Nobody declared war, but the conflict escalated into battles fought with the use of aviation, artillery, and tanks. On June 1, 1939, the Soviet Union officially declared, "We will defend the borders of the Mongolian People's Republic as we defend our own." The next day Gen. Zhukov flew from Moscow to Mongolia to take command of the Soviet and Mongolian troops.[52]

Stalin armed Soviet troops in Mongolia with the most modern weapons, including the BT-5 and BT-7 tanks all armed with the most powerful tank cannon of that time. Soviet armored automobiles were also armed with the same powerful cannon. Some of the best Soviet pilots were sent to Mongolia and established air superiority above the theater of operations. The Red Army used long-range bombers, and for the first time I-16 fighters successfully used air-to-air RS-82 rocket missiles. The Red Army also had the newest and best artillery, howitzers, and mortars in the world.[53]

During the course of endless exhausting battles, Zhukov decided to end the conflict with a sudden and crushing defeat of the Japanese army. On Aug. 20, 1939, at 5:45 AM, 153 Soviet bombers under the cover of a corresponding number of fighters carried out a surprise raid over Japanese air bases and command posts. An extremely intense and powerful artillery barrage joined in immediately and lasted almost three hours. Soviet aviation carried out a second raid during the course of the artillery action, and at 9:00 AM Soviet tank units broke through Japanese defenses. Zhukov had conducted a classic encirclement operation. On the fourth day of the attack, the circle drawn around Japanese troops was tightened and the rout of the Japanese army began. There had never been such a crushing military defeat in all of Japanese history.[54]

The Soviet operation at Khalkhin-Gol, which is sometimes referred to as the Nomonhan Incident, was brilliant in its planning and execution. It totally surprised the Japanese—during the first hour and a half of battle, the Japanese artillery did not fire a single shot and not a single Japanese plane rose into the air. Khalkhin-Gol was the first blitzkrieg of the 20th century. It was the first time in human history that large masses of tanks were used correctly to strike in depth, and it was a prime example of the use of unseen concentration of artillery in tight areas of the front. The defeat of the Japanese army on the Khalkhin-Gol

thwarted Japanese aggression in the direction of Mongolia and the Soviet Union. In the fall of 1941, during months critical for the Soviet Union, the Japanese remembered Khalkhin-Gol and did not dare attack the Soviet Union.[55]

For obvious reasons, the Japanese did not report their defeat in Mongolia to the world. Since there were no international observers and journalists in Mongolia, few people knew about the operation at the time. Stalin also ordered silence concerning the impressive Soviet defeat of the Japanese army. Stalin ordered silence because he was preparing the same sort of defeat on a much grander scale for all of Europe. Stalin's interest lay in concealing the might of the Red Army, and making the world believe that the Soviet army was not able to conduct modern warfare. Stalin wanted to catch Hitler and the rest of Europe off-guard and not scare them.[56]

On Aug. 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression agreement called the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. This agreement guaranteed that Hitler would not have to fight the Soviet Union if Germany invaded Poland. A secret agreement also discussed the division of Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union in the event of war.[57]

Hitler attacked Poland on Sept. 1, 1939, and Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on Sept. 3, 1939. The Soviet Union waited until Sept. 17, 1939, to attack Poland from the east. Stalin's troops committed similar or worse atrocities in Poland than Germany, but Great Britain and France did not declare war on the Soviet Union. The fault for beginning the war fell upon Germany, and world opinion considered the Soviet Union to be innocent in starting the war.

Suvorov states that even the German blitzkrieg in Poland failed. On Sept. 15, 1939, two weeks after the start of World War II, the activity of the German air force dropped substantially, and the German army was almost completely out of fuel. The Soviet army attacked Poland on Sept. 17, 1939, to save the German blitzkrieg and allow the partition of Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union.[58]

Another reason the Soviets waited until Sept. 17, 1939, to invade Poland is that the ceasefire with Japan ending the Nomonhan Incident was not signed until Sept. 15, 1939. The Soviets wanted to ensure that they no longer had to fight Japan before they invaded Poland.[59]

In October 1939, Stalin's diplomats continued the Soviet Union's territorial aggression by demanding the cession of the Karelian Isthmus from Finland in exchange for a territory twice the size of the isthmus. Stalin's demands were rejected because the Karelian Isthmus is a direct gateway to the capital of Finland. The geographical disposition of Finland is such that any aggression against Finland from the Soviet Union could come only through the Karelian Isthmus. For this reason, starting in 1918, Finland began an extensive buildup of defensive fortifications and obstructions on the Karelian Isthmus known as the Mannerheim Line. Finland spent practically all of her military budget for the 10 years preceding the war on the completion of the Mannerheim Line. Stalin's diplomats in essence had demanded that Finland hand over to the Red Army all of her heavily fortified defenses in exchange for swampland and marshy woods no one needed.[60]

Stalin issued an order to crush Finland when Stalin's demands were rejected. After a brief but intense artillery softening-up, the Red Army crossed the Finnish border on Nov. 30, 1939. The Red Army first encountered a security pale full of traps, barricades, obstacles, and minefields. The entire space was filled with granite boulders, concrete blocks, forest blockages, scarps and counterscarps, anti-tank trenches, and bridges wired with explosives ready to be blown up by the Finnish border patrol. Finnish snipers and light mobile squads were fully active and operating to the best of their capacity. The Red Army took two weeks and suffered heavy casualties before it passed through the security pale.

After overcoming the security pale, the Red Army reached Finland's main line of defense—the Mannerheim Line. The line was a brilliantly camouflaged defense structure, well integrated into the surroundings, and stretching up to 30 kilometers in depth. In addition to innumerable minefields and anti-tank trenches, the Mannerheim Line contained 2,311 concrete, ironclad, and wooden defense structures, as well as granite boulders and hundreds of rows of thick barbwire on metal stakes connected to mines. The fighting on the Mannerheim Line was especially tenacious. The Red Army finally broke through the Mannerheim Line on March 12, 1940, after suffering colossal casualties: 126,875 soldiers and officers killed, 188,671 wounded, 58,370 ill, and 17,867 frostbitten. [61]

All military experts prior to Finland's war with the Soviet Union had declared that breaking through the Mannerheim Line could not be done by any army. The Red Army had done the impossible. Furthermore,

the Red Army broke through the Mannerheim Line impromptu in winter without any preparation for such limiting conditions. The military experts of the West should have recognized the amazing warfare capabilities of the Red Army. If the Red Army could break through the Mannerheim Line in the winter, then it was capable of crushing Europe and whoever else got in its way. Instead, military experts of the West declared the Red Army to be unfit and unprepared for war.[62]

Only three months after the Soviet Union ended military operations in Finland, the three Baltic nations, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, surrendered to Stalin and became republics of the Soviet Union. The governments and military leadership of these three Baltic countries had carefully watched the war in Finland. They correctly concluded that the Red Army could not be stopped by any number of casualties, and that resistance to the Soviet Union was futile. Therefore, the three Baltic nations surrendered without firing a shot. With the addition of these three neutral countries, the Soviet Union advanced its borders to the west and made it easier for the Soviet Union to conduct an offensive operation against Europe.[63]

Stalin also issued an ultimatum to the government of Romania to give up Bessarabia. Realizing that resistance was futile, Romania handed over both Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union without even organizing lengthy talks.64 Thus, within less than a year, the Soviet Union destroyed a Japanese army in Mongolia, took over the eastern part of Poland by military force, conducted an extremely difficult and successful invasion of Finland, forced the Baltic nations of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia to join the Soviet Union against their will, and took possession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from Romania.

These Soviet military conquests and ultimatums expanded the Soviet Union's territory by 426,000 square kilometers, approximately equal to the surface area of the German Reich in 1919.65 These Soviet military operations prove that the Soviet Union was extremely powerful and aggressive. The Soviet Union was well-positioned to launch a massive offensive against all of Europe after these military conquests.

Stalin Removes Defensive Barriers; Plans Offensive War

After the division of Poland by the Soviet Union and Germany, Soviet troops could have created a powerful barrier on the new Soviet-

German border. In 1939 conditions for defense along the Soviet-German border were highly favorable: forests, rivers, swamps, few roads, and lots of time. However, instead of making the area impassable, it was quickly made more penetrable. The Red Army tore down previously existing fortifications and buried them under mounds of ground. The Soviet Union also stopped producing anti-tank and anti-aircraft cannon. The Soviet Union had huge land mine production that could have been used for defense, but after the new borders with Germany were established this production was curbed.[66]

The Red Army also dismantled the security pale created earlier on the old western borders, and failed to create a new security pale on the Polish territory annexed to the Soviet Union. The Red Army in Finland learned the hard way that a security pale could ease the position of the defense and complicate the position of the aggressor. All Soviet commanders expressed their awe at the Finnish line of defense. The Soviet Union had to expend a huge amount of time, strength, resources, and blood to cross the Finnish security pale. However, the Soviet Union dismantled its security pale in 1940 because it was not interested in conducting a defensive war.[67]

The Soviet Union also constructed new railroads and railroad bridges in the western border regions. Almost all railroad troops were concentrated in the western border regions. The railroad troops worked intensively to modernize old railroads and build new ones right up to the border. Simultaneously with the construction of railroads, automobile roads were built in the western regions. The Red Army was building railroads and roads from east to west, which is usually done when preparing for advance, for a quick transfer of reserves, and for further supplying the troops after they crossed the borders. All of this work was designed for offense and hurt the Soviet Union in a defensive war. When Germany attacked the Soviet Union, German troops used the roads, bridges, supplies, rails, and sectional bridges constructed by the Soviets in the western regions to aid their advance into Soviet territory.[68]

The Soviet Union also destroyed its partisan movement in the late 1930s. Soviet leaders knew that partisan tactics could win a war against any aggressor. With the largest territory of any country in the world, Soviet territory naturally facilitated partisan warfare. In the 1920s, Stalin created light mobile units and stationed them in the woods in the event of a German attack. These partisan units were comprised only of commanders, organizers, and specialists that acted as a nucleus. At the

very beginning of a war, each peacetime partisan unit would expand into a powerful formation numbering thousands of people.[69]

The Soviet peacetime partisan groups had secret bases created in impenetrable forests and islets amid the swamps. In an emergency, the partisans could easily disappear from any attackers into the mined forests and swamps, which were impassable to the enemy. Soviet partisan units were formed in the Soviet security pale, where during retreat of Soviet troops all bridges would be blown up, tunnels buried, and railroads and communication channels destroyed. The partisan groups were trained to prevent the enemy from restoring the destroyed infrastructure. In addition, some partisans were trained for undercover activities. These partisans did not retreat to the forests, but stayed in the cities and towns with the task of "gaining the trust of the enemy" and "offering him assistance."

In the Soviet Union's invasion of Finland, the Red Army encountered the Mannerheim Line, a security pale before it, and light squads of partisan fighters within. The light ski units of Finnish partisans carried out sudden strikes and then immediately disappeared into the forests. The Red Army suffered tremendous casualties from these strikes. All of the Red Army's modern technology was useless in a fight against an enemy that evaded open battle.

However, having learned a cruel lesson in Finland, Stalin did not change his mind and create partisan units in the western regions of the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union's industrial and military might grew, Stalin planned to fight enemies on their soil rather than on Soviet land. In the second half of the 1930s, defense systems and partisan units became unnecessary for the Soviet Union.[70] Stalin reestablished partisan units only after Germany had invaded the Soviet Union.

From 1926 to 1937, the Soviet Union constructed 13 fortified regions along its western borders known unofficially as "the Stalin Line." There were many differences between the Soviet Stalin Line and the French Maginot Line. Unlike the French Maginot Line, the Stalin Line was built in secrecy and not publicized. The Stalin Line was much deeper and was built not only to stop infantry, but mostly to stop tanks. The Soviets also used huge quantities of steel and granite boulders in addition to concrete. The Stalin Line was built from the Baltic Sea in the north to the Black Sea in the south and could not be bypassed. Finally, unlike the Maginot Line, the Stalin Line was not built at the very border, but farther into Soviet territory.[71]

The 13 fortified regions on the Stalin Line were built for defense and came at a tremendous cost in effort and money. Each fortified region was also a military formation that could independently conduct military operations during a long period of time and in isolated conditions. In 1938 it was decided to strengthen all 13 regions by building heavy artillery installations within them. The Soviet Union also started construction of eight more fortified regions. Then, when the MolotovRibbentrop Pact created a common border between Germany and the Soviet Union, Stalin ordered further construction of the fortified regions to stop. The existing fortified regions were disarmed, and everything connected with defense was dismantled and destroyed.[72]

The construction of a new line of fortified regions began during the summer of 1940 on the new Soviet-German border. These new regions were unofficially referred to as the Molotov Line, but they were never finished. The defense buildup on the new borders proceeded very slowly, while the destruction of the Stalin Line was surprisingly fast. When Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, the Molotov Line was not yet built. Soviet generals and marshals after Stalin's death unanimously expressed their anger. They asked: How could Stalin liquidate and disarm the fortified regions on the old borders without building the necessary defenses on the new western borders? The answer is that Stalin was not planning to fight on his territory; Stalin was planning an offensive war against all of Europe.[73]

Another defense system of the Soviet Union was the Dnepr military flotilla. All Dnepr river bridges were mined before 1939 and could be thoroughly demolished so that nothing would be left to restore. The Dnepr military flotilla was created in the early 1930s to prevent the establishment and crossing of temporary bridges across the river. The flotilla included 120 warships and motorboats, as well as its own air force with shoreline and air defense batteries. The Dnepr flotilla could securely close off the roads to the industrial regions in the south of Ukraine and to the Black Sea bases of the Soviet navy. A German attack could be stopped on the Dnepr line, or at least held up for several months. However, when Hitler attacked France, Stalin ordered the removal of mines from the Dnepr river bridges and disbanded the military flotilla. The Dnepr flotilla could only be used in a defensive war on Soviet territory, and Stalin did not believe he needed it.[74]

Stalin divided the defensive Dnepr flotilla into two flotillas: the Danube flotilla and the Pinsk flotilla. The Danube flotilla would be useless

in a defensive war. In an offensive war, however, the Danube flotilla could be deadly for Germany. It only had to sail 300 or 400 kilometers up the river to the strategically important bridge at Chernavoda, where it could disrupt the petroleum supply from Ploiesti to the port of Constanza. The entire German war machine could be stopped simply because German tanks, planes, and warships would be out of fuel. However, when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, the Danube flotilla found itself cut off from Soviet troops without the possibility of retreat. Most of its ships had to be sunk, while gigantic supplies were either destroyed or left behind.[75]

The Pinsk flotilla would also be difficult to use for defense. The Pinsk flotilla had 66 river warships and cutters, a squadron of airplanes, a company of marines, and other units. In the defensive war of 1941, the Soviets had to blow up and abandon all of the ships of the Pinsk flotilla. However, in a war of aggression, the Pinsk flotilla could have used the newly constructed canal from Pinsk to Kobrin, which would then allow its ships to reach the Vistula basin and head further west to the German rivers. In 1945, a Soviet admiral reached Berlin with his flotilla. [76]

The records of a conference of the Soviet High Command held in Moscow from Dec. 23, 1940, through the evening of Dec. 31, 1940, also indicate that the Soviet Union was planning a massive offensive against Europe. This extremely secret meeting was attended by 274 of the highest-ranking leaders of the Red Army. Most of the speakers discussed the importance of the new tactics of sudden surprise attack. Defense at the primary locations of attack was not foreseen, even theoretically. The Soviet military leaders made it clear at the conference that they had no established contemporary defense theory. Soviet military leaders also did not work on questions of defense after the conference. The goal of the Red Army was to conduct grandiose, sudden, offensive operations that overwhelmed the enemy on its own territory.[77]

During the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, Yakov Iosifovich Dzhugashvili, the son of Stalin, was taken prisoner by the Germans. Stalin's son was searched and questioned. A letter dated June 11, 1941, was found in his pockets from another officer stating: "I am at the training camps. I would like to be home by fall, but the planned walk to Berlin might hinder this." German intelligence officers asked Yakov Dzhugashvili to clarify the statement about the "planned walk to Berlin." Stalin's son read the letter and quietly muttered: "Damn it!" Obviously,

the letter indicates that Soviet forces were planning to invade Germany later that year.[78]

German intelligence officers also asked Stalin's son why the Soviet artillery, which had the best cannon and howitzers in the world, fired so poorly. Stalin's son truthfully answered: "The maps let the Red Army down, because the war, contrary to expectations, unfolded to the east of the state border." The Soviet maps were of territories in which the Red Army planned to advance, and were useless for defending the country. Storages of topographic maps located unreasonably close to the border were either destroyed by the advancing German army or by the retreating Soviet forces. In 1941, the Red Army fought without maps, and the Soviet artillery could not fire accurately without maps.[79]

Every Soviet commander, starting with regiment level and higher, had in his safe a so-called "Red Packet," which contained the plans for war. When Germany invaded, the commanders opened their "Red Packets," but they did not find in them anything useful for defense. The Red Army had neither prepared for defense nor conducted any training in defensive operations. The defensive operations of the Red Army in the summer of 1941 were pure improvisation.[80]

The actions of the Red Army during the first days of the war speak best about Soviet intentions to conduct an offensive war. Up until June 30, 1941, Gen. Zhukov insisted on advance and demanded that commanders of Soviet forces aimed at Romania and Hungary exclusively attack. Zhukov stopped the attack only when he and his colleagues concluded that his armies could no longer advance. On June 22, 1941, several other Soviet commanders also followed prewar plans without awaiting orders from Moscow, and attacked the following regions: the Rava-Russkaya region, Tilzit in Eastern Prussia, and the Polish city of Suvalki.

The actions of the Soviet fleet during the first days of the war also show with sufficient clarity its plans for offense. On June 22, 1941, the submarines of the Baltic Fleet sailed toward the shores of Germany with the objective of sinking all enemy ships and vessels according to the rules of unrestricted warfare. No exceptions were made, not even for medical vessels sailing under the Red Cross flag. Soviet submarines from the Black Sea Fleet immediately sailed into the sea toward the shores of Romania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. On June 25 and 26, 1941, the Black Sea fleet's cruisers carried out an intensive artillery raid in the vicinity of the Romanian port of Constanta. At the same time, the Danube military flotilla began an assault in the Danube river delta. The garrison of the Soviet

naval base Hanko also conducted intensive assault operations during the beginning of the war, taking over 19 Finnish islands in the course of several days.[81]

The Soviet air force also acted in an aggressive manner at the start of the war. On June 25, 1941, despite losses suffered during the first days of the war, Soviet air forces bombed all known air fields of the southern part of Finland. On June 23, 1941, acting according to plans, the Soviet long-range bomber air force carried out a massive attack against military targets in Koenigsberg and Danzig. Soviet long-range bombers also began to bomb the Ploiesti oil fields in Romania on June 26, 1941. After a few days of raids, the amount of oil Germany obtained in Romania was reduced almost in half. If Hitler had not attacked first, the Soviet air force would have been much more dangerous, and could have totally paralyzed the entire German war effort through its strikes against the oil-producing regions.[82]

Further evidence that the Soviet Union was planning to attack Germany is provided by Andrei Vlasov, a Soviet general who had been captured by the Germans. During a conversation in 1942 with SS Gen. Richard Hildebrandt, Vlasov was asked if and when Stalin had intended to attack Germany. Hildebrandt later stated: "Vlasov responded by saying that the attack was planned for August-September 1941. The Russians had been preparing the attack since the beginning of the year, which took quite a while because of the poor Russian railroad network. Hitler had sized up the situation entirely correctly, and had struck directly into the Russian buildup. This, said Vlasov, is the reason for the tremendous initial German successes."[83]

Stalin's Role in Elevating Hitler to Power & Creating War

Suvorov states that Stalin paved the way for Adolf Hitler to come to power. Stalin read Mein Kampf and realized that Hitler's main goal was to liberate Germany from the chains of the Versailles Treaty. Stalin understood that if Hitler tried to free Germany from the Versailles Treaty, both France and Great Britain would interfere, because France imposed the treaty in alliance with Great Britain. Stalin's tactic relied on eliminating one enemy with the hands of another. If Germany entered into a war with Great Britain and France, other countries would be pulled into the war and great destruction would follow. The Soviet Union could then invade Europe and easily take over the entire continent.[84]

In 1925 Stalin declared that World War II was inevitable. Stalin's goal was not to start the war or be a participant at the start of the war, but to enter the war last and tip the scale in the Soviet Union's favor. Stalin thought that Hitler, who made enemies with the French and the Jews, would be the perfect vehicle to start a war in Europe. In the German parliamentary elections of Nov. 6, 1932, neither Hitler's party (NSDAP), the Social Democrats, or the Communist Party obtained a majority of the votes. At the end of 1932, the NSDAP was out of money and facing bankruptcy. It looked as if Hitler's time would be up, and that he would be finished as a politician. However, Stalin ordered the German Communist Party to go against the Social Democrats and open the way for Hitler to take power in Germany.[85]

Suvorov agrees with Hitler that the Versailles Treaty was extremely unfair and degrading to Germany. The Versailles Treaty demanded from Germany virtually complete disarmament. The number of armed forces was fixed at 100,000, all military drafts were abolished in Germany, the General Staff and all academies were disbanded, and the creation of a new General Staff and academies were not allowed by the treaty. Germany lost the right to have heavy artillery, tanks, and aviation (including blimps). The submarine fleet was completely abolished, and the surface naval fleet was cut drastically. Germany was forbidden to have chemical weapons and supplies of poisonous gas. The majority of German fortifications were blown up, and the treaty forbade all import into Germany of any weaponry or war materiel. The treaty required arms production to be under international control.[86]

Central and Western Europe was in such a debilitated state after World War I that a major war could not arise because no nation was capable of starting one. To avert war in Europe, all the Kremlin leaders had to do was to make sure that the Versailles Treaty was not breached so that Germany would stay disarmed and weak militarily. But the Kremlin leaders did the opposite. The Soviet Union helped Germany secretly reorganize its army. The German government was allowed to create secret design bureaus and training centers on Soviet territory. Germany was provided access to Soviet factories that produced tanks and airplanes so that the Germans could look, memorize, and copy the designs. The Soviet government eventually gave German commanders all that was forbidden by the Versailles Treaty such as tanks, heavy artillery, war planes, training classes, and weapons testing and shooting ranges.

On April 15, 1925, an agreement was signed to create a secret air force center for training German military pilots in the Russian city of Lipetsk. Germans who went to the German aviation school in Lipetsk had their names changed and were formally discharged from the Reichswehr. Planes designed for training and testing secretly arrived at Lipetsk by non-stop flights at high altitudes. By the end of 1933, the school in Lipetsk had trained 450 German pilots and air force personnel, many of whom later entered the core of the Luftwaffe command staff. Over the years, numerous German airplane models were also secretly developed and tested for Germany in the Soviet Union. The Luftwaffe was born in the Soviet city of Lipetsk as part of Stalin's plan to prepare Germany for a new world war.

In 1926 Stalin also created a tank school for the Reichswehr near the Soviet city of Kazan. In Kazan future German generals mastered the art of modern tank warfare. Stalin also made sure that German engineers and designers did not fall behind other European nations in technological and scientific advancement. Stalin ensured that all amassed scientific and technological knowledge and experience were made available to newly starting German creators of military weapons. An agreement was also worked out in the 1920s creating production facilities in the Soviet Union for the German war industry, masked as Soviet-German enterprises. Germany could not have armed itself for a second world war without Stalin's help.[87]

Stalin's first attempt to start a major war in Europe occurred in July 1936, when Gen. Francisco Franco led a militant uprising against the Spanish Republic. Gen. Franco was provided military aid by the dictators of Germany, Italy, and Portugal—Hitler, Benito Mussolini, and Antonio Salazar. Stalin sent to the Spanish Republic 2,065 military commanders of various rank as well as 648 warplanes, 347 tanks, 60 armored cars, 1,186 artillery weapons, 20,486 machine guns, 497,813 rifles, and numerous supplies. After almost three years of fighting, Gen. Franco won the war and Soviet military advisers were evacuated.

Suvorov states that Stalin did not count on victory in the Spanish war. Stalin's goal was to start a major war in Europe by drawing Great Britain and France into the war in Spain against Germany, Italy, and Portugal. Soviet propaganda screamed in outrage that children were dying in Spain while Great Britain and France did nothing. Stalin's agents asked: How can Great Britain and France show such heartless indifference to the death and suffering of so many Spanish children?

However, Stalin's political agents, diplomats, and spies were not able to spread the war in Spain beyond its borders. Stalin executed many of his spies and diplomats for their failure. By the end of 1938, Stalin dropped all of his anti-Hitler propaganda to calm Hitler and encourage him to attack Poland.[88]

On Aug. 11, 1939, British and French delegations arrived in Moscow to discuss joint action against Germany. During the course of the talks, British and French delegates told the Soviets that they were very serious in their guarantees to Poland. If Germany attacked Poland, Great Britain and France would declare war against Germany. This was the information that Stalin needed to know.

On Aug. 19, 1939, Stalin stopped the talks with Great Britain and France, and told the German ambassador in Moscow that he wanted to reach an agreement with Germany.[89] On that same day, Aug. 19, 1939, a secret meeting of the Politburo took place. The following are some excerpts from Stalin's speech:

If we accept Germany's proposal about the conclusion of a pact regarding invasion, she will of course attack Poland, and France and England's involvement in this war will be inevitable. Western Europe will be subjected to serious disorders and disturbances. Under these conditions, we will have many chances to stay on the sidelines of the conflict, and we will be able to count on our advantageous entrance into the war. It is in the interest of the USSR—the motherland of workers—that the war unfolds between the Reich and the capitalist Anglo-French bloc. It is necessary to do everything within our powers to make this war last as long as possible, in order to exhaust the two sides. It is precisely for this reason that we must agree to signing the pact, proposed by Germany, and work on making this war, once declared, last a maximum amount of time.[90]

On Aug. 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement which led to the destruction and division of Poland and the beginning of World War II. The Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement instigated the war in Europe that Stalin had long planned and prepared for. The nations of Western Europe became mired in a destructive war while the Soviet Union remained neutral. Stalin's role in unleashing World War II was quickly and thoroughly forgotten. Stalin even received substantial aid from the United States and Great Britain

after Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. Ultimately, at the end of the war, Poland did not gain her independence, but was given over to the Soviet Union along with all of Central Europe and part of Germany. [91]

The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact began to unravel when Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov arrived in Berlin on Nov. 12, 1940. Molotov presented to Hitler a long list of ridiculous territorial claims on behalf of the Soviet Union. Molotov demanded strongholds in Yugoslavia, in the Adriatic Sea, in Greece, in the Bosporus and Dardanelles, in the Persian Gulf; he demanded that countries south of the Baku-Batumi line, in the direction of the Persian Gulf, be given over to Soviet control, including eastern Turkey, northern Iran, and Iraq.[92]

These territorial claims were repeated on Nov. 25, 1940, when the Soviet Union proposed a peace pact between Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union. Molotov also demanded naval bases on the Danish side of the straits of Kattegat and Skagerrak, and from Japan the renunciation of its oil concessions in the province of Northern Sakhalin. The German ambassador to Moscow was told on Nov. 25, 1940, that Germany had to withdraw its troops from Finnish territory immediately. Molotov repeatedly reminded Hitler that without Soviet raw materials German victories in Europe would have been impossible. Hitler and his officials were surprised by such extraordinary demands and did not respond.

Hitler stated to Molotov in their talks that the Soviet Union's takeover of Northern Bukovina violated their pact about the division of spheres of influence. Molotov replied that the Soviet Union did indeed violate the previously reached agreement with Germany, but that it would not give up what it got from Romania. Moreover, Stalin wanted Southern Bukovina and Bulgaria. Hitler again reminded Molotov that they had agreed about the division of Europe back in August 1939. Molotov replied that it was now time for a new division of Europe that would give an advantage to the Soviet Union. Hitler brought up questions of safety from a Soviet invasion of Germany's oil supply in Romania and other territory crucial to Germany. Molotov did not give a satisfactory reply, and further discussions were in the same tone.[93]

Hitler had been preparing for an invasion of Great Britain when Stalin demanded new territories in Europe—territories on which Germany's economy and armed forces depended completely. After Molotov's departure, Hitler gathered his most trusted subordinates and clearly let them understand that he planned to invade the Soviet Union.

On June 21, 1941, Hitler wrote a letter to Mussolini: "Russia is trying to destroy the Romania oil field….The task for our armies is eliminating this threat as soon as possible." The Soviet threat to the Romanian oil fields is a major reason why Hitler invaded the Soviet Union. Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union was not at all a struggle for Lebensraum (living space).[94]

Why Hitler's Invasion of the Soviet Union Surprised Stalin

Stalin had three separate independent espionage agencies working for him. The total power of these agencies was colossal, and testimonies abound about the might of Stalin's espionage. These Soviet espionage services had penetrated into leading German military and political circles. Soviet military intelligence managed to gain access in Germany to the most secret information from the highest levels of power. Given these facts, the question is: "How could Hitler have surprised Stalin with his invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941?"

Suvorov says that Hitler knew that it had become impossible to conceal his preparations to invade the Soviet Union. Therefore, Hitler said in secret, in a way that Stalin could hear, "Yes, I want to attack Stalin after I have finished the war in the west." The Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces (GRU) also made extensive studies of all the economic, political, and military aspects of the situation and concluded that Germany could not win a war on two fronts. The GRU concluded that Hitler would not begin a war in the east without first finishing the war in the west. The head of the GRU submitted a detailed report to Stalin on March 20, 1941, which concluded that "the earliest possible date on which operations against the USSR may begin is the moment following victory over England or after an honorable peace for Germany has been achieved."[95]

Soviet intelligence knew about the massive concentration of German troops on Soviet borders, the locations of all German divisions, the huge ammunition supplies, the movements of the German air force, and many other things. Soviet GRU agents knew many important secrets, including the name of Operation Barbarossa and the time of its inception. Yet on the eve of the German invasion, Soviet intelligence reported that preparations for invasion had not yet begun, and without these preparations it was impossible for Germany to begin the war.[96]

Soviet intelligence believed, with good reason, that a country needed serious preparations to fight the Soviet Union. One of the vital things Germany would need to fight the Soviet Union was sheepskin coats so that its troops could survive the Russian winter. All GRU agents in Europe gathered and analyzed information on sheep in Europe, and on the main sheep-breeding centers and slaughterhouses. As soon as Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union, Soviet intelligence thought that Germany would order industry to begin producing millions of sheepskin coats. This would be reflected in rising sheepskin prices, and sheepskin coats would be delivered to German divisions. However, sheepskin coats were never delivered to any divisions of the German army.

Soviet intelligence also reasoned that the German army would have to use a new type of lubricating oil for its weaponry and motor fuel for its vehicles for the extremely cold Russian winters. The lubricating oil Germany usually used would congeal in the frost, component parts would freeze together, and the weapons would not work. The normal German motor fuel broke down into incombustible components in heavy frost. The quantities and type of liquid fuels possessed by Germany were not sufficient to conduct deep offensive operations in the Soviet Union. Germany was not even conducting research in the field of creating frost-resistant fuels and oils.

The GRU closely followed many other indicators for warning signals of a German invasion. German soldiers needed boots, warm underwear, sweaters, special tents, hats, heaters, skis, ski wax, masking robes, devices for heating water, and frost-resistant batteries. The German army also needed tanks with broad caterpillar tracks, thousands of cars that could drive in poor road conditions, and so on. The German army had none of these. Outside of a great buildup of German troops on the Soviet border, Germany had made no preparations for war against the Soviet Union. Since the German army had not taken reasonable actions to prepare for war, Stalin and his agents did not believe that Germany would invade the Soviet Union.[97]

However, Hitler launched his invasion of the Soviet Union without making reasonable preparations. Hitler realized that he had no choice but to invade the Soviet Union. If Hitler had waited for Stalin to attack, all of Europe would have been lost.

Suvorov states in The Chief Culprit that both German and Soviet forces were positioned for attack on June 22, 1941. The position of the divisions of the Red Army and the German army on the border mirrored

each other. The airfields of both armies were moved all the way up to the border. From the defensive point of view, this kind of deployment of troops and airfields by both armies was stupid and suicidal. Whichever army attacked first would be able to easily encircle the troops of the other army. Hitler attacked first to enable German troops to trap and encircle the best units of the Red Army.[98]

Hitler's Decision to Invade the USSR & Other Comments

Suvorov's book The Chief Culprit fails to mention Adolf Hitler's speech on Dec. 11, 1941, declaring war on the United States. This speech provides important corroborating evidence why Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. Hitler states in this speech:

When I became aware of the possibility of a threat to the east of the Reich in 1940 through reports from the British House of Commons and by observations of Soviet Russian troop movements on our frontiers, I immediately ordered the formation of many new armored, motorized and infantry divisions. The human and material resources for them were abundantly available….

We realized very clearly that under no circumstances could we allow the enemy the opportunity to strike first into our heart. Nevertheless, the decision in this case was a very difficult one. When the writers for the democratic newspapers now declare that I would have thought twice before attacking if I had known the strength of the Bolshevik adversaries, they show that they do not understand either the situation or me.

I have not sought war. To the contrary, I have done everything to avoid conflict. But I would forget my duty and my conscience if I were to do nothing in spite of the realization that a conflict had become unavoidable. Because I regarded Soviet Russia as a danger not only for the German Reich but for all of Europe, I decided, if possible, to give the order myself to attack a few days before the outbreak of this conflict.

A truly impressive amount of authentic material is now available that confirms that a Soviet Russian attack was intended. We are also sure about when this attack was to take place. In view of this danger, the extent of which we are perhaps only now truly aware, I can only thank the Lord God that He enlightened me in time and has given me the strength to do

what must be done. Millions of German soldiers may thank Him for their lives, and all of Europe for its existence.

I may say this today: If this wave of more than 20,000 tanks, hundreds of divisions, tens of thousands of artillery pieces, along with more than 10,000 airplanes, had not been kept from being set into motion against the Reich, Europe would have been lost.

Several nations have been destined to prevent or parry this blow through the sacrifice of their blood. If Finland had not immediately decided, for the second time, to take up weapons, then the comfortable bourgeois life of the other Nordic countries would have been quickly ended.

If the German Reich, with its soldiers and weapons, had not stood against this opponent, a storm would have burned over Europe that would have eliminated once and for all time the laughable British idea of the European balance of power in all its intellectual paucity and traditional stupidity.

If the Slovaks, Hungarians and Romanians had not also acted to defend this European world, then the Bolshevik hordes would have poured over the Danube countries as did once the swarms of Attila's Huns, and [Soviet] Tatars and Mongols would [then] force a revision of the Treaty of Montreux on the open country by the Ionian Sea.

If Italy, Spain and Croatia had not sent their divisions, then a European defense front would not have arisen that proclaims the concept of a new Europe and thereby effectively inspires all other nations as well. Because of this awareness of danger, volunteers have come from northern and western Europe: Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Flemish, Belgians and even French. They have all given the struggle of the allied forces of the Axis the character of a European crusade, in the truest sense of the word.[99]

Hitler's speech confirms Suvorov's thesis that the German invasion of the Soviet Union was for preemptive purposes. Hitler's attack was not for Lebensraum or any other malicious reason.

Hitler's speech also mentions an important point not discussed in The Chief Culprit: numerous brave men from northern and western Europe volunteered to join Germany in its fight against the Soviet Union. Volunteers from 30 nations enlisted to fight in the German armed forces during World War II.[100] These volunteers knew that the Soviet Union,

which Suvorov calls “the most criminal and most bloody empire in human history,”[101] could not be allowed to conquer all of Europe.

Suvorov states in The Chief Culprit that by exposing Stalin’s aggressive endeavors, he is not attempting to exonerate Hitler. For Suvorov, Hitler still remains a “heinous criminal.”[102] However, Suvorov does make it clear that Hitler’s preemptive attack of the Soviet Union prevented Stalin from conquering all of Europe.[103] Suvorov also clearly shows that it was Stalin and not Hitler who broke the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. As Frederick the Great of Prussia once stated, “The attacker is the one who forces his adversary to attack.”[104]

As brilliant as Suvorov is in exposing the historical lies of the corrupt Soviet regimes, his book contains a major contradiction. Throughout The Chief Culprit, Suvorov states that Germany did not have the strategic resources needed to successfully conduct a sustained military conflict. Furthermore, many of Germany’s strategic resources came from militarily vulnerable sources. Germany’s iron ore came mostly from northern Sweden, its lumber from Finland and Sweden, and its nickel supplies from Finland.[105] Germany’s primary source of oil came from Romania, and this Romanian supply of oil was never enough for Germany to effectively conduct a sustained military campaign.[106] All of these raw materials were vulnerable to attack from the Soviet Union. Suvorov states that Germany’s lack of raw materials not only prohibited it from conducting a two-front war, but also from conducting a prolonged single-front war. Germany’s only hope for victory was a blitzkrieg—the quick defeat of an enemy.[107]

Despite Germany’s inability to successfully fight a prolonged war, Suvorov makes statements in his book as if Germany was attempting to conquer the world. Suvorov states: “In that same year, 1939, Hitler began his war for global domination,”[108] and “Hitler went after world domination in September 1939 with just six tank divisions.”[109] Hitler never had the resources or military to obtain world domination. Hitler was not even aware that his attack of Poland on Sept. 1, 1939, would turn into anything more than a local conflict. If Hitler had known that his invasion of Poland would result in a major world war, he never would have invaded Poland.

Suvorov also implies that Hitler attacked Poland because Poland refused to satisfy Hitler’s aggressive demands. Suvorov states: “Hitler demanded a review of the Versailles Treaty. In accordance with this treaty, Eastern Prussia was separated from the main part of Germany, and

the city of Danzig was declared a free city. Hitler demanded to be given a corridor through Polish territory to build a highway and a railroad between East Prussia and mainland Germany. Additionally, the city of Danzig was to become a part of Germany. The Polish government refused to satisfy Hitler's demands."[110]

This analysis is simplistic and misleading. As we will discuss in Chapter Three, it would be more accurate to state that Poland, with the backing of Great Britain, refused to negotiate with Germany and adopted policies that forced war between Germany and Poland.

Footnotes

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[9] Ibid., pp. 23-24.

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[25] Ibid., pp. 55-57.

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[29] Ibid., pp. 69-72.

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[31] Ibid., p. 76.

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[33] Ibid., pp. 77-78.

[34] Ibid., pp. 79-80.

[35] Ibid., p. 94.

[36] Ibid., p. 239.

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[41] Ibid., pp. 131-132.

[42] Ibid., pp. 133-135.

[43] Ibid., pp. 150-152.

[44] Ibid., pp. 156-157.

[45] Ibid., pp. 58-59.

[46] Ibid., p. 59.

[47] Ibid., pp. 196-197.

[48] Ibid., p. 205.

[49] Ibid., pp. 207-217.

[50] Ibid., pp. 92-97.

[51] Ibid., pp. 257-258.

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[88] Ibid., pp. 98-104.

[89] Ibid., pp. 106-108.

[90] Ibid., p. 109.

[91] Ibid., pp. 111-112.

[92] Ibid., p. 278.

[93] Ibid., pp. 181-183.

[94] Ibid., pp. 159, 183.

[95] Ibid., pp. 244-247.

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[97] Ibid., pp. 248-250.

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Chapter Two

• Franklin D. Roosevelt and America's Second Crusade

Most historians portray President Franklin D. Roosevelt as a lover of peace and democracy who had to involve the United States in World War II to stop fascist aggression. However, as we shall see in the following discussion, Franklin Roosevelt and his administration secretly made every effort to instigate war in Europe. Roosevelt and his administration then secretly adopted policies and manipulated world events to plunge the United States into war against Germany. All of these secret policies and actions occurred while Roosevelt repeatedly told the American public that he was committed to keeping the United States out of war.

Roosevelt Admires Stalin & Hates Hitler

Josef Stalin is widely acknowledged to be one of the world's most ruthless dictators and one of the greatest mass murderers in all of history. Despite Stalin's criminal record, Franklin D. Roosevelt was a good friend of Stalin. Roosevelt indulged in provocative name-calling against the heads of totalitarian nations such as Germany, Italy and Japan, but never against Stalin or the Soviet Union.[1] Roosevelt always spoke favorably of Stalin, and American wartime propaganda referred to Stalin affectionately as "Uncle Joe."

Roosevelt's attitude toward Stalin is remarkable considering that his first appointed ambassador to the Soviet Union warned Roosevelt of the danger of supporting Stalin. William Bullitt served as America's first ambassador to the Soviet Union from November 1933 to 1936. Bullitt left the Soviet Union with few illusions, and by the end of his tenure he was openly hostile to the Soviet government.

Bullitt stated in his final report from Moscow on April 20, 1936, that the Russian standard of living was possibly lower than that of any other country in the world. Bullitt reported that the Bulgarian Comintern leader, Dimitrov, had admitted that the Soviet popular front and collective security tactics were aimed at undermining the foreign capitalist systems. Bullitt concluded that relations of sincere friendship between the Soviet Union and the United States were impossible.[2] Bullitt stated in his final report to the State Department:

The problem of relations with the government of the Soviet Union is…a subordinate part of the problem presented by communism as a militant faith determined to produce world revolution and the "liquidation" (that is to say murder) of all non-believers. There is no doubt whatsoever that all orthodox Communist parties in all countries, including the United States, believe in mass murder….The final argument of the believing Communist is invariably that all battle, murder, and sudden death, all the spies, exiles, and firing squads are justified.[3]

Joseph E. Davies succeeded William Bullitt as ambassador to the Soviet Union. Davies reported to President Roosevelt on April 1, 1938, that the terror in Russia was "a horrifying fact." Davies complained of the gigantic Soviet expenditures for defense, totaling approximately 25% of the Soviet Union's total income in 1937. Davies reported that Stalin, in a letter to Pravda on Feb. 14, 1938, had confirmed his intention to spread Communism around the world. Stalin also promised in his letter that the Soviet Union would work with foreign Communists to achieve this goal. Stalin concluded in his letter, "I wish very much…that there were no longer on earth such unpleasant things as a capitalist environment, the danger of a military attack, the danger of the restoration of capitalism, and so on." Davies stated in his report that the Soviet Union could best be described as "a terrible tyranny."[4]

Roosevelt was fully aware of the slave-labor system, the liquidation of the kulaks, the man-made famine, the extreme poverty and backwardness, and the extensive system of espionage and terror that existed in the Soviet Union. However, from the very beginning of his administration, Roosevelt sang the praises of a regime that recognized no civil liberties whatsoever. In an attempt to gain swift congressional approval for Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union, Roosevelt even stated that Stalin's regime was at the forefront of "peace and democracy in the world." At a White House press conference, Roosevelt also claimed that there was freedom of religion in the Soviet Union.[5]

Henry A. Wallace, vice president of the United States during Roosevelt's third term, joined the chorus hailing the Soviet Union as a gallant ally whose good faith and good intentions could not be questioned. Vice-President Wallace preached that the Soviet Union could do no wrong, and that any criticism of Stalin's dictatorship was akin to treason.[6] Wallace even stated in a speech that "There are no more

similar countries in the world than the Soviet Union and the United States of America."[7]

The Roosevelt administration's support for the Soviet Union was also hailed by former ambassador Joseph Davies in his book Mission to Moscow, which praised Stalin's tough-minded ability to protect himself from internal threat. Published in 1941, Mission to Moscow provided welcome reassurance to the American public that their democracy was in alliance with a fair-minded and trustworthy Soviet leader. The book became a runaway international success, selling 700,000 copies in the United States alone, and topping the bestseller lists in the 13 languages into which it was translated.[8]

Among other things, Davies said in his book that the Soviets wanted "to promote the brotherhood of man and to improve the lot of the common people. They wish to create a society in which men live as equals, governed by ethical ideas. They are devoted to peace."[9] Mission to Moscow was turned into a Hollywood movie in 1943 at a time when the American media were celebrating Soviet military triumphs. State Department experts on the Soviet Union called the movie "one of the most blatantly propagandistic pictures ever seen." Stalin awarded Joseph Davies the Order of Lenin in May 1945 for his contribution to "friendly Soviet-American relations."[10]

The Soviet Union had been a totalitarian regime since 1920. By the time Hitler's National Socialist Party came to power in 1933, the Soviet government had already murdered millions of its own citizens. The Soviet terror campaign accelerated in the late 1930s, resulting in the murder of many more millions of Soviet citizens as well as thousands of American citizens working in the Soviet Union. Many Americans lost their entire families in the Soviet purge of the late 1930s. Despite these well-documented facts, the Roosevelt administration always fully supported the Soviet Union.[11]

By contrast, the Roosevelt administration's relationship with Germany steadily deteriorated due to Roosevelt's acerbic hostility toward Hitler's regime. Roosevelt and his administration made every effort to convince the American public to support war against Germany even though Hitler had never wanted war with either the United States or Great Britain.

The Secret Polish Documents

The Germans seized a mass of documents from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs when they invaded Warsaw in late September 1939. The documents were seized when a German SS brigade led by Freiherr von Kuensberg captured the center of Warsaw ahead of the regular German army. Von Kuensberg's men took control of the Polish Foreign Ministry just as Ministry officials were in the process of burning incriminating documents. These documents clearly establish Roosevelt's crucial role in planning and instigating World War II. They also reveal the forces behind President Roosevelt that pushed for war.[12]

Some of the secret Polish documents were first published in the United States as The German White Paper. Probably the most revealing document in the collection is a secret report dated Jan. 12, 1939, by Jerzy Potocki, the Polish ambassador to the United States. This report discusses the domestic situation in the United States. I quote Ambassador Potocki's report in full:

There is a feeling now prevalent in the United States marked by growing hatred of Fascism, and above all of Chancellor Hitler and everything connected with National Socialism. Propaganda is mostly in the hands of the Jews who control almost 100% [of the] radio, film, daily and periodical press. Although this propaganda is extremely coarse and presents Germany as black as possible— above all religious persecution and concentration camps are exploited—this propaganda is nevertheless extremely effective since the public here is completely ignorant and knows nothing of the situation in Europe.

At the present moment most Americans regard Chancellor Hitler and National Socialism as the greatest evil and greatest peril threatening the world. The situation here provides an excellent platform for public speakers of all kinds, for emigrants from Germany and Czechoslovakia who with a great many words and with most various calumnies incite the public. They praise American liberty which they contrast with the totalitarian states.

It is interesting to note that in this extremely well-planned campaign which is conducted above all against National Socialism, Soviet Russia is almost completely eliminated. Soviet Russia, if mentioned at all, is mentioned in a friendly manner and things are presented in such a way that it would seem that the Soviet Union were cooperating with the bloc

of democratic states. Thanks to the clever propaganda the sympathies of the American public are completely on the side of Red Spain.

This propaganda, this war psychosis is being artificially created. The American people are told that peace in Europe is hanging only by a thread and that war is inevitable. At the same time the American people are unequivocally told that in case of a world war, America also must take an active part in order to defend the slogans of liberty and democracy in the world. President Roosevelt was the first one to express hatred against Fascism. In doing so he was serving a double purpose; first he wanted to divert the attention of the American people from difficult and intricate domestic problems, especially from the problem of the struggle between capital and labor. Second, by creating a war psychosis and by spreading rumors concerning dangers threatening Europe, he wanted to induce the American people to accept an enormous armament program which far exceeds United States defense requirements.

Regarding the first point, it must be said that the internal situation on the labor market is growing worse constantly. The unemployed today already number 12 million. Federal and state expenditures are increasing daily. Only the huge sums, running into billions, which the treasury expends for emergency labor projects, are keeping a certain amount of peace in the country. Thus far only the usual strikes and local unrest have taken place. But how long this government aid can be kept up it is difficult to predict today. The excitement and indignation of public opinion, and the serious conflict between private enterprises and enormous trusts on the one hand, and with labor on the other, have made many enemies for Roosevelt and are causing him many sleepless nights.

As to point two, I can only say that President Roosevelt, as a clever player of politics and a connoisseur of American mentality, speedily steered public attention away from the domestic situation in order to fasten it on foreign policy. The way to achieve this was simple. One needed, on the one hand, to enhance the war menace overhanging the world on account of Chancellor Hitler, and, on the other hand, to create a specter by talking about the attack of the totalitarian states on the United States. The Munich pact came to President Roosevelt as a godsend. He described it as the capitulation of France and England to bellicose German militarism. As was said here: Hitler compelled Chamberlain at pistol-point. Hence, France and England had no choice and had to conclude a shameful peace.

The prevalent hatred against everything which is in any way connected with German National Socialism is further kindled by the brutal attitude against the Jews in Germany and by the émigré problem. In this action Jewish intellectuals participated; for instance, Bernard Baruch; the Governor of New York State, Lehman; the newly appointed judge of the Supreme Court, Felix Frankfurter; Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, and others who are personal friends of Roosevelt. They want the president to become the champion of human rights, freedom of religion and speech, and the man who in the future will punish trouble-mongers. These groups, people who want to pose as representatives of "Americanism" and "defenders of democracy" in the last analysis, are connected by unbreakable ties with international Jewry.

For this Jewish international, which above all is concerned with the interests of its race, to put the president of the United States at this "ideal" post of champion of human rights, was a clever move. In this manner they created a dangerous hotbed for hatred and hostility in this hemisphere and divided the world into two hostile camps. The entire issue is worked out in a mysterious manner. Roosevelt has been forcing the foundation for vitalizing American foreign policy, and simultaneously has been procuring enormous stocks for the coming war, for which the Jews are striving consciously. With regard to domestic policy, it is extremely convenient to divert public attention from anti-Semitism which is ever growing in the United States, by talking about the necessity of defending faith and individual liberty against the onslaught of Fascism.[13]

On Jan. 16, 1939, Potocki reported to the Warsaw Foreign Ministry a conversation he had with American Ambassador William Bullitt. Bullitt was in Washington on a brief leave of absence from Paris. Potocki reported that Bullitt stated that the main objectives of the Roosevelt administration were: "1) The vitalizing foreign policy, under the leadership of President Roosevelt, severely and unambiguously condemns totalitarian countries. 2) The United States preparation for war on sea, land and air which will be carried out at an accelerated speed and will consume the colossal sum of $1.250 million. 3) It is the decided opinion of the president that France and Britain must put an end to any sort of compromise with the totalitarian countries. They must not let themselves in for any discussions aiming at any kind of territorial changes. 4) They have the moral assurance that the United States will leave the policy of isolation and be prepared to intervene actively on the

side of Britain and France in case of war. America is ready to place its whole wealth of money and raw materials at their disposal."[14]

Juliusz (Jules) Lukasiewicz, the Polish ambassador to France, sent a top secret report from Paris to the Polish Foreign Ministry at the beginning of February 1939. This report outlines the U.S. policy toward Europe as explained to him by William Bullitt:

A week ago, the ambassador of the United States, W. Bullitt, returned to Paris after having spent three months holiday in America. Meanwhile, I had two conversations with him which enable me to inform Monsieur Minister on his views regarding the European situation and to give a survey of Washington's policy….

The international situation is regarded by official quarters as extremely serious and being in danger of armed conflict. Competent quarters are of the opinion that if war should break out between Britain and France on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other, and Britain and France should be defeated, the Germans would become dangerous to the realistic interests of the United States on the American continent. For this reason, one can foresee right from the beginning the participation of the United States in the war on the side of France and Britain, naturally after some time had elapsed after the beginning of the war. Ambassador Bullitt expressed this as follows: "Should war break out we shall certainly not take part in it at the beginning, but we shall end it."[15]

On March 7, 1939, Ambassador Potocki sent another remarkably perceptive report on Roosevelt's foreign policy to the Polish government. I quote Potocki's secret report in full:

The foreign policy of the United States right now concerns not only the government, but the entire American public as well. The most important elements are the public statements of President Roosevelt. In almost every public speech he refers more or less explicitly to the necessity of activating foreign policy against the chaos of views and ideologies in Europe. These statements are picked up by the press and then cleverly filtered into the minds of average Americans in such a way as to strengthen their already

formed opinions. The same theme is constantly repeated, namely, the danger of war in Europe and saving the democracies from inundation by enemy fascism. In all of these public statements there is normally only a single theme, that is, the danger from Nazism and Nazi Germany to world peace.

As a result of these speeches, the public is called upon to support rearmament and the spending of enormous sums for the navy and the air force. The unmistakable idea behind this is that in case of an armed conflict the United States cannot stay out but must take an active part in the maneuvers. As a result of the effective speeches of President Roosevelt, which are supported by the press, the American public is today being conscientiously manipulated to hate everything that smacks of totalitarianism and fascism. But it is interesting that the USSR is not included in all of this. The American public considers Russia more in the camp of the democratic states. This was also the case during the Spanish civil war when the so-called Loyalists were regarded as defenders of the democratic idea.

The State Department operates without attracting a great deal of attention, although it is known that Secretary of State [Cordell] Hull and President Roosevelt swear allegiance to the same ideas. However, Hull shows more reserve than Roosevelt, and he loves to make a distinction between Nazism and Chancellor Hitler on the one hand, and the German people on the other. He considers this form of dictatorial government a temporary "necessary evil." In contrast, the State Department is unbelievably interested in the USSR and its internal situation and openly worries itself over its weaknesses and decline. The main reason for the United States interest in the Russians is the situation in the Far East. The current government would be glad to see the Red Army emerge as victor in a conflict with Japan. That's why the sympathies of the government are clearly on the side of China, which recently received considerable financial aid amounting to $25 million.

Eager attention is given to all information from the diplomatic posts as well as to the special emissaries of the president who serve as ambassadors of the United States. The president frequently calls his representatives from abroad to Washington for personal exchanges of views and to give them special information and instructions. The arrival of the envoys and ambassadors is always shrouded in secrecy and very little surfaces in the press about the results of their visits. The State Department

also takes care to avoid giving out any kind of information about the course of these interviews.

The practical way in which the president makes foreign policy is most effective. He gives personal instructions to his representatives abroad, most of whom are his personal friends. In this way the United States is led down a dangerous path in world politics with the explicit intention of abandoning the comfortable policy of isolation. The president regards the foreign policy of his country as a means of satisfying his own personal ambition. He listens carefully and happily to his echo in the other capitals of the world. In domestic as well as foreign policy, the Congress of the United States is the only object that stands in the way of the president and his government in carrying out his decisions quickly and ambitiously. One hundred and fifty years ago, the Constitution of the United States gave the highest prerogatives to the American parliament which may criticize or reject the law of the White House.

The foreign policy of President Roosevelt has recently been the subject of intense discussion in the lower house and in the Senate, and this has caused excitement. The so-called Isolationists, of whom there are many in both houses, have come out strongly against the president. The representatives and the senators were especially upset over the remarks of the president, which were published in the press, in which he said that the borders of the United States lie on the Rhine. But President Roosevelt is a superb political player and understands completely the power of the American parliament. He has his own people there, and he knows how to withdraw from an uncomfortable situation at the right moment.

Very intelligently and cleverly he ties together the question of foreign policy with the issues of American rearmament. He particularly stresses the necessity of spending enormous sums in order to maintain a defensive peace. He says specifically that the United States is not arming in order to intervene or to go to the aid of England or France in case of war, but because of the need to show strength and military preparedness in case of an armed conflict in Europe. In his view this conflict is becoming ever more acute and is completely unavoidable.

Since the issue is presented this way, the houses of Congress have no cause to object. To the contrary, the houses accepted an armament program of more than 1 billion dollars. (The normal budget is $550 million, the emergency $552 million.). However, under the cloak of a rearmament policy, FDR continues to push forward his foreign policy, which unofficially

shows the world that in case of war the United States will come out on the side of the democratic states with all military and financial power.

In conclusion it can be said that the technical and moral preparation of the American people for participation in a war—if one should break out in Europe—is proceeding rapidly. It appears that the United States will come to the aid of France and Great Britain with all its resources right from the beginning. However, I know the American public and the representatives and senators who all have the final word, and I am of the opinion that the possibility that America will enter the war as in 1917 is not great. That's because the majority of the states in the Midwest and West, where the rural element predominates, want to avoid involvement in European disputes at all costs. They remember the declaration of the Versailles Treaty and the well-known phrase that the war was to save the world for democracy. Neither the Versailles Treaty nor that slogan have reconciled the United States to that war. For millions there remains only a bitter aftertaste because of unpaid billions which the European states still owe America.[16]

These secret Polish reports were written by top level Polish ambassadors who were not necessarily friendly to Germany. However, they understood the realities of European politics far better than people who made foreign policy in the United States. The Polish ambassadors realized that behind all of their rhetoric about democracy and human rights, the Jewish leaders in the United States who agitated for war against Germany were deceptively advancing their own interests.

There is no question that the secret documents taken from the Polish Foreign Ministry in Warsaw are authentic. Charles C. Tansill considered the documents genuine and stated, "Some months ago I had a long conversation with M. Lipsky, the Polish ambassador in Berlin in the prewar years, and he assured me that the documents in the German White Paper are authentic."[17]

William H. Chamberlain wrote, "I have been privately informed by an extremely reliable source that Potocki, now residing in South America, confirmed the accuracy of the documents, so far as he was concerned."[18] Historian Harry Elmer Barnes also stated, "Both Professor Tansill and myself have independently established the thorough authenticity of these documents."[19]

Edward Raczynski, the Polish ambassador to London from 1934 to 1945, confirmed in his diary the authenticity of the Polish documents. He wrote in his entry on June 20, 1940: "The Germans published in April a White Book containing documents from the archives of our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, consisting of reports from Potocki from Washington, Lukasiewicz in Paris and myself. I do not know where they found them, since we were told that the archives had been destroyed. The documents are certainly genuine, and the facsimiles show that for the most part the Germans got hold of the originals and not merely copies."[20]

The official papers and memoirs of Juliusz Lukasiewicz published in 1970 in Diplomat in Paris 1936-1939 reconfirmed the authenticity of the Polish documents. Lukasiewicz was the Polish ambassador to Paris who authored several of the secret Polish documents. The collection was edited by Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, a former Polish diplomat and cabinet member. Jedrzejewicz considered the documents made public by the Germans absolutely genuine, and quoted from several of them.

Tyler G. Kent, who worked at the U.S. Embassy in London in 1939 and 1940, has also confirmed the authenticity of the secret Polish documents. Kent says that he saw copies of U.S. diplomatic messages in the files which corresponded to the Polish documents.[21]

The German Foreign Office published the Polish documents on March 29, 1940. The Reich Ministry of Propaganda released the documents to strengthen the case of the American isolationists and to prove the degree of America's responsibility for the outbreak of war. In Berlin, journalists from around the world were permitted to examine the original documents themselves, along with a large number of other documents from the Polish Foreign Ministry. The release of the documents caused an international media sensation. American newspapers published lengthy excerpts from the documents and gave the story large front page headline coverage.[22]

However, the impact of the released documents was far less than the German government had hoped for. Leading U.S. government officials emphatically denounced the documents as not being authentic. William Bullitt, the U.S. ambassador who was especially incriminated by the documents, stated, "I have never made to anyone the statements attributed to me." Secretary of State Cordell Hull denounced the documents by stating: "I may say most emphatically that neither I nor any of my associates in the Department of State have ever heard of any such conversations as those alleged, nor do we give them the slightest

credence. The statements alleged have not represented in any way at any time the thought or the policy of the American government."[23] American newspapers stressed these high-level denials in reporting the release of the Polish documents.

These categorical denials by high-level U.S. government officials almost completely eliminated the effect of the secret Polish documents. The vast majority of the American people in 1940 trusted their elected political leaders to tell the truth. If the Polish documents were in fact authentic and genuine, this would mean that President Roosevelt and his representatives had lied to the American public, while the German government told the truth. In 1940, this was far more than the trusting American public could accept.

More Evidence Roosevelt Helped Instigate World War II

While the secret Polish documents alone indicate that Roosevelt was preparing the American public for war against Germany, a large amount of complementary evidence confirms the conspiracy reported by the Polish ambassadors. The diary of James V. Forrestal, the first U.S. secretary of Defense, also reveals that Roosevelt and his administration helped start World War II. Forrestal's entry on Dec. 27, 1945, states:

Played golf today with Joe Kennedy [Roosevelt's ambassador to Great Britain in the years immediately before the war]. I asked him about his conversations with Roosevelt and Neville Chamberlain from 1938 on. He said Chamberlain's position in 1938 was that England had nothing with which to fight and that she could not risk going to war with Hitler. Kennedy's view: That Hitler would have fought Russia without any later conflict with England if it had not been for Bullitt's urging on Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 that the Germans must be faced down about Poland; neither the French nor the British would have made Poland a cause of war if it had not been for the constant needling from Washington. Bullitt, he said, kept telling Roosevelt that the Germans wouldn't fight; Kennedy that they would, and that they would overrun Europe. Chamberlain, he says, stated that America and the world Jews had forced England into the war.

In his telephone conversations with Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 the president kept telling him to put some iron up Chamberlain's backside. Kennedy's response always was that putting iron up his backside

did no good unless the British had some iron with which to fight, and they did not.

What Kennedy told me in this conversation jibes substantially with the remarks Clarence Dillon had made to me already, to the general effect that Roosevelt had asked him in some manner to communicate privately with the British to the end that Chamberlain should have greater firmness in his dealings with Germany. Dillon told me that at Roosevelt's request he had talked with Lord Lothian in the same general sense as Kennedy reported Roosevelt having urged him to do with Chamberlain. Lothian presumably was to communicate to Chamberlain the gist of his conversation with Dillon. Looking backward there is undoubtedly foundation for Kennedy's belief that Hitler's attack could have been deflected to Russia."[24]

Joseph Kennedy is known to have had a good memory, and it is highly likely that Kennedy's statements to James Forrestal are accurate. Forrestal died on May 22, 1949, under mysterious circumstances when he fell from his hospital window.

Sir Ronald Lindsay, the British ambassador to Washington, confirmed Roosevelt's secret policy to instigate war against Germany with the release of a confidential diplomatic report after the war. The report describes a secret meeting on Sept. 18, 1938, between Roosevelt and Ambassador Lindsay. Roosevelt said that if Britain and France were forced into a war against Germany, the United States would ultimately join the war. Roosevelt's idea to start a war was for Britain and France to impose a blockade against Germany without actually declaring war. The important point was to call it a defensive war based on lofty humanitarian grounds and on the desire to wage hostilities with a minimum of suffering and the least possible loss of life and property. The blockade would provoke some kind of German military response, but would free Britain and France from having to declare war. Roosevelt believed he could then convince the American public to support war against Germany, including shipments of weapons to Britain and France, by insisting that the United States was still neutral in a non-declared conflict.[25]

President Roosevelt told Ambassador Lindsay that if news of their conversation was ever made public, it could mean Roosevelt's impeachment. What Roosevelt proposed to Lindsay was in effect a scheme to violate the U.S. Constitution by illegally starting a war. For this

and other reasons, Ambassador Lindsay stated that during his three years of service in Washington he developed little regard for America's leaders.[26]

Ambassador Lindsay in a series of final reports also indicated that Roosevelt was delighted at the prospect of a new world war. Roosevelt promised Lindsay that he would delay German ships under false pretenses in a feigned search for arms. This would allow the German ships to be easily seized by the British under circumstances arranged with exactitude between the American and British authorities. Lindsay reported that Roosevelt "spoke in a tone of almost impish glee and though I may be wrong the whole business gave me the impression of resembling a school-boy prank."

Ambassador Lindsay was personally perturbed that the president of the United States could be gay and joyful about a pending tragedy which seemed so destructive of the hopes of all mankind. It was unfortunate at this important juncture that the United States had a president whose emotions and ideas were regarded by a friendly British ambassador as being childish.[27]

Roosevelt's desire to support France and England in a war against Germany is discussed in a letter from Verne Marshall, former editor of the Cedar Rapids Gazette, to Charles C. Tansill. The letter states:

President Roosevelt wrote a note to William Bullitt [in the summer of 1939], then ambassador to France, directing him to advise the French government that if, in the event of a Nazi attack against Poland, France and England did not go to Poland's aid, those countries could expect no help from America if a general war developed. On the other hand, if France and England immediately declared war on Germany, they could expect "all aid" from the United States.

FDR's instructions to Bullitt were to send this word along to "Joe" and "Tony," meaning ambassadors Kennedy, in London, and Biddle, in Warsaw, respectively. FDR wanted Daladier, Chamberlain and Josef Beck to know of these instructions to Bullitt. Bullitt merely sent his note from FDR to Kennedy in the diplomatic pouch from Paris. Kennedy followed Bullitt's idea and forwarded it to Biddle. When the Nazis grabbed Warsaw and Beck disappeared, they must have come into possession of the FDR note. The man who wrote the report I sent you saw it in Berlin in October 1939.[28]

William Phillips, the American ambassador to Italy, also stated in his postwar memoirs that the Roosevelt administration in late 1938 was committed to going to war on the side of Britain and France. Phillips wrote: "On this and many other occasions, I would have liked to have told him [Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister] frankly that in the event of a European war, the United States would undoubtedly be involved on the side of the Allies. But in view of my official position, I could not properly make such a statement without instructions from Washington, and these I never received."[29]

When Anthony Eden returned to England in December 1938, he carried with him an assurance from President Roosevelt that the United States would enter as soon as practicable a European war against Hitler if the occasion arose. This information was obtained by Sen. William Borah of Idaho, who was debating how and when to give out this information when he dropped dead in his bathroom. The story was confirmed to historian Harry Elmer Barnes by some of Sen. Borah's closest colleagues at the time.[30]

The American ambassador to Poland, Anthony Drexel Biddle, was an ideological colleague of President Roosevelt and a good friend of William Bullitt. Roosevelt used Biddle to influence the Polish government not to enter into negotiations with Germany. Carl J. Burckhardt, the League of Nations high commissioner to Danzig, reported in his postwar memoirs on a memorable conversation he had with Biddle. On Dec. 2, 1938, Biddle told Burckhardt with remarkable satisfaction that the Poles were ready to wage war over Danzig. Biddle predicted that in April a new crisis would develop, and that moderate British and French leaders would be blown away by public opinion. Biddle predicted a holy war against Germany would break out.[31]

Bernard Baruch, who was Roosevelt's chief advisor, scoffed at a statement made on March 10, 1939, by Neville Chamberlain that "the outlook in international affairs is tranquil." Baruch agreed passionately with Winston Churchill, who had told him: "War is coming very soon. We will be in it and you [the United States] will be in it."[32]

Georges Bonnet, the French foreign minister in 1939, also confirmed the role of William Bullitt as Roosevelt's ambassador in pushing France into war. In a letter to Hamilton Fish dated March 26,

1971, Bonnet wrote, “One thing is certain is that Bullitt in 1939 did everything he could to make France enter the war.”[33]

Dr. Edvard Benes, the former president of Czechoslovakia, wrote in his memoirs that he had a lengthy secret conversation at Hyde Park with President Roosevelt on May 28, 1939. Roosevelt assured Dr. Benes that the United States would actively intervene on the side of Great Britain and France against Germany in the anticipated European war.[34]

American newspaper columnist Karl von Wiegand, who was the chief European newspaper columnist of the International News Service, met with Ambassador William Bullitt at the U.S. Embassy in Paris on April 25, 1939. More than four months before the outbreak of war, Bullitt told Wiegand: “War in Europe has been decided upon. Poland has the assurance of the support of Britain and France, and will yield to no demands from Germany. America will be in the war soon after Britain and France enter it.”[35] When Wiegand said that in the end Germany would be driven into the arms of Soviet Russia and Bolshevism, Ambassador Bullitt replied: “What of it? There will not be enough Germans left when the war is over to be worth Bolshevizing.”[36]

On March 14, 1939, Slovakia dissolved the state of Czechoslovakia by declaring itself an independent republic. Czechoslovakia President Emil Hácha signed a formal agreement the next day with Hitler establishing a German protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia, which constituted the Czech portion of the nation. The British government initially accepted the new situation, reasoning that Britain’s guarantee of Czechoslovakia given after Munich was rendered invalid by the internal collapse of the Czech state. It soon became evident after the proclamation of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia that the new regime enjoyed considerable popularity among the Czechs. Also, the danger of a war between the Czechs and the Slovaks had been averted.[37]

However, Bullitt’s response to the creation of the German protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia was highly unfavorable. Bullitt telephoned Roosevelt and, in an “almost hysterical” voice, Bullitt urged Roosevelt to make a dramatic denunciation of Germany and to immediately ask Congress to repeal the Neutrality Act.[38]

Washington journalists Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen reported in their nationally syndicated column that on March 16, 1939, President Roosevelt “sent a virtual ultimatum to Chamberlain” demanding that the British government strongly oppose Germany.

Pearson and Allen reported that "the president warned that Britain could expect no more support, moral or material through the sale of airplanes, if the Munich policy continued."[39]

Responding to Roosevelt's pressure, the next day Chamberlain ended Britain's policy of cooperation with Germany when he made a speech at Birmingham bitterly denouncing Hitler. Chamberlain also announced the end of the British "appeasement" policy, stating that from now on Britain would oppose any further territorial moves by Hitler. Two weeks later the British government formally committed itself to war in case of German-Polish hostilities.

Roosevelt also attempted to arm Poland so that Poland would be more willing to go to war against Germany. Ambassador Bullitt reported from Paris in a confidential telegram to Washington on April 9, 1939, his conversation with Polish Ambassador Lukasiewicz. Bullitt told Lukasiewicz that although U.S. law prohibited direct financial aid to Poland, the Roosevelt administration might be able to supply war planes to Poland indirectly through Britain. Bullitt stated: "The Polish ambassador asked me if it might not be possible for Poland to obtain financial help and airplanes from the United States. I replied that I believed the Johnson Act would forbid any loans from the United States to Poland, but added that it might be possible for England to purchase planes for cash in the United States and turn them over to Poland."[40]

Bullitt also attempted to bypass the Neutrality Act and supply France with airplanes. A secret conference of Ambassador Bullitt with French Premier Daladier and the French minister of aviation, Guy La Chambre, discussed the procurement of airplanes from America for France. Bullitt, who was in frequent telephonic conversation with Roosevelt, suggested a means by which the Neutrality Act could be circumvented in the event of war. Bullitt's suggestion was to set up assembly plants in Canada, apparently on the assumption that Canada would not be a formal belligerent in the war. Bullitt also arranged for a secret French mission to come to the United States and purchase airplanes in the winter of 19381939. The secret purchase of American airplanes by the French leaked out when a French aviator crashed on the West Coast.[41]

On Aug. 23, 1939, Sir Horace Wilson, Chamberlain's closest advisor, went to American Ambassador Joseph Kennedy with an urgent appeal from Chamberlain to President Roosevelt. Regretting that Britain had unequivocally obligated itself to Poland in case of war, Chamberlain

now turned to Roosevelt as a last hope for peace. Kennedy telephoned the State Department and stated: "The British want one thing from us and one thing only, namely that we put pressure on the Poles. They felt that they could not, given their obligations, do anything of this sort but that we could."

Presented with a possibility to save the peace in Europe, President Roosevelt rejected Chamberlain's desperate plea out of hand. With Roosevelt's rejection, Kennedy reported, British Prime Minister Chamberlain lost all hope. Chamberlain stated: "The futility of it all is the thing that is frightful. After all, we cannot save the Poles. We can merely carry on a war of revenge that will mean the destruction of all Europe."[42]

Roosevelt Wants the U.S. At War with Germany

After the outbreak of war, Joseph Kennedy contacted Roosevelt and recommended that Roosevelt act boldly for peace. On Sept. 11, 1939, Kennedy cabled to Roosevelt from London: "It seems to me that the situation may crystallize to a point where the president can be the savior of the world. The British government as such certainly cannot accept any agreement with Hitler, but there may be a point when the president himself may work out plans for world peace. Now this opportunity may never arise, but as a fairly practical fellow all my life, I believe that it is entirely conceivable that the president can get himself in a spot where he can save the world…."

President Roosevelt rejected Kennedy's idea to save peace in Europe. Roosevelt stated to Henry Morgenthau: "Joe has been an appeaser and will always be an appeaser….If Germany and Italy made a good peace offer tomorrow, Joe would start working on the king and his friend the queen and from there on down to get everybody to accept it."[43]

Roosevelt sent Kennedy a strictly confidential telegram on Sept. 11, 1939, stating that any American peace effort was totally out of the question. Roosevelt said that he "sees no opportunity or occasion for any peace move to be initiated by the President of the United States. The people of the United States would not support any move for peace initiated by this government that would consolidate or make possible a survival of a regime of force and aggression."[44]

President Roosevelt also refused all mediation efforts with the German government. On Oct. 3, 1939, Hermann Goering stated to the American negotiator, William R. Davis: "You can assure Mr. Roosevelt that if he will undertake mediation, Germany will agree to an adjustment whereby a new Polish State and a new Czecho-Slovakian independent government would come into being. I agree that the conference should be in Washington."[45] Goering renewed the offer in mid-October 1939, and again at the beginning of 1940. Neither Davis nor the Reich government ever received an answer.

Overtures made by the former president of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht, were also rejected. The contacts established by the Reich press chief, Dr. Otto Dietrich, with the foreign correspondent and chief of the Berlin office of the Associated Press, L.P. Lochner, were equally unproductive. Roosevelt justified his refusal of mediation by saying, "He could not come to the fore as mediator without the consent of the two Western powers."[46]

The beginning of the war in Europe made it possible for the Roosevelt administration to attempt to eliminate the undesired arms embargo. Roosevelt called a special session of Congress on Sept. 21, 1939, and argued that repeal of the embargo provisions of the Neutrality Act was a means to keep the United States at peace. Roosevelt's exact words were:

Let no group assume the exclusive label of the "peace bloc." We all belong to it....I give you my deep and unalterable conviction, based on years of experience as a worker in the field of international peace, that by the repeal of the embargo the United States will more probably remain at peace than if the law remains as it stands today. ...Our acts must be guided by one single, hardheaded thought— keeping America out of war.[47]

Many members of Congress disagreed with Roosevelt's viewpoint. Sen. William E. Borah recalled that Secretary of State Hull had once said that the purpose of the Neutrality Act was to keep us out of war. Borah commented: "If the purpose of the Embargo Act then was to keep us out of war, what is the purpose of repealing it: to get us into war?" Sen. Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., argued that "repeal can only be interpreted at home and abroad as an official act taken by our government for the purpose of partial participation in the European war."[48]

The amended Neutrality Act of 1939 with new cash-and-carry provisions was finally enacted by Congress on Nov. 3, 1939, and signed into law the next day. The amended Neutrality Act enabled Roosevelt to establish a one-sided transfer of weapons to Germany's adversaries. American vessels were transferred to foreign registries, principally to that of Panama, immediately after this new legislation became law in order not to be restricted by its provisions. It was slick but legal to do so, and although Roosevelt had on other occasions argued against the violation of the "spirit" of laws, he approved of this obvious violation of the purpose of the Neutrality Act. British and French agents began purchasing American vessels as a result of this new legislation. [49]

Roosevelt also initiated a deceitfully named "neutrality patrol" of American waters by or before Sept. 22, 1939. Wholly contrary to the established rules of international law, the so-called "neutral zone" was extended out to sea anywhere from 300 to 1,000 miles in order to benefit Britain against Germany. It was not long before American naval vessels were directing and escorting British warships to capture German vessels. On Dec. 19, 1939, for example, the U.S.S. Tuscaloosa directed and escorted the British Hyperion to the German merchant vessel Columbus within this "neutral zone."[50]

On Oct. 18, 1939, Roosevelt announced that only the submarines of the Soviet Union were allowed in American ports. All the other belligerents were forbidden to enter American ports except in case of force majeure.[51]

By March 19, 1940, Roosevelt was allowing our advanced type of aircraft to be sold to Britain and other countries, while compelling the American Army and Navy to wait for them for many months to come. This problem became so acute that Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox wrote in a report to Roosevelt after the Pearl Harbor attack: "Of course, the best means of defense against air attack consists of fighter planes. Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft available to the Army for the defense of the Island is due to the diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians."[52]

On May 15, 1940, Churchill cabled Roosevelt and requested a long list of war materials, as well as the abandonment of American neutrality. The next day Roosevelt made the first in a series of requests to Congress for additional appropriations "for National Defense." On May 17, 1940, Roosevelt ordered the remaining older U.S. destroyers to be

commissioned. This led to the Sept. 2, 1940, Destroyers for Bases Agreement between the United States and Great Britain. This agreement transferred 50 old destroyers from the United States Navy in exchange for land rights on British possessions.[53]

On July 19, 1940, Hitler appealed to Great Britain to make peace. Hitler's offer was very serious, and many competent observers believed that Britain would have accepted Hitler's offer had it not been for Roosevelt's intervention.[54] Instead, Hitler's peace offer was rejected, and Churchill continued to make more formidable demands of Roosevelt for help against Germany.

By Dec. 12, 1940, joint staff conferences between the U.S. and Britain were secretly commenced in London, Manila, and Washington. Neither the American people nor the Congress was told the truth about these conferences. Admiral Stark wrote to his fleet commanders at the close of these conferences, "The question of our entry into war now seems to be when, and not whether."[55]

Roosevelt began preparing the American public to adopt lend-lease legislation. In a fireside chat to the American public on Dec. 29, 1940, Roosevelt warned of the dire peril supposedly threatening the Western Hemisphere:

Never since Jamestown and Plymouth Rock has American civilization been in such danger as now….If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia and the high seas—and they will be in a position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere. It is no exaggeration to say that all of us in the Americas would be living at the point of a gun—a gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well as military.[56]

In his State of the Union address to Congress on Jan. 6, 1941, Roosevelt outlined his plan for lend-lease aid to the anti-Axis powers. International law has long recognized that it is an act of war for a neutral government to supply arms, munitions, and implements of war to a belligerent. But Roosevelt brushed off objections to lend-lease based on international law. Roosevelt stated, "Such aid is not an act of war, even if a dictator should unilaterally proclaim it to be." In this same speech, Roosevelt barred the door to suggestions of a negotiated peace, "We are

committed to the proposition that the principles of morality and considerations of our own security will not permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers."[57]

President Roosevelt signed the Lend-Lease Act into law on March 11, 1941. This legislation marked the end of any pretense of neutrality on the part of the United States. Despite soothing assurances by Roosevelt that the United States would not get into the war, the adoption of the Lend-Lease Act was a decisive move which put America into an undeclared war in the Atlantic. It opened up an immediate appeal for naval action to insure that munitions and supplies procured under the Lend-Lease Act would reach Great Britain.[58]

Roosevelt in the prewar period had two faces. For the American people, the Congress, and the public record, there was the face of bland assurance that Roosevelt would do everything in his power to keep the United States out of war. Typical is a speech Roosevelt made to an audience in Boston: "While I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." Roosevelt added in a later speech, "The first purpose of our foreign policy is to keep our country out of war."[59]

But in more intimate surroundings Roosevelt presented a second face. Roosevelt talked in private conversations as if the United States was already at war. Dr. Constantin Fotitch, the Yugoslav ambassador in Washington, stated after a talk with Roosevelt on April 3, 1941: "The United States was still neutral, yet the president spoke to me about the organization of peace after the victory; about 'common objectives, common efforts and the common enemy'; in short, as if the United States was already in the war against the Axis. When Mr. Roosevelt received me he greeted me almost as a new ally who had just joined the coalition against the enemy."[60]

Another example that Roosevelt had decided to enter the war on the side of Great Britain was revealed by Harry Hopkins at a luncheon on Jan. 11, 1941. Hopkins told Winston Churchill: "The president is determined that we shall win the war together. Make no mistake about it. He has sent me here to tell you that at all costs and by all means he will carry you through, no matter what happens to him—there is nothing he will not do so far as he has human power."[61]

On April 9, 1941, the United States entered into an agreement with a Danish official for the defense of Greenland. Simultaneously, Roosevelt illegally sent American Marines to occupy Greenland. [62] In June 1941, Roosevelt also agreed with Churchill to relieve the British troops in Iceland, and this was done with U.S. Marines on July 7, 1941.[63] Also in June 1941, Roosevelt ordered the closing of all the German and Italian consulates in the United States.[64]

Another step toward war in the Atlantic was the adoption on April 24, 1941, by the United States of a naval patrol system to insure delivery of munitions and supplies to Great Britain. The American Navy under this scheme was assigned the responsibility of patrolling the Atlantic Ocean west of a median point represented by 25º longitude. American warships and planes within this area would search out German vessels and submarines and broadcast their position to the British navy. Roosevelt tried to represent the naval patrol as a merely defensive move, but it was clearly a hostile act toward Germany designed to help the British war effort.[65]

Late June and July 1941 were largely concerned with the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The first wartime meeting between Roosevelt and Churchill began on Aug. 9, 1941, in a conference at the harbor of Argentia in Newfoundland. The principal result of this conference was the signing of the Atlantic Charter on Aug. 14, 1941. Roosevelt repeated to Churchill during this conference his predilection for an undeclared war, saying, “I may never declare war; I may make war. If I were to ask Congress to declare war, they might argue about it for three months.”

The Atlantic Charter was in effect a joint declaration of war aims, although Congress had not voted for American participation in the war. The Atlantic Charter, which provided for Anglo-American cooperation in policing the world after the Second World War, was a tacit but inescapable implication that the United States would soon become involved in the war. This implication is fortified by the large number of top military and naval staff personnel who were present at the conference.[66]

Roosevelt’s next move toward war in the Atlantic was the issuing of secret orders on Aug. 25, 1941, to the Atlantic Fleet to attack and destroy German and Italian “hostile forces.” These secret orders resulted in an incident on Sept. 4, 1941, between an American destroyer, the Greer, and a German submarine.[67] Roosevelt falsely claimed in a

fireside chat to the American public on Sept. 11, 1941, that the German submarine had fired first. The reality is that the Greer had tracked the German submarine for three hours, and broadcast the submarine's location for the benefit of any British airplanes and destroyers which might be in the vicinity. The German submarine fired at the Greer only after a British airplane had dropped four depth charges which missed their mark. During this fireside chat Roosevelt finally admitted that, without consulting Congress or obtaining congressional sanction, he had ordered a shooton-sight campaign against Axis submarines.[68]

On Sept. 13, 1941, Roosevelt ordered the Atlantic Fleet to escort convoys in which there were no American vessels.[69] This policy would make it more likely to provoke future incidents between American and German vessels. Roosevelt also agreed about this time to furnish Britain with "our best transport ships." These included 12 liners and 20 cargo vessels manned by American crews to transport two British divisions to the Middle East.[70]

More serious incidents followed in the Atlantic. On Oct. 17, 1941, an American destroyer, the Kearny, dropped depth charges on a German submarine. The German submarine retaliated and hit the Kearny with a torpedo, resulting in the loss of 11 lives. On Oct. 30, 1941, an older American destroyer, the Reuben James, was sunk with a casualty list of 115 of her crew members.[71] Some of her seamen were convinced the Reuben James had already sunk a U-boat or two before she was torpedoed by the German submarine.[72]

On Oct. 27, 1941, Roosevelt broadcast over nationwide radio his Navy Day address. Roosevelt began his Navy Day address by stating that German submarines had torpedoed the U.S. destroyers Greer and Kearny. Roosevelt characterized these incidents as unprovoked acts of aggression directed against all Americans, and that "history will record who fired the first shot."

What Roosevelt failed to mention in his broadcast is that in each case the U.S. destroyers had been involved in attack operations against the German submarines, which fired in self-defense only as a last resort. Hitler wanted to avoid war with the United States at all costs, and had expressly ordered German submarines to avoid conflicts with U.S. warships, except to avoid imminent destruction. It was Roosevelt's shoot-on-sight orders to U.S. Navy vessels that were designed to make incidents like the ones Roosevelt condemned inevitable.[73]

In an effort to convince his listeners in his Navy Day speech that Germany was a real threat to American security, Roosevelt made the following announcement: "Hitler has often protested that his plans for conquest do not extend across the Atlantic Ocean. I have in my possession a secret map, made in Germany by Hitler's government—by the planners of the new world order. It is a map of South America and a part of Central America as Hitler proposes to organize it." Roosevelt explained that the map showed South America, as well as "our great life line, the Panama Canal," divided into five vassal states under German control. Roosevelt concluded: "That map, my friends, makes clear the Nazi design not only against South America but against the United States as well."[74]

The Italian government stated that if Roosevelt did not publish his map "within 24 hours, he will acquire a sky high reputation as a forger." A reporter at a press conference the next day asked Roosevelt for a copy of the secret map. Roosevelt refused, insisting that it came from "a source which is undoubtedly reliable." The truth about the map emerged after the war: It was a forgery produced by the British intelligence service. William Stephenson, chief of British intelligence operations in North America, passed it on to the chief of U.S. intelligence, William Donovan, who gave it to Roosevelt. Wartime British agent Ivar Bryce claimed credit for thinking up the secret map in his memoir published in late 1984.[75]

Roosevelt went on in his Navy Day address to mention that he also had in his possession "another document made in Germany by Hitler's government. It is a detailed plan to abolish all existing religions—Catholic, Protestant, Mohammedan, Hindu, Buddhist, and Jewish alike" which Germany will impose "on a dominated world, if Hitler wins."

Roosevelt continued: "The property of all churches will be seized by the Reich and its puppets. The cross and all other symbols of religion are to be forbidden. The clergy are to be ever liquidated….In the place of the churches of our civilization there is to be set up an international Nazi church, a church which will be served by orators sent out by the Nazi government. And in the place of the Bible, the words of Mein Kampf will be imposed and enforced as Holy Writ. And in the place of the cross of Christ will be put two symbols: the swastika and the naked sword."[76]

As with the secret map, the German government correctly denounced Roosevelt's religious document as a preposterous fraud. Roosevelt's Navy Day address was loaded with brazen falsehoods designed to convince the American public to enter into war against Germany. Despite Roosevelt's lies and provocations, the American public

was still against entering the war. By the end of October 1941, Roosevelt had no more ideas how to get into a formal and declared war: "…He had said everything 'short of war' that could be said. He had no more tricks left. The hat from which he had pulled so many rabbits was empty."[77]

Even full-page advertisements entitled "Stop Hitler Now" inserted in major American newspapers by Roosevelt's supporters had failed to sway the American public. The advertisements warned the American people that a Europe dominated by Hitler was a threat to American democracy and the Western Hemisphere. The advertisements asked: "Will the Nazis considerately wait until we are ready to fight them? Anyone who argues that they will wait is either an imbecile or a traitor." Roosevelt endorsed the advertisement, saying that it was "a great piece of work."[78]

Yet the American people were still strongly against war.

Germany and Italy had firmly decided to do nothing that would accelerate or cause America's entry into the war. The front door to war in Europe appeared to be completely barred. Roosevelt was forced to use the back door to obtain a declared war against Germany.

Roosevelt Uses Japan as a Back Door to War

The impetus for the war which began at Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, had started 10 years earlier. In September 1931, Japan seized Mukden, the capital of the semi-independent Chinese regime in Manchuria. The seizure of Mukden was the beginning of a process that eventually led to all of Manchuria being under Japanese control. A new state, Manchukuo, was set up under the nominal rule of an emperor, but whose real power was in the hands of Japanese army officers and civilian officials. The United States refused to recognize Manchukuo, but this led to no major adverse consequences.[79]

A new crisis arose when Japan and China began a large-scale war in the summer of 1937. In an address in Chicago on Oct. 5, 1937, Roosevelt proposed that aggressor nations be subject to "quarantine."[80] This was Roosevelt's first public attempt to discard the doctrine of neutrality for the United States in concert with what later became known as "peace-loving nations"—among them the Soviet Union. However, Roosevelt could not get the American people to support the "quarantine" proposal because the American public did not want their elected officials to thrust

war upon them.[81] There is no doubt that Roosevelt was disappointed by the failure of the American people to respond favorably to his speech.[82]

The most serious incident affecting America's relations with Japan before Pearl Harbor was the sinking of the United States gunboat Panay by Japanese bombers on Dec. 12, 1937. Four lives were lost in the bombing. The sinking of the Panay closely followed the capture of the Chinese capital of Nanking, and the Japanese military leaders had been in an exuberant, trigger-happy mood. The Japanese government was quick to apologize for the incident, and paid an indemnity of two and a quarter million dollars to compensate the United States for its losses. Fortunately, the sinking of the Panay failed to kindle any desire for war in the United States.[83]

The United States began a campaign of economic pressure against Japan. On July 26, 1939, the United States gave notice to Japan of its intention, effective six months from the date, to abrogate the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan. On July 2, 1940, Roosevelt signed the Export Control Act, authorizing the president to license or prohibit the export of essential defense materials. Roosevelt acted at once under these powers.[84] U.S. ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, remarked, "I have pointed out that once started on a policy of sanctions we must see them through and that such a policy may conceivably lead to eventual war."[85]

On July 26, 1940, Roosevelt announced a ban on Japanese acquisition of U.S. high-octane aviation gasoline, certain grades of steel and scrap iron, and some lubricants. On Sept. 26, 1940, Roosevelt imposed a ban on all scrap iron exports to Japan. Since the Japanese steel industry was highly dependent on imported scrap iron from the United States, the ban compelled Japan to draw down its stockpiles and operate its steel industry well below capacity. The embargo was expanded in December 1940 to include iron ore, steel, and steel products. The following month the embargo was expanded to include copper, brass, bronze, zinc, nickel, and potash. Other items were continually added to the list, each of which was much needed for Japanese industrial production.[86]

Provoking Japan into an overt act of war was the principal policy that guided Roosevelt's actions toward Japan throughout 1941. Lt. Cmdr. Arthur H. McCollum, head of the Far East desk of the Office of Naval Intelligence, wrote an eight-action memo dated Oct. 7, 1940, outlining

how to provoke a Japanese attack on the United States. McCollum had spent his youth in various Japanese cities and spoke Japanese before learning English. McCollum was an expert in Japanese activities, culture, and intentions, and he had access to intercepted and decoded Japanese military and diplomatic messages. The following are the eight actions that McCollum predicted would provoke a Japanese attack on the United States:

Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore.

Make an arrangement with Holland for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies.

Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek.

Send a division of long-range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore.

Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient.

Keep the main strength of the U.S. Fleet, now in the Pacific, in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands.

Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil.

Completely embargo all trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire.[87]

McCollum's eight-action memorandum was approved by Roosevelt's most trusted military advisers. Roosevelt's "fingerprints" can be found on each of the provocations listed in the memorandum. For example, Roosevelt personally took charge of the fourth action, which involved the deliberate deployment of American warships within or adjacent to the territorial waters of Japan. Roosevelt called the provocations under the fourth action "pop-up" cruises. Roosevelt stated: "I just want them to keep popping up here and there and keep the Japs guessing. I don't mind losing one or two cruisers, but do not take a chance on losing five or six." White House records show that from March through July 1941, Roosevelt ignored international law and dispatched naval vessels into Japanese waters on three such pop-up cruises.[88]

Roosevelt also adopted additional measures that were consistent with the third action listed in McCollum's eight-action memorandum of giving aid to the Chinese government of Chiang Kai-shek. The United States had loaned China 25 million dollars for currency stabilization on Sept. 25, 1940. China received an additional 100 million dollar loan on Nov. 30, 1940. On March 11, 1941, China became eligible for lend-lease aid. The United States also entered into a monetary stabilization accord with China on April 26, 1941.[89] Finally, increased military aid was granted to Chiang Kai-shek, and a U.S. Army Commission was sent to China in October 1941.[90]

The climax of Roosevelt's measures designed to bring about war in the Pacific occurred on July 25, 1941, when Roosevelt froze all Japanese assets in the United States. This brought commercial relations between the nations to an effective end, including an end to the export of oil to Japan. As early as Aug. 7, 1941, Prince Konoye, the Japanese premier, requested a meeting with Roosevelt to resolve the differences between the United States and Japan. American Ambassador Grew sent a series of telegrams to Washington, D.C. in which he strongly recommended that such a meeting take place. However, Roosevelt steadfastly refused to meet with the Japanese premier.[91]

Foreign Minister Toyoda made a dispatch to Japanese Ambassador Nomura on July 31, 1941. Since U.S. Intelligence had cracked the Japanese diplomatic code, Roosevelt and his associates were able to read this message:

Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas….I know that the Germans are somewhat dissatisfied with our negotiations with the United States, but we wished at any cost to prevent the United States from getting into the war, and we wished to settle the Chinese incident.[92]

This obvious desire of Japan for peace with the United States did not change Roosevelt's policy toward Japan. Roosevelt refused to lift the oil embargo against Japan. The Roosevelt administration was well aware that Japan imported approximately 90% of her oil, and that 75% to 80%

of her oil imports came from the United States. Roosevelt also knew that the Netherlands East Indies, which produced 3% of the world's oil output, was the only other convenient oil producer that could meet Japan's import needs.[93]

On Oct. 31, 1941, an oil agreement between Japan and the Netherlands East Indies expired. The Netherlands East Indies had promised to deliver to Japan about 11.4 million barrels of oil, but had actually delivered only one-half of that amount. The Japanese navy had consumed about 22% of its oil reserves by the time the war broke out.[94]

Resentment over the economic pressure being exerted by the United States and other countries began mounting in Japan. U.S. Ambassador Grew repeatedly warned Roosevelt and his administration that economic pressure would not bring Japan to its knees. Ambassador Grew cautioned that a belligerent Japanese response "may come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness."[95] Ambassador Grew's warnings, as he later remarked in his diary, "brought no response whatsoever; they were never even referred to, and reporting to the department was like throwing pebbles into a lake at night; we were never even permitted to see the ripples."[96]

The refusal of Roosevelt to meet with Konoye and Roosevelt's economic boycott of Japan were a real ultimatum to Japan. On Nov. 5, 1941, Japan sent instructions to Ambassador Nomura that Nov. 25, 1941, would be the deadline in the negotiations with the United States. Tensions between Japan and the United States continued to mount, but Roosevelt and his administration showed no interest in negotiations with Japan. Ten days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Defense Secretary Henry Stimson wrote in his diary: "[Roosevelt] brought up the event that we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do. The question was how we should maneuver them into firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves."[97]

Roosevelt and his advisors briefly discussed a modus vivendi or truce with Japan. In fact, on Nov. 21, 1941, the army's War Plans Division told Secretary of State Cordell Hull it was a matter of "grave importance…that we reach a modus vivendi with Japan."[98] Hull permitted the peacemakers in Roosevelt's administration to put together a proposal that had real potential. The proposal offered Japan practical proof of American friendship in the form of a 2-billion-dollar loan contingent on Japan's ending the war with China on reasonable terms.

The proposal promised a renewal of the shipments of oil, metals, and other minerals that Japan needed for her factories. The proposal might have at least produced a temporary truce with Japan. But the idea of a modus vivendi was quickly rejected by interventionists in the State Department and War Department, and the final version was an unacceptable ghost of the original proposal.[99]

Instead of a modus vivendi, on Nov. 26, 1941, Secretary of State Hull handed to the Japanese diplomatic representatives a 10-point proposal which amounted to a sharp ultimatum. The proposal, which was cleared by Roosevelt before submission, called for complete Japanese withdrawal from China and Indochina. The proposal also called for Japan to support only the Nationalist government of China, with which Japan had been in conflict for four years, and to interpret its pledges under the Tripartite Pact so that Japan would be bound to peace in the Pacific and to noninterference in Europe. The United States would meanwhile be free to intervene in Europe.[100]

Roosevelt knew that the Japanese government could not accept such a proposal: the proposal was in effect an invitation to war. The Japanese leaders were dumbfounded by such harsh terms, referring to the proposal as "humiliating."[101] In a defense deposition at the Tokyo war crime trials, Foreign Minister Togo said of the Hull proposal: "The reaction of all of us to it was, I think, the same. Ignoring all past progress and areas of agreement in the negotiations, the United States had served upon us what we viewed as an ultimatum containing demands far in excess of the strongest positions theretofore taken."[102]

Japan attacked Pearl Harbor on Dec. 7, 1941, as a result of Roosevelt's provocations. Secretary of War Henry Stimson was relieved the attack had taken place. Stimson stated:

We three [Hull, Knox, Stimson] all thought that we must fight if the British fought. But now the Japs have solved the whole thing by attacking us directly in Hawaii….When the news first came in that Japan had attacked us, my first feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people. This continued to be my dominant feeling in spite of the news of catastrophes which quickly developed. For I feel that this country united has practically nothing to fear; while the apathy and divisions stirred by unpatriotic men have been hitherto very discouraging.[103]

Roosevelt and his administration had finally forced Japan to attack the United States. The American public would now enthusiastically support all-out war with Japan. The next step was to provoke Hitler and Germany into declaring war on the United States.

Germany Declares War on the United States

On Dec. 8, 1941, President Roosevelt made a speech to Congress calling for a declaration of war against Japan. Condemning the attack on Pearl Harbor as a "date which will live in infamy," Roosevelt did not once mention Germany. Hitler's policy of keeping incidents between the United States and Germany to a minimum seemed to have succeeded. Hitler had ignored or downplayed the numerous provocations that Roosevelt had made against Germany. Even after Roosevelt issued orders to shoot-on-sight at German submarines, Hitler had ordered his naval commanders and air force to avoid incidents that Roosevelt might use to bring America into the war. Also, since the Tripartite Pact did not obligate Germany to join Japan in a war initiated by Japan, it appeared unlikely that Hitler would declare war on the U.S.[104]

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor surprised Hitler. Hitler had never wanted Japan to attack the United States. Germany had repeatedly urged Japan to attack Singapore and the rest of Great Britain's Far East Empire, but Japan refused to do so. After the war Col. Gen. Alfred Jodl said that Hitler had wanted Japan to attack Great Britain and the Soviet Union in the Far East, which would have set up a two-front war. Hitler thought Roosevelt would probably not be able to persuade the American public to go to war to defend Britain's Asian colonies. Jodl said that Hitler had wanted in Japan "a strong new ally without a strong new enemy."[105]

Hitler's decision to stay out of war with the United States was made more difficult on Dec. 4, 1941, when the Chicago Tribune carried in huge black letters the headline: F.D.R.'s WAR PLANS! The Washington Times Herald, the largest paper in the nation's capital, carried a similar headline. Chesly Manly, the Tribune's Washington correspondent, revealed in his report what Roosevelt had repeatedly denied: that Roosevelt was planning to lead the United States into war against Germany. The source of Manly's information was no less than a verbatim copy of Rainbow Five, the top-secret war plan drawn up at Roosevelt's request by the joint board of the United States Army and Navy. Manly's

story even contained a copy of President Roosevelt's letter ordering the preparation of the plan.[106]

Rainbow Five called for the creation of a 10-million-man army, including an expeditionary force of 5 million men that would invade Europe in 1943 to defeat Germany. On Dec. 5, 1941, the German Embassy in Washington, D.C., cabled the entire transcript of the newspaper story to Berlin. The story was reviewed and analyzed in Berlin as "the Roosevelt War Plan." On Dec. 6, 1941, Adm. Erich Raeder submitted a report to Hitler prepared by his staff that analyzed the Rainbow Five plan.

Raeder concluded that the most important point contained in Rainbow Five was the fact that the United States would not be ready to launch a military offensive against Germany until July 1943. [107]

On Dec. 9, 1941, Hitler returned to Berlin from the Russian front and plunged into two days of conferences with Raeder, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, and Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering. The three advisors stressed that the Rainbow Five plan showed that the United States was determined to defeat Germany. They pointed out that Rainbow Five stated that the United States would undertake to carry on the war against Germany alone even if Russia collapsed and Britain surrendered to Germany. The three advisors leaned toward Adm. Raeder's view that an air and U-boat offensive against both British and American ships might be risky, but that the United States was already unquestionably an enemy.[108]

On Dec. 9, 1941, Roosevelt made a radio address to the nation that is seldom mentioned in the history books. In addition to numerous uncomplimentary remarks about Hitler and Nazism, Roosevelt accused Hitler of urging Japan to attack the United States. Roosevelt declared:

We know that Germany and Japan are conducting their military and naval operations with a joint plan. Germany and Italy consider themselves at war with the United States without even bothering about a formal declaration….Your government knows Germany has been telling Japan that if Japan would attack the United States Japan would share the spoils when peace came. She was promised by Germany that if she came in she would receive control of the whole Pacific area and that means not only the Far East, but all the islands of the Pacific and also a stranglehold on the west coast of North and Central and South America. We know also that

Germany and Japan are conducting their naval operations in accordance with a joint plan.[109]

All of the above statements are obviously false. Germany and Japan did not have a joint naval plan before Pearl Harbor, and never concocted one for the rest of the war. Germany did not have foreknowledge and certainly never encouraged Japan to attack the United States. Japan never had any ambition to attack the west coast of North, Central, or South America. Germany also never promised anything to Japan in the Far East. Germany's power in the Far East was negligible.[110]

On Dec. 10, 1941, when Hitler resumed his conference with Raeder, Keitel, and Goering, Hitler said that Roosevelt's speech confirmed everything in the Tribune story. Hitler considered Roosevelt's speech to be a de facto declaration of war. Since war with the United States was inevitable, Hitler felt he had no choice but to declare war on the United States. Hitler declared war on the U.S. in his Reichstag speech on Dec. 11, 1941, stating among other things:

Since the beginning of the war, the American President Roosevelt has steadily committed ever more serious crimes against international law. Along with illegal attacks against ships and other property of German and Italian citizens, there have been threats and even arbitrary deprivations of personal freedom by internment and such. The increasingly hostile attacks by the American President Roosevelt have reached the point that he has ordered the American navy to immediately attack, fire upon and sink all German and Italian ships, in complete violation of international law. American officials have even boasted about destroying German submarines in this criminal manner. American cruisers have attacked and captured German and Italian merchant ships, and their peaceful crews were taken away to imprisonment. In addition, President Roosevelt's plan to attack Germany and Italy with military forces in Europe by 1943 at the latest was made public in the United States, and the American government made no effort to deny it.

Despite the years of intolerable provocations by President Roosevelt, Germany and Italy sincerely and very patiently tried to prevent the expansion of this war and to maintain relations with the United States. But as a result of his campaign, these efforts have failed.[111]

Hitler ended this speech with a declaration of war against the United States. Roosevelt had finally gotten a declared war with Germany using Japan as a back door to war.

Closing Thoughts

No nation has ever been led into war with as many soothing promises of peace as the American public received from President Roosevelt. Most of the American public felt that the United States had entered the First World War under false pretenses. Polls consistently showed that the American people did not favor entry into a second war in Europe. Roosevelt assuaged these fears with statements such as "…I have passed unnumbered hours, I shall pass unnumbered hours, thinking and planning how war may be kept from this nation."[112]

The truth is that Roosevelt did everything in his power to plunge the United States into war against Germany. Roosevelt eventually went so far as to order American vessels to shoot-on-sight German and Italian vessels—a flagrant act of war. However, Hitler wanted to avoid war with the United States at all costs. Hitler expressly ordered German submarines to avoid conflicts with U.S. warships, except to prevent imminent destruction. It appeared that Hitler's efforts might be successful in keeping the United States out of the war against Germany.

President Roosevelt finally was able to use Japan as a back door to instigate war against Germany. Roosevelt followed an eight-step action plan designed to induce Japan to attack the United States. The complete embargo of all trade with Japan was especially crippling to Japan, as she was dependent on imports of oil and other natural resources for her existence. When the United States refused to negotiate with Japan to ease the embargo, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and other places in the Far East. Germany declared war against the United States four days after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor. The leak of Rainbow Five, which outlined the plan of the United States to invade Germany by July 1943, had forced Germany to declare war on the United States.

Defenders of Roosevelt's policies claim that National Socialist Germany was so uniquely evil that she had to be stopped at all costs. Germany had already taken over most of Europe, and many people believed that the United States must enter the war to protect democracy and freedom around the world. In the next chapter we will examine how

the war in Europe started. We will also examine whether the United States needed to enter the war to stop Germany's aggression in Europe and Asia.

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Chapter Three

• The Forced War: How WWII Was Originated

Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, was a preemptive strike that prevented the Soviet Union from conquering all of Europe. Hitler was later forced to declare war on the United States because of Franklin D. Roosevelt's numerous provocations, including a shoot-on-sight policy against German shipping and leaked plans of a United States invasion of Germany by 1943. In both cases war was forced on Germany against her wishes. We will now examine the events that led to Germany's invasion of Poland and the start of World War II.

The Treaty of Versailles

The Treaty of Versailles is sometimes said to be the beginning of the Second World War. The Versailles Treaty crushed Germany beneath a burden of shame and reparations, stole vital German territories, and rendered Germany defenseless against enemies from within and without. Britain's David Lloyd George warned the treaty makers at Versailles: "If peace is made under these conditions, it will be the source of a new war."[1] We will examine in this section some of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty that made it so unfair to Germany.

President Woodrow Wilson in an address to Congress on Jan. 8, 1918, set forth his Fourteen Points as a blueprint to peacefully end World War I. The main principles of Wilson's Fourteen Points were a non-vindictive peace, national self-determination, government by the consent of the governed, an end of secret treaties, and an association of nations strong enough to check aggression and keep the peace in the future. Faced with ever increasing American reinforcements of troops and supplies and a starvation blockade imposed by the Allies, Germany decided to end World War I by signing an armistice on Nov. 11, 1918. The parties agreed to a pre-armistice contract that bound the Allies to make the final peace treaty conform to Wilson's Fourteen Points.[2]

The Treaty of Versailles was a deliberate violation of the prearmistice contract. Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles placed upon Germany the sole responsibility "for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have

been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies." This so-called "war guilt clause" was fundamentally unfair and aroused widespread hatred among virtually all Germans. It linked up Germany's obligation to pay reparations with a blanket self-condemnation to which almost no German could subscribe.[3]

The Allies under the Versailles Treaty could set reparations at any amount they wanted. In 1920, the Allies set the final bill for reparations at the impossible sum of 269 billion gold marks. [4] The Allied Reparations Committee in 1921 lowered the amount of reparations to 132 billion gold marks or approximately $33 billion—still an unrealistic demand.[5]

The Allied representatives at the Paris Peace Conference decided that Germany should lose all of her colonies. All private property of German citizens in German colonies was also forfeited. The rationale for this decision was the hypocritical guise of humanitarian motives that claimed that Germany had totally failed to appreciate the duties of colonial trusteeship. Germany was extremely upset that the Allied governments refused to count the loss of her colonies as a credit in her reparations account. Some Germans estimated the value of Germany's colonies at $9 billion. This was a large sum of money that would have greatly reduced Germany's financial burden to pay reparations under the treaty's war guilt clause.[6]

The Treaty of Versailles forced Germany to cede 73,485 square kilometers of her territory, inhabited by 7,325,000 people, to neighboring states. Germany lost 75% of her annual production of zinc ore, 74.8% of iron ore, 7.7% of lead ore, 28.7% of coal, and 4% of potash. Of her annual agricultural production, Germany lost 19.7% in potatoes, 18.2% in rye, 17.2% in barley, 12.6% in wheat, and 9.6% in oats. The Saar territory and other regions to the west of the Rhine were occupied by foreign troops and were to remain occupied for 15 years until a plebiscite was held. The costs of the occupation of the Saar territory totaling 3.64 billion gold marks had to be paid by Germany.[7]

The Versailles Treaty forced Germany to disarm almost completely. The treaty abolished the general draft, prohibited all artillery and tanks, allowed a volunteer army of only 100,000 troops and officers, and abolished the air force. The navy was reduced to six capital ships, six light cruisers, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo-boats, 15,000 men and 500 officers. After the delivery of its remaining navy, Germany had to hand

over its merchant ships to the Allies with only a few exceptions. All German rivers had to be internationalized and overseas cables ceded to the victors. An international military committee oversaw the process of disarmament until 1927.[8]

The German delegation in Paris was formally presented with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles on May 7, 1919. At first the German delegation refused to sign the treaty. After German delegate Johann Giesberts read the long list of humiliating provisions of the treaty, he stated with vehemence: "This shameful treaty has broken me, for I believed in Wilson until today. I believed him to be an honest man, and now that scoundrel brings us such a treaty."[9]

German foreign minister Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau replied: "It is demanded of us that we admit ourselves to be the only ones guilty of the war. Such a confession in my mouth would be a lie. We are far from declining any responsibility for this great world war…but we energetically deny that Germany and its people, who were convinced that they were making a war of defense, were alone guilty…."[10]

Germany eventually signed the Treaty of Versailles on June 28, 1919, because she faced death by starvation and invasion if she refused. With the naval blockade still in force and her merchant ships and even Baltic fishing boats sequestered, Germany could not feed her people. Germany's request to buy 2.5 million tons of food was denied by the Allies. U.S. warships now supported the blockade. With German families starving, Bolshevik uprisings in several German cities, Trotsky's Red Army driving into Europe, Czechs and Poles ready to strike from the east, and Allied forces prepared to march on Berlin, Germany was forced to capitulate.[11]

Francesco Nitti, prime minister of Italy, said of the Versailles Treaty: "It will remain forever a terrible precedent in modern history that against all pledges, all precedents and all traditions, the representatives of Germany were never even heard; nothing was left to them but to sign a treaty at a moment when famine and exhaustion and threat of revolution made it impossible not to sign it…."[12]

It is estimated that approximately 800,000 Germans perished because of the Allied naval blockade.[13] The blockade's architect and chief advocate had been the first lord of the admiralty, Winston Churchill. His confessed aim had been to starve the whole German population into submission.[14] One commentator noted the effects of the blockade:

"Nations can take philosophically the hardships of war. But when they lay down their arms and surrender on assurances that they may have food for their women and children, and then find that this worst instrument of attack on them is maintained—then hate never dies."[15]

Herbert Hoover said of the Allied blockade in Germany: "The blockade should be taken off…these people should be allowed to return to production not only to save themselves from starvation and misery but that there should be awakened in them some resolution for continued national life…the people are simply in a state of moral collapse….We have for the last month held that it is now too late to save the situation."[16]

When Hoover was in Brussels in 1919, a British admiral arrogantly said to him, "Young man, I don't see why you Americans want to feed these Germans." Hoover impudently replied, "Old man, I don't understand why you British want to starve women and children after they are licked."[17]

George E.R. Gedye was sent to Germany in February 1919 on an inspection tour. Gedye described the impact of the blockade upon the German people:

Hospital conditions were appalling. A steady average of 10% of the patients had died during the war years from lack of fats, milk and good flour. Camphor, glycerine and cod-liver oil were unprocurable. This resulted in high infant mortality….We saw some terrible sights in the children's hospital, such as the "starvation babies" with ugly, swollen heads….Such were the conditions in Unoccupied Territory. Our report naturally urged the immediate opening of the frontiers for fats, milk and flour…but the terrible blockade was maintained as a result of French insistence…until the Treaty of Versailles was signed in June, 1919….No severity of punishment could restrain the Anglo-American divisions of the Rhine from sharing their rations with their starving German fellow-creatures.[18]

Few historians in postwar years believed Germany to be solely responsible for the outbreak of World War I. There were differences of opinion about the degree of responsibility borne by Germany, Great Britain, France, Russia, and other belligerent nations, but no responsible person could find Germany totally responsible for the war. Representative of impartial scholarship on the subject is the opinion of

Dr. Sidney B. Fay of Harvard University. Fay concluded after an extensive study of the causes of World War I:

Germany did not plot a European war, did not want one and made genuine, though too belated efforts to avert one….It was primarily Russia's general mobilization, made when Germany was trying to bring Austria to a settlement, which precipitated the final catastrophe, causing Germany to mobilize and bring war….The verdict of the Versailles Treaty that Germany and her allies were responsible for the war, in view of the evidence now available, is historically unsound.[19]

Other historians who established that Germany was not primarily responsible for causing World War I include professors Harry Elmer Barnes, Michael H. Cochran, Max Montgelas, and Georges Demartial. The Englishman Arthur Ponsonby also convincingly demonstrated that atrocity charges against the Germans were manufactured by Allied propagandists.[20]

Most American liberals who had originally supported American involvement in World War I eventually repudiated the thesis of unique German responsibility for the war. They logically denounced the failure to revise the Treaty of Versailles with its absurd attempt to collect astronomical reparations from Germany.[21]

Despite the unfairness of the Treaty of Versailles, its provisions remained in effect and were formally confirmed by the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact of 1928. Germans regarded the provisions of the Versailles Treaty as chains of slavery that needed to be broken. One German commented in regard to the Versailles Treaty, "The will to break the chains of slavery will be implanted from childhood on."[22] Adolf Hitler referred to the Versailles Treaty in Mein Kampf as "…a scandal and a disgrace …the dictate signified an act of highway robbery against our people."[23] Hitler was committed to breaking the chains of Versailles when he came to power in Germany in 1933.

The Road to Breaking the Chains of Versailles

Hitler's first success in breaking the chains of Versailles was a legal victory in the Saar plebiscite on Jan. 13, 1935. This highly

industrialized region had been detached from Germany and placed under the administration of the League of Nations by the Treaty of Versailles. The terms of the Versailles Treaty called for a plebiscite after 15 years with three choices: return to Germany, annexation by France, or continuation of League of Nations rule.[24] In an unquestionably free election, the vote was 477,119 in favor of union with Germany and only 46,613 in favor of the continuance of the existing regime.[25] Despite offering the Saar citizens a number of tax and customs advantages if they decided to become part of France, only 0.40% of voters voted to join France; 8.85% voted for independence of the Saar, and 90.75% voted for union with Germany.[26]

The Saar inhabitants who voted overwhelmingly to return to Germany were mostly industrial workers—Social Democrats or Roman Catholics. They knew what awaited them in Germany: a dictatorship, the destruction of trade unions, and restrictions on freedom of expression.[27] They knew of the establishment of the Dachau concentration camp and the execution of scores of SA members in the Roehm purge on June 30, 1934. The German economy in January 1935 was also not substantially better than that of France or other countries in Europe. The Saar election was evidence that the appeal of German nationalism could be irresistible.

Hitler began an assault on the Versailles provisions with the creation of a German air force on March 9, 1935. On March 16, 1935, Hitler announced the restoration of compulsory military service. Germany regarded the army of the Soviet Union at 960,000 men as excessively large, and France had recently increased the terms of service in her armies. Hitler wanted to increase German military strength to 550,000 troops because of this Franco-Russian threat.[28]

Germany continued to modify the Versailles provisions by signing the Anglo-German Naval Agreement on June 18, 1935. This treaty fixed the size of the German fleet at 35% of the total tonnage of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Germany could also build a submarine force equal to that of Great Britain. Hitler was elated with the agreement. Hitler had dreamed of an Anglo-German alliance ever since he had fought Britain in World War I. Britain's naval treaty with Germany also effectively undermined the Stresa Front that Britain had established with France and Italy earlier in 1935.[29]

Germany was forbidden under the Treaty of Versailles to build fortifications or maintain troops in a wide demilitarized zone along its

western frontier. This arrangement made the vital Ruhr and Rhineland industries vulnerable to a swift attack from France. The Treaty of Locarno, of which Britain and Italy were co-guarantors, also endorsed the demilitarization of the Rhineland. Hitler challenged this limitation when he sent troops into the Rhineland on March 7, 1936. Although this was a major gamble by Hitler, France was unwilling to challenge Hitler without British support. Britain was unwilling to authorize anything resembling war because there was a general feeling in Britain that Germany was only asserting a right of sovereignty within her own borders.[30]

Germany was now able to protect her western borders by constructing the Siegfried Line. Lloyd George, the former prime minister of Great Britain, commended Hitler in the House of Commons for having reoccupied the Rhineland to protect his country:

France had built the most gigantic fortifications ever seen in any land, where, almost a hundred feet underground, you can keep an army of over 100,000 and where you have guns that can fire straight into Germany. Yet the Germans are supposed to remain without even a garrison, without a trench….If Herr Hitler had allowed that to go on without protecting his country, he would have been a traitor to the Fatherland.[31] On later meeting Hitler, Lloyd George was "spellbound by Hitler's astonishing personality and manner" and referred to Hitler as "indeed a great man. Fuehrer is the proper name for him, for he is a born leader—yes, a statesman."[32]

Other British statesmen were also impressed with Hitler. In a book published in 1937, Churchill expresses his "admiration for the courage, the perseverance, and the vital force which enabled [Hitler] to challenge, defy, conciliate, or overcome, all the authorities or resistances which barred his path."[33] Hitler and his Nazis had shown "their patriotic ardor and love of country."[34] Churchill also wrote: "Those who have met Herr Hitler face to face have found a highly competent, cool, well-informed functionary with an agreeable manner, a disarming smile, and few have been unaffected by a subtle personal magnetism. Nor is this impression merely the dazzle of power. He exerted it on his companions at every stage in his struggle, even when his fortunes were in the lowest depths."[35]

By March 1936 Germany had taken important steps in overcoming the provisions of the Versailles Treaty. Hitler made no more moves in Europe for the next two years. Until 1938, Hitler's moves in foreign policy had been bold but not reckless. From the point of view of the Western Powers, his methods constituted unconventional diplomacy whose aims were recognizably in accord with traditional German nationalist clamor.[36]

The Anschluss

The statesmen at the Paris Peace Conference had wanted to divide rather than unify Austria and Germany. Austria had asked Allied permission at the Paris Peace Conference to enter into a free-trade zone with Germany. Austria's request was denied. As far back as April and May of 1921, plebiscites on a union with Germany were held in Austria at the Tyrol and at Salzburg. The votes in the Tyrol were over 140,000 for the Anschluss and only 1,794 against. In Salzburg, more than 100,000 voted for union with Germany and only 800 against.[37] Despite the overwhelming desire of Austrians to join with Germany, the Treaty of St. Germain signed by Austria after World War I prevented the union.

Under the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain, Germany and Austria could not even enter into a customs union without permission from the League of Nations. In 1931, hard hit by the Great Depression, Germany asked again for permission to form an Austro-German customs union. The League of Nations denied Germany's request. Germany later requested an end to its obligation to pay war reparations under Versailles because of Germany's economic crisis caused by the Great Depression. Germany's request was again refused. Many historians believe the resulting economic distress contributed to the rapid rise of National Socialists to power in Germany.[38] The Allied refusals also increased the desire of German and Austrian nationalists to exercise their right of self-determination.

Hitler was given encouragement for the peaceful incorporation of Austria into Germany when he met with Edward Frederick Lindley Wood (Lord Halifax) at Berchtesgaden on Nov. 19, 1937. Lord Halifax mentioned the important questions of Danzig, Austria, and Czechoslovakia on his own initiative without any prompting from Hitler. Halifax told Hitler that Great Britain realized that the Paris Treaties of 1919 contained mistakes that had to be rectified.[39] Halifax stated that

Britain would not go to war to prevent an Anschluss with Austria, a transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany, or a return of Danzig to the Reich. Britain might even be willing to serve as an honest broker in effecting the return of what rightfully belonged to Germany, if this was all done in a gentlemanly fashion.[40]

Lord Halifax had given Hitler his approval for the peaceful incorporation of Germans in Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Danzig into Germany if done "without far reaching disturbances." British historian A.J.P. Taylor writes:

This was exactly what Hitler wanted…Halifax's remarks, if they had any practical sense, was an invitation to Hitler to promote German nationalist agitation in Danzig, Czechoslovakia, and Austria; an assurance also that his agitation would not be opposed from without. Nor did these promptings come from Halifax alone. In London, Eden told Ribbentrop: "People in Europe recognized that a closer connection between Germany and Austria would have to come about sometime." The same news came from France. Papen, on a visit to Paris, "was amazed to note" that Chautemps, the premier, and Bonnet, then finance minister, "considered a reorientation of French policy in Central Europe as entirely open to discussion…." They had "no objection to a marked extension of German influence in Austria obtained through evolutionary means"; nor in Czechoslovakia "on the basis of a reorganization into a nation of nationalities."[41]

Lord Halifax's message to Hitler underscores a crucial point in the history of this era: Hitler's agenda was no surprise to European statesmen. Any German nationalist would demand adjustments to the frontiers laid down at Versailles. With Great Britain's approval of the peaceful annexation of Austria into Germany, the problem was how to get the Austrians to peacefully agree to unification with Germany. Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg would soon force the issue.[42]

Since the summer of 1934, Austria had been governed by a conservative dictatorship headed by Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg. Schuschnigg persecuted Austrians who favored unification with Germany. Political dissidents landed in concentration camps, and the regime denied persons of "deficient civic reliability" the right to practice their occupation.[43]

In January 1938, Austrian police discovered plans of some Austrian National Socialists to overthrow Schuschnigg in violation of a "Gentlemen's Agreement" entered into with Germany on July 11, 1936. Schuschnigg met with Hitler at Berchtesgaden on Feb. 12, 1938, complaining of the attempted overthrow of his government by Austrian National Socialists. Hitler and Schuschnigg reached an agreement that day, but Schuschnigg claimed that Hitler had been violent in manner during the first two hours of conversation.[44] Some accounts of their meeting say that Schuschnigg was bullied by Hitler and subject to a long list of indignities.[45]

Schuschnigg began to consider means of repudiating the agreement made with Hitler in their meeting on Feb. 12, 1938. Schuschnigg's solution was to hold a rigged plebiscite. On March 9, 1938, Schuschnigg announced that a plebiscite would be held four days later on March 13, 1938, to decide, finally and forever, whether Austria was to remain an independent nation.

The planned plebiscite was completely unfair. There was only one question, which asked the voter, "Are you for a free and German, independent and social, Christian and united Austria, for peace and work, for the equality of all those who affirm themselves for the people and the Fatherland?" There were no voting lists; only yes ballots were to be provided by the government; anyone wishing to vote no had to provide their own ballot, the same size as the yes ballots, with nothing on it but the word no.[46] During preparations for the election, the government press in Austria announced that anyone voting "no" would be guilty of treason.[47]

The Austrian government took additional steps to ensure that the vote would swing in their direction. The qualification age to vote was raised to 24, making it impossible for young National Socialists to register their views. Schuschnigg and his men also distributed a huge number of flyers, scattering some by aircraft in Austria's most remote and snowbound corners. Trucks drove around the country transmitting the message of Austrian independence by loudspeaker. Everywhere the German theme was driven home: To be a good Austrian was to be a good German; to be German was to be free. Austrians were better Germans than the National Socialists.[48]

Hitler was shocked by Schuschnigg's proposed plebiscite. Hitler had hoped for an evolutionary strategy in Austria that would gradually merge Austria into the Reich. However, Hitler felt humiliated and

betrayed by Schuschnigg, and he could not let the phony plebiscite proceed. After receiving word on March 11, 1938, that Mussolini accepted the Anschluss, Hitler decided to march into Austria with his troops on March 12, 1938. Hitler was greeted with a joyously enthusiastic reception from the mass of the Austrian people.[49] Not a shot was fired by Hitler's army.

Hitler was aware of the bad publicity abroad such an apparent act of force would generate. However, Schuschnigg and his entire cabinet had resigned from office after Britain, France, and Italy all denounced the phony plebiscite. Hitler feared that Austrian Marxists might take advantage of Austria's momentary political vacuum and stage an uprising. Goering also warned of the possibility that Austria's neighbors might exploit its temporary weakness by occupying Austrian territory. Hitler decided to militarily occupy Austria to prevent either of these possibilities from occurring.[50]

On April 10, 1938, joint plebiscites were held in Germany and Austria to approve the Anschluss. All Germans and Austrians over the age of 20 were eligible to vote, with the exception of Jews and criminals.

The result of the poll was 99.08% of the people in favor of the Anschluss. The plebiscite might have been manipulated to some extent as shown by the near unanimous assent from the Dachau concentration camp. Also, the ballot was not anonymous since the voter's name and address were printed on the back of each ballot. However, there is no question that the vast majority of people in Germany and Austria approved the Anschluss. Hitler's aims had struck a chord with national German aspirations, and the plebiscite reflected Hitler's popularity with the German people.[51]

The invasion of Austria had hurt Germany's public image. As historian A.J.P. Taylor states:

Hitler had won. He had achieved the first object of his ambition. Yet not in the way that he had intended. He had planned to absorb Austria imperceptibly, so that no one could tell when it had ceased to be independent; he would use democratic methods to destroy Austrian independence as he had done to destroy German democracy. Instead he had been driven to call in the German army. For the first time, he lost the asset of aggrieved morality and appeared as a conqueror, relying on force. The belief soon became established that Hitler's seizure of Austria was a

deliberate plot, devised long in advance, and the first step toward the domination of Europe. This belief was a myth. The crisis of March 1938 was provoked by Schuschnigg, not by Hitler. There had been no German preparations, military or diplomatic. Everything was improvised in a couple of days—policy, promises, armed force….But the effects could not be undone….The uneasy balance tilted, though only slightly, away from peace and toward war. Hitler's aims might still appear justifiable; his methods were condemned. By the Anschluss—or rather by the way in which it was accomplished—Hitler took the first step in the policy which was to brand him as the greatest of war criminals. Yet he took this step unintentionally. Indeed he did not know that he had taken it.[52]

Winston Churchill made the following statement in the House of Commons shortly after the Anschluss:

The public mind has been concentrated upon the moral and sentimental aspects of the Nazi conquest of Austria—a small country brutally struck down, its government scattered to the winds, the oppression of the Nazi Party doctrine imposed upon a Catholic population and upon the working classes of Austria and Vienna, the hard ill usage of persecution which indeed will ensue—which is probably in progress at the moment—of those who, this time last week, were exercising their undoubted political rights, discharging their duties to their own country….[53]

Churchill's statement is a misrepresentation of the truth. The overwhelming majority of Austrians had desired a union with Germany. The Anschluss was hugely popular in Austria. Churchill in his speech had begun the warmongering that led to World War II.

The Czechoslovakia Crisis & The Munich Agreement

At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, 3.25 million German inhabitants of Bohemia and Moravia were transferred to the new Czechoslovakia in a flagrant disregard of Woodrow Wilson's ideal of self-determination. The new Czechoslovakia was a multiethnic, multilingual, Catholic-Protestant conglomerate that had never existed before. From 1920 to 1938, repeated petitions had been sent to the League of Nations

by the repressed minorities of Czechoslovakia. By 1938, the Sudeten Germans were eager to be rid of Czech rule and become part of Germany. In a fair plebiscite, a minimum of 80% of Sudeten Germans would have voted to become part of the new Reich.[54]

It was clear to Czech leaders that the excitement among the Sudeten Germans after the Anschluss would soon force the resolution of the Sudeten question. The Czech cabinet and military leaders decided on May 20, 1938, to order a partial mobilization of the Czech armed forces. This partial mobilization was based on the false accusation that German troops were concentrating on the Czech frontiers. Czech leaders hoped that the resulting confusion would commit the British and French to the Czech position before a policy favoring concessions to the Sudeten Germans could be implemented. Although the plot failed, Czech leaders granted interviews in which they claimed that Czechoslovakia had scored a great victory over Germany. An international press campaign representing that Czechoslovakia had forced Hitler to back down from his planned aggression reverberated around the world.[55]

British Ambassador to Germany Nevile Henderson believed that the Czech mobilization of its army, and the ridicule heaped upon Hitler by the world press, led directly to the Munich Agreement:

The defiant gesture of the Czechs in mobilizing some 170,000 troops and then proclaiming to the world that it was their action which had turned Hitler away from his purpose was…regrettable. But what Hitler could not stomach was the exultation of the press. …Every newspaper in America and Europe joined in the chorus. "No" had been said and Hitler had been forced to yield. The democratic powers had brought the totalitarian states to heel, etc. It was, above all, this jubilation which gave Hitler the excuse for his…worst brain storm of the year, and pushed him definitely over the border line from peaceful negotiation to the use of force. From May 23rd to May 28th his fit of sulks and fury lasted, and on the later date he gave orders for a gradual mobilization of the army, which should be prepared for all eventualities in the autumn.[56]

By the 1930s, the majority of the British people believed that Germany had been wronged at Versailles. The British people now broadly supported the appeasement of Germany in regaining her lost territories.

If appeasement meant granting self-determination to the Sudetenland Germans, the British people approved.[57]

Lord Halifax informed French leaders on July 20, 1938, that a special fact-finding mission under Lord Runciman would be sent to Czechoslovakia. President Benes of Czechoslovakia was disturbed by this news. It was a definite indication that the British might adopt a compromising policy toward Germany in the crisis. The British mission completed its study in September 1938, and it reported that the main difficulty in the Sudeten area had been the disinclination of the Czechs to grant reforms. This British report was accompanied by the final rupture of negotiations between the Sudeten Germans and the Czech leaders. The Czech crisis was coming to a climax.[58]

British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain flew to Hitler's mountain retreat at Berchtesgaden to discuss the Czech problem directly with Hitler. At their meeting Hitler consented to refrain from military action while Chamberlain would discuss with his cabinet the means of applying the principle of self-determination to the Sudeten Germans. The result was a decision to transfer to Germany areas in which the Sudeten Germans occupied more than 50% of the population. President Benes of Czechoslovakia reluctantly accepted this proposal.[59]

A problem developed in the negotiations when Chamberlain met with Hitler a second time. Hitler insisted on an immediate German military occupation of regions where the Sudeten Germans were more than half of the population. Hitler also insisted that the claims of the Polish and Hungarian minorities be satisfied before participating in the proposed international guarantee of the new Czechoslovakia frontier. Several days of extreme tension followed. Chamberlain announced on Sept. 28, 1938, to the House of Commons that Hitler had invited him, together with Daladier and Mussolini, to a conference in Munich the following afternoon. The House erupted in an outburst of tremendous enthusiasm.[60]

The parties signed the Munich Agreement in the early hours of Sept. 30, 1938. Hitler got substantially everything he wanted. The Sudeten Germans had become a part of Germany. Chamberlain and Hitler signed a joint declaration that the Munich Agreement and the Anglo-German naval accord symbolized "the desire of our two peoples never to go to war with each other again." Chamberlain told the cheering crowd in London that welcomed him home, "I believe it is peace in our time."[61] War had been averted in Europe.

The British war enthusiasts lost no time in launching their effort to spoil the celebration of the Munich Agreement. On Oct. 1, 1938, First Lord of the Admiralty Alfred Duff Cooper announced that he was resigning from the British cabinet. In a speech delivered on Oct. 3, 1938, Cooper criticized the British government for not assuming a definite commitment during the Czech crisis. He asserted that Great Britain would not have been fighting for the Czechs, but rather for the balance of power, which was precious to some British hearts. Duff Cooper believed that it was his mission and that of his country to prevent Germany from achieving a dominant position on the continent.[62]

Clement Attlee, the new Labor Party leader, spoke of the Munich Agreement as a huge victory for Hitler and an "annihilating defeat for democracy." Of course, Attlee in his speech included the Soviet Union as a democracy. Anthony Eden gave a speech in which he criticized Chamberlain on detailed points, and expressed doubt that Britain would fulfill her promised guarantee to the Czech state. Eden advised the House to regard the current situation as a mere pause before the next crisis. He claimed that the British armament campaign was proceeding too slowly.[63]

In his speech on Oct. 5, 1938, Winston Churchill stated that Hitler had extracted British concessions at pistol point, and he loved to use the image of Hitler as a gangster. Churchill used flowery rhetoric and elegant phrases to describe the allegedly mournful Czechs slipping away into darkness. Churchill wanted to convince his countrymen that National Socialist Germany was governed by an insatiable desire for world conquest. The simple and stark purpose of the speech was to convince the British people to eventually accept a war of annihilation against Germany. Churchill was a useful instrument in building up British prejudice against Germany.[64]

The debate on the Munich Agreement surpassed all other parliamentary debates on British foreign policy since World War I. Other Conservatives who refused to accept the Munich Agreement include Harold Macmillan, Duncan Sandys, Leopold Amery, Harold Nicolson, Roger Keyes, Sidney Herbert, and Gen. Edward Spears. These men were joined by a score of lesser figures in the House of Commons, and they were supported by such prominent people as Lord Cranborne and Lord Wolmer in the House of Lords. Chamberlain won the vote of confidence, but he did not possess the confidence of the British Conservative Party.[65]

The warmongering that led to World War II was increasing in Great Britain. Hitler was dismayed at the steady stream of hate propaganda directed at Germany. In a speech given in Saarbruecken on Oct. 9, 1938, Hitler said: "…All it would take would be for Mr. Duff Cooper or Mr. Eden or Mr. Churchill to come to power in England instead of Chamberlain, and we know very well that it would be the goal of these men to immediately start a new world war. They do not even try to disguise their intents, they state them openly."[66]

Germany's Decision to Occupy Prague

The Munich Agreement was meant to mark the beginning of a new epoch in European affairs. The Versailles Treaty was now officially dead and buried. The Versailles system directed against Germany had been successfully dismantled without a war. A new epoch, based on equality and mutual confidence among the four great European Powers, was supposed to take its place.[67]

Public opinion in the Western democracies soon took a hard turn against Germany. On the night of Nov. 9-10, 1938, National Socialist storm troopers went on a rampage, looting Jewish shops, smashing windows, burning synagogues, and beating Jews. Hundreds were assaulted and dozens perished in what came to be known as Kristallnacht, the night of broken glass. The United States soon called its German ambassador home. Much of the goodwill garnered by Germany from the 1936 Berlin Olympics and the Munich Agreement, which the democracies still believed had averted war, was washed away by Kristallnacht.[68]

War propaganda began to intensify in Great Britain. The British press in late November 1938 reported rumors that Germany was massing her troops in preparation for an invasion of Czechoslovakia. These false rumors originated from London. Anthony Eden was sent to the United States by Halifax in December 1938 to spread rumors about sinister German plans. Roosevelt responded with a provocative and insulting warning to Germany in his message to Congress on Jan. 4, 1939.[69]

Halifax secretly circulated rumors both at home and abroad which presented the foreign policy of Hitler in the worst possible light. On Jan. 24, 1939, Halifax sent a message to President Roosevelt in which he claimed to have received "a large number of reports from various reliable sources which throw a most disquieting light on Hitler's mood

and intentions." Halifax claimed that Hitler had recently planned to establish an independent Ukraine, and that Hitler intended to destroy the Western nations in a surprise attack before he moved into the East. Halifax further claimed that not only British intelligence but "highly placed Germans who are anxious to prevent this crime" had furnished evidence of this evil conspiracy. These claims were all lies. Hitler did not have the remotest intention at the time of attacking the Ukraine or any Western country.[70]

A crisis developed in Czechoslovakia after the Munich Agreement. The German, Polish, and Hungarian minorities had been successfully separated from Czech rule. However, the Slovaks and Ruthenians were also eager to escape from Czech rule, and they received encouragement from Poland and Hungary. For about four months after Munich, Hitler considered the possibility of protecting the remnants of the Czech state. Hitler gradually came to the conclusion that the Czech cause was lost in Slovakia, and that Czech cooperation with Germany could not be relied upon. Hitler eventually decided to transfer German support from the Czechs to the Slovaks.[71]

Increasingly serious internal difficulties faced the Czech state, and in early 1939 the Czech problem with Slovakia deteriorated rapidly. The climax of the Slovak crisis occurred on March 9, 1939, when the Czech government dismissed the four principal Slovak ministers from the local government at Bratislava.

Josef Tiso, the Slovakian leader, arrived in Berlin on March 13, 1939, and met with Hitler in a hurried conference. Hitler admitted to Tiso that until recently he had been unaware of the strength of the independence movement in Slovakia. Hitler promised Tiso that he would support Slovakia if she continued to demonstrate her will to independence. The Slovakian government proceeded to vote a declaration of independence from Czechoslovakia on March 14, 1939.[72] Ruthenia also quickly declared independence and became part of Hungary, dissolving what was left of the Czech state.[73]

Czech President Emil Hácha on his own initiative asked to see Hitler in the hope of finding a solution for a hopeless crisis. President Hácha was correctly received at Berlin with the full military honors due a visiting chief of state. Hitler met Hácha's train and presented flowers and chocolates to Hácha's daughter, who accompanied her father.

After World War II, Hácha's daughter denied to Allied investigators that her father had been subjected to any unusual pressure during his visit to Berlin. This information is important because Hácha, who was bothered by heart trouble, had a mild heart attack during his visit with the German leaders. Hácha agreed to accept German medical assistance, and recovered quickly enough to negotiate the outline of an agreement with Germany and the Czech state. The details were arranged between the Czechs and the Germans at Prague on March 15th and 16th.[74]

The occupation of Prague by German troops was legalized by the agreements signed with the Czech and Slovak leaders. The period of direct German military rule lasted a little over one month. The new regime formed by the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia on March 16, 1939, enjoyed considerable popularity among the Czechs. On July 31, 1939, Hitler agreed to permit the Czech government to have a military force of 7,000 soldiers, which included 280 officers.[75]

President Hácha had voluntarily placed the fate of the Czech state in the hands of Germany. Hácha and his new cabinet resumed control of the government on April 27, 1939.[76] Hácha would serve Hitler faithfully throughout the war. British historian Donald Cameron Watt writes, "[Hitler] was remarkably kind…to the Czech Cabinet after the march into Prague, keeping its members in office for a time and paying their pensions."[77]

The motives behind Hitler's actions in the Czech crisis of March 1939 remain in dispute. British historian A.J.P. Taylor evaluates Hitler's motives:

All the world saw in this the culmination of a long-planned campaign. In fact, it was the unforeseen by-product of developments in Slovakia; and Hitler was acting against the Hungarians rather than against the Czechs. Nor was there anything sinister or premeditated in the protectorate over Bohemia. Hitler, the supposed revolutionary, was simply reverting in the most conservative way to the pattern of previous centuries. Bohemia had always been part of the Holy Roman Empire; it had been part of the German Confederation between 1815 and 1866; then it had been linked to German Austria until 1918. Independence, not subordination, was the novelty in Czech history. Of course Hitler's protectorate brought tyranny to Bohemia—secret police, the S.S., the concentration camps; but no more

than in Germany itself…Hitler's domestic behavior, not his foreign policy, was the real crime which ultimately brought him—and Germany—to the ground. It did not seem so at the time. Hitler took the decisive step in his career when he occupied Prague. He did it without design; it brought him slight advantage. He acted only when events had already destroyed the settlement of Munich. But everyone outside Germany, and especially the other makers of that settlement, believed that he had deliberately destroyed it himself.[78]

American historian David Hoggan writes: "Hitler's decision to support the Slovaks and to occupy Prague had been based on the obvious disinterest of the British leaders in the Czech situation. There had been ample opportunities for them to encourage the Czechs in some way, but they had repeatedly refused to do so. The truth was that the British leaders did not care about the Czechs. They used Hitler's policy as a pretext to become indignant about the Germans."[79]

Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain originally explained in the House of Commons on March 15, 1939, that Germany had no obligation to consult Great Britain in dealing with the Czech-Slovak crisis. The British government had also never fulfilled its promise to guarantee the Czech state after the Munich Agreement. Chamberlain stated that the Slovak declaration of independence on March 14, 1939, put an end by internal disruption to the Czech state, and therefore the British guarantee to preserve the integrity of Czechoslovakia was no longer binding.[80] Chamberlain concluded, "Let us remember that the desire of all the peoples of the world still remains concentrated on the hopes of peace."[81]

Lord Halifax now began to take command of British policy toward Germany. Halifax informed Chamberlain that his speech of March 15, 1939, was unacceptable. President Roosevelt of the United States was also highly critical of Chamberlain's speech. Two days later on March 17, 1939, Chamberlain expressed the first sign of a major shift in policy toward Germany. In a speech in his home city of Birmingham, Chamberlain charged Hitler with "a flagrant breach of personal faith." Chamberlain presented himself as the victim of German duplicity, and stated that he would never be able to believe Hitler again. Chamberlain asked rhetorically if this was a step by Hitler to attempt to dominate the world by force.[82]

Halifax expressed his hostile views concerning Germany's occupation of Prague to German Ambassador Herbert von Dirksen on March 15, 1939. Halifax claimed that Hitler had unmasked himself as a dishonest person, and that German policy implied a rejection of good relations with Great Britain. Halifax insisted that Germany was "seeking to establish a position in which they could by force dominate Europe, and, if possible, the world." Halifax stated that he could understand Hitler's taste for bloodless victories, but he promised the German diplomat that Hitler would be forced to shed blood the next time.[83]

The reports which Ambassador Dirksen sent to Berlin during the next several days indicate that he was considerably shaken by the violent British reaction to the latest Czech crisis. The entire German Embassy staff was dismayed by the events of March 1939. Ambassador Dirksen recognized the importance of an Anglo-German understanding, and he became almost incoherent with grief when confronted with the collapse of his diplomatic efforts. The British had created the impression that the future of Bohemia was a matter of complete indifference to them. Then the British hypocritically turned around and declared that the events in Bohemia had convinced them that Hitler was seeking to conquer the world. No wonder the German diplomats in London were in despair. [84]

Halifax next sought a broader basis than the Czech crisis to justify Britain's belligerence toward Germany. Virgil Tilea, the Romanian minister to Great Britain, was recruited by Halifax to make false charges against Germany. Tilea was carefully coached for his role by Sir Robert Vansittart, Great Britain's vehemently anti-German chief diplomatic advisor. On March 17, 1939, Tilea issued a carefully prepared public statement which charged that Germany was seeking to obtain control of the entire Romanian economy. Tilea further claimed that Germany had issued an ultimatum that terrified Romanian leaders. These false accusations were published by the major British newspapers. Millions of British newspaper readers were aghast at Hitler's apparently unlimited appetite for conquest. Tilea's false accusations produced anxiety and outspoken hostility toward Germany among the British public.[85]

The British minister to Romania, Reginald Hoare, contacted Halifax and proceeded to explain in detail the ridiculous nature of Tilea's charges. Hoare stated that it was "so utterly improbable that the minister of foreign affairs would not have informed me that an immediate (italics his) threatening situation had developed here that I called on him as soon as your telegrams to Warsaw and Moscow had been deciphered. He told

me that he was being inundated with enquiries regarding the report of a German ultimatum which had appeared in The Times and Daily Telegraph today. There was not a word of truth in it."[86]

Hoare naturally assumed that his detailed report would induce Halifax to disavow the false Tilea charges. Nothing of this sort occurred. Hoare was astonished when Halifax continued to express his faith in the authenticity of Tilea's story after its falsehood had been exposed. The Tilea hoax was crucial to the development of Halifax's policy of inciting hatred among the British public toward Germany. Halifax was not concerned with any adverse repercussions of the Tilea hoax in Romania.[87]

Halifax had lied to the British public about German policy toward Czechoslovakia after the Munich Agreement, and he had lied to them about the alleged crisis in Romania. It was only by means of these palpable falsehoods that the British public had been stirred into a warlike mood. It was by these means that Halifax would be able to persuade the British public to accept a foreign policy that was both dangerous and devoid of logic.[88]

Great Britain's Blank Check to Poland

On March 21, 1939, while hosting French Prime Minister Daladier, Chamberlain discussed a joint front with France, Russia, and Poland to act together against German aggression. France agreed at once, and the Russians agreed on the condition that both France and Poland sign first. However, Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck vetoed the agreement on March 24, 1939.[89] Polish statesmen feared Russia more than they did Germany. Polish marshal Edward Smigly-Rydz told the French ambassador, "With the Germans we risk losing our liberty; with the Russians we lose our soul."[90]

Another complication arose in European diplomacy when the residents of Memel in Lithuania wanted to join Germany. The Allied victors in the Versailles Treaty had detached Memel from East Prussia and placed it under a League of Nations protectorate. Lithuania then proceeded to seize Memel from the League of Nations shortly after World War I. Memel was a German city which in the seven centuries of its history had never separated from its East Prussian homeland. Germany was so

weak after World War I that it could not prevent the tiny new-born nation of Lithuania from seizing the ancient Prussian city of Memel.[91]

Germany's occupation of Prague generated uncontrollable excitement among the mostly German population of Memel. The population of Memel was clamoring to return to Germany and could no longer be restrained. The Lithuanian foreign minister traveled to Berlin on March 22, 1939, where he agreed to the immediate transfer of Memel to Germany. The annexation of Memel into Germany went through the next day. The question of Memel appears to have exploded of itself without any deliberate German plan of annexation.[92] Polish leaders had agreed that the return of Memel to Germany from Lithuania would not constitute an issue of conflict between Germany and Poland.[93]

What did cause an issue of conflict between Germany and Poland was the so-called Free City of Danzig. Danzig was founded in the early 14th century and was historically the key port at the mouth of the great Vistula River. From the beginning Danzig was inhabited almost exclusively by Germans, with the Polish minority in 1922 constituting less than 3% of the city's 365,000 inhabitants. The Treaty of Versailles converted Danzig from a German provincial capital into a League of Nations protectorate subject to numerous servitudes established for the benefit of Poland. The citizens of Danzig had never wanted to leave Germany, and they were eager to return to Germany in 1939. Their eagerness to join Germany was exacerbated by the fact that Germany's economy was healthy while Poland's economy was still mired in depression.[94]

The citizens of Danzig had consistently demonstrated their unwavering loyalty to National Socialism and its principles. They had even elected a National Socialist parliamentary majority before this result had been achieved in Germany. It was widely known that Poland was constantly seeking to increase her control over Danzig despite the wishes of Danzig's citizens. Hitler was not opposed to Poland's further economic aspirations at Danzig, but Hitler was resolved never to permit the establishment of a Polish political regime at Danzig. Such a renunciation of Danzig by Hitler would have been a repudiation of the loyalty of Danzig citizens to the Third Reich and their spirit of self-determination.[95]

Germany presented a proposal for a comprehensive settlement of the Danzig question with Poland on Oct. 24, 1938. Hitler's plan would allow Germany to annex Danzig and construct a superhighway and a railroad to East Prussia. In return Poland would be granted a permanent

free port in Danzig and the right to build her own highway and railroad to the port. The entire Danzig area would also become a permanent free market for Polish goods on which no German customs duties would be levied. Germany would take the unprecedented step of recognizing and guaranteeing the existing German-Polish frontier, including the boundary in Upper Silesia established in 1922. This later provision was extremely important since the Versailles Treaty had given Poland much additional territory which Germany proposed to renounce. Hitler's offer to guarantee Poland's frontiers also carried with it a degree of military security that no other non-Communist nation could match. [96]

Germany's proposed settlement with Poland was far less favorable to Germany than the Thirteenth Point of Wilson's program at Versailles had been. The Versailles Treaty gave Poland large slices of territory in regions such as West Prussia and Western Posen which were overwhelmingly German. The richest industrial section of Upper Silesia was also later given to Poland despite the fact the Poles lost the plebiscite there. Germany was willing to renounce these territories in the interest of German-Polish cooperation. This concession of Hitler's was more than adequate to compensate for the German annexation of Danzig and construction of a superhighway and a railroad in the corridor. The Polish diplomats themselves believed that Germany's proposal was a sincere and realistic basis for a permanent agreement.[97]

On March 26, 1939, the Polish ambassador to Berlin, Joseph Lipski, formally rejected Germany's proposals for a settlement. The Poles had waited over five months to reject Germany's proposals, and they refused to countenance any change in existing conditions. Lipski stated to German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop that "it was his painful duty to draw attention to the fact that any further pursuance of these German plans, especially where the return of Danzig to the Reich was concerned, meant war with Poland."[98]

Józef Beck accepted an offer from Great Britain on March 30, 1939, that gave an unconditional unilateral guarantee of Poland's independence. The British Empire agreed to go to war as an ally of Poland if the Poles decided that war was necessary. In words drafted by Halifax, Chamberlain spoke in the House of Commons on March 31, 1939, declaring:

I now have to inform the House…that in the event of any action which clearly threatened Polish independence and which the Polish government accordingly considered it vital to resist with their national forces, his majesty's government would feel themselves bound at once to lend the Polish Government all support in their power. They have given the Polish Government an assurance to that effect.[99]

Great Britain for the first time in history had left the decision whether or not to fight a war outside of her own country to another nation. Britain's guarantee to Poland was binding without commitments from the Polish side. The British public was astonished by this move. Despite its unprecedented nature, Halifax encountered little difficulty in persuading the British Conservative, Liberal, and Labour parties to accept Great Britain's unilateral guarantee of Poland.[100]

Numerous British historians and diplomats have criticized Britain's unilateral guarantee of Poland. For example, British diplomat Roy Denman called the war guarantee to Poland "the most reckless undertaking ever given by a British government. It placed the decision on peace or war in Europe in the hands of a reckless, intransigent, swashbuckling military dictatorship."[101] British historian Niall Ferguson states that the war guarantee to Poland tied Britain's "destiny to that of a regime that was every bit as undemocratic and anti-Semitic as that of Germany."[102] English military historian Liddell Hart stated that the Polish guarantee "placed Britain's destiny in the hands of Poland's rulers, men of very dubious and unstable judgment. Moreover, the guarantee was impossible to fulfill except with Russia's help."[103]

American historian Richard M. Watt writes concerning Britain's unilateral guarantee of Poland: "This enormously broad guarantee virtually left to the Poles the decision whether or not Britain would go to war. For Britain to give such a blank check to a Central European nation, particularly to Poland—a nation that Britain had generally regarded as irresponsible and greedy—was mind-boggling."[104]

When the Belgian minister to Germany, Vicomte Jacques Davignon, received the text of the British guarantee to Poland, he exclaimed that "blank check" was the only possible description of the British pledge. Davignon was extremely alarmed in view of the proverbial recklessness of the Poles. German State Secretary Ernst von Weizsaecker attempted to reassure Davignon by claiming that the situation between

Germany and Poland was not tragic. However, Davignon correctly feared that the British move would produce war in a very short time.[105]

Weizsaecker later exclaimed scornfully that "the British guarantee to Poland was like offering sugar to an untrained child before it had learned to listen to reason!"[106]

The Deterioration of German-Polish Relations

German-Polish relationships had become strained by the increasing harshness with which the Polish authorities handled the German minority. The Polish government in the 1930s began to confiscate the land of its German minority at bargain prices through public expropriation. The German government resented the fact that German landowners received only one-eighth of the value of their holdings from the Polish government. Since the Polish public was aware of the German situation and desired to exploit it, the German minority in Poland could not sell the land in advance of expropriation. Furthermore, Polish law forbade Germans from privately selling large areas of land.

German diplomats insisted that the November 1937 Minorities Pact with Poland for the equal treatment of German and Polish landowners be observed in 1939. Despite Polish assurances of fairness and equal treatment, German diplomats learned on Feb. 15, 1939, that the latest expropriations of land in Poland were predominantly of German holdings. These expropriations virtually completed the elimination of substantial German landholdings in Poland at a time when most of the larger Polish landholdings were still intact. It became evident that nothing could be done diplomatically to help the German minority in Poland.[107]

Poland threatened Germany with a partial mobilization of her forces on March 23, 1939. Hundreds of thousands of Polish army reservists were mobilized, and Hitler was warned that Poland would fight to prevent the return of Danzig to Germany. The Poles were surprised to discover that Germany did not take this challenge seriously. Hitler, who deeply desired friendship with Poland, refrained from responding to the Polish threat of war. Germany did not threaten Poland and took no precautionary military measures in response to the Polish partial mobilization.[108]

Hitler regarded a German-Polish agreement as a highly welcome alternative to a German-Polish war. However, no further negotiations for a German-Polish agreement occurred after the British guarantee to Poland for the simple reason that Józef Beck refused to negotiate. Beck ignored repeated German suggestions for further negotiations. Beck knew perfectly well that Halifax hoped to accomplish the complete destruction of Germany. Halifax had considered an Anglo-German war inevitable since 1936, and Britain's anti-German policy was made public with Chamberlain's speech on March 17, 1939. Halifax discouraged German-Polish negotiations because he was counting on Poland to provide the pretext for a British preventive war against Germany.[109]

The situation between Germany and Poland deteriorated rapidly during the brief span of six weeks from the Polish partial mobilization of March 23, 1939, to a speech delivered by Beck on May 5, 1939. Beck's primary purpose in delivering his speech before the Sejm, the lower house of the Polish parliament, was to convince the Polish public and the world that he was able and willing to challenge Hitler. Beck knew that Halifax had succeeded in creating a warlike atmosphere in Great Britain, and that he could go as far as he wanted without displeasing the British. Beck took an uncompromising attitude in his speech that effectively closed the door to further negotiations with Germany.

Beck made numerous false and hypocritical statements in his speech. One of the most astonishing claims in his speech was that there was nothing extraordinary about the British guarantee to Poland. He described it as a normal step in the pursuit of friendly relations with a neighboring country. This was in sharp contrast to British diplomat Sir Alexander Cadogan's statement to Joseph Kennedy that Britain's guarantee to Poland was without precedent in the entire history of British foreign policy.[110]

Beck ended his speech with a stirring climax that produced wild excitement in Poland's Sejm. Someone in the audience screamed loudly, "We do not need peace!" and pandemonium followed. Beck had made many Poles in the audience determined to fight Germany. This feeling resulted from their ignorance which made it impossible for them to criticize the numerous falsehoods and misstatements in Beck's speech. Beck made the audience feel that Hitler had insulted the honor of Poland with what were actually quite reasonable peace proposals. The Polish foreign minister had effectively closed the door to further negotiations

with Germany. Beck had made Germany the deadly enemy of Poland.[111]

More than 1 million ethnic Germans resided in Poland at the time of Beck's speech, and these Germans were the principal victims of the German-Polish crisis in the coming weeks. The Germans in Poland were subjected to increasing doses of violence from the dominant Poles. The British public was told repeatedly that the grievances of the German minority in Poland were largely imaginary. The average British citizen was completely unaware of the terror and fear of death that stalked these Germans in Poland. Ultimately, many thousands of Germans in Poland paid for the crisis with their lives. They were among the first victims of Halifax's war policy against Germany.[112]

The immediate responsibility for security measures involving the German minority in Poland rested with Interior Department Ministerial Director Waclaw Zyborski. Zyborski consented to discuss the situation on June 23, 1939, with Walther Kohnert, one of the leaders of the German minority at Bromberg. Zyborski admitted to Kohnert that the Germans of Poland were in an unenviable situation, but he was not sympathetic to their plight. Zyborski ended their lengthy conversation by stating frankly that his policy required a severe treatment of the German minority in Poland. He made it clear that it was impossible for the Germans of Poland to alleviate their hard fate. The Germans in Poland were the helpless hostages of the Polish community and the Polish state. [113]

Other leaders of the German minority in Poland repeatedly appealed to the Polish government for help during this period. Sen. Hans Hasbach, the leader of the conservative German minority faction, and Dr. Rudolf Wiesner, the leader of the Young German Party, each made multiple appeals to Poland's government to end the violence. In a futile appeal on July 6, 1939, to Premier Slawoj-Skladkowski, head of Poland's Department of Interior, Wiesner referred to the waves of public violence against the Germans at Tomaszów near Lódz, May 13-15th, at Konstantynów, May 21-22nd, and at Pabianice, June 22-23, 1939. The appeal of Wiesner produced no results. The leaders of the German political groups eventually recognized that they had no influence with Polish authorities despite their loyal attitudes toward Poland. It was "open season" on the Germans of Poland with the approval of the Polish government.[114]

The Polish anti-German incidents of this period also occurred against the German majority in the Free City of Danzig. On May 21, 1939, Zygmunt Morawski, a former Polish soldier, murdered a German at Kalthof on Danzig territory. The incident itself would not have been so unusual except for the fact that Polish officials acted as if Poland and not the League of Nations had sovereign power over Danzig. Polish officials refused to apologize for the incident, and they treated with contempt the effort of Danzig authorities to bring Morawski to trial. It was obvious that the Poles in Danzig considered themselves above the law.[115]

Tension steadily mounted at Danzig after the Kalthof murder. The citizens of Danzig were convinced that Poland would show them no mercy if Poland were permitted to obtain the upper hand. The Poles were furious when they learned that Danzig was defying Poland by organizing her own militia for home defense. The Poles blamed Hitler for this situation. The Polish government protested to German Ambassador Hans von Moltke on July 1, 1939, about the current military defense measures of the Danzig government. Józef Beck told French Ambassador Léon Noel on July 6, 1939, that the Polish government had decided that additional measures were necessary to meet the alleged threat from Danzig.[116]

On July 29, 1939, the Danzig government presented two protest notes to the Poles concerning illegal activities of Polish custom inspectors and frontier officials. The Polish government responded by terminating the export of duty-free herring and margarine from Danzig to Poland. Polish officials next announced in the early hours of Aug. 5, 1939, that the frontiers of Danzig would be closed to the importation of all foreign food products unless the Danzig government promised by the end of the day never to interfere with the activities of Polish customs inspectors. This threat was formidable since Danzig produced only a relatively small portion of her own food. All Polish customs inspectors would also bear arms while performing their duty after Aug. 5, 1939. The Polish ultimatum made it obvious that Poland intended to replace the League of Nations as the sovereign power at Danzig.[117]

Hitler concluded that Poland was seeking to provoke an immediate conflict with Germany. The Danzig government submitted to the Polish ultimatum based on Hitler's recommendation.

Beck had explained to British Ambassador Kennard that the Polish government was prepared to take military measures against Danzig if it failed to accept the Polish terms. The citizens of Danzig were convinced that Poland would have executed a full military occupation of

Danzig had the Polish ultimatum been rejected. It was apparent to the German government that the British and French were either unable or unwilling to restrain the Polish government from arbitrary steps that could produce an explosion.[118]

On August 7 1939, the Polish censors permitted the newspaper Illustrowany Kuryer Codzienny in Kraków to feature an article of unprecedented recklessness. The article stated that Polish units were constantly crossing the German frontier to destroy German military installations and to carry confiscated German military equipment into Poland. The Polish government failed to prevent the newspaper, with the largest circulation in Poland, from telling the world that Poland was instigating a series of violations of her frontier with Germany. Polish Ambassador Jerzy Potocki unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Beck to seek an agreement with the Germans. Potocki later succinctly explained the situation by stating that "Poland prefers Danzig to peace."[119]

President Roosevelt knew that Poland had caused the crisis which began at Danzig, and he was worried that the American public might learn the truth about the situation. This could be a decisive factor in discouraging Roosevelt's plan for American military intervention in Europe. Roosevelt instructed U.S. Ambassador Biddle to urge the Poles to be more careful in making it appear that German moves were responsible for any inevitable explosion at Danzig. Biddle reported to Roosevelt on Aug. 11, 1939, that Beck expressed no interest in engaging in a series of elaborate but empty maneuvers designed to deceive the American public. Beck stated that at the moment he was content to have full British support for his policy.[120]

Roosevelt also feared that American politicians might discover the facts about the hopeless dilemma which Poland's provocative policy created for Germany. When American Democratic Party campaign manager and Postmaster General James Farley visited Berlin at this time, Roosevelt instructed the American Embassy in Berlin to prevent unsupervised contact between Farley and the German leaders. The German Foreign Office concluded on Aug. 10, 1939, that it was impossible to penetrate the wall of censorship around Farley. The Germans knew that President Roosevelt was determined to prevent them from freely communicating with visiting American leaders.[121]

Polish Atrocities Force War

On Aug. 14, 1939, the Polish authorities in East Upper Silesia launched a campaign of mass arrests against the German minority. The Poles then proceeded to close and confiscate the remaining German businesses, clubs, and welfare installations. The arrested Germans were forced to march toward the interior of Poland in prisoner columns. The various German groups in Poland were frantic by this time, and they feared that the Poles would attempt the total extermination of the German minority in the event of war. Thousands of Germans were seeking to escape arrest by crossing the border into Germany. Some of the worst recent Polish atrocities included the mutilation of several Germans. The Poles were warned not to regard their German minority as helpless hostages who could be butchered with impunity.[122]

Rudolf Wiesner, who was the most prominent of the German minority leaders in Poland, spoke of a disaster "of inconceivable magnitude" since the early months of 1939. Wiesner claimed that the last Germans had been dismissed from their jobs without the benefit of unemployment relief, and that hunger and privation were stamped on the faces of the Germans in Poland. German welfare agencies, cooperatives, and trade associations had been closed by Polish authorities. Exceptional martial law conditions of the earlier frontier zone had been extended to include more than one-third of the territory of Poland. The mass arrests, deportations, mutilations, and beatings of the last few weeks in Poland surpassed anything which had happened before. Wiesner insisted that the German minority leaders merely desired the restoration of peace, the banishment of the specter of war, and the right to live and work in peace. Wiesner was arrested by the Poles on Aug. 16, 1939, on suspicion of conducting espionage for Germany in Poland.[123]

The German press devoted increasing space to detailed accounts of atrocities against the Germans in Poland. The Völkischer Beobachter reported that more than 80,000 German refugees from Poland had succeeded in reaching German territory by Aug. 20, 1939. The German Foreign Office had received a huge file of specific reports of excesses against national and ethnic Germans in Poland. More than 1,500 documented reports had been received since March 1939, and more than 10 detailed reports were arriving in the German Foreign Office each day. The reports presented a staggering picture of brutality and human misery.[124]

W.L. White, an American journalist, later recalled that there was no doubt among well-informed people by this time that horrible atrocities were being inflicted every day on the Germans of Poland.[125]

Donald Day, a Chicago Tribune correspondent, reported on the atrocious treatment the Poles had meted out to the ethnic Germans in Poland:

I traveled up to the Polish corridor where the German authorities permitted me to interview the German refugees from many Polish cities and towns. The story was the same. Mass arrests and long marches along roads toward the interior of Poland. The railroads were crowded with troop movements. Those who fell by the wayside were shot. The Polish authorities seemed to have gone mad. I have been questioning people all my life and I think I know how to make deductions from the exaggerated stories told by people who have passed through harrowing personal experiences. But even with generous allowance, the situation was plenty bad. To me the war seemed only a question of hours.[126]

British Ambassador Nevile Henderson in Berlin was concentrating on obtaining recognition from Halifax of the cruel fate of the German minority in Poland. Henderson emphatically warned Halifax on Aug. 24, 1939, that German complaints about the treatment of the German minority in Poland were fully supported by the facts. Henderson knew that the Germans were prepared to negotiate, and he stated to Halifax that war between Poland and Germany was inevitable unless negotiations were resumed between the two countries. Henderson pleaded with Halifax that it would be contrary to Polish interests to attempt a full military occupation of Danzig, and he added a scathingly effective denunciation of Polish policy. What Henderson failed to realize is that Halifax was pursuing war for its own sake as an instrument of policy. Halifax desired the complete destruction of Germany.[127]

On Aug. 25, 1939, Henderson reported to Halifax the latest Polish atrocity at Bielitz, Upper Silesia. Henderson never relied on official German statements concerning these incidents, but instead based his reports on information he had received from neutral sources. The Poles continued to forcibly deport the Germans of that area, and compelled them to march into the interior of Poland. Eight Germans were murdered and many more were injured during one of these actions.

Hitler was faced with a terrible dilemma. If Hitler did nothing, the Germans of Poland and Danzig would be abandoned to the cruelty and violence of a hostile Poland. If Hitler took effective action against the Poles, the British and French might declare war against Germany. Henderson feared that the Bielitz atrocity would be the final straw to prompt Hitler to invade Poland. Henderson, who strongly desired peace with Germany, deplored the failure of the British government to exercise restraint over the Polish authorities.[128]

On Aug. 23, 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union entered into the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. This non-aggression pact contained a secret protocol which recognized a Russian sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. German recognition of this Soviet sphere of influence would not apply in the event of a diplomatic settlement of the German-Polish dispute. Hitler had hoped to recover the diplomatic initiative through the Molotov-Ribbentrop nonaggression pact. However, Chamberlain warned Hitler in a letter dated Aug. 23, 1939, that Great Britain would support Poland with military force regardless of the MolotovRibbentrop agreement. Beck also continued to refuse to negotiate a peaceful settlement with Germany.[129]

Germany made a new offer to Poland on Aug. 29, 1939, for a last diplomatic campaign to settle the German-Polish dispute. The terms of a new German plan for a settlement, the so-called Marienwerder proposals, were less important than the offer to negotiate as such. The terms of the Marienwerder proposals were intended as nothing more than a tentative German plan for a possible settlement. The German government emphasized that these terms were formulated to offer a basis for unimpeded negotiations between equals rather than constituting a series of demands which Poland would be required to accept. There was nothing to prevent the Poles from offering an entirely new set of proposals of their own.

The Germans, in offering to negotiate with Poland, were indicating that they favored a diplomatic settlement over war with Poland. The willingness of the Poles to negotiate would not in any way have implied a Polish retreat or their readiness to recognize the German annexation of Danzig. The Poles could have justified their acceptance to negotiate with the announcement that Germany, and not Poland, had found it necessary to request new negotiations. In refusing to negotiate, the Poles were announcing that they favored war. The refusal of British

Foreign Secretary Halifax to encourage the Poles to negotiate also indicated that he favored war.[130]

French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier and British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain were both privately critical of the Polish government. Daladier in private denounced the "criminal folly" of the Poles. Chamberlain admitted to Ambassador Joseph Kennedy that it was the Poles, and not the Germans, who were unreasonable. Kennedy reported to President Roosevelt, "frankly he [Chamberlain] is more worried about getting the Poles to be reasonable than the Germans." However, neither Daladier nor Chamberlain made any effort to influence the Poles to negotiate with the Germans.[131]

On Aug. 29, 1939, the Polish government decided upon the general mobilization of its army. The Polish military plans stipulated that general mobilization would be ordered only in the event of Poland's decision for war. Henderson informed Halifax of some of the verified Polish violations prior to the war. The Poles blew up the Dirschau (Tczew) bridge across the Vistula River even though the eastern approach to the bridge was in German territory. The Poles also occupied a number of Danzig installations and engaged in fighting with the citizens of Danzig on the same day. Henderson reported that Hitler was not insisting on the total military defeat of Poland. Hitler was prepared to terminate hostilities if the Poles indicated that they were willing to negotiate a satisfactory settlement.[132]

Germany decided to invade Poland on Sept. 1, 1939. All of the British leaders claimed that the entire responsibility for starting the war was Hitler's. Prime Minister Chamberlain broadcast that evening on British radio that "the responsibility for this terrible catastrophe (war in Poland) lies on the shoulders of one man, the German Chancellor."

Chamberlain claimed that Hitler had ordered Poland to come to Berlin with the unconditional obligation of accepting without discussion the exact German terms. Chamberlain denied that Germany had invited the Poles to engage in normal negotiations. Chamberlain's statements were unvarnished lies, but the Polish case was so weak that it was impossible to defend it with the truth.

Halifax also delivered a cleverly hypocritical speech to the House of Lords on the evening of Sept. 1, 1939. Halifax claimed that the best proof of the British will to peace was to have Chamberlain, the great appeasement leader, carry Great Britain into war. Halifax concealed the

fact that he had taken over the direction of British foreign policy from Chamberlain in October 1938, and that Great Britain would probably not be moving into war had this not happened. He assured his audience that Hitler, before the bar of history, would have to assume full responsibility for starting the war. Halifax insisted that the English conscience was pure, and that, in looking back, he did not wish to change a thing as far as British policy was concerned. [133]

On Sept. 2, 1939, Italy and Germany agreed to hold a mediation conference among themselves and Great Britain, France, and Poland. Halifax attempted to destroy the conference plan by insisting that Germany withdraw her forces from Poland and Danzig before Great Britain and France would consider attending the mediation conference. French Foreign Minister Bonnet knew that no nation would accept such treatment, and that the attitude of Halifax was unreasonable and unrealistic.

Ultimately, the mediation effort collapsed, and both Great Britain and France declared war against Germany on Sept. 3, 1939. When Hitler read the British declaration of war against Germany, he paused and asked to no one in particular: "What now?"[134] Germany was now in an unnecessary war with three European nations.

Similar to the other British leaders, Nevile Henderson, the British ambassador to Germany, later claimed that the entire responsibility for starting the war was Hitler's. Henderson writes in his memoirs in 1940: "If Hitler wanted peace he knew how to insure it; if he wanted war, he knew equally well what would bring it about. The choice lay with him, and in the end the entire responsibility for war was his."[135] Henderson forgets in this passage that he had repeatedly warned Halifax that the Polish atrocities against the German minority in Poland were extreme. Hitler invaded Poland in order to end these atrocities.

Polish Atrocities Continue Against German Minority

The Germans in Poland continued to experience an atmosphere of terror in the early part of September 1939. Throughout the country the Germans had been told, "If war comes to Poland you will all be hanged." This prophecy was later fulfilled in many cases.

The famous bloody Sunday in Torun on Sept. 3, 1939, was accompanied by similar massacres elsewhere in Poland. These massacres

brought a tragic end to the long suffering of many ethnic Germans. This catastrophe had been anticipated by the Germans before the outbreak of war, as reflected by the flight, or attempted escape, of large numbers of Germans from Poland. The feelings of these Germans were revealed by the desperate slogan, "Away from this hell, and back to the Reich!"[136]

Dr. Alfred-Maurice de Zayas writes concerning the ethnic Germans in Poland:

The first victims of the war were Volksdeutsche, ethnic German civilians resident in and citizens of Poland. Using lists prepared years earlier, in part by lower administrative offices, Poland immediately deported 15,000 Germans to eastern Poland. Fear and rage at the quick German victories led to hysteria. German "spies" were seen everywhere, suspected of forming a fifth column. More than 5,000 German civilians were murdered in the first days of the war. They were hostages and scapegoats at the same time. Gruesome scenes were played out in Bromberg on September 3, as well as in several other places throughout the province of Posen, in Pommerellen, wherever German minorities resided.[137]

Polish atrocities against ethnic Germans have been documented in the book Polish Acts of Atrocity Against the German Minority in Poland. Most of the outside world dismissed this book as nothing more than propaganda used to justify Hitler's invasion of Poland. However, skeptics failed to notice that forensic pathologists from the International Red Cross and medical and legal observers from the United States verified the findings of these Polish war crimes investigations. These investigations were also conducted by German police and civil administrations, and not the National Socialist Party or the German military. Moreover, both anti-German and other university-trained researchers have acknowledged that the charges in the book are based entirely on factual evidence.[138]

The book Polish Acts of Atrocity Against the German Minority in Poland states:

When the first edition of this collection of documents went to press on November 17, 1939, 5,437 cases of murder committed by soldiers of the Polish army and by Polish civilians against men, women and children of the

German minority had been definitely ascertained. It was known that the total when fully ascertained would be very much higher. Between that date and February 1, 1940, the number of identified victims mounted to 12,857. At the present stage investigations disclose that in addition to these 12,857, more than 45,000 persons are still missing. Since there is no trace of them, they must also be considered victims of the Polish terror. Even the figure 58,000 is not final. There can be no doubt that the inquiries now being carried out will result in the disclosure of additional thousands dead and missing.[139]

Medical examinations of the Polish murder victims showed that Germans of all ages, from four months to 82 years of age, were murdered. The report concludes:

I*t was shown that the murders were committed with the greatest brutality and that in many cases they were purely sadistic acts— that gouging of eyes was established and that other forms of mutilation, as supported by the depositions of witnesses, may be considered as true.*

The method by which the individual murders were committed in many cases reveals studied physical and mental torture; in this connection several cases of killing extended over many hours and of slow death due to neglect had to be mentioned.

By far the most important finding seems to be the proof that murder by such chance weapons as clubs or knives was the exception, and that as a rule modern, highly-effective army rifles and pistols were available to the murderers. It must be emphasized further that it was possible to show, down to the minutest detail, that there could have been no possibility of execution [under military law].[140]

The Polish atrocities were not acts of personal revenge, professional jealousy or class hatred; instead they were a concerted political action. They were organized mass murders caused by a psychosis of political animosity. The hate-inspired urge to destroy everything German was driven by the Polish press, radio, school, and government propaganda. Britain's blank check of support had

encouraged Poland to conduct inhuman atrocities against its German minority.[141]

The book Polish Acts of Atrocity Against the German Minority in Poland answers the question of why the Polish government allowed such atrocities to happen:

The guarantee of assistance given Poland by the British government was the agent which lent impetus to Britain's policy of encirclement. It was designed to exploit the problem of Danzig and the corridor to begin a war, desired and long-prepared by England, for the annihilation of Greater Germany. In Warsaw moderation was no longer considered necessary, and the opinion held was that matters could be safely brought to a head. England was backing this diabolical game, having guaranteed the "integrity" of the Polish state. The British assurance of assistance meant that Poland was to be the battering ram of Germany's enemies. Henceforth Poland neglected no form of provocation of Germany and, in its blindness, dreamt of "victorious battle at Berlin's gates." Had it not been for the encouragement of the English war clique, which was stiffening Poland's attitude toward the Reich and whose promises led Warsaw to feel safe, the Polish government would hardly have let matters develop to the point where Polish soldiers and civilians would eventually interpret the slogan to extirpate all German influence as an incitement to the murder and bestial mutilation of human beings.[142]

Footnotes

[1] Degrelle, Leon, Hitler: Born at Versailles, Torrance, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1992, Author's Preface, p. x.

[2] Chamberlain, William Henry, America's Second Crusade, Chicago: Regnery, 1950, pp. 13-15, 20-22.

[3] Tansill, Charles C., "The United States and the Road to War in Europe," in Barnes, Harry Elmer (ed.), Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Newport Beach, CA: Institute for Historical Review, 1993, pp. 81, 84.

[4] Franz-Willing, "The Origins of the Second World War," The Journal of Historical Review, Torrance, CA: Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 1986, p. 103.

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Chapter Four

• The Allied Conspiracy to Instigate & Prolong WWII

President Franklin D. Roosevelt revealed his antagonism toward Germany when he wrote to Secretary of War Henry Stimson on Aug. 26, 1944: "Too many people here and in England hold the view that the German people as a whole are not responsible for what has taken place—that only a few Nazi leaders are responsible. That unfortunately is not based on fact. The German people as a whole must have it driven home to them that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization."[1]

President Roosevelt in this communication ignores the existence of a German opposition to National Socialism which frequently manifested itself during its rule and which culminated in the unsuccessful conspiracy to assassinate Adolf Hitler on July 20, 1944. More importantly, Roosevelt tried to place the entire blame for starting World War II on the German people as a whole. As we have seen, Germany and its people were not primarily responsible for starting World War II. In this chapter we will show that, in fact, it was President Roosevelt and the other Allied leaders who were engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization.

FDR Conspires to Allow 'Surprise' Attack at Pearl Harbor

By the closing months of 1941, the United States was intercepting and breaking within a matter of hours almost every code produced by Japan.[2] The Army Signal Corps had broken the top Japanese diplomatic code known as PURPLE in August 1940. The United States was thus able to decipher and read all diplomatic messages sent between Tokyo and Japanese officials all over the world. Copies of these and other intercepted messages were circulated to all key administration officials in Washington, D.C. These messages, known as MAGIC, revealed much important information to the recipients.

The United States sent duplicate code machines to London, Singapore, and the Philippine Islands to keep the British and our Far East forces informed. Hawaii never received a duplicate code machine. Therefore, our government in Washington, D.C. had a far greater than

normal responsibility to make certain that Hawaii was properly informed and alerted.[3] However, the two United States commanders at Pearl Harbor, Rear Adm. Husband Kimmel and Maj. Gen. Walter Short, were never informed of the intercepted Japanese messages. The Roosevelt administration did not disclose these intercepted Japanese messages to Kimmel and Short because it wanted the Japanese to make a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

In the last week of November 1941, Roosevelt knew that an attack by the Japanese in the Pacific was imminent. Roosevelt warned William Bullitt against traveling across the Pacific, "I am expecting the Japs to attack any time now, probably within the next three or four days."[4] Roosevelt and his administration knew this based on the intercepted Japanese messages. This information should have been given to the commanders at Pearl Harbor to enable them to prepare for and thwart the Japanese attack.

The war was only 10 days old before some congressmen questioned why America's military leaders at Pearl Harbor had been unprepared for the Japanese attack. Fearing that a congressional investigation would harm both his political future and the war effort, Roosevelt appointed a five-man board of inquiry headed by Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts of the U.S. Supreme Court. In order to maintain military secrecy, the Roberts Commission did not examine or discuss any of the Japanese naval intercepts. The Roberts Commission's report concluded that the Pearl Harbor attack was successful due to failures and errors of judgment by Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short. They were both charged with dereliction of duty. President Roosevelt approved the Roberts Commission's report on Jan. 24, 1942.[5]

A number of investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack followed the Roberts Commission report. Most of these investigations have been attempts to suppress, mislead, or confuse those who seek the truth. Facts and files have been withheld so as to reveal only those items of information which benefit the Roosevelt administration.[6]

Investigations conducted by the Army and Navy boards did eventually exonerate Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short from derelictions of duty and failures to act which were "the effective causes" of the disaster at Pearl Harbor. In its report released on Aug. 29, 1945, the Navy Court of Inquiry said that Adm. Harold Stark had "failed to display the sound judgment expected of him" in not transmitting to Adm. Kimmel in 1941

important information. This important information included warning Kimmel "that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon."[7]

One commentator has noted that those who maintained secrecy, failed to remember, or testified on behalf of the administration in the Pearl Harbor investigations rose very quickly to high places. These people include Gen. George Marshall, who was made a permanent five-star general, Col. Walter Bedell Smith, who became a three-star general, Alben Barkley, who became vice president under Harry Truman, Sen. Scott Lucas, who became the Senate majority leader, and John W. Murphy and Samuel H. Kaufman, who were both appointed to lifetime federal judgeships. On the other hand, virtually no one who testified in the various hearings as to the facts that were damaging to the Roosevelt administration and their superiors was ever promoted or rewarded.[8]

None of the Pearl Harbor investigations was able to prove definitively that the Roosevelt administration knew beforehand of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. This is because key evidence began to be concealed as early as Dec. 11, 1941. On this date Rear Adm. Leigh Noyes, the Navy's director of communications, consigned the pre-Pearl Harbor Japanese military and diplomatic intercepts and the relevant directives to Navy vaults. In August 1945, the Navy blocked public access to the pre-Pearl Harbor intercepts by classifying the documents TOP SECRET. When the congressional investigation into the Pearl Harbor attack began on Nov. 15, 1945, only diplomatic messages were released. None of the details of the interception, decoding, or dissemination of the pre-Pearl Harbor naval messages was introduced into evidence.[9]

The Freedom of Information Act has since been used by Robert Stinnett to release information not available in previous Pearl Harbor investigations. Stinnett, a veteran of the Pacific war, conducted 17 years of research involving more than 200,000 documents and interviews. Stinnett concludes that: 1) the United States provoked Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor; 2) U.S. intelligence knew that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was coming; and 3) Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Walter Short were deprived of this intelligence.[10]

Stinnett states: "Seven Japanese naval broadcasts intercepted between November 28 and December 6 [1941] confirmed that Japan intended to start the war and that it would begin at Pearl Harbor. The evidence that poured into American intelligence stations is overpowering. All the broadcasts have one common denominator: none ever reached Admiral Kimmel."[11]

Adm. Robert A. Theobald, who was in the port of Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked, conducted extensive research for many years into the Pearl Harbor attack. Theobald concludes that President Roosevelt forced Japan to war by unrelenting diplomatic-economic pressure. Also, Theobald concludes that Roosevelt enticed Japan to initiate hostilities with its surprise attack of the Pacific fleet in Hawaiian waters. By withholding information from Adm. Kimmel that would have caused Kimmel to render the attack impossible, Theobald states that President Roosevelt brought war to the United States on Dec. 7, 1941. There would have been no Pearl Harbor attack if MAGIC had been made available to the Hawaiian commanders.[12]

Adm. Theobald lists the following facts to show that the Pearl Harbor attack was in accord with President Roosevelt's plans:

President Roosevelt and his military and naval advisors were well aware that Japan invariably started her wars with a surprise attack synchronized closely with her delivery of the declaration of war;

In October, 1940, the president stated that, if war broke out in the Pacific, Japan would commit the overt act which would bring the United States into war;

The Pacific Fleet, against contrary naval advice, was retained in Hawaii by order of the president for the alleged reason that the Fleet, so located, would exert a restrictive effect upon Japanese aggression in the Far East;

The fleet in Hawaii was neither powerful enough nor in the necessary strategic position to influence Japan's diplomatic decisions, which could only be accomplished by the stationing of an adequate naval force in Far Eastern waters;

Before the fleet could operate at any distance from Pearl Harbor, its train (tankers, supply and repair vessels) would have had to be tremendously increased in strength—facts that would not escape the notice of the experienced Japanese spies in Hawaii;

President Roosevelt gave unmistakable evidence, in March, 1941, that he was not greatly concerned with the Pacific Fleet's effects upon Japanese diplomatic decisions, when he authorized the weakening of that fleet, already inferior to that of Japan, by the detachment of three battleships, one aircraft carrier, four light cruisers, and 18 destroyers for duty in the

Atlantic—a movement which would immediately be detected by Japanese espionage in Hawaii and the Panama Canal Zone;

The successful crippling of the Pacific Fleet was the only surprise operation which promised the Japanese navy sufficiently large results to justify the risk of heavy losses from land-based air attacks if the surprise failed;

Such an operation against the fleet in Hawaii was attended with far greater chances of success, especially from the surprise standpoint, and far less risk of heavy losses than a similar attack against the fleet based in U.S. West Coast ports;

The retention of the fleet in Hawaii, especially after its reduction in strength in March, 1941, could serve only one possible purpose, an invitation to a surprise Japanese attack;

The denial to the Hawaiian commanders of all knowledge of Magic was vital to the plan for enticing Japan to deliver a surprise attack upon the fleet in Pearl Harbor, because, as late as Saturday, December 6, Admiral Kimmel could have caused the attack to be canceled by taking his fleet to sea and disappearing beyond land-based human ken.[13]

Adm. Theobald's conclusions are reinforced by Adm. William F. Halsey, who was one of three senior commanders of the Pacific Fleet serving under Adm. Kimmel. Adm. Halsey states: "…I did not know then of any of the pertinent 'MAGIC messages.' All our intelligence pointed to an attack by Japan against the Philippines or the southern areas in Malaya or the Dutch East Indies. While Pearl Harbor was considered and not ruled out, the mass of evidence made available to us pointed in another direction. Had we known of Japan's minute and continued interest in the exact location and movement of our ships in Pearl Harbor, as indicated in the 'MAGIC messages,' it is only logical that we would have concentrated our thought on meeting the practical certainty of an attack on Pearl Harbor."[14]

Adm. Kimmel was dumbfounded that the MAGIC messages were never disclosed to him. Kimmel states that if he had all of the important information then available to the Navy Department, he would have gone to sea with his fleet and been in a good position to intercept the Japanese attack.[15] Adm. Kimmel concludes in regard to the Pearl Harbor attacks:

Again and again in my mind I have reviewed the events that preceded the Japanese attack, seeking to determine if I was unjustified in drawing from the orders, directives and information that were forwarded to me the conclusions that I did. The fact that I then thought and now think my conclusions were sound when based upon the information I received, has sustained me during the years that have passed since the first Japanese bomb fell on Pearl Harbor.

When the information available in Washington was disclosed to me I was appalled. Nothing in my experience of nearly 42 years of service in the Navy had prepared me for the actions of the highest officials in our government which denied this vital information to the Pearl Harbor commanders.

If those in authority wished to engage in power politics, the least that they should have done was to advise their naval and military commanders what they were endeavoring to accomplish. To utilize the Pacific Fleet and the Army forces at Pearl Harbor as a lure for a Japanese attack without advising the commander-inchief of the fleet and the commander of the Army base at Hawaii is something I am wholly unable to comprehend.[16]

Adm. James O. Richardson agrees with Kimmel's assessment. Richardson wrote after the war:

I consider that, after Pearl Harbor, Admiral Kimmel received the rawest of raw deals from Franklin D. Roosevelt….I consider [Harold] "Betty" Stark, in failing to ensure that Kimmel was furnished with all the information available from the breaking Japanese dispatches, to have been to a marked degree professionally negligent in carrying out his duties as chief of naval operations.

This offense was compounded, since in writing he had assured the commander-in-chief of the United States Fleet twice (both myself and Kimmel) that the commander-in-chief was "being kept advised on all matters within his own [Stark's] knowledge" and "you may rest assured that just as soon as I get anything of definite interest, I shall fire it along."[17]

The U.S. government and military possessed solid intelligence before Dec. 7, 1941, concerning Japanese plans to attack the United States. According to the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

Information from informers and other means as to the activities of our potential enemy and their intentions in the negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete disclosure of Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know what…Japanese potential moves…were scheduled…against the United States. Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions….This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity of resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war.[18]

The Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor was no surprise to the Roosevelt administration. Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short were denied the vital information of a planned Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor because Roosevelt wanted an excuse to get the United States into the war. Roosevelt made Kimmel and Short the scapegoats for the Pearl Harbor tragedy. This is consistent with Franklin Roosevelt's complex and devious nature. Roosevelt admitted to Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau six months after Pearl Harbor: "You know I am a juggler, and I never let my right hand know what my left hand does…and furthermore I am willing to mislead and tell untruths if it will help win the war."[19]

FDR Conspires to Force the U.S. To Enter World War II

Numerous historians and political leaders conclude that Roosevelt conspired to force the United States into war. Historian Harry Elmer Barnes summarizes President Roosevelt's efforts to involve the United States in World War II:

Roosevelt "lied the United States into war." He went as far as he dared in illegal efforts, such as convoying vessels carrying munitions, to provoke Germany and Italy to make war on the United States. Failing in

this, he turned to a successful attempt to enter the war through the back door of Japan. He rejected repeated and sincere Japanese proposals that even Hull admitted protected all the vital interests of the United States in the Far East, by his economic strangulation in the summer of 1941 forced the Japanese into an attack on Pearl Harbor, took steps to prevent the Pearl Harbor commanders, General Short and Admiral Kimmel, from having their own decoding facilities to detect a Japanese attack, kept Short and Kimmel from receiving the decoded Japanese intercepts that Washington picked up and indicated that war might come at any moment, and ordered General Marshall and Admiral Stark not to send any warning to Short and Kimmel before noon on December 7th, when Roosevelt knew that any warning sent would be too late to avert the Japanese attack at 1:00 P.M., Washington time.[20]

William Henry Chamberlain also concludes that Roosevelt guided America into the war. Chamberlain writes: "The war with Germany was also very largely the result of the initiative of the Roosevelt administration. The destroyer deal, the lend-lease bill, the freezing of Axis assets, the injection of the American Navy, with much secrecy and doubletalk, into the Battle of the Atlantic: these and many similar actions were obvious departures from neutrality, even though a Neutrality Act, which the president had sworn to uphold, was still on the statute books."[21]

Chamberlain goes on to state that America's entry into World War II was based on illusions:

America's Second Crusade was a product of illusions which are already bankrupt. It was an illusion that that the United States was at any time in danger of invasion by Nazi Germany. It was an illusion that Hitler was bent on the destruction of the British Empire. It was an illusion that China was capable of becoming a strong, friendly, Western-oriented power in the Far East. It was an illusion that a powerful Soviet Union in a weakened and impoverished Eurasia would be a force for peace, conciliation, stability, and international co-operation. It was an illusion that the evils and dangers associated with totalitarianism could be eliminated by giving unconditional support to one form of totalitarianism against another. It was an illusion that a combination of appeasement and personal charm could melt away designs of conquest and domination which were deeply rooted in Russian history and Communist philosophy.[22]

Historian Klaus Fischer writes that Roosevelt implemented numerous actions in 1941 that prepared the United States to enter World War II:

Roosevelt's actions against both Germany and Japan were positively provocative, including the previously mentioned programs of cash and carry, lend-lease, neutrality zones, restoring conscription, increased defense appropriations, and secret war plans. In March 1941 Roosevelt informed the British that they could have their ships repaired in American docks, and that same month the president ordered the seizure of all Axis vessels in American ports. On April 10, Roosevelt extended the security zone all the way to the eastern coast of Greenland, negotiating the use of military bases on the island with a Danish official who did not have approval from his home government. If we add the various economic sanctions the president imposed on Japan, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Roosevelt was preparing the nation for war.[23]

Clare Boothe Luce surprised many people at the Republican Convention in 1944 by saying that Roosevelt "lied the American people into war because he could not lead them into it." Once this statement proved to be true, the Roosevelt supporters ceased to deny it. Instead, they said Roosevelt was forced to lie to save his country and the rest of the world.

Sir Oliver Lyttelton, the British minister of productions in Churchill's cabinet, confirms that the United States was not forced into war. Speaking before the American Chamber of Commerce in London in 1944, Lyttelton stated: "Japan was provoked into attacking the Americans at Pearl Harbor….It is a travesty of history to ever say America was forced into war."[24]

On Dec. 8, 1941, Rep. Hamilton Fish made the first speech in Congress asking for a declaration of war against Japan. Fish later said that if he had known what Roosevelt had been doing to provoke Japan to attack, he never would have asked for a declaration of war. Fish states:

FDR deliberately goaded Japan into war….Roosevelt was the main instigator and firebrand to light the fuse of war, abetted by the five

members of his war cabinet. They were all sure that the Japanese would start the war by an undeclared strategic attack.

Roosevelt, through his numerous campaign pledges and also by the plank of the Democratic national platform against intervention, had tied himself in unbreakable peace knots. There was only one way out—to provoke Germany or Japan into attacking us. He tried in every way possible to incite the Germans to attack, but to no avail. The convoy of ships, and the shoot-at-sight order, were open and brazen efforts by the president to take the country into war against Germany, but Hitler avoided the lure.

The delay and virtual refusal to inform our Hawaiian commander is inconceivable, except as a part of a deceitful and concerted scheme of silence….The tragedy of Pearl Harbor rests with FDR, not only because of the infamous war ultimatum, but for not making sure that Kimmel and Short were notified of the Japanese answer to the ultimatum.[25]

If Roosevelt's secret policies had been known, the public demand for his impeachment would probably have been unstoppable. Fish states: "If the American people had known that they were deliberately tricked into a foreign war by Roosevelt in defiance of all his promises and pledges, there would have been political bombs exploding all over the United States, including demands for his resignation or impeachment."[26] Fish concludes: "Roosevelt had the opportunity to be a great peacemaker. Instead he chose to be a disastrous warmaker."[27]

Even biographers friendly to Roosevelt admit that until the last year when he was weighed down by physical illness, Roosevelt had never been as happy as during World War II. After the Casablanca Conference, Roosevelt wrote a letter to George VI: "A truly mighty meeting….As for Mr. Churchill and myself, I need not tell you that we make a perfectly matched team in harness and out—and incidentally we had lots of fun together, as we always do."[28]

USSR Conspires to Foment WWII & Infiltrate U.S. Government

Stalin adopted three Five Year Plans beginning in 1927 designed to make the Soviet Union by far the greatest military power in the world. Stalin also conspired to start a major war in Europe by drawing Great Britain and France into war against Germany and other countries. Stalin's

plan was to eliminate one enemy with the hands of another. If Germany entered into a war with Great Britain and France, other countries would enter into the war and great destruction would follow. The Soviet Union could then invade Europe and easily take over the entire continent.

Stalin first attempted to start a major war in Europe in 1936 during the civil war in Spain. Stalin's political agents, propagandists, diplomats, and spies in Spain all screamed in outrage that children were dying in Spain while Great Britain and France did nothing. However, Stalin's agents were not able to spread the war beyond Spain's borders. By the end of 1938, Stalin stopped all anti-Hitler propaganda to calm Hitler and to encourage him to attack Poland.

Stalin eventually forced war in Europe with the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. British and French delegations had arrived in Moscow on Aug. 11, 1939, to discuss joint action against Germany. During the course of the talks, British and French delegates told the Soviets that if Germany attacked Poland, Great Britain and France would declare war against Germany. This was the information that Stalin needed to know. On Aug. 19, 1939, Stalin stopped the talks with Great Britain and France, and told the German ambassador in Moscow that he wanted to reach an agreement with Germany. Germany and the Soviet Union then signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, which resulted in the destruction and division of Poland.[29]

The Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement is remarkable in that Hitler repeatedly stated he hated communism and did not trust the leaders of the Soviet Union. Hitler writes in Mein Kampf:

It must never be forgotten that the present rulers of Russia are blood-stained criminals, that here we have the dregs of humanity which, favored by the circumstances of a tragic moment, overran a great state, degraded and extirpated millions of educated people out of sheer blood-lust, and that now for nearly 10 years they have ruled with such a savage tyranny as was never known before. It must not be forgotten that these rulers belong to a people in whom the most bestial cruelty is allied with a capacity for artful mendacity and believes itself today more than ever called to impose its sanguinary despotism on the rest of the world. It must not be forgotten that the international Jew, who is today the absolute master of Russia, does not look upon Germany as an ally but as a state condemned to the same doom as Russia. One does not form an alliance with a partner whose only

aim is the destruction of his fellow partner. Above all, one does not enter into alliances with people for whom no treaty is sacred; because they do not move about this earth as men of honor and sincerity but as the representatives of lies and deception, thievery and plunder and robbery. The man who thinks that he can bind himself by treaty with parasites is like the tree that believes it can form a profitable bargain with the ivy that surrounds it.[30]

Hitler also states in Mein Kampf: "Therefore the fact of forming an alliance with Russia would be the signal for a new war. And the result of that would be the end of Germany."[31]

Hitler repeated his distrust of the Soviet Union in a conversation on March 3, 1938, with British Ambassador Nevile Henderson. Hitler stated in this conversation that any limitations on arms depended on the Soviet Union. Hitler noted that the problem was rendered particularly difficult "by the fact that one could place as much confidence in the faith in treaties of a barbarous creature like the Soviet Union as in the comprehension of mathematical formulae by a savage. Any agreement with the U.S.S.R. was quite worthless." Hitler added that it was impossible, for example, to have faith in any Soviet agreement not to use poison gas.[32]

These statements by Hitler in Mein Kampf and to Nevile Henderson were prescient. Stalin had been conspiring to take over all of Europe ever since the 1920s. Stalin and the Soviet Union could not be trusted to uphold any peace agreement. However, Hitler decided to enter into the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement because Hitler was desperate to end the atrocities being committed against the ethnic Germans in Poland. Hitler was hoping that the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement would prevent Great Britain and France from declaring war against Germany.[33]

Hitler also signed the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement because the negotiations that had been ongoing between Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union had taken on a threatening character for Germany. Hitler was confronted with the alternative of being encircled by this massive alliance coalition or ending it via diplomatic channels. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact prevented Germany from being encircled by these three powers.[34]

Stalin stayed out of the war in Europe he had conspired to instigate. Stalin kept the war in Europe going by supplying much needed

supplies to Germany. However, Hitler's swift victory over France prevented the massive destruction in Europe Stalin had hoped for. Molotov was sent to Germany in November 1940 to announce the Soviet Union's new territorial demands in Europe. These new territorial demands effectively ended the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. Hitler was forced to launch a preemptive attack on June 22, 1941, to prevent the Soviet Union from conquering all of Europe.

The Soviet war effort in the European theater of World War II was enormous. Most historians underestimate the incredible power of the Soviet military. As historian Norman Davies states: "…the Soviet war effort was so overwhelming that impartial historians in the future are unlikely to rate the British and American contribution to the European theater as much more than a supporting role. The proportions were not 'fifty-fifty', as many imply when talking of the final onslaught on Nazi Germany from East and West. Sooner or later people will have to adjust to the fact that the Soviet role was enormous and the Western role was respectable but modest."[35]

A crucial factor that prevented the Soviet takeover of Europe was the more than 400,000 non-German Europeans who volunteered to fight on the Eastern Front. Combined with 600,000 German troops, the 1,000,000 man Waffen-SS represented the first truly pan-European army to ever exist. The heroism of these non-German volunteers who joined the Waffen-SS prevented the planned Soviet conquest of Europe. In this regard, Waffen-SS Gen. Leon Degrelle states:

If the Waffen-SS had not existed, Europe would have been overrun entirely by the Soviets by 1944. They would have reached Paris long before the Americans. Waffen-SS heroism stopped the Soviet juggernaut at Moscow, Cherkov, Cherkassy and Tarnopol. The Soviets lost more than 12 months. Without SS resistance the Soviets would have been in Normandy before Eisenhower. The people showed deep gratitude to the young men who sacrificed their lives.[36]

The Soviet Union also conspired to have Japan attack the United States. Harry Dexter White, who was later proven to be a Soviet agent, carried out a mission to provoke Japan into war with the United States. When Secretary of State Cordell Hull allowed the peacemakers in Roosevelt's administration to put together a modus vivendi that had real

potential, White drafted a 10-point proposal that the Japanese were certain to reject. White passed a copy of his proposal to Hull, and this final American offer—the so-called "Hull note"—was presented to the Japanese on Nov. 26, 1941.[37]

The Hull note, which was based on two memoranda from White, was a declaration of war as far as the Japanese were concerned. The Hull note destroyed any possible peace settlement with the Japanese, and led to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In this regard, historian John Koster writes:

Harry Dexter White, acting under orders from Soviet intelligence, pulled the strings by which Cordell Hull and [State Department expert on Far Eastern Affairs] Stanley Hornbeck handed the Japanese an ultimatum that was tantamount to a declaration of war—when both the Japanese cabinet and the U.S. military were desperately eager for peace….Harry Dexter White knew exactly what he was doing. The man himself remains a mystery, but the documents speak for themselves. Harry Dexter White gave us Pearl Harbor.[38]

The Soviets had also planted numerous other agents in the Roosevelt administration. For example, Harold Glasser, a member of Morgenthau's Treasury staff, provided intelligence from the War Department and the White House to the Soviets. Glasser's reports were deemed so important by the NKVD that 74 reports generated from his material went directly to Stalin. One historian writes of the Soviet infiltration of the U.S. government and its effect on Roosevelt:

These spies, plus the hundreds in other U.S. agencies at the time, including the military and the OSS, permeated the administration in Washington, and, ultimately, the White House, surrounding FDR. He was basically in the Soviets' pocket. He admired Stalin, sought his favor. Right or wrong, he thought the Soviet Union indispensable in the war, crucial to bringing world peace after it, and he wanted the Soviets handled with kid gloves. FDR was star struck. The Russians hardly could have done better if he was a Soviet spy.[39]

The opening of the Soviet archives in 1995 revealed that more than[300] Communist members or supporters had infiltrated the American government. Working in Lend-Lease, the Treasury Department, the State Department, the office of the president, the office of the vice president, and even American intelligence operations, these spies constantly tried to shift U.S. policy in a pro-Soviet direction. During World War II several of these Soviet spies were well positioned to influence American policy. Especially at the Tehran and Yalta meetings toward the end of World War II, the Soviet spies were able to influence Roosevelt to make huge concessions to the Soviet Union.[40]

Churchill Conspires to Perpetuate WWII, Destroy Germany

Hitler had never wanted war with Great Britain. To Hitler, Great Britain was the natural ally of Germany and the nation he admired most. Hitler had no ambitions against Britain or her Empire, and all of the captured records solidly bear this out.[41]

Hitler had also never planned for a world war. British historian A.J.P. Taylor shatters the myth of a great German military buildup:

In 1938-39, the last peacetime year, Germany spent on armament about 15% of her gross national product. The British proportion was almost exactly the same. German expenditure on armaments was actually cut down after Munich and remained at this lower level, so that British production of aeroplanes, for example, was way ahead of German by 1940. When war broke out in 1939, Germany had 1,450 modern fighter planes and 800 bombers; Great Britain and France had 950 fighters and 1,300 bombers. The Germans had 3,500 tanks; Great Britain and France had 3,850. In each case Allied intelligence estimated German strength at more than twice the true figure. As usual, Hitler was thought to have planned and prepared for a great war. In fact, he had not.[42]

Taylor further states that Hitler was not intending or anticipating a major war:

He was not projecting a major war; hence it did not matter that Germany was not equipped for one. Hitler deliberately ruled out the "rearmament in depth" which was pressed on him by his technical advisors. He was not interested in preparing for a long war against the Great Powers. He chose instead "rearmament in width"—a frontline army without reserves, adequate only for a quick strike. Under Hitler's direction, Germany was equipped to win the war of nerves—the only war he understood and liked; she was not equipped to conquer Europe….In considering German armament we escape from the mystic regions of Hitler's psychology and find an answer in the realm of fact. The answer is clear. The state of German armament in 1939 gives the decisive proof that Hitler was not contemplating general war, and probably not intending war at all.[43]

Hitler was eager to make peace once Great Britain and France had declared war against Germany. Hitler confided to his inner circle: "If we on our side avoid all acts of war, the whole business will evaporate. As soon as we sink a ship and they have sizable casualties, the war party over there will gain strength."[44] Hitler made a peace offer on Oct. 6, 1939, that was quickly rejected. No doubt the leaders of the Soviet Union, who wanted a general European war, were relieved by the quick rejection of Hitler's offer.

Hitler dreamed of an Anglo-German alliance even when Germany was at war with Great Britain. Hitler biographer Alan Bullock states: "Even during the war Hitler persisted in believing that an alliance with Germany…was in Britain's own interest, continually expressed his regret that the British had been so stupid as not to see this, and never gave up the hope that he would be able to overcome their obstinacy and persuade them to accept his view."[45]

Germany's offensive against Dunkirk was halted by Hitler's order on May 24, 1940. German Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt insists that his hands were tied by Hitler's instructions. Hitler talked to von Rundstedt and two key men of his staff, Gens. Georg von Sodenstern and Guenther Blumentritt. As Gen. Blumentritt tells the story:

He [Hitler] then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and of the civilization that Britain had brought into the world….He said that all he wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge Germany's position on the continent. The

return of Germany's lost colonies would be desirable but not essential, and he would even offer to support Britain with troops if she should be involved in any difficulties anywhere.[46]

Hitler told his friend Frau Troost: "The blood of every single Englishman is too valuable to be shed. Our two peoples belong together, racially and traditionally—this is and always has been my aim even if our generals can't grasp it."[47]

Hitler states in his political testament of Feb. 26, 1945: "Churchill was quite unable to appreciate the sporting spirit of which I had given proof by refraining from creating an irreparable breach between the British and ourselves. We did, indeed, refrain from annihilating them at Dunkirk. We ought to have been able to make them realize that the acceptance by them of the German hegemony established in Europe, a state of affairs to the implementation of which they had always been opposed, but which I had implemented without any trouble, would bring them inestimable advantages."[48]

Having been given the gift of Dunkirk by Hitler, Churchill refused to acknowledge it. Churchill instead described the evacuation of British troops off the beaches of Dunkirk as a heroic miracle accomplished by the British navy. Churchill became even more bellicose in his determination to continue the war.[49]

Hitler's desire to preserve the British Empire was expressed on another occasion when the military fortunes of the Allies were at their lowest ebb. When France appealed for an armistice, von Ribbentrop gave the following summary of Hitler's attitude toward Great Britain in a strictly private talk with the Italian Foreign Minister Count Galeazzo Ciano:

He [Ribbentrop] said that in the Fuehrer's opinion the existence of the British Empire as an element of stability and social order in the world is very useful. In the present state of affairs it would be impossible to replace it with another, similar organization. Therefore, the Fuehrer—as he has also recently stated in public—does not desire the destruction of the British Empire. He asks that England renounce some of its possessions and recognize the fait accompli. On these conditions Hitler would be prepared to come to an agreement.[50]

After Dunkirk, Ribbentrop wrote that Hitler was enthused with making a quick peace with England. Hitler outlined the peace terms he was prepared to offer the British: "It will only be a few points, and the first point is that nothing must be done between England and Germany which would in any way violate the prestige of Great Britain. Secondly, Great Britain must give us back one or two of our old colonies. That is the only thing we want."[51]

On June 25, 1940, Hitler telephoned Joseph Goebbels to lay out the terms of an agreement with Great Britain. Goebbels wrote in his diary:

The Fuehrer…believes that the [British Empire] must be preserved if at all possible. For if it collapses, then we shall not inherit it, but foreign and even hostile powers take it over. But if England will have it no other way, then she must be beaten to her knees. The Fuehrer, however, would be agreeable to peace on the following basis: England out of Europe, colonies and mandates returned. Reparations for what was stolen from us after [World War I].[52]

Hitler took the initiative to end the war after the fall of France in June 1940. In a victory speech on July 19, 1940, Hitler declared that it had never been his intention to destroy or even harm the British Empire. Hitler made a general peace offer in the following words:

In this hour I feel it to be my duty before my conscience to appeal once more to reason and commonsense in Great Britain as much as elsewhere. I consider myself in a position to make this appeal, since I am not the vanquished, begging favors, but the victor, speaking in the name of reason. I can see no reason why this war must go on.[53]

This speech was followed by private diplomatic overtures to Great Britain through Sweden, the United States, and the Vatican. There is no question that Hitler was eager to end the war. But Churchill was in the war with the objective of destroying Germany. Churchill was not concerned with saving the British Empire from destruction. British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax also wanted the war to continue, and

brushed aside what he called Hitler's "summons to capitulate at his will."[54] Hitler's peace offer was officially rejected on July 22, 1940.[55]

Alan Clarke, defense aid to Margaret Thatcher, believes that only Churchill's obsession with Hitler and "single-minded determination to keep the war going" prevented his accepting Germany's offer to end the war in 1940: "There were several occasions when a rational leader could have got, first reasonable, then excellent terms from Germany. Hitler actually offered peace in July 1940 before the Battle of Britain started. After the RAF victory, the German terms were still available, now weighed more in Britain's favor."[56]

On Aug. 14, 1940, during the Battle of Britain, Hitler called his field marshals into the Reich Chancellery to impress upon them that victory over Britain must not lead to the collapse of the British Empire:

Germany is not striving to smash Britain because the beneficiaries will not be Germany, but Japan in the east, Russia in India, Italy in the Mediterranean, and America in world trade. This is why peace is possible with Britain—but not so long as Churchill is prime minister. Thus we must see what the Luftwaffe can do, and wait a possible general election.[57]

Hitler continued to search for a way to end the war he had never wanted. On May 10, 1941, Deputy Fuehrer Rudolf Hess flew in a Messerschmitt 110 to Scotland to attempt to negotiate a peace settlement with Great Britain. On May 11, 1941, Rudolf Hess told the duke of Hamilton why he had flown to Scotland: "I am on a mission of humanity. The Fuehrer does not want to defeat England and wants to stop fighting."[58]

While it is impossible to prove that Hess flew to Scotland with Hitler's knowledge and approval, the available evidence suggests that he did. The relationship between Hess and Hitler was so close that one can logically assume that Hess would not have undertaken such an important step without first informing Hitler. Also, Hess was prohibited from speaking openly about his mission during the entire 40-year period of his imprisonment in Spandau prison. This "gag order" was obviously imposed because Hess knew things that, if publicly known, would be highly embarrassing to the Allied governments.[59]

A peaceful settlement of the war was impossible after the announcement of the Allied policy of unconditional surrender at a press conference in Casablanca on Jan. 23, 1943. The Allied policy of unconditional surrender ensured that the war would be fought to its bitter end. Maurice Hankey, an experienced British statesman, summed up the effect of the unconditional surrender policy as follows:

It embittered the war, rendered inevitable a fight to the finish, banged the door to the possibility of either side offering terms or opening up negotiations, gave the Germans and the Japanese the courage of despair, strengthened Hitler's position as Germany's "only hope," aided Goebbels's propaganda, and made inevitable the Normandy landing and the subsequent terribly exhausting and destructive advance through north France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Holland and Germany. The lengthening of the war enabled Stalin to occupy the whole of Eastern Europe, to ring down the iron curtain and so to realize at one swoop a large installment of his avowed aims against so-called capitalism, in which he includes social democracy….Not only the enemy countries, but nearly all countries were bled white by this policy, which has left us all, except the United States of America, impoverished and in dire straits. Unfortunately also, these policies, so contrary to the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount, did nothing to strengthen the moral position of the Allies.[60]

Numerous other historians and political leaders have stated that Great Britain and the United States made it impossible for Germany to reach a peaceful resolution to the war. It is widely acknowledged that Hitler did not want a war with either Great Britain or the United States.[61] Instead, Great Britain and the U.S. wanted war with Germany. In this regard, Rep. Hamilton Fish states:

If Roosevelt and Churchill had really wished to deliver the world from the menace of totalitarianism, they had their Godgiven opportunity on June 22, 1941. England could have withdrawn from the war and made peace with Hitler on the most favorable terms. Hitler had no designs whatever on the United States, so we would not have been endangered by this turn of events. Then Hitler and Stalin would have fought each other into

exhaustion. This is exactly what the Baldwin-Chamberlain foreign policy had originally envisaged. Mr. Truman, then a senator, strongly supported this policy, as did Senator Vandenberg and many others. It would have left the United States and England dominant powers in the world, and they might have kept it a predominantly free world.[62]

German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop had told Rep. Hamilton Fish that cooperation between England and Germany was essential for the maintenance of peace. Hitler had even "offered to place 15 German army divisions and the entire fleet at the disposal of the British government to support her empire in case of war anywhere in the world." Fish did not believe this statement from von Ribbentrop at the time, but it was substantiated years later.[63]

Hitler voiced his puzzlement to the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin at Great Britain's refusal to accept his peace offers. Hitler felt he had repeatedly extended the hand of peace and friendship to the British, and each time they had blackened his eye in reply. Hitler said, "The survival of the British Empire is in Germany's interest too because if Britain loses India, we gain nothing thereby."[64]

Even a diplomat from Churchill's own Conservative Party admitted: "To the world at large, Churchill appeared to be the very embodiment of a policy of war. To have brought him into government when the balance between peace and war was still quivering, might have definitely tilted the scales on the side of war."[65]

The refusal of Churchill to negotiate peace with Germany is remarkable in that Churchill spoke of the evils of communism. Churchill once said of communism:

It is not only a creed; it is a plan of campaign. A Communist is not only the holder of certain opinions, he is the pledge adept of a well-thought-out means of enforcing them. The anatomy of discontent and revolution has been studied in every phase and aspect, and a veritable drill book prepared in a scientific spirit of sabotaging all existing institutions. No faith need be kept with non-Communists. Every act of goodwill, or tolerance or conciliation or mercy or magnanimity on the part of governments or statesmen is to be utilized for their ruin. Then, when the time is ripe and the moment opportune, every form of lethal violence, from revolt to private

assassination, must be used without stint or compunction. The citadel will be stormed under the banners of liberty and democracy, and once the apparatus of power is in the hands of the brotherhood, all opposition, all contrary opinions must be extinguished by death. Democracy is but a tool to be used and afterwards broken.[66]

Despite his aversion to communism, Churchill ignored all German peace efforts and joined the Soviet Union in the war against Germany.

On Jan. 20, 1943, Joseph E. Davies disclosed that Hitler offered to retire from office if by doing so Great Britain would make peace with Germany. Churchill and other British leaders refused Hitler's offer.[67]

Churchill never once attempted to make peace with Germany. In a Jan. 1, 1944, letter to Stalin, Churchill said: "We never thought of peace, not even in that year when we were completely isolated and could have made peace without serious detriment to the British Empire, and extensively at your cost. Why should we think of it now, when victory approaches for the three of us?"[68]

It is well known that Churchill loved war. English publicist F.S. Oliver has written of Churchill: "From his youth up, Mr. Churchill has loved with all his heart, all his mind, and with all his soul, and with all his strength, three things: war, politics, and himself. He loved war for its dangers, he loved politics for the same reason, and himself he has always loved for the knowledge that his mind is dangerous…."[69] Churchill always wanted to continue the war against Germany rather than negotiate a peaceful settlement.

Even leaders of the German resistance movement discovered that the Allied policy of unconditional surrender would not change with Hitler dead. On July 18, 1944, Otto John returned from fruitless negotiations with Allied representatives in Madrid and informed his fellow plotters that unconditional surrender would be in place even if they succeeded in killing Hitler.

Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier, a former conspirator and president of the West German Parliament after the war, stated in a 1975 interview: "What we in the German resistance during the war did not want to see, we learned in full measure afterward; that this war was ultimately not waged against Hitler, but against Germany."[70]

Great Britain Practices Uncivilized Warfare

In addition to ignoring all German efforts to make peace, Churchill and other leaders of Great Britain began to conduct a war of unprecedented violence. On July 3, 1940, a British fleet attacked and destroyed much of the French fleet at Oran in southwestern Algeria to prevent it from falling into German hands. The French navy went to the bottom of the sea, and with it 1,297 French sailors. Churchill and the British government did not seem to mind that 1,297 of their French ally's sailors were killed in the attack. This attack on the French fleet illustrates Churchill's determination to continue fighting Hitler "no matter what the cost."[71]

A surprising aspect of the British attack on the French fleet is that low-flying British airplanes repeatedly machine-gunned masses of French sailors as they struggled in the water. It is an event still remembered with great bitterness in France. This deliberate British war crime was soon followed by the assassination of French Adm. Darlan by British agents in Algiers.[72]

Great Britain also began to violate the essential rule of civilized warfare that hostilities must be limited to the combatant forces. On May 11, 1940, British bombers began to attack the industrial areas of Germany. The British government adopted a new definition of military objectives so that this term included any building which in any way contributed, directly or indirectly, to the war effort of the enemy.

On Dec. 16, 1940, a moonlight raid by 134 British planes took place on Mannheim designed "to concentrate the maximum amount of damage in the center of the town." Great Britain abandoned all pretense of attacking military, industrial, or any other particular target with this raid.[73]

After France surrendered on June 22, 1940, for about a month Hitler clung to the hope that the war could be brought to an end by a negotiated peace. Once Hitler realized that a negotiated peace was impossible, he launched a massive air attack on Britain in order to win command of the air. The German air attacks were purely a military operation, carried out mainly in daylight, against airfields, docks and shipping. It was not until Sept. 6, 1940, that the German Luftwaffe was ordered to launch a reprisal air offensive against Great Britain. These

German reprisal attacks were exactly similar to the British air attacks against Germany which had been going on ever since May 11, 1940.

The two air offensives continued concurrently until the spring of 1941, when the Luftwaffe was withdrawn to take part in the invasion of the Soviet Union. The German air offensive was a complete failure in that it did not achieve its sole purpose of inducing the British government to discontinue the air offensive against Germany. The British air offensive was a failure to the extent that it did nothing toward crippling Germany's war production. However, it was a huge success to the extent that it generated a frenzied war psychosis in Great Britain and prevented the war from stagnating. The British public incorrectly believed that the British air offensive against Germany was merely a justified reprisal for the attacks of the Luftwaffe on Great Britain. The British public did not realize that it was Great Britain that had initiated the air attacks.[74]

On March 28, 1942, the British air offensive against Germany initiated Frederick Lindemann's bombing plan. The Lindemann Plan, which continued with undiminished ferocity until the end of the war, concentrated on bombing German working-class houses. The British bombing during this period was simple terror bombing designed to shatter the morale of the German civilian population and thereby generate an inclination to surrender. The bombing focused on working-class houses built close together because a higher percentage of bloodshed per ton of explosives dropped could be expected as opposed to bombing higher class houses surrounded by large yards and gardens.[75]

The climax of the British bombing offensive under the Lindemann Plan was reached on the night of Feb. 13, 1945, when a massive bombing raid was directed against Dresden. The population of Dresden was swollen by a horde of terrified German women and children running from the advancing Soviet army. No one will ever know exactly how many people died in the bombing of Dresden, but estimates of 250,000 or more civilian deaths appear to be reasonable. The bombing of Dresden served no military purpose; it was designed solely to terrify the German civilian population and break their will to continue the war.[76]

A horrifying aspect of the Dresden terror bombings occurred during the daylight hours of Feb. 14, 1945. On this day low-flying American fighters machine-gunned helpless Germans as they rushed toward the Elbe River in a desperate attempt to escape the inferno. Since Dresden had no air defense, the German civilians were easy targets.[77]

As word of the savage bombings of innocent German civilians began to filter to the outside world, the British government initially denied the slaughter. British leaders declared that the targets of the British air offensive were always military in nature. Despite the persistent government denials, the truth of the British mass bombings of civilian targets could not be suppressed forever. Critics of the civilian bombings became concerned about the moral demise of Great Britain. For example, British historian Basil Liddell Hart stated: "It will be ironical if the defenders of civilization depend for victory upon the most barbaric, and unskilled, way of winning a war that the modern world has seen….We are now counting for victory on success in the way of degrading it to a new level—as represented by indiscriminate (night) bombing."[78]

Evidence of the ruthless mass bombings of congested German cities was provided by many of the British bomber crews themselves. The almost total lack of German opposition to the British bombings toward the end of the war made the bombing of cities less like war and more like murder. While open criticism of government policy was not allowed, the guilt of young British flyers occasionally surfaced. One British crewman confessed: "There were people down there being fried to death in melted asphalt in the roads, they were being burnt up and we were shuffling incendiary bombs into this holocaust. I felt terribly sorry for the people in the fire I was helping to stoke up."[79]

After the destruction of Dresden, outrage was directed at Arthur Harris, the British chief of Bomber Command. Once known affectionately by his men as "Bomber" Harris, after Dresden many of his men nicknamed him "Butcher" Harris. One angry British crewman later explained: "We were told at the briefing that there were many thousands of Panzer troops in the streets [of Dresden], either going to or coming back from the Russian Front. My personal feeling is that if we'd been told the truth at the briefing, some of us wouldn't have gone."[80]

Winston Churchill, the man directly responsible for the Dresden holocaust, began to publicly distance himself from the terror bombings. Churchill stated to Sir Charles Portal, the chief of the British Air Staff, on March 28, 1945:

It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts should be reviewed. The destruction of Dresden

remains a serious query against the conduct of Allied bombing….I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives, such as oil and communications behind the immediate battle-zone, rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction, however impressive.[81]

In spite of Churchill's protests, the British terror bombing continued unabated until the end of the war. On May 3, 1945, the British Royal Air Force attacked the German Cap Arcona and Thielbek passenger ships. Both of these ships were flying many large white flags with huge Red Cross emblems painted on the sides of the ships. The British attacks, which were a violation of international law, resulted in the deaths of approximately 7,000 prisoners being shipped from the Neuengamme concentration camp to Stockholm. When large numbers of corpses dressed in concentration camp garb washed ashore the German coastline a few days later, the British claimed the Germans had intentionally drowned the prisoners in the Baltic Sea. It took years for the truth of the illegal British attacks to be made public.[82]

After Dresden, Joseph Goebbels angrily urged Hitler to retaliate by abrogating the Geneva Convention. However, Hitler and his military staff continued to abide by the Geneva Convention throughout the war. As a result, almost 99% of Allied prisoners of war survived the war to return home.[83]

Like Winston Churchill, other British leaders responsible for the terror bombings began distancing themselves from the deeds when the details of atrocities at Dresden and other places became publicly known. British commander Sir Arthur Harris insisted he was only following orders from "higher up." Harris and other Allied leaders actually had very little to fear. The Allies had, after all, won the war. With an army of journalists, film makers, and historians to cover their tracks, none of the Allied war criminals risked being held accountable for their crimes.[84]

Allies Conspire to Allow Stalin to Control Eastern Europe

In addition to not negotiating peace with Germany and practicing uncivilized warfare, the Allied leaders intentionally allowed the Soviet Union to take over Berlin and Eastern Europe. The supreme Allied commander in the West, Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, had no intention of occupying Berlin. According to Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs, "Stalin said

that if it hadn't been for Eisenhower, we wouldn't have succeeded in capturing Berlin."[85]

Stalin wanted his troops to reach as far into Europe as possible to enable the Soviet Union to control more of Europe after the war was over. Stalin knew that once the Soviet troops had a stronghold in Eastern Europe, it would be almost impossible to dislodge them. Soviet hegemony could not be dislodged unless Roosevelt wanted to take on the Soviet Union after fighting Germany. Stalin said in private: "Whoever occupies a territory imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach."[86]

The United States could have easily prevented the Soviet Union from marching so far west into Europe. After defeating Germany in north Africa, the Americans and British went into Sicily and then Italy. Churchill favored an advance up the Italian or Balkan peninsulas into central Europe. Such a march would be quicker in reaching Berlin, but Roosevelt and Stalin opposed this strategy at the Tehran Conference in November 1943. In general sessions at Tehran with Churchill present, Roosevelt opposed strengthening the Italian campaign. Instead, Roosevelt wanted troops in Italy to go to France for the larger cross-Channel attack planned for 1944.[87]

Gen. Mark Clark, the American commander in Italy, later commented on Roosevelt's decision: "The weakening of the campaign in Italy in order to invade southern France, instead of pushing on into the Balkans, was one of the outstanding mistakes of the war….Stalin knew exactly what he wanted…and the thing he wanted most was to keep us out of the Balkans."[88]

The Allied military leaders also intentionally prevented Gen. George Patton from quickly defeating Germany in Western Europe. In August 1944, Patton's Third Army was presented with an opportunity to encircle the Germans at Falaise, France. However, Gens. Omar Bradley and Dwight Eisenhower ordered Patton to stop at Argentan and not complete the encirclement of the Germans, which most historians agree Patton could have done. As a result, probably 100,000 or more German soldiers escaped to later fight U.S. troops in December 1944 in the lastditch counterattack known as the Battle of the Bulge.[89]

Patton wrote in his diary concerning the halt that prevented the encirclement of Germans at Falaise: "This halt [was] a great mistake.

[Bradley's] motto seems to be, 'In case of doubt, halt.' I wish I were supreme commander."[90]

Maj. Gen. Richard Rohmer, who was a Canadian fighter pilot at the time, wrote that if the gap had closed it "could have brought the surrender of the Third Reich, whose senior generals were now desperately concerned about the ominous shadow of the great Russian bear rising on the eastern horizon of the Fatherland." Even Col. Ralph Ingersoll, Gen. Bradley's own historian, wrote, "The failure to close the Argentan-Falaise gap was the loss of the greatest single opportunity of the war."[91]

By Aug. 31, 1944, Patton had put Falaise behind and quickly advanced his tanks to the Meuse River, only 63 miles from the German border and 140 miles from the Rhine River. The German army Patton was chasing was disorganized and in disarray; nothing could stop Patton from roaring into Germany. However, on August 31, the Third Army's gasoline allotment was suddenly cut by 140,000 gallons per day. This was a huge chunk of the 350,000 to 400,000 gallons per day the Third Army had been consuming. Patton's advance was halted even though the way ahead was open and largely undefended by the German army in retreat.

Siegfried Westphal, Gen. von Rundstedt's chief of staff, later described the condition of the German army on the day Patton was stopped: "The overall situation in the west [for the Germans] was serious in the extreme. The Allies could have punched through at any point with ease." The halt of the Third Army blitzkrieg allowed the Germans to reposition and revitalize. With the knowledge that they were defending their home soil, the Germans found a new purpose for fighting. They were not just waging a war, but were defending their families from what they regarded as revenge seeking hordes.[92]

Germany took advantage of the overall Allied slowdown and reorganized her troops into a major fighting force. Germany's counterattack in the Battle of the Bulge took Allied forces completely by surprise. The Germans created a "bulge" in the lax American line, and the Allies ran the risk of being cut off and possibly annihilated or thrown back into the sea. Patton had to pull back his Third Army in the east and begin another full scale attack on the southern flank of the German forces. Patton's troops arrived in a matter of days and were the crucial factor in pushing the German bulge back into Germany.[93]

Patton was enthused after the Battle of the Bulge and wanted to quickly take his Third Army into the heart of Germany. The German army

had no more reserves and was definitely on its last legs. However, once again Patton was held back by Gen Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff led by Gen. Marshall. Patton was dumbfounded. Patton wrote: "I'll be damned if I see why we have divisions if not to use them. One would think people would like to win a war…we will be criticized by history, and rightly so, for having sat still so long."[94]

The Western Allies were still in a position to easily capture Berlin. However, Eisenhower ordered a halt of American troops on the Elbe River, thereby in effect presenting a gift to the Soviet Union of central Germany and much of Europe. One American staff officer bitterly commented: "No German force could have stopped us. The only thing that stood between [the] Ninth Army and Berlin was Eisenhower."[95]

On May 8, 1945, the day the war in Europe officially ended, Patton spoke his mind in an "off the record" press briefing. With tears in his eyes, Patton recalled those "who gave their lives in what they believed was the final fight in the cause of freedom." Patton continued:

I wonder how [they] will speak today when they know that for the first time in centuries we have opened Central and Western Europe to the forces of Genghis Khan. I wonder how they feel now that they know there will be no peace in our times and that Americans, some not yet born, will have to fight the Russians tomorrow, or 10, 15 or 20 years from tomorrow. We have spent the last months since the Battle of the Bulge and the crossing of the Rhine stalling; waiting for Montgomery to get ready to attack in the north; occupying useless real estate and killing a few lousy Huns when we should have been in Berlin and Prague. And this Third Army could have been. Today we should be telling the Russians to go to hell instead of hearing them tell us to pull back. We should be telling them if they didn't like it to go to hell and invite them to fight. We've defeated one aggressor against mankind and established a second far worse, more evil and more dedicated than the first.[96]

A few days later Patton shocked everyone at a Paris hotel gathering by saying basically the same things. At a later gathering in Berlin, when asked to drink a toast with a Soviet general, Patton told his translator, "tell that Russian sonovabitch that from the way they are acting here, I regard them as enemies and I'd rather cut my throat than have a drink with one of my enemies!"[97]

Patton became known among U.S. and Soviet leaders as a bona fide menace and a threat to world peace. In addition, Patton was viewed as insubordinate, uncontrollable, and, in the eyes of some, treasonous. Douglas Bazata claims to have been given the order to assassinate Patton by the Office of Strategic Services, an American military espionage ring. Bazata says he shot Patton during a planned auto wreck of Patton's vehicle on Dec. 9, 1945. Patton later died in a hospital on Dec. 21, 1945, under very suspicious circumstances.[98]

Did Germany Conspire to Start World War II?

No confirmation has ever been found in German archives that Germany conspired to instigate World War II. The Axis powers also never had a clear-cut plan for achieving world domination. Gen. George Marshall points out in a report titled The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific that there was never close cooperation among the Axis powers. Marshall's report, which was published after the war, was based on American intelligence reports and interviews with captured German commanders. Marshall's report contains the following statements:

No evidence has yet been found that the German High Command had any over-all strategic plan….

When Italy entered the war Mussolini's strategic aims contemplated the expansion of his empire under the cloak of German military success. Field Marshal Keitel reveals that Italy's declaration of war was contrary to her agreement with Germany. Both Keitel and Jodl agree that it was undesired….

Nor is there evidence of close strategic coordination between Germany and Japan. The German General Staff recognized that Japan was bound by the neutrality pact with Russia but hoped that the Japanese would tie down strong British and American land, sea and air forces in the Far East.

In the absence of anything so far to the contrary, it is believed that Japan also acted unilaterally and not in accordance with a unified strategic plan…. Not only were the European partners of the Axis unable to coordinate their plans and resources and agree within their own nations

how best to proceed, but the eastern partner, Japan, was working in even greater discord. The Axis as a matter of fact existed on paper only.[99]

Hitler confirms the lack of military coordination between Germany and Italy in his Testament. Hitler states:

Even while they proved themselves incapable of maintaining their positions in Abyssinia and Cyrenaica, the Italians had the nerve to throw themselves, without seeking our advice and without even giving us previous warning of their intentions, into a pointless campaign in Greece. The shameful defeats which they suffered caused certain of the Balkan states to regard us with scorn and contempt. Here, and nowhere else, are to be found the causes of Yugoslavia's stiffening and her volte-face in the spring of 1941. This compelled us, contrary to all our plans, to intervene in the Balkans, and that in its turn led to a catastrophic delay in the launching of our attack on Russia. We were compelled to expend some of our best divisions there. And as a net result we were then forced to occupy vast territories in which, but for this stupid show, the presence of any of our troops would have been quite unnecessary.[100]

British historian A.J.P. Taylor agrees that Hitler did not conspire to instigate war or conquer the world. Taylor states: "Hitler did not make plans—for world conquest or anything else. He assumed that others would provide opportunities, and that he would seize them."[101]

Could Germany Have Averted World War II?

A review of the historical record indicates that it would have been extremely difficult for Germany to have averted World War II.

Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933 determined to free Germany from the Versailles Treaty's onerous provisions. The Treaty of Versailles was a deliberate violation of the pre-armistice contract that was to be based on Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. Germany was forced to sign the Versailles Treaty against her will and to admit sole responsibility for the origin of World War I. Consequently, Germany had to pay burdensome reparations to the Allies, lost large amounts of her territory including all

of her colonies, and was left defenseless against potential enemies. By 1928, historians had documented that Germany was not primarily responsible for originating World War I.[102] The Allies, however, refused to renounce or modify the Versailles Treaty.

Hitler's determination to free Germany from the Versailles Treaty was entirely justified. No responsible leader would have allowed his nation to be subject to the provisions of the Versailles Treaty forever. Hitler began to rearm Germany beginning in March 1935. On March 7, 1936, Hitler sent troops into the Rhineland to protect Germany's western borders from invasion by constructing the Siegfried Line. Great Britain and France did not challenge Hitler's move because there was a general feeling that Germany was only asserting a right of sovereignty within her own borders.

The impetus toward World War II began with the Anschluss in March 1938. Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg of Austria announced on March 9, 1938, that Austria would hold a plebiscite four days later to decide if Austria would remain forever independent of Germany. The proposed plebiscite was a total farce in that, among other reasons, only a yes ballot for independence was issued from the government. Anyone wishing to vote no had to provide their own ballot, the same size as the yes ballots, with nothing on it but the word no. Hitler marched into Austria with his army to stop the phony plebiscite.

The Anschluss with Germany was hugely popular among the Austrian people. Austria had been part of Germany for more than 1,000 years prior to World War I. The legislators of Austria had voted to join Germany after World War I, but the architects of the Versailles Treaty refused to abide by the desire of the Austrian legislators. The Anschluss was regarded by most Austrians as an act of liberation from a hated puppet regime.[103] However, even though not a shot was fired, by using his army Hitler lost the asset of aggrieved morality. Hitler appeared to the world for the first time as a conqueror relying on force.

A crisis later developed when the Czech government and military leaders decided on May 20, 1938, to order a partial mobilization of the Czech armed forces. This partial mobilization was based on the lie that German troops were concentrating on the Czech frontiers. President Benes and other Czech leaders then lied to the world press that Czechoslovakia had forced Germany to back down. Hitler was furious and decided that the desire of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia to return to Germany should now be fulfilled.

The threat of war ended when the Munich Agreement was signed on Sept. 30, 1938, by Great Britain, Germany, France and Italy. Hitler got substantially everything he wanted, and the Sudeten Germans returned to the Reich. Similar to the Anschluss with Austria, the Sudeten Germans regarded the Munich Agreement as an act of liberation from a hated regime. The British war enthusiasts, however, denounced the Munich Agreement as an inappropriate appeasement of Germany. The warmongering that led to World War II began to increase in Great Britain.

After the Munich Agreement, a crisis developed in Czechoslovakia when Slovakia declared her independence from Czech rule on March 14, 1939. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia that followed occurred without design or encouragement from Germany. The Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, established on March 16, 1939, was legalized by agreements signed with the Czech and Slovak leaders. German troops occupied Prague for over a month to provide stability pursuant to these agreements. Hitler acted only when events had already destroyed the settlement of Munich. Most people outside Germany, however, thought Hitler had intentionally planned the dissolution of Czechoslovakia.

Halifax hypocritically expressed his hostile views concerning Germany's occupation of Prague, and promised that Hitler would be forced to shed blood the next time. British officials said that Hitler had overstepped his bounds, and that his word could never be trusted again. The truth is that Halifax and other British officials did not care about Czechoslovakia. They were merely using the Czech crisis as a means to stir up hostility toward Germany among the British public.[104]

In hindsight, Hitler's establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia proved to be a tactical mistake. It probably would have been better for Hitler not to have involved Germany in the resolution of the Czech crisis. This would have prevented the British warmongers from claiming that Hitler had violated the Munich Agreement.

Halifax also supported the hoax that Germany was seeking to obtain control of the entire Romanian economy, and that Germany had terrified Romanian leaders with an ultimatum. Halifax continued to support these claims even after their falsehood had been exposed. Halifax made these and other false claims in order to further turn the British public's opinion against Germany. Obviously, Hitler could not have prevented Halifax from making these lies against him.

The impetus for war continued when Great Britain announced an unconditional unilateral guarantee of Poland's independence on March 31, 1939. This unprecedented blank check to Poland obligated Great Britain to go to war if the Poles decided war was necessary. Polish authorities proceeded to instigate numerous acts of murder, beatings, deportation and discrimination against the Germans of Poland and Danzig. It was "open season" on the Germans in Poland. Hitler soon had more than sufficient justification to go to war with Poland based on traditional practices among nations.

British Ambassador Nevile Henderson tried to inform Halifax of these Polish atrocities, but Halifax refused to listen. Halifax was interested in Poland only as a means of fomenting war against Germany. Polish newspapers recklessly admitted that Polish units were constantly crossing the German frontier to destroy German military installations and to carry confiscated German military equipment into Poland. Józef Beck also refused any peace negotiations with Germany.

The leaders of the German minority in Poland repeatedly appealed to the Polish government for mercy during this period, but to no avail. More than 80,000 German refugees had been forced to leave Poland by Aug. 20, 1939, and virtually all other ethnic Germans in Poland were clamoring to leave to escape Polish atrocities.[105]

Hitler was forced to invade Poland to end these atrocities against Poland's ethnic German minority. Hitler had hoped the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement would persuade Great Britain not to declare war on Germany. However, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany two days after Germany's invasion of Poland.

Hitler planned to offer to restore sovereignty to the Czech state and to western Poland as part of a peace proposal with Great Britain and France. Joachim von Ribbentrop informed Soviet leaders of Hitler's intention in a note on Sept. 15, 1939. Stalin and Molotov sought to stifle any action that might bring Germany and the Allies to the conference table. They told Ribbentrop that they did not approve of the resurrection of the Polish state. Aware of Germany's dependency on Soviet trade, Hitler abandoned his plan to reestablish Polish statehood.[106]

Numerous historians who blame Hitler for starting World War II claim that if Hitler had wanted peace he would not have been so impatient to undo the Versailles Treaty. In reality Hitler was responding to the

actions of the Austrian, Czech, and Polish leaders. American historian David Hoggan writes:

Schuschnigg had challenged Germany with a fraudulent anti-German plebiscite scheme, and Hitler responded by intervening in Austria. Benes challenged Germany with a Czech mobilization based on the false claim of German troop concentrations on the Czech frontier. Hitler responded with his decision to liberate the Sudetenland from Czech rule in 1938. Beck challenged Germany with a partial mobilization and a threat of war, and Hitler, who deeply desired friendship with Poland, refrained from responding at all. It was not until Beck joined the British encirclement front that Hitler took precautionary military measures against the Polish threat. It would have been incompatible with the security of Germany to refrain from doing so, after the formation of a hostile Anglo-Polish combination. The charge that Hitler did not know how to wait can be applied more appropriately to the Austrian, Czech and Polish leaders.[107]

Harry Elmer Barnes agreed with Hoggan's analysis. Barnes stated: "The primary responsibility for the outbreak of the German-Polish War was that of Poland and Britain, while for the transformation of the German-Polish conflict into a European War, Britain, guided by Halifax, was almost exclusively responsible."[108]

Barnes further stated: "It has now been irrefutably established on a documentary basis that Hitler was no more responsible for war in 1939 than the Kaiser was in 1914, if indeed as responsible….Hitler's responsibility in 1939 was far less than that of Beck in Poland, Halifax in England or even Daladier in France."[109]

Dr. Barnes also disputed the generally accepted theory of Hitler's diabolism. Barnes stated that some very well informed people contended that Hitler was too soft, generous and honorable rather than too tough and ruthless. They point to the following considerations:

[Hitler] made a genuine and liberal peace offer to Britain on August 25, 1939; he permitted the British to escape at Dunkirk to encourage Britain to make peace, which later on cost him the war in north Africa; he failed to occupy all of France, take north Africa at once, and split the British Empire;

he lost the Battle of Britain by failing to approve the savagery of saturation bombing of civilians and to build armed bombers to carry on this type of military barbarism which played so large a role in the Allied victory; he delayed his attack on Russia and offered Molotov lavish concessions in November, 1940, to keep peace between Germany and Russia; he lost the war with Russia by delaying the invasion in order to bail Mussolini out of his idiotic attack on Greece; and he declared war on the United States to keep his pledged word with Japan, which had long before made it clear that it deserved no such consideration and loyalty from Hitler.[110]

The Allies had planned a long and devastating war resulting in the complete destruction of Germany. This is indicated by a conversation on Nov. 21, 1938, between William Bullitt and Polish Ambassador Jerzy Potocki. According to what military experts told Bullitt during the fallcrisis of 1938, a war lasting at least six years would break out in Europe. In the military experts' opinion the war would result in the complete destruction of Europe, with communism reigning in all European states. The benefits would accrue to the Soviet Union at the conclusion of the war. Bullitt, who enjoyed the special confidence of President Roosevelt, also told Potocki that the United States would take part in the war after Great Britain and France had made the first move. The complete destruction of Germany and the Communist takeover of Eastern Europe occurred exactly as Bullitt had predicted.[111]

It is difficult to see how Hitler could have avoided war in Europe no matter what policies he adopted. Even if Hitler had passively accepted the chains of the Versailles Treaty and done nothing to rearm, the Soviet Union would have eventually attacked Germany and taken over all of Europe.

The Lawless Allied Conspiracy Against Modern Civilization

In his final statement at the Nuremberg trial, Hermann Goering said he "did not want a war" and "did not bring it about." Franz von Papen was beside himself. At the lunch break he furiously attacked Goering: "Who in the world is responsible for all this destruction if not you? You haven't taken the responsibility for anything! All you do is make bombastic speeches. It is disgraceful!" Goering laughed at Papen in response.[112]

Goering was correct that Germany was not primarily responsible for starting World War II. Adolf Hitler and National Socialist Germany had not wanted a war. Instead, the historical record clearly indicates that the Allied leaders had conspired to both instigate and prolong World War II. It was the Allied leaders who had engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization.

In addition to the Allied leaders, the Western press showed no constraint when it came to stirring up hatred against Germany. Germany was constantly portrayed as a threat to other nations. In this regard, Hitler remarked in his Reichstag speech on April 28, 1939:

As far as Germany is concerned, I am not aware that threats of that kind are being made against other nations; but I do read every day in the democratic newspapers lies about these threats.I read every day of German mobilization, of landings, of extortions and that against countries with whom we are living not only in perfect tranquility, but with whom we have, in many cases, a deep friendship.

[T]hen it is criminal negligence, not to use a stronger expression, when heads of nations, who have at their disposal the power, are incapable of tightening the reins of the war-mongering press and so keep the world safe from the threatening disaster of a military conflict.[113]

The Allied nations and the Western press did more than conspire to start a world war leading to the complete destruction of Germany. The historical record shows that the Allies were planning a devastating treatment of Germany after the end of the war. In the next three chapters we will examine the horrific Allied crimes committed against the German people after the end of World War II.

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Part II

Allied Postwar Crimes Against Germans

Chapter Five

• Allied Pow Camps

World War II is often referred to as the "Good War," a morally clear-cut conflict between good and evil.[1] The "Good War" is also claimed to have led to a good peace. After a period of adjustment, the United States generously adopted the Marshall Plan and put Germany back on her feet. Germany with the help of the Allies soon became a prosperous democracy which took her place among the family of good nations.

The above misleading description does not reflect the horrific treatment of Germans after the end of the Second World War. In this chapter we will examine the mass murder of captured German soldiers in the Allied prisoner of war camps.

Introduction to the U.S. & French Prisoner of War Camps

On July 27, 1929, the Allies extended the Protective Regulations of the Geneva Convention for Wounded Soldiers to include prisoners of war (POWs). These regulations state: "All accommodations should be equal to the standard of their troops. The Red Cross supervises. After the end of the hostilities the POWs should be released immediately." On March 10, 1945, Dwight Eisenhower, the supreme Allied commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, disregarded these regulations by classifying German prisoners captured on German territory as "Disarmed Enemy Forces" (DEFs). The German prisoners were therefore at the mercy of the Allies and were not protected by international law.[2]

The Western Allies deliberately murdered approximately 1 million disarmed German POWs by means of starvation, exposure, and illness. This Allied atrocity was first publicly exposed in 1989 in the book Other Losses by James Bacque. Dr. Ernest F. Fisher, Jr., a retired colonel in the U.S. Army and a distinguished Army historian, wrote the foreword to the updated version of Other Losses. I quote Dr. Fisher's Foreword from Other Losses in its entirety:

Over most of the Western Front in late April 1945, the thunder of artillery had been replaced by the shuffling of millions of pairs of boots as columns of disarmed German soldiers marched wearily toward Allied barbed wire enclosures. Scattered enemy detachments fired a few volleys before fading into the countryside and eventual capture by Allied soldiers.

The mass surrenders in the west contrasted markedly with the final weeks on the eastern front where surviving Wehrmacht units still fought the advancing Red Army to enable as many of their comrades as possible to evade capture by the Russians.

This was the final strategy of the German High Command then under Grand Adm. Doenitz, who had been designated commander-in-chief by Adolf Hitler following Reich Marshall Goering's surrender to the west.

From the German point of view, this strategy delivered millions of German soldiers to what they believed would be the more merciful hands of the Western Allies under supreme military commander Gen. Dwight Eisenhower. However, given Gen. Eisenhower's fierce and obsessive hatred not only of the Nazi regime, but indeed of all things German, this belief was at best a desperate gamble. More than 5 million German soldiers in the American and French zones were crowded into barbed wire cages, many of them literally shoulder to shoulder. The ground beneath soon became a quagmire of filth and disease. Open to the weather, lacking even primitive sanitary facilities, underfed, the prisoners soon began dying of starvation and disease. Starting in April 1945, the United States Army and the French army casually annihilated about 1 million men, most of them in American camps. Not since the horrors of the Confederate-administered prison at Andersonville during the American Civil War had such cruelties taken place under American military control. For more than four decades this unprecedented tragedy lay hidden in Allied archives.

How at last did this enormous war crime come to light? The first clues were uncovered in 1986 by the author James Bacque and his assistant. Researching a book about Raoul Laporterie, a French resistance hero who had saved about 1,600 refugees from the Nazis, they interviewed a former German soldier who had become a friend of Laporterie in 1946. Laporterie had taken this man, Hans Goertz, and one other, out of a French prison camp in 1946 to give them work as tailors in

his chain of stores. Goertz declared that "Laporterie saved my life, because 25% of the men in that camp died in one month." What had they died of? "Starvation, dysentery, disease."

Checking as far as possible the records of the camps where Goertz had been confined, Bacque found that it had been one of a group of three in a system of 1,600, all equally bad, according to ICRC reports in the French army archives at Vincennes, Paris. Soon they came upon the first hard evidence of mass deaths in U.S.controlled camps. This evidence was found in army reports under the bland heading Other Losses. The terrible significance of this term was soon explained to Bacque and me by Col. Philip S. Lauben, a former chief of the Germany Affairs Branch of SHAEF.

In the spring of 1987, Mr. Bacque and I met in Washington. Over the following months, we worked together in the National Archives and in the George C. Marshall Foundation in Lexington, Virginia, piecing together the evidence we uncovered. The plans made at the highest levels of the U.S. and British governments in 1944 expressed a determination to destroy Germany as a world power once and for all by reducing her to a peasant economy, although this would mean the starvation of millions of civilians. Up until now, historians have agreed that the Allied leaders soon canceled their destructive plans because of public resistance.

Eisenhower's hatred, passed through the lens of a compliant military bureaucracy, produced the horror of death camps unequaled by anything in American military history. In the face of the catastrophic consequences of this hatred, the casual indifference expressed by the SHAEF officers is the most painful aspect of the U.S. Army's involvement.

Nothing was further from the intent of the great majority of Americans in 1945 than to kill off so many unarmed Germans after the war. Some idea of the magnitude of this horror can be gained when it is realized that these deaths exceed by far all those incurred by the German army in the west between June 1941 and April 1945. In the narrative that follows, the veil is drawn from this tragedy.[3]

Col. Fisher sat on a U.S. Army commission investigating allegations of war crimes committed by American soldiers in 1945. He later said that the commission was "a whitewash."[4]

After conducting his research in France, James Bacque realized that a catastrophe had occurred in the American and French POW camps. In the United States National Archives on Pennsylvania Avenue, Bacque found the documents with the heading Weekly Prisoner of War and

Disarmed Enemy Forces Report. In each report was the heading Other Losses, which paralleled the statistics he had seen in France.

Bacque reviewed these reports with Col. Philip S. Lauben, who had been chief of the German Affairs Branch of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in charge of prisoner transfers and repatriation. Bacque and Lauben went over the headings in the reports one by one until they got to the heading Other Losses. Lauben said, "It means deaths and escapes." When Bacque asked how many escapes, Lauben answered "Very, very minor." Bacque later learned that the escapes were less than one-tenth of 1%.[5]

Bacque states that because some prisoner documents were deceptive when made, and because many records were destroyed in the 1950s or hidden in euphemisms, the number of dead will always be in dispute. However, there is no question that enormous numbers of men of all ages, plus some women and children, died of starvation, exposure, unsanitary conditions, and disease in American and French POW camps in Germany and France starting in April 1945.

Bacque estimates in Other Losses that the victims undoubtedly number over 790,000, almost certainly over 900,000, and quite likely over a million. The prisoners' deaths were knowingly caused by Army officers who had sufficient resources to keep these prisoners alive. Relief organizations such as the Red Cross that attempted to help prisoners in the American camps were refused permission by the Army.[6]

U.S. Witnesses to American & French Prisoner of War Camps

Some American guards have published accounts of their experiences at the Allied POW camps. One of the most credible and informative is that of Martin Brech. The following is the major portion of his account:

In October, 1944, at age 18, I was drafted into the U.S. Army. ...In late March or early April, 1945, I was sent to guard a POW camp near Andernach along the Rhine. I had four years of high school German, so I was able to talk to the prisoners, although this was forbidden. Gradually, however, I was used as an interpreter and asked to ferret out members of the S.S. (I found none).

In Andernach about 50,000 prisoners of all ages were held in an open field surrounded by barbed wire. The women were kept in a separate enclosure I did not see until later. The men I guarded had no shelter and no blankets; many had no coats. They slept in the mud, wet and cold, with inadequate slit trenches for excrement. It was a cold, wet spring and their misery from exposure alone was evident.

Even more shocking was to see the prisoners throwing grass and weeds into a tin can containing a thin soup. They told me they did this to help ease their hunger pains. Quickly, they grew emaciated. Dysentery raged, and soon they were sleeping in their own excrement, too weak and crowded to reach the slit trenches. Many were begging for food, sickening and dying before our eyes. We had ample food and supplies, but did nothing to help them, including no medical assistance.

Outraged, I protested to my officers and was met with hostility or bland indifference. When pressed, they explained they were under strict orders from "higher up." No officer would dare do this to 50,000 men if he felt that it was "out of line," leaving him open to charges. Realizing my protests were useless, I asked a friend working in the kitchen if he could slip me some extra food for the prisoners. He too said they were under strict orders to severely ration the prisoners' food and that these orders came from "higher up." But he said they had more food than they knew what to do with and would sneak me some.

When I threw this food over the barbed wire to the prisoners, I was caught and threatened with imprisonment. I repeated the "offense," and one officer angrily threatened to shoot me. I assumed this was a bluff until I encountered a captain on the hill above the Rhine shooting down at a group of German civilian women with his .45 caliber pistol. When I asked, "Why?" he mumbled, "Target practice," and fired until his pistol was empty. I saw the women running for cover, but, at that distance, couldn't tell if any had been hit.

This is when I realized I was dealing with cold-blooded killers filled with moralistic hatred. They considered the Germans subhuman and worthy of extermination; another expression of the downward spiral of racism. Articles in the G.I. newspaper, Stars and Stripes, played up the German concentration camps, complete with photos of emaciated bodies; this amplified our self-righteous cruelty and made it easier to imitate behavior we were supposed to oppose. Also, I think, soldiers not exposed to combat were trying to prove how tough they were by taking it out on the prisoners and civilians.

These prisoners, I found out, were mostly farmers and workingmen, as simple and ignorant as many of our own troops. As time went on, more of them lapsed into a zombie-like state of listlessness, while others tried to escape in a demented or suicidal fashion, running through open fields in broad daylight toward the Rhine to quench their thirst. They were mowed down.

Some prisoners were as eager for cigarettes as for food, saying they took the edge off their hunger. Accordingly, enterprising G.I. "Yankee traders" were acquiring hordes of watches and rings in exchange for handfuls of cigarettes or less. When I began throwing cartons of cigarettes to the prisoners to ruin this trade, I was threatened by rank-and-file G.I.s too.

The only bright spot in this gloomy picture came one night when I was put on the "graveyard shift," from two to four A.M. Actually, there was a graveyard on the uphill side of this enclosure, not many yards away. My superiors had forgotten to give me a flashlight and I hadn't bothered to ask for one, disgusted as I was with the whole situation by that time. It was a fairly bright night and I soon became aware of a prisoner crawling under the wires toward the graveyard. We were supposed to shoot escapees on sight, so I started to get up from the ground to warn him to get back. Suddenly I noticed another prisoner crawling from the graveyard back to the enclosure. They were risking their lives to get to the graveyard for something; I had to investigate.

When I entered the gloom of this shrubby, tree-shaded cemetery, I felt completely vulnerable, but somehow curiosity kept me moving. Despite my caution, I tripped over the legs of someone in a prone position. Whipping my rifle around while stumbling and trying to regain composure of mind and body, I soon was relieved I hadn't reflexively fired. The figure sat up. Gradually, I could see the beautiful but terror-stricken face of a woman with a picnic basket nearby. German civilians were not allowed to feed, nor even come near the prisoners, so I quickly assured her I approved of what she was doing, not to be afraid, and that I would leave the graveyard to get out of the way.

I did so immediately and sat down, leaning against a tree at the edge of the cemetery to be inconspicuous and not frighten the prisoners. I imagined then, and still do now, what it would be like to meet a beautiful woman with a picnic basket, under those conditions, as a prisoner. I have never forgotten her face.

Eventually, more prisoners crawled back to the enclosure. I saw they were dragging food to their comrades and could only admire their courage and devotion.

On May 8, V.E. Day, I decided to celebrate with some prisoners I was guarding who were baking bread the other prisoners occasionally received. This group had all the bread they could eat, and shared the jovial mood generated by the end of the war. We all thought we were going home soon, a pathetic hope on their part. We were in what was to become the French zone, where I soon would witness the brutality of the French soldiers when we transferred our prisoners to them for their slave labor camps.

On this day, however, we were happy.

As a gesture of friendliness, I emptied my rifle and stood it in the corner, even allowing them to play with it at their request. This thoroughly "broke the ice," and soon we were singing songs we taught each other or I had learned in high school German ("Du, du liegst mir im Herzen"). Out of gratitude, they baked me a special small loaf of sweet bread, the only possible present they had left to offer. I stuffed it in my "Eisenhower jacket" and snuck it back to my barracks, eating it when I had privacy. I have never tasted more delicious bread, nor felt a deeper sense of communion while eating it. I believe a cosmic sense of Christ (the Oneness of all Being) revealed its normally hidden presence to me on that occasion, influencing my later decision to major in philosophy and religion.

Shortly afterward, some of our weak and sickly prisoners were marched off by French soldiers to their camp. We were riding on a truck behind this column. Temporarily, it slowed down and dropped back, perhaps because the driver was as shocked as I was. Whenever a German prisoner staggered or dropped back, he was hit on the head with a club until he died. The bodies were rolled to the side of the road to be picked up by another truck. For many, this quick death might have been preferable to slow starvation in our "killing fields."

When I finally saw the German women in a separate enclosure, I asked why we were holding them prisoner. I was told they were "camp followers," selected as breeding stock for the S.S. to create a super-race. I spoke to some and must say I never met a more spirited or attractive group of women. I certainly didn't think they deserved imprisonment.

I was used increasingly as an interpreter, and was able to prevent some particularly unfortunate arrests. One rather amusing incident involved an old farmer who was being dragged away by several M.P.s. I was

told he had a "fancy Nazi medal," which they showed me. Fortunately, I had a chart identifying such medals. He'd been awarded it for having five children! Perhaps his wife was somewhat relieved to get him "off her back," but I didn't think one of our death camps was a fair punishment for his contribution to Germany. The M.P.s agreed and released him to continue his "dirty work."

Famine began to spread among the German civilians also. It was a common sight to see German women up to their elbows in our garbage cans looking for something edible—that is, if they weren't chased away.

When I interviewed mayors of small towns and villages, I was told their supply of food had been taken away by "displaced persons" (foreigners who had worked in Germany), who packed the food on trucks and drove away. When I reported this, the response was a shrug. I never saw any Red Cross at the camp or helping civilians, although their coffee and doughnut stands were available everywhere else for us. In the meantime, the Germans had to rely on the sharing of hidden stores until the next harvest.

Hunger made German women more "available," but despite this, rape was prevalent and often accompanied by additional violence. In particular I remember an 18-year-old woman who had the side of her face smashed with a rifle butt and was then raped by two G.I.s. Even the French complained that the rapes, looting and drunken destructiveness on the part of our troops was excessive. In Le Havre, we'd been given booklets warning us that the German soldiers had maintained a high standard of behavior with French civilians who were peaceful, and that we should do the same. In this we failed miserably.

"So what?" some would say. "The enemy's atrocities were worse than ours." It is true that I experienced only the end of the war, when we were already the victors. The German opportunity for atrocities had faded; ours was at hand. But two wrongs don't make a right. Rather than copying our enemy's crimes, we should aim once and for all to break the cycle of hatred and vengeance that has plagued and distorted human history. This is why I am speaking out now, 45 years after the crime. We can never prevent individual war crimes, but we can, if enough of us speak out, influence government policy. We can reject government propaganda that depicts our enemies as subhuman and encourages the kind of outrages I witnessed. We can protest the bombing of civilian targets, which still goes on today. And we can refuse ever to condone our government's murder of unarmed and defeated prisoners of war.

I realize it is difficult for the average citizen to admit witnessing a crime of this magnitude, especially if implicated himself. Even G.I.s sympathetic to the victims were afraid to complain and get into trouble, they told me. And the danger has not ceased. Since I spoke out a few weeks ago, I have received threatening calls and had my mailbox smashed. But it's been worth it. Writing about these atrocities has been a catharsis of feeling suppressed too long, a liberation, and perhaps will remind other witnesses that "the truth will make us free, have no fear." We may even learn a supreme lesson from all this: only love can conquer all.[7]

Martin Brech saw bodies go out of the camp by the truckload, but he was never told how many there were, or where and how they were buried.[8] Brech said in 1995 regarding the U.S. Army, "It is clear that in fact it was the policy to shoot any civilians trying to feed the prisoners." Brech has also confirmed that Eisenhower's starvation policy was harshly enforced down to the lowest level of camp guard.[9]

Many other U.S. Army officers and NCOs have admitted that the conditions in the Allied POW camps were lethal for the Germans. Cpl. Daniel McConnell suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder caused by his experiences in a U.S. Army camp at Heilbronn. McConnell had been ordered, despite his ignorance of medicine, to take over Baker No. 4, a "hospital" tent at Heilbronn. McConnell writes: "One day while working on a coal detail, I was summoned to the office of the first sergeant who said, 'We see from your 201 file you know some German— the guy out in the prison camp is messing up. We're sending you out to straighten things out.' "

The "hospital" had no medical facilities beyond bottles of aspirin. McConnell writes: "After a tour of inspection, I saw that Baker No. 4 was a hospital in name only. Not even the most elementary standards of cleanliness were maintained or enforceable. Cleaning compounds and disinfectants were unavailable, not to mention medical and surgical [supplies]….The odor was unendurable….Operations were performed without anesthesia….At night the chatter of a machine gun or the crack of a rifle could be heard as a POW went for the wire to escape."[10]

The mud-floored tent was simply a way to assemble dying prisoners convenient to the trucks that would soon take away their corpses. McConnell saw the prisoners die en masse in this camp, and saw the prisoners buried by bulldozers in mass graves. McConnell states:

"When a POW died, his remains were taken in a gunny sack to a tent near the main gate. There a medical officer would sign a death certificate, which I would witness. A number of bodies would be taken to a long slit trench outside the camp for mass burial. If next of kin were present (a rare event), a few words were spoken by a clergyman, then a bulldozer would start up and cover the bodies with earth."

Since McConnell was ordered to supervise all of this without being able to stop it, his guilt never left him. After 50 years McConnell's mental condition eventually made him physically ill. The Veterans Administration, which in 1998 awarded McConnell a 100% medical pension, admitted that McConnell had been injured for life by the horrors he had witnessed in the camp but could not prevent.[11]

Probably the most eminent of the American eyewitnesses to the camps is Maj. Gen. Richard Steinbach (then a colonel), who was ordered to take over administration of several U.S. Army prison camps near Heilbronn. In his memoirs, Steinbach says that on an inspection tour he found that the conditions in the American camps were terrible. The great majority of the prisoners had no shelter. Most of the prisoners had lost weight, some were suffering from illness, and some were slowly losing their minds. Often far less than the official food allotment of 1,000 calories per day was given to the prisoners, even though Steinbach soon found that sufficient food was available.[12]

Steinbach knew what had caused the terrible conditions in the American POW camps: "This was caused by the Morgenthau Plan…. Morgenthau was venting his pent-up feelings on Germany by starving these men….[His] objective was vengeance rather than promoting U.S. national objectives. Of course, Franklin D. Roosevelt, the president who approved this plan, was also responsible. Worse even than the starvation was the idleness enforced on these people. I was amazed and disgusted at the same time. Was this the American way to treat people, even though some might be criminals? Obviously it was not. I directed the U.S. camp commander to send to the railhead and draw supplementary rations." Steinbach said that the food and tents were delivered immediately from supplies nearby.[13]

Gen. Withers Alexander Burress, like Steinbach a member of the Sixth Army command, found the same conditions in his camps. Steinbach says he saw the same things elsewhere: "I inspected other camps and

found the same situation, ordering the same remedial action….As soon as I returned to our headquarters, I met with Gen. Burress. He said that the German POW camp was something beyond his comprehension." Unfortunately, Steinbach was transferred early the next year, and conditions at Heilbronn deteriorated again according to Cpl. Daniel McConnell.[14]

American prison camps in France were also kept far below the standards set by the Geneva Convention. Lt. Col. Henry W. Allard, who was in charge of some camps in France from late 1944 through May 1945, says that only food rations were sent to the camps. Supplies such as medicine, clothing, fuel, mess kits, and stoves were denied to the prisoners. Allard describes the camps' conditions: "The standards of PW [prisoner of war] camps in the ComZ [the U.S. Army's rear zone] in Europe compare as only slightly better or even with the living conditions of the Japanese PW camps our men tell us about, and unfavorably with those of the Germans."[15]

After the war conditions in the American camps grew steadily worse. Col. Philip Lauben later said that the American and French camps in the Vosges region in France were so bad that "the Vosges was just one big death camp."[16]

Disastrous overcrowding, disease, exposure and malnutrition were the rule in the U.S. camps in Germany beginning in 1945. U.S. Army Cols. James B. Mason and Charles H. Beasley observed the conditions in the American camps along the Rhine in April 1945:

April 20 was a blustery day with alternate rain, sleet and snow and with bone-chilling winds sweeping down the Rhine valley from the north over the flats where the enclosure was located. Huddled close together for warmth, behind the barbed wire was a most awesome sight—nearly 100,000 haggard, apathetic, dirty, gaunt, blank-staring men clad in dirty field gray uniforms, and standing ankle-deep in mud. Here and there were dirty white blurs which, upon a closer look were seen to be men with bandaged heads or arms or standing in shirt sleeves! The German Division Commander reported that the men had not eaten for at least two days, and the provision of water was a major problem—yet only 200 yards away was the river Rhine running bank-full.[17]

The view from inside the camps was even worse. The inmates suffered from nagging hunger and thirst, and large numbers died from starvation, dysentery, and exposure to the elements. Capt. Ben H. Jackson said that when he approached one of the camps along the Rhine: "I could smell it a mile away. It was barbaric."[18]

A Jewish intelligence lieutenant at Bad Kreuznach stated: "I've been interrogating German officers for the War Crimes Commission, and when I find them half-starved to death right in our own P.W. cages and being treated like you wouldn't treat a dog, I ask myself some questions. Sometimes I have to get them fed up and hospitalized before I can get a coherent story out of them….All these directives about don't coddle the Germans have thrown open the gates for every criminal tendency we've got in us."[19]

Gen. Mark Clark, the U.S. political commissioner in Austria, was horrified by the conditions in the U.S. camps when he arrived in Austria. Clark took the unusual step of writing a memo "for files." This was probably to exculpate himself before history without offending his boss, Gen. Dwight Eisenhower. Clark wrote:

When I first came to Austria from Italy, Gen. Keyes told me of the deplorable conditions which existed in the Ebensee Camp, mostly due to over-crowding and to lack of proper nourishment. He told me he was taking corrective steps….I sent for Col. Lloyd, my inspector-general, and told him to make an inspection at this camp. Later Gen. Hume came in with a detailed report showing the critical situation which exists there. I immediately directed the overcrowding be released, and that the caloric value of the ration be increased to approximately 2800 calories. I am not sure that I have the authority to do this, but will do it anyway because some immediate action must be taken. What astounds me is my lack of information on this camp from my staff officers.[20]

The deplorable condition of the Austrian camps is confirmed by a special investigation held in September 1945 under the command of U.S. Lt. Col. Herbert Pollack. Pollack found starvation conditions and severe malnutrition problems among many of the prisoners in U.S. camps in Austria.[21]

U.S. Sgt. Merrill W. Campbell writes of a mass atrocity he witnessed in southern Germany:

There [were] 10,000 or more German prisoners in this open field, standing shoulder to shoulder. This bunch of prisoners [was] there for three days or more with no food or water, no shelter. There was little concern for these people. There [were] no German civilians around. As for food and water, I personally think it could have been provided to them. Most of the guards were very brutal. As I was not in charge of this camp, there was little I could do. On the morning the prisoners were moved out, my company had orders to leave and go to Garmisch as my company was leaving the area. I looked back where they were moving the prisoners out; mud was deep as far as I could see. Heads, arms and legs of the dead were sticking out of the mud. It made me sick and disgusted.[22]

U.S. Capt. Frederick Siegfriedt was detailed in eastern France near Zimming in December 1945, where there were about 17,000 German prisoners. Captain L., a lifelong friend of Siegfriedt's, was medical officer of the detachment. Siegfriedt writes:

Capt. L. had been an extremely hard working and conscientious person all his life. It was evident that he was under extreme stress trying to cope with the conditions at CCE 27 and receiving no cooperation, no help, no understanding, was helpless, and had not even anyone to talk to. I was able to serve to fill the [last] need. He explained to me that most of the men had dysentery and were suffering from malnutrition. Some men in the cages had as many as 17 bloody stools a day, he said. He took me to one of the former French barracks that served as the hospital. It had 800 men lying all over, on the cold concrete floors as well as the beds. It just broke your heart to see it….Almost without exception the other [U.S.] officers were reclassified because of alcoholism or psychiatric problems….The operation of CCE 27 seemed typical of the entire system. When an enclosure got a bunch of prisoners they didn't know what to do with, or could not otherwise handle, they were shipped unannounced to another enclosure….I have no idea how many died [or] where they were buried. I am sure the Americans did not bury them, and we had no such thing as a bulldozer. I can only assume that a detail of German PWs would bury them. I could look out of the window of my office and tell if the body

being carried by was alive or dead by whether or not there was a fifth man following with the man's personal possessions. The number could have been from five to 25 a day.[23]

Siegfriedt concludes that "…the [American] staff was much more concerned with living the luxurious life than it was about the operation of the prison camps."[24]

An American officer, who requested anonymity because of fear of reprisals, said: "The conditions you so aptly described were exactly as it was in Regensburg, Moosburg and other camps throughout lower Bavaria and Austria. Death was commonplace and savage treatment given by the Polish guards under American officers."[25]

Many German POWs "accidentally suffocated" in Allied boxcars while being shipped. U.S. Lt. Arthur W. von Fange saw about 12 locked boxcars filled with men stationed on a siding near Remagen in March 1945. He heard cries from within which gradually died down. Von Fange said, "I don't imagine they lasted three days."[26] Several times in March 1945, American guards opening rail cars of prisoners arriving from Germany found the prisoners dead inside. At Mailly le Camp on March 16, 1945, 104 prisoners were found dead. A further 27 German prisoners were found dead at Attichy. [27]

Soon after Germany surrendered on May 8, 1945, Gen. Eisenhower sent an urgent courier throughout the huge area that he commanded. The message reads in part: "The military government has requested me to make it known, that, under no circumstances may food supplies be assembled among the local inhabitants, in order to deliver them to the German prisoners of war. Those who violate this command and nevertheless try to circumvent this blockade, to allow anything to come to the prisoners, place themselves in danger of being shot…."[28] Copies of this order have been found in many towns and villages in Germany.[29]

An American sergeant (who has asked to remain anonymous), saw this order to civilians posted in German and English on the bulletin board of U.S. Army Military Government Headquarters in Bavaria, signed by the chief of staff of the military governor of Bavaria. The order was even posted in Polish in Straubing and Regensburg, because there were a lot of Polish guards at those camps. The American sergeant said that it was the intention of army command from May 1945 through the end of 1947 to exterminate as many German POWs in the U.S. zone as the traffic

would bear without international scrutiny. This sergeant, who at the time was in military intelligence in the U.S. Army of Occupation, witnessed the lethal conditions inflicted on German prisoners at several camps, including Regensburg near Munich.[30]

Oscar E. Plummer of Clinton, Illinois writes of the lethal conditions he observed in American POW camps:

I served in the U.S. Army during World War II, and was wounded in Belgium. I spent a lot of time in Germany during and after the war.

Many people are reluctant to believe that the United States could have mistreated German prisoners in the way that James Bacque relates in his book Other Losses. I can attest to the fact that the U.S. Army did have those inhumane holding pens for German prisoners: I saw them! These were guarded, fenced-in areas with thousands of German prisoners of war inside, and there were no interior buildings or shelters. The POWs looked very thin and drawn. This was months after the war was over. They should have been released when the war was over.[31]

Additional Witnesses to the American & French POW Camps

Many other witnesses and government officials knew about the horrible conditions in the Allied POW camps. In an interview conducted in June 1945 with the U.S. Army, Dr. Konrad Adenauer deplored the U.S. death camps along the Rhine in very strong terms. Adenauer said:

Some of the German PWs are being held in camps in a manner contrary to all humanitarian principles and flagrantly contrary to the Hague [and Geneva] conventions. All along the Rhine from Remagen-Sinzig to Ludwigshafen the German prisoners have been penned up for weeks without any protection from the weather, without drinking water, without medical care and with only a few slices of bread to eat. They could not even lie down on the floor [ground]. These were many hundreds of thousands. It is said that the same is true in the interior of Germany. These people died by the thousands. They stood day and night in wet mud up to their ankles! Conditions have improved during the past few weeks. Of course the enormous number of prisoners is one of the causes of these conditions but it is noteworthy that to the best of my knowledge, it took a great many weeks

to improve at least the worst conditions. The impression made on the Germans by the publication of facts about the concentration camps was greatly weakened by this fact….I know that in the winter of 1941-1942 the Russian prisoners were very badly treated by the Germans, and we ought to be ashamed of the fact, but I feel that you ought not to do the same thing. German prisoners too in camps ate grass and picked leaves from the trees because they were hungry exactly as the Russians unfortunately did….[32]

Dr. Adenauer's description of the German men who "stood day and night in wet mud up to their ankles" as they died by the thousands is similar to the description of the prisoners in American camps along the Rhine made in April 1945 by Cols. Beasley and Mason, who said that the prisoners were "standing ankle-deep in mud."

Dr. Joseph Kirsch, a French volunteer doctor who worked in an evacuation hospital for moribund prisoners of war, writes:

I volunteered to the military government of the 21st [French] Military region [near Metz]….I was assigned to the French military hospital at the little seminary of Montigny….In May 1945, the Americans who occupied the hospital at Legouest brought us every night by ambulance, stretchers loaded with moribund prisoners in German uniforms….These ambulances arrived by the back door….We lined up the stretchers in central hall. For treatment, we had nothing at our disposal. We could only perform elementary superficial examinations (auscultation), only to find out the anticipated cause of death in the night…for in the morning, more ambulances arrived with coffins and quicklime….These prisoners were in such extremely bad condition that my role was reduced to comforting the dying. This drama has obsessed me since the war; I consider it a horror.[33]

Similar to the experience of U.S. Cpl. Daniel McConnell, Dr. Kirsch discovered that these "hospitals" were merely places to take moribund prisoners rather than places to help the prisoners get well.

Prisoners transferred from the American camps to the French camps kept on starving. Journalist Jacques Fauvet wrote in Le Monde: "As one speaks today of Dachau, in ten years people throughout the world will speak about camps like Saint Paul d'Eyjeaux," where 17,000 prisoners taken over from the Americans in late July were dying so fast that within

a few weeks two cemeteries of 200 graves each had been filled. The death rate by the end of September was 10 per day, or over 21% per year.

Fauvet challenged the question of revenge: "People will object that the Germans weren't very particular on the matter of feeding our men, but even if they did violate the Geneva Convention, that hardly seems to justify our following their example….People have often said that the best service that we could do the Germans would be to imitate them, so they would one day find us before the judgment of history, but it is to an ideal higher than mere dignity that France should remain faithful; it is to be regretted that the foreign press had to remind us of that….We didn't suffer and fight to perpetuate the crimes of other times and places."[34]

Jean-Pierre Pradervand, head of the delegations of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in France, went to inspect the French camp at Thorée les Pins in the late summer of 1945. This camp was already known in the village nearby as "Buchenwald" after the notorious German camp. Two thousand of the men at the camp were already so far gone that nothing could save them. Twenty of the prisoners died that day while Pradervand was there. Approximately 6,000 of the prisoners would soon be dead unless they were immediately given food, clothing, shelter and medical care. All of the remaining prisoners were undernourished.

Pradervand first appealed directly to de Gaulle, who repeatedly ignored him. So Pradervand got in touch with the ICRC in Geneva, asking for action. On Sept. 14, 1945, the ICRC in Geneva sent a devastating document to the State Department in Washington, D.C. based on Pradervand's report of the conditions in the camp. The document requested that the U.S. government take emergency measures to supply the prisoners with food, medications, clothing, boots, blankets, and soap. The ICRC recommended that the United States increase rations in American camps in Europe to obviate the prolonged undernourishment of the German prisoners.[35]

Henry W. Dunning, who was in the prisoner of war department of the American Red Cross, also wrote on Sept. 5, 1945, to the American Red Cross headquarters in Washington, D.C. Dunning stated:

[T]he situation of the German prisoners of war in France has become desperate and shortly will become an open scandal. During the past week several Frenchmen, who were formerly prisoners of the Germans, have

called on me to protest the treatment being given German prisoners of war by the French government. Gen. Thrasher, commanding the Oise Intermediary sector, asked one of our field workers to come to Paris to see me about the same matter. Mrs. Dunning, returning from Bourges, reports that dozens of German prisoners are dying there weekly. I saw Pradervand, who told me that the situation of German prisoners in France in many instances is worse than in the former German concentration camps. He showed me photographs of human skeletons and letters from French camp commanders who have asked to be relieved because they can get no help from the French government and cannot stand to see the prisoners dying from lack of food. Pradervand has appealed to everyone in the French government but to no avail.[36]

The French newspaper Le Figaro reported the horrific conditions of the prisoner camps in September 1945. The newspaper had been convinced by the testimony of impeccable witnesses, such as a priest, Father Le Meur, who had actually seen the prisoners starving in the camps. Le Figaro's reporter, Serge Bromberger, wrote:

The most serious source confirmed that the physical state of the prisoners was worse than deplorable. People were talking a horrifying death rate, not from sickness but starvation, and of men who weighed an average 35-45 kilos [80-100 pounds]. At first we doubted the truth of all this, but appeals came to us from many sources and we could not disregard the testimony of Father Le Meur, assistant general chaplain to the prisoners.

Le Figaro interviewed French Gen. Louis Buisson, the head of the Prisoner of War Service, who admitted that the prisoners got only 900 to 1,000 calories per day. Buisson said, "The doctors told us this was just enough for a man lying in bed never moving not to die too quickly."[37]

Louis Clair wrote in The Progressive of the horrible conditions in the French camps of German POWs. He reported:

In a camp in the Sarthe district for 20,000 prisoners, inmates receive 900 calories a day; thus 12 die every day in the hospital. Four to five thousand are unable to work at all anymore. Recently trains with new

prisoners arrived in the camp: several prisoners had died during the trip, several others had tried to stay alive by eating coal that had been laying in the freight train by which they came.

In an Orleans camp, the commander received 16 francs a day per head or prisoner to buy food, but he spent only nine francs, so that the prisoners were starving. In the Charentes district, 2,500 of the 12,000 camp inmates were sick. A young French soldier wrote to a friend just returned from a Nazi camp: "I watch those who made you suffer so much, dying of hunger, sleeping on cold cement floors, in no way protected from rain and wind. I see kids of 19, who beg me to give them certificates that they are healthy enough to join the French Foreign Legion….Yes, I, who hated them so much, today can only feel pity for them."

A witness reported on the camp in Langres: "I have seen them beaten with rifle butts and kicked in the streets of the town because they broke down of overwork. Two or three of them die of exhaustion every week."

In another camp near Langres, 700 prisoners slowly died of hunger; they had hardly any blankets and not enough straw to sleep on; there is a typhoid epidemic in the camp, which has already spread to the neighboring village. In another camp prisoners received only one meal a day but are expected to continue working. Elsewhere so many died recently that the cemetery space was exhausted and another cemetery had to be crafted.

In a camp where prisoners work on the removal of mines, regular food supplies arrive only every second day so that "prisoners make themselves a soup of grass and some stolen vegetables." All prisoners of this camp have contracted tuberculosis. Here and elsewhere treatment differs in no respect from the Nazi SS brutality. Many cases have been reported where men have been so horribly beaten that their limbs were broken. In one camp, men were awakened during the night, crawled out of their barracks and then were shot "because of attempted escape."

There are written affidavits proving that in certain camps commanding officers sold on the black market all the supplies that had been provided by American Army authorities; there are other affidavits stating that the prisoners were forced to take off their shoes and run the gauntlet. And so on, and so on…These are the facts.[38]

The ICRC inspecting the French camps in 1945 and 1946 reported time after time that conditions were "unsatisfactory," "disturbing,"

"alarming," but very seldom that they were satisfactory. At the end of October 1946, the ICRC stated that "the situation at present is more than alarming. More than half the German POWs working are insufficiently clad and will not be able to stand up to the rigors of winter without running the gravest risks of disease. In such conditions a high number of deaths in the course of winter must be expected." The same dire warnings were repeated in a report by the ICRC in 1947.[39]

Random shootings of prisoners were common in the French camps. Lt. Col. Barnes reported that drunken French army officers at Andernach one night drove their jeep through the camp laughing and shouting as they blasted the prisoners with their Sten guns. The result was 47 prisoners dead and 55 wounded. French guards, pretending to notice an escape attempt at another camp, shot down 10 prisoners in their cages. The violence reached such heights in the 108th Infantry Regiment that Gen. Billotte, the commanding officer of the region, recommended that the regiment be dissolved. Billotte's recommendation was based on the advice of Lt. Col. de Champvallier, the Regiment's CO, who had given up attempting to discipline his men.[40]

French Capt. Julien thought as he walked in the former American camp of 32,000 prisoners at Dietersheim in July 1945, "This is just like Buchenwald and Dachau."

The muddy ground was "peopled with living skeletons," some of whom died as he watched, others huddled under bits of cardboard. Women lying in holes in the ground stared at him with bulging bellies from hunger edema, old men with long gray hair watched him feebly, and starving children of six or seven looked at him with lifeless eyes. Julien could find no food at all in this camp. The two German doctors in the "hospital" were attempting to take care of the many dying patients stretched out on dirty blankets on the ground, between the marks of the tents the Americans had taken with them.

The 103,500 prisoners in five camps near Dietersheim were supposed to be part of the labor force given by the Americans to the French for reparations. However, of these prisoners the French counted 32,640 who could not work because they were old men, women, children less than eight years old, boys age eight to 14, terminally sick or cripples. All of these prisoners were immediately released. The prisoners found at another former U.S. camp at Hechtsheim were also in lamentable condition. The skeletal prisoners at Hechtsheim dressed in rags again reminded Capt. Julien of the victims in German concentration camps. In

his report, Julien called the camps bagnes de mort lents or "slow death camps."

Capt. Julien took immediate steps to improve conditions in the camps. The official army ration had been only 800 calories per person per day. This starvation level, which was the same as the German concentration camp at Belsen when it was liberated, was all that the French army allocated to POWs from its own supplies. Capt. Julien rounded up the women from the village, who immediately brought food to the camp. Julien received additional help in his efforts to improve conditions in the camps from "German authorities" and the ICRC. By Aug. 1, 1945, over 90% of the prisoners were housed in tents, food rations were greatly increased, and the death rate had been cut by more than half. Capt. Julien's system of improving the camps worked. The U.S. Army could have adopted Julien's humanitarian methods, but chose instead to let the German POWs die of exposure and slow starvation.[41]

On a visit to one prison camp, Robert Murphy, who was the civilian political advisor to Eisenhower while he served for a few months as military governor, "was startled to see that our prisoners were almost as weak and emaciated as those I had observed in Nazi prison camps."

The commandant of the camp told Murphy that he had deliberately kept the inmates on a starvation diet. The commandant explained, "These Nazis are getting a dose of their own medicine." Murphy was later able to get the commandant transferred to another post. It is uncertain how much conditions at the camp improved after the commandant's transfer.[42]

Survivor Witnesses to the American & French POW Camps

Surviving German prisoners have provided additional testimony of the horrific conditions and mistreatment they received in the Allied POW camps. Many surviving German prisoners were badly mistreated even before arriving at the Allied camps. Werner Wilhelm Laska, a German prisoner of war, reports his transfer to an American prison camp:

The American guards who arrived with the truck were nasty and cruel from the start. I was forced in with kicks and punches to my back. Other German soldiers were already on board. After a drive of an hour or two we arrived at an open field on which many servicemen were already assembled, in rank and file. As we got off the truck, a large group of

Americans awaited us. They received us with shouts and yells, such as: "You Hitler, you Nazi, etc…." We got beaten, kicked and pushed; one of those gangsters brutally tore my watch from my wrist. Each of these bandits already possessed 10 or 20 watches, rings and other things. The beating continued until I reached the line where my comrades stood. Most of our water-bottles (canteens), rucksacks etc. were cut off, and even overcoats had to be left on the ground. More and more prisoners arrived, including even boys and old men. After a few hours, big trailer-trucks—usually used for transporting cattle—lined up for loading with human cattle.

We had to run the gauntlet to get into the trucks; we were beaten and kicked. Then they jammed us in so tightly that they couldn't even close the hatches. We couldn't even breathe. The soldiers drove the vehicles at high speed over the roads and through villages and towns; behind each trailer-truck always followed a jeep with a mounted machine gun.

In late afternoon we stopped in an open field again, and were unloaded in the same manner, with beating and kicking. We had to line up at attention just like recruits in basic training. Quickly, the Americans fenced us in with rolls of barbed wire, so there was no space to sit or to lie down that night. We even had to do our necessities in the standing position. Since we received no water or foodstuffs, our thirst and hunger became acute and urgent. Some men still had tea in their canteens, but there was hardly enough for everyone.

Next day the procedure began as on the day before; running the gauntlet into the cattle-trailers, then transport to the next open field. No drinking and no eating, but always fenced in—there is an American song: "…Don't fence me in…"—as well as the childish behavior of most of the Americans: Punishing the Nazis! After the first night, when we were loaded again, some of us stayed on that field, either dead or so weak and sick that they could not move any more. We had been approaching the Rhine River, as we noticed, but we had still one night to pass in the manner related. It was terrible!

All this could not have been a coincidence. It must have been a plan, because, as we later learned, there was nearly the same treatment in all camps run by American units. During the war we heard about the "Morgenthau Plan" and the "Kaufman Plan," and exactly that seemed to have been happening to us in those moments: the extermination of an entire people![43]

Laska eventually was sent to France to work in coal mines and other unpleasant places, where his ordeal continued. On Jan. 7, 1950, the French finally discharged Laska to Germany.[44]

James Bacque writes that the response he has received following the original publication of Other Losses has been amazing. Bacque states: "Most gratifying has been the huge response from thousands of ex-prisoners who have written to me, or telephoned, sent faxes or e-mail, or even called at my door, to thank me for telling a story they feared would die with them. They continue to send me diaries, letters, Tagebücher, self-published books, typescripts of memoirs, in three or four languages, along with photographs, maps, drawings, paintings and even a few artifacts."[45]

Several prisoners from Heilbronn have written Bacque to confirm the dreadful conditions witnessed by Cpl. Daniel McConnell and Maj. Gen. Richard Steinbach. One is Anton Pfarrer, who was 16 years old when captured and imprisoned at Heilbronn. Pfarrer writes: "I can recall nearly every day of suffering, but I made it back, although so many thousands never did. There were 3,000 men in my cage in May but by the end of August, only 1,500 were left to answer roll call. They had all died." There were no discharges from his cage during that time. Pfarrer telephoned Gen. Steinbach in 1998 to thank Steinbach for saving his life.[46]

Rudi Buchal had been ordered to serve as a German medical orderlyclerk in the POW "hospital" at Bretzenheim, a tent with an earth floor inside the camp. The hospital had no beds, no medical supplies, no blankets, and starvation rations for the first month or more. A few supplies were later obtained by American teams from the German towns nearby. Buchal was told by drivers of the 560th Ambulance Company that 18,100 POWs had died in the six camps around Bretzenheim in the 10 weeks of American control. Buchal also heard the figure of 18,100 dead from the Germans who were in charge of the hospital statistics, and from other American hospital personnel. The six camps were Bretzenheim, Biebelsheim, Bad Kreuznach, Dietersheim, Hechtsheim and Heidesheim.[47]

The reliability of Rudi Buchal has been attested to by the U.S. Army itself. Upon discharge Buchal received a paper stating that in the opinion of U.S. Army officers who commanded him, "During the above mentioned period [April-July 1945] he proved himself to be co-operative, capable, industrious and reliable." Similar to the experiences of U.S. Cpl. Daniel McConnell and French Dr. Joseph Kirsch, Buchal discovered that

these “hospitals” were merely places to take moribund prisoners rather than places to help the prisoners get well. Buchal recalls that many of the mortally sick evacuees were taken to Idstein, north of Wiesbaden. Buchal states, “And I can remember that from there no prisoners returned.”[48]

German prisoners who survived Bretzenheim have described arriving there on May 9, 1945. The prisoners saw three rows of corpses along the road in front of the camp. A total of 135 dead from Bretzenheim were acknowledged by the Americans to have been buried in Stromberg on May 9 and May 10. Not all of the dead at Bretzenheim were killed by the usual starvation, disease and exposure.[49]

Johannes Heising, formerly the abbot of a monastery on the Rhine, published a book in the 1990s about his experiences in the U.S. camp at Remagen. Franz-Josef Plemper, another former prisoner at Remagen, reminded Heising of an event not described in Heising’s book: on one night the Americans had bulldozed living men under the earth in their foxholes. Plemper described the scene to Heising:

One night in April 1945, I was startled out of my stupor in the rain and the mud by piercing screams and loud groans. I jumped up and saw in the distance (about 30 to 50 meters) the searchlight of a bulldozer. Then I saw this bulldozer moving forward through the crowd of prisoners who lay there. In the front it had a blade making a pathway. How many of the prisoners were buried alive in their earth holes I do not know. It was no longer possible to ascertain. I heard clearly cries of, “You murderer.”

The horror of this incident had been so painful that Heising had suppressed it from his memory. Heising remembered this event only after Plemper reminded him of it.[50]

A similar incident occurred at the American camp at Rheinberg in mid-June 1945. According to reports from several ex-prisoners, the last act of the Americans at Rheinberg before the British took over was to bulldoze one section of the camp level while there were still living men in their holes in the ground.[51]

Prisoner Wolfgang Iff said that in his sub-section of perhaps 10,000 people at Rheinberg, 30 to 40 bodies were dragged out every day. As a member of the burial commando, Iff was well placed to see what was

going on. Iff saw about 60 to 70 bodies going out per day in other cages of similar size.[52]

A 50-year-old sergeant with a Ph.D. kept a diary in ink on toilet paper at Rheinberg. He writes on May 20, 1945: "How long will we have to be without shelter, without blankets or tents? Every German soldier once had shelter from the weather. Even a dog has a doghouse to crawl into when it rains. Our only wish is finally after six weeks to get a roof over our heads. Even a savage is better housed. Diogenes, Diogenes, you at least had your barrel."[53]

Part of the problem at Rheinberg was that for a long time it was overcrowded. A cage measuring 300 meters by 300 meters was supposed to hold no more than 10,000 people. However, at the beginning, as many as 30,000 prisoners were forced in, leaving about three square meters per person. Prisoner Thelen told his son through the barbed wire that approximately 330 to 770 prisoners per day were dying at Rheinberg. The camp then contained between 100,000 and 120,000 prisoners.[54]

Charles von Luttichau said of his POW camp at Kripp near Remagen on the Rhine:

The latrines were just logs flung over ditches next to the barbed wire fences. To sleep, all we could do was to dig out a hole in the ground with our hands, then cling together in the hole. We were crowded very close together. Because of illness, the men had to defecate on the ground. Soon, many of us were too weak to take off our trousers first. So our clothing was infected, and so was the mud where we had to walk and sit and lie down. There was no water at all at first, except the rain, then after a couple of weeks we could get a little water from a standpipe. But most of us had nothing to carry it in, so we could get only a few mouthfuls after hours of lining up, sometimes even through the night. We had to walk along between the holes on the soft earth thrown up by the digging, so it was easy to fall into a hole, but hard to climb out. The rain was almost constant along that part of the Rhine that spring. More than half the days we had rain. More than half the days we had no food at all. On the rest, we got a little K ration. I could see from the package that they were giving us one-tenth of the rations that they issued to their own men. So in the end we got perhaps 5% of a normal U.S. Army ration. I complained to the American camp commander that he was breaking the Geneva Convention, but he just said, "Forget the Convention. You haven't any rights."

Within a few days, some of the men who had gone healthy into the camp were dead. I saw our men dragging many dead bodies to the gate of the camp, where they were thrown loose on top of each other onto trucks, which took them away.[55]

One 17-year-old boy who could see his village in the distance was found shot one morning at the foot of the barbed wire fence. His body was strung up and left hanging on the wire by the guards as a warning to the other prisoners. Many prisoners cried out, "Moerder, moerder [murderer, murderer]!" In retaliation, the camp commander withheld the prisoners' meager rations for three days. For prisoners who were already starving and could hardly move because of weakness, it was frightful; for many it meant death. The commander also withheld rations at other times to punish the prisoners.[56]

George Weiss, a German tank repairman, said his camp on the Rhine was so crowded that "we couldn't even lie down properly. All night we had to sit up jammed against each other. But the lack of water was the worst thing of all. For three and a half days we had no water at all. We would drink our own urine. It tasted terrible, but what could we do? Some men got down on the ground and licked the ground to get some moisture. I was so weak I was already on my knees, when finally we got a little water to drink. I think I would have died without that water. But the Rhine was just outside the wire. The guards sold us water through the wire, and cigarettes. One cigarette cost 900 marks. I saw thousands dying. They took the bodies away on trucks."[57]

German Cpl. Helmut Liebich was captured near Gotha in central Germany by the Americans on April 17, 1945. The Gotha DEF camp had only the usual barbed wire fences with no tents. The prisoners were forced to run a gauntlet between lines of guards who hit them with sticks in order to get a small ration of food. On April 27, 1945, the prisoners were transferred to the American camp at Heidesheim farther west, where there was no food at all for days, and then very little. The prisoners started to die in large numbers from exposure, starvation and thirst. Liebich saw about 10 to 30 bodies a day being dragged out of his section, Camp B, which held about 5,200 prisoners.

On May 13, 1945, Liebich was transferred to another American camp at Bingen-Buedesheim near Bad Kreuznach. Liebich soon fell sick with dysentery and typhus. He was transferred again, semi-conscious, in

an open-topped railway car with about 60 other prisoners. On a detour through Holland, the Dutch stood on bridges to smash stones down on the heads of the prisoners. After three nights, Liebich's fellow prisoners helped him stagger into the American camp at Rheinberg, again without shelter or much food.

One day in June 1945, Liebich saw the British coming through the hallucinations of his fever. The British saved his life in their hospital at Lintfort. Liebich remembered the life-saving care he received from the British with gratitude for the rest of his life. Liebich states: "It was wonderful to be under a roof in a real bed. We were treated like human beings again. The Tommies treated us like comrades."[58]

Former prisoners have also reported numerous instances of prisoners and civilians who were shot by American and French guards. Paul Kaps, a German soldier who was in the U.S. camp at Bad Kreuznach, writes, "In one night, May 8, 1945, 48 prisoners were shot dead in Cage 9." Prisoner Hanns Scharf witnessed an especially gruesome killing when a German woman with her two children asked an American guard at Bad Kreuznach to give a wine bottle to her husband, who was just inside the wire. The guard drank the wine himself, and when the bottle was empty the guard killed the prisoner with five shots. The other prisoners protested, and U.S. Army Lt. Holtsman said: "This is awful. I'll make sure there is a stiff court-martial." No evidence of a court-martial of this or any other similar incidents has ever been found.[59]

Prisoners and civilian women were shot even though the Eisenhower order gave individual camp commanders a chance to exempt family members trying to feed relatives through the wire. German prisoner Paul Schmitt was shot in the American camp at Bretzenheim when he came close to the wire to receive a basket of food from his wife and young son. Dr. Helmut von Frizberg saw an American guard at Remagen shoot a German prisoner for talking to his wife through the wire. Frau Agnes Spira was shot by French guards at Dietersheim in July 1945 for taking food to prisoners. Her memorial in nearby Buedesheim reads, "On the 31 of July 1945, my mother was suddenly and unexpectedly torn from me because of her good deed toward the imprisoned soldiers."[60]

French Capt. Julien got into serious trouble for quarreling with a fellow officer, Capt. Rousseau. Rousseau shot at German women in Julien's presence, at about the same time and in the same place as a French officer shot Frau Spira. At Bad Kreuznach, William Sellner said

that at night guards would shoot machine gun bullets at random into the camps, apparently for sport. Ernst Richard Krische in Bad Kreuznach wrote in his diary on May 4, 1945: "Wild shooting in the night, absolute fireworks. It must be the supposed peace. Next morning 40 dead as 'victims of the fireworks,' in our cage alone, many wounded."[61]

Allies Had Ability to Feed and Shelter Prisoners

The record clearly shows that the Allies had the ability to feed and shelter their POWs. The Allies prevented food from reaching Germany. James Bacque writes:

Even as the gallows at Nuremberg displayed their awful warning, the Allies were depriving men, women and children in Germany of available food. Foreign relief agencies were prevented from sending food from abroad; Red Cross food trains were sent back full to Switzerland; all foreign governments were denied permission to send food to German civilians; fertilizer production was sharply reduced; and food was confiscated during the first year, especially in the French zone. The fishing fleet was kept in port while people starved. British soldiers actually blew up one fishing boat in front of the eyes of astonished Germans. "The people say the sea is full of fish, but they want to starve us," said Burgomaster Petersen.[62]

Some historians claim that Eisenhower's order banning civilian food supply of the camps was prompted by an overall threat of a food shortage. However, many German prisoners and civilians saw American guards burn the food brought by civilian women. Ernst Kraemer, a prisoner at Buederich and Rheinberg, states: "At first, the women from the nearby town brought food into the camp. The American soldiers took everything away from the women, threw it in a heap and poured gasoline [benzine] over it and burned it." Writer Karl Vogel, the German camp commander appointed by the Americans in Camp 8 at GarmischPartenkirchen, says that Eisenhower himself ordered the food to be destroyed. The Americans were destroying food outside the gate even though the prisoners were getting only 800 calories per day.[63]

German prisoner Herbert Peters states concerning conditions at the huge U.S. camp at Rheinberg: “Even when there was little for us to eat, the provisions enclosure was enormous. Piles of cartons like bungalows with intersecting streets throughout.”[64]

Ten prisoners and several civilians describe starvation conditions at Bretzenheim through the approximately 70 days the camp was under U.S. control. The official U.S. Army ration book shows that the prisoners at Bretzenheim received 600 to 850 calories per day. According to Capt. Lee Berwick of the 424th Infantry Regiment, the prisoners at Bretzenheim starved even though food was piled up all along the camp fence. Capt. Berwick could not explain why the prisoners got only 600 to 850 calories per day. During the camp’s worst period of about 16 days, Berwick estimates that three to five bodies a day at Bretzenheim were taken from each of 20 cages within the larger enclosure.[65]

The German prisoners went on starving despite plenty of food in Europe. The U.S. Army had stored 13,500,000 high-protein Red Cross food parcels in army warehouses in Europe taken over from the ICRC in May 1945. On Nov. 17, 1945, the Army was still wondering what to do with these parcels. Each parcel contained on average 12,000 calories. There was enough food in them to have given the approximately 700,000 German prisoners who had died by then a supplementary 1,000 calories per day for about eight months. The ICRC parcels alone would probably have kept most of the German prisoners alive until early 1946.[66]

One of the first signs of the Allies’ starvation policy came from North America, where the ICRC delegation reported that the German prisoners’ rations had been cut as soon as Germany released its Allied POWs. Then, in late May or early June 1945, the ICRC loaded two freight trains with food from their warehouses in Switzerland, where they had over 100,000 tons of food in storage. The trains traveled to their destination in the American sector via the normal route prescribed by the German government during the war. When the trains reached their destinations, the U.S. Army informed the ICRC officials accompanying the trains that the warehouses were full. The trains were forced to return to Switzerland.[67]

Max Huber, the head of the ICRC, began inquiries into the U.S. Army’s actions. After a long investigation, Huber wrote a letter to the U.S. State Department. Huber referred to the Red Cross food trains that were returned full to Switzerland in the spring of 1945. Huber writes:

When hostilities in Europe ceased, the International Committee of the Red Cross made every effort to improve the situation of prisoners of all categories whose status after the liberation by the Allied armies became that of "ex-prisoner of war." Anticipating the difficulties which would result from these circumstances, the committee hoped to alleviate as much as possible the hardships of the former internee by working out a relief scheme with the Allied military authorities which, while bringing a considerable measure of aid, would also prove to be a rational means of liquidating the accumulated stocks in Switzerland and other countries.

…Meanwhile, the numerous communications from Allied officers in charge of assembly areas and camps for Displaced Persons; the reports of our delegates on medical missions in Germany; and especially the many direct requests addressed to us from the camps themselves, bear witness to the fact that tens if not hundreds of thousands of displaced persons in Germany are still in dire need of aid. From all this we are bound to recognize that the demands made upon the Anglo-American pool by the competent sections of the Allied armies are not proportionate to the prevailing need….In consequence, the humanitarian work of the International Committee is in danger of becoming discredited. Our responsibility for the proper use of relief supplies placed in our care is incompatible with a restriction to the fulfillment of orders which renders us powerless to furnish relief which we ourselves judge necessary.

The anticipated requisitions were either not made at all, or else came in with much delay. Having effected delivery with our trains in Germany in default of those promised by the Allied armies in Germany but never placed at our disposal, we would then find that the receiving personnel at the various destinations were without proper instructions as to the handling of these consignments. If the warehouse happened to be full, our trains would be refused there in turn. That the warehouses were still filled to overflowing was proof positive that the distributions in view of which previous requisitions had been made were still in abeyance….The Allied authorities' dispositions…of Anglo-American stocks…have failed to achieve relief in reasonable proportion to the extent of these stocks and degree of transport facilities available.

Practical experience showed…that in consequence of the general food shortage caused by the occupation army's normal requisitions and the dislocation of transport, the [armies] were unable to allot even a minimum ration to the Balts, Bulgarians, Hungarians, Italians, Romanians and apatrides [stateless people] on Germany territory. Thus, stating our case

fully to the governments and Red Cross societies concerned, we desire to stress the fact that the conditions set forth above leave us no alternative but to express our grave concern for the immediate future. To stand passively by whilst holding large quantities of immediately available relief supplies and knowing the plight of many camps of displaced persons of all categories in Germany, growing steadily more alarming, is not compatible with the tradition of our institution.[68]

The United States Force, European Theater (USFET), over Eisenhower's signature, calmly ignored everything Huber said in his letter. Huber was forced to return the food to its original donors because the Army refused to distribute it. There was so much food to return that it took thousands of train cars to return the food to its sources in Paris and Brussels. Huber apologized for clogging the rail system in France with this unnecessary work. Huber also had to obtain extra trucks beyond the 500 belonging to the ICRC in Geneva to return over 30,000 tons of food to the original donors.[69]

Relief agencies such as the YMCA, the Unitarians, the American Friends Service Committee (the Quakers), and various other church groups were also attempting to send aid into Germany. For the crucial months until November 1945, while Eisenhower was military governor of the U.S. zone of Germany, the Army made it difficult if not impossible for welfare from relief agencies to reach Germans. For example, the American Quakers were ordered to keep out of the U.S. zone. Also, the YMCA was refused permission by the U.S. Army to feed German prisoners in U.S. camps in France even though the YMCA offered to pay for all goods received from the army. The general attitude of the U.S. Army towards civilian relief agencies is clear from the opinion expressed by Stephen Cary, European commissioner of the American Friends Service Committee, who said, "We were very unhappy with their heavy-handed and restrictive treatment."[70]

The Quartermaster Progress Reports from April through June 1945 also confirm that there was a huge surplus of food in the U.S. Army. Every month shows a vast surplus amounting to more than 100 days on hand for the whole Army. This food surplus existed even though there was mass starvation in the U.S. POW camps.[71]

The U.S. Army also had plenty of tents, barbed wire, medical and other supplies for the German prisoners. These items were scarce in the

camps not because the Army lacked supplies, but because requests for supplies were denied. Gen. Everett S. Hughes said on March 19, 1945, after he visited the huge supply dumps at Naples and Marseille: "[Marseille is] Naples all over again. More stocks than we can ever use. Stretch as far as eye can see."[72]

Gen. Robert Littlejohn, who as quartermaster of USFET was in charge of Eisenhower's supplies, tried to get agreement on how to dispose of the Army's surplus subsistence. Littlejohn wrote to Eisenhower on Oct. 10, 1945: "There is in this theater a substantial excess of subsistence in certain items due to the rapid discharge of prisoners of war after VE day, the accelerated deployment of U.S. military, the sharp decrease in employment by U.S. forces of Allied liberated nationals and the ending of the supply responsibilities of the French army…."[73]

The rations the U.S. Army had accumulated in October 1945 amounted to a 139-day supply of food in the European Theater of Operations. This was 39-days more than the 100-day supply of food the Army liked to keep on hand. The surplus in the United States was so great that Gen. Littlejohn noted that "we have been invited to increase our rations of fruit juices and have been advised that our requirements for fresh eggs, fresh fruits, potatoes and butter can and should be met from U.S. sources." Littlejohn's letter goes on to discuss a policy on how to get rid of the surplus, which some officers wanted to send to the United States. Despite this surplus, the German prisoners in U.S. camps kept on starving.[74]

The evidence also suggests that France had enough food to feed their German POWs. The total number of prisoners on hand in France at its peak of about 800,000 represented about 2% of France's total population of about 40 million in 1945. If, as many German prisoners contend, their ration was about half the minimum to sustain life, then just 1% of the total food consumed in France would have saved them all from starvation. This food could have turned the German prisoners into productive workers contributing to the French economic recovery.[75]

The failure of the Red Cross and other relief agencies to supply the German POWs with food stands in stark contrast to the success of the Red Cross during the war. As the French, American, British and Canadian prisoners left German captivity at the end of World War II, the Red Cross was there to welcome them with food parcels drawn from the millions in storage in their warehouses in Switzerland. The returning prisoners had received about 1,500 calories per day from the Germans. Another life-

saving 2,000 calories per day had arrived by mail, mainly from France, Canada and the United States.

The effectiveness of the Red Cross care was demonstrated by the fact that, according to a news release of the American Red Cross in May 1945, over 98% of the Allied prisoners were coming home safe. The released prisoners were in good health not only because of the food, but also because of clothing and medicine which had arrived safely by mail.[76]

The Soviet, British and Canadian Prisoner of War Camps

The opening of the KGB archives after the fall of the Communist regime in the Soviet Union provided accurate and detailed information of how many Germans died in the Soviet camps. German soldiers captured by the Soviets between June 22, 1941, and Sept. 9, 1945, totaled 2,389,560, of which 450,587 died in Soviet captivity. Of the 450,587 who died, 356,687 died in rear camps run by the NKVD, and 93,900 died between capture at the front and arrival in the rear camps. An additional 271,672 German civilians were imprisoned, of which 66,481 died. The total number of German prisoners who died in Soviet captivity, both civilian and military, is therefore 517,068.[77]

The KGB generated millions of pages of detailed records of their prisoners. A personal dossier was kept for each prisoner, recording his name, unit, serial number, dates of capture and release, medical and legal history. The dossiers average around 20 pages per prisoner. The Soviet archives prove beyond a doubt that the Soviets committed enormous crimes against their surrendered prisoners. Soviet prisoners died under conditions that were contrary to the rules of war, against the Geneva Convention, against the Soviet constitution and even against Soviet self-interest. The skills and labor of these prisoners, who could have contributed to the rebuilding of a ruined Russia after the war, were sacrificed for nothing.[78]

The Soviet prisoners slaved in a vast system of 6,000 camps spread across the U.S.S.R. The camps were located from Minsk in the west, to Karaganda in the south-center, to Vorkuta in the north, and to Magadan in the northeast. The general impression in the West is that life in the gulag for prisoners consisted of unvaried suffering under a relentless cruelty. While this is mostly true, the Soviets did sometimes take measures to improve camp conditions.

For example, between Jan. 10 and Feb. 22, 1943, at Stalingrad, the Red Army took 91,545 German prisoners of war. Most of these prisoners were taken to Beketovka, where conditions were so bad that within a few weeks 42,000 out of 55,000 prisoners died. The Soviets conducted an investigation into the conditions at Beketovka between March 22 and 25, 1943. The doctors reported that 71% of the prisoners were sick, many infested with lice and with inadequate clothing. The Soviets soon provided more food and better accommodations for their German prisoners, and by the end of the war the camp had its own vegetable gardens.[79]

By contrast to the other Allies, the British and Canadians responsibly took care of their POWs. Soon after VE day, the total prisoners under British and Canadian control came to over 2 million. At first the British and Canadians were short of food and shelter for their German prisoners. However, with the exception of the British camp at Overijsche, the British and Canadian camps soon provided enough food and shelter for the prisoners to survive in fair health. The British members of the Combined Chiefs of Staff also refused to adopt the American designation of DEF status for their German prisoners. They instead used the term "surrendered enemy personnel" (SEP) to distinguish their POWs who they could not treat according to the letter of the Geneva Convention. [80]

The experience of German prisoner Werner Heyne is typical of the treatment POWs received in British and Canadian camps. Heyne was in a camp near Dieppe where there were "many thousands of men crowded into the cages built in the fields." The prisoners were immediately fed, given enough to drink, and got tents within a few days. There were no deaths in this camp, and after a month the German POWs were shipped to better camps in England.[81] Probably less than 10,000 German POWs died in British and Canadian captivity.[82]

How Could Such Atrocities be Concealed?

After the Allies defeated Germany in 1945, the press in Germany was directly licensed and censured by the victors. Eisenhower or his deputies ran everything inside Germany, so censorship was extremely easy to maintain. The Allies established a client government in which journalists, writers, artists, and academics all supported "the West."[83] Both the German and Allied press refused to publish anything concerning

Allied atrocities, while stories about German atrocities were frequently published.

For example, Gens. George Patton, Omar Bradley, and Dwight Eisenhower toured the German concentration camp at Ohrdruf on April 12, 1945. They saw more than 3,200 naked, emaciated dead bodies flung into shallow graves, with many more dead bodies lying in the streets where they had fallen. Soon after seeing Ohrdruf, Eisenhower ordered every unit nearby that was not in the front lines to tour the camp. Eisenhower stated: "We are told that the American soldier does not know what he is fighting for. Now, at least, he will know what he is fighting against."

Eisenhower also cabled London and Washington, urging delegations of officials and newsmen to be eyewitnesses to the camps. Eisenhower's message to Washington read: "We are constantly finding German camps in which they have placed political prisoners where unspeakable conditions exist. From my own personal observation, I can state unequivocally that all written statements up to now do not paint the full horrors."[84]

The tour of liberated concentration camps became a ritual in the occupied Germany of late April and early May. American officers forced local citizens and German POWs to view the camps. German civilians were paraded against their will in front of the sickening piles of dead bodies found in the German camps.

A long string of official visitors also began to answer Eisenhower's call for witnesses to the horrors in the camps. Congress chose a bipartisan joint committee to tour the sites of the camps, and the congressmen were all shocked at the conditions in the camps. In addition to the congressional tour, Eisenhower arranged for a committee of distinguished American journalists to make a similar inspection of the camps. The American journalists all dutifully reported the horrors they had witnessed at the camps.[85]

Joseph Pulitzer, a German-American in the heavily German-American city of St. Louis, was so incensed by what he saw at the camps that he launched a campaign of public education. Pulitzer wanted to dispel the belief in America that this talk of German atrocities is mostly propaganda. In cooperation with the federal government, Pulitzer's St. Louis Post-Dispatch conducted an exhibition of life-size photomurals made from the Signal Corps photographs of the camps. The photo exhibit

was coupled with the showing of an hour-long motion picture documentary on the camps produced by the Signal Corps.[86] Soon virtually everyone in the civilized world had seen pictures of the horrific conditions in the German concentration camps.

Dwight Eisenhower could have authorized the same public exposure of the DEF camps he ran in Germany. For obvious reasons he chose not to. The censorship by SHAEF under Eisenhower's command was stricter than it had been during the actual fighting. The New York Times argued vigorously against this policy in a front-page news story on May 27, 1945: "The American people are being deprived of information to which they are entitled….It seems almost as though now that there is no enemy to fight, high Army officers are spending a large part of their time writing directives to circumscribe the movements and activities of war correspondents."[87]

The U.S. Army kept close watch over what the press was saying. Eisenhower and his staff carefully monitored and controlled how their reputations were being treated by the press. Eisenhower even told a meeting of American newspaper editors, "I have always considered as quasi-staff officers, correspondents accredited to my headquarters." According to Gen. Patton, Eisenhower expected complete loyalty and solidarity in the event any of them were called before a congressional committee. Why was Eisenhower so wary of public opinion? Gen. Patton suggests an answer: because Eisenhower was using "practically Gestapo methods" against Germany.[88]

The United States government also refused to allow the ICRC to visit the German POWs in direct defiance of American obligations under the Geneva Convention. The ICRC under the Geneva Convention was supposed to visit the POWs in the camps and then report in secret to the holding power and the protecting power. On May 8, 1945, VE day, the U.S. State Department informed the Swiss government that its role as protecting power for the disintegrated German government was abolished. With this done, the U.S. State Department informed the ICRC that there was no need to continue visits in Germany as the protecting power had been abolished. While ignoring the requirements of the Geneva Convention, the U.S. State Department informed the Swiss that the U.S. would continue to treat the prisoners "in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Convention."[89]

The elimination of the ICRC and the Swiss government had disastrous consequences for the German POWs. The German POWs lost

the right to tell impartial observers in private what was happening to them. The right to send and receive mail also disappeared with the Swiss. The U.S. War Department imposed the most damaging ban of all, covering all the U.S. camps, when it disallowed the mailing of Red Cross parcels to the prisoners. This eliminated the ability of German POWs to get sufficient food as well as to send news of their treatment to others and to receive news from home. No news from the camps would leak out to impartial observers. This allowed the treatment of the German POWs to be conducted for many years in a secrecy that was maintained against all but the victims.[90]

Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King of Canada made the only important protest on the Allied side against the removal of the ICRC from Germany. King's protest was quickly squelched by the British, who pointed out that the other Allies had all agreed that the German government was to be extinguished, and that to leave provisional representation of POW interests by the Swiss might be dangerous. Of course, what it would be dangerous to were the French and American governments. The mass murder of German POWs could not have continued if the ICRC had been allowed to visit the Allied POW camps.[91]

Germans have been permitted to dig up mass graves of prisoners at former Russian camps, but the German government has sometimes prevented the uncovering of evidence from the French and American POW camps. For example, Otto Tullius, a German prisoner who survived Bretzenheim, was a farmer who owned some of the land where he was imprisoned. After the camp was closed, the land was returned to Tullius, and he began farming there again. As Tullius plowed the land, he kept turning up cast-offs from the prisoners in the camp such as flasks, belt buckles, and tin dishes. In the 1980s, Otto Schmitt began to excavate on the land beside the Tullius house, searching for more artifacts or even bodies from the camp. Schmitt was forced to stop his excavation work when the police threatened him with a fine of 250,000 DM.[92]

At Rheinberg, German construction crews in the 1950s and gravediggers in the 1980s discovered human remains with German army World War II dog tags. These human remains were jumbled closely together in common graves with no sign of coffin or grave marker.[93]

Other evidence of mass graves of German POWs at American-run camps has been found at Lambach in Austria in early 1996. Horst Littmann, an expert recommended by the Austrian Ministry of the Interior, concluded that the bodies were from American POW camps at

Hofau, Grueberfeld, and Kuhweide.[94] However, this evidence of mass death of German POWs was not reported to the public by the media.

Another example of Allied censorship is when Jean-Pierre Pradervand of the ICRC gave Gen. Bedell Smith, Eisenhower's chief of staff, pictures of starved, dying German prisoners at Thorée les Pins. These prisoners had recently been transferred from the Americans to the French. Pradervand's photographs disappeared into Eisenhower's office, not to be seen again until they reappeared as evidence of atrocities in French POW camps. Then the photographs disappeared forever. They are not preserved among the many photographs in the Smith collection at Abilene. The world press issued a story exonerating the U.S. Army, and the German POWs kept on dying.[95]

How Many German POWs Died in U.S. & French Camps?

The families of the dead German POWs eventually influenced government officials to look into the fate of their missing family members. The (West German) Government Ministry of Refugees, under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, had the Germans complete a survey. The survey was about 94% complete in the three Western zones, but only about 30% complete in the Soviet zone. The survey announced on March 31, 1950, that there were still missing, their fate unknown, about 1,407,000 persons. There were believed to be 69,000 ex-soldiers still in prison, 1,148,000 soldiers reported missing, and 190,000 missing civilians.[96] If everyone had completed the survey, it is estimated that the missing POWs would total about 1.7 million.[97]

Since the Soviet archives prove that approximately 517,000 German POWs died in Soviet captivity, we can get a reasonable approximation of the German POW deaths in French and U.S. camps. If we subtract the 517,000 German prisoners who died in Soviet captivity from the 1,407,000 total German prisoners missing in the survey, we have a total missing prisoner amount of 890,000. If we then subtract 100,000 from this total to account for the estimated number of German POWs who died in Yugoslavia, Poland, and other countries, the German POW deaths in American and French captivity amount to 790,000. If the more realistic total of 1.7 million is used as the estimate of total German POW deaths, the total deaths of German POWs in French and American captivity would be 1,083,000. These amounts confirm James Bacque's original estimate of German POW deaths in 1989 before the Soviets opened their archives.

Most historians still dispute that such large numbers of German POWs died in the American and French POW camps. Some historians use the official figures of the Maschke Commission to refute Bacque's estimates. The Maschke Commission, which was set up by the German government to investigate the fate of German POWs, officially completed its work at the end of 1972. A modest amount of its series of 22 books was sold, mainly to universities and research libraries.

Willy Brandt has admitted that the books edited by Dr. Erich Maschke were financed and censored by the West German Foreign Office in order to serve German foreign policy. Dr. Maschke's figures are demonstrably wrong. For example, the Maschke U.S. wartime capture figure of 3,761,431 is more than 2,000,000 lower than the true U.S. total capture in north Africa, Italy and northern Europe.[98] The Maschke Commission estimate of 1,094,250 German POW deaths in Soviet camps is also far higher than the amount recorded in Soviet archives.[99]

Other historians say that Bacque misinterpreted the words "Other Losses" in the Weekly Prisoner of War and Disarmed Enemy Forces Reports. They claim that this category includes far more than deaths and escapes. Col. Philip S. Lauben told James Bacque in 1987 that the heading Other Losses means deaths and escapes, with the escapes being only a very minor amount. Lauben was the head of the German Affairs Branch of SHAEF. He was the officer in charge of repatriations and transfers who helped prepare the weekly forms that used the term Other Losses.

Lauben gave Bacque permission to tape their interview and signed a transcript of his statement to Bacque that Other Losses means deaths and escapes. More than a month later, and knowing that Col. Ernest F. Fisher had been an Army historian, Lauben also told Fisher that Other Losses means deaths and escapes. Since Lauben worked regularly with these documents, he was in a position to know what Other Losses meant.[100]

Until someone can find errors in the German survey under Adenauer or in the released Soviet archives, Bacque's estimate of German POWs who died in American and French captivity appears to be reasonable. Bacque states: "Among all of the many editors, writers, TV producers and professors all over Europe and North America who have furiously denounced the author of Other Losses since 1989, not one has ever commented on his subsequent amazing discoveries in the Soviet

archives."[101]

Closing Remarks on Other Losses

One critic of Other Losses has asked: "How could the bodies disappear without one soldier's coming forward in nearly 50 years to relieve his conscience?"[102] The answer to this question is that numerous American soldiers and officers have come forth to witness the atrocious death rate in the American and French POW camps. From low-ranking soldiers such as Martin Brech, Daniel McConnell, and Merrill W. Campbell, through middle-rank officers such as Ben H. Jackson, Frederick Siegfriedt, and Lee Berwick, to high-ranking officers such as Richard Steinbach, Henry W. Allard, James B. Mason, Charles H. Beasley, Mark Clark, and Herbert Pollack, Americans have described the lethal conditions in the American and French POW camps. All of the American eyewitness reports are extended and confirmed by the thousands of Germans who have written letters, books, and articles showing beyond reasonable doubt a high death rate in the Allied POW camps.

Gen. Eisenhower had deplored the Germans' useless defense at the end of World War II because of the waste of life. However, the Germans died faster in the French and American POW camps after they surrendered than they had during the war. By one estimate, 10 times as many Germans died in the French and American POW camps as were killed in all combat on the Western Front in northwest Europe from June 1941 to April 1945.[103]

James Bacque ends his outstanding book with an appeal for openmindedness and understanding. Bacque states: "Surely it is time for the guesswork and the lying to stop. Surely it is time to take seriously what the eyewitnesses on both sides are trying to tell us about our history. All over the Western world, savage atrocities against the Armenians, the Ukrainians and the Jews are known. Only the atrocities against the Germans are denied. Are Germans not people in our eyes?"[104]

Whenever a historian denies that the Western Allies mass murdered German POWs, I recall a conversation I had with an elderly German couple in the late 1990s. After the wife told me she had been in Berlin when the Red Army captured the city, I asked them the following question: Do you know that the Western Allies, led by the United States

of America, intentionally starved to death approximately 1 million German prisoners of war after the war was over?

An agonizing look of pain overtook the husband as they both said "Yes." The agonizing look of pain on the husband's face did not result from his merely reading a book. His pain was caused by something he had lived through. Unfortunately, since he is German, most historians could care less about his pain and suffering.

Footnotes

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[22] Ibid., pp. 191-192.

[23] Ibid., pp. 192-193.

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[26] Ibid., p. 194.

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[34] Ibid., pp. 97-98.

[35] Ibid., pp. 87-88.

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[37] Ibid., p. 91.

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[41] Ibid., pp. 81-83.

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[47] Bacque, James, Crimes and Mercies: The Fate of German Civilians under Allied Occupation, 1944-1950, 2nd edition, Vancouver, British Columbia: Talonbooks, 2007, pp. 49-50.

[48] Ibid., pp. 50-51, 53.

[49] Bacque, James, Other Losses: An Investigation into the Mass Deaths of German Prisoners at the Hands of the French and Americans after World War II, 3rd edition, Vancouver: Talonbooks, 2011, pp. xxxiv-xxxv.

[50] Ibid., p. lxiii.

[51] Ibid., p. 130.

[52] Ibid., pp. 40-41.

[53] Ibid., pp. 37, 39.

[54] Ibid., p. 41.

[55] Ibid., pp. 33-34.

[56] Ibid., p. 34.

[57] Ibid., p. 36.

[58] Ibid., pp. 128-130.

[59] Ibid., pp. xxxiv, 239.

[60] Ibid., pp. xxxii-xxxiv.

[61] Bacque, James, Crimes and Mercies: The Fate of German Civilians under Allied Occupation, 1944-1950, 2nd edition, Vancouver, British Columbia: Talonbooks, 2007, p. 46.

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[66] Ibid., p. 102.

[67] Ibid., p. 69.

[68] Ibid., pp. 69-71.

[69] Ibid., p. 73.

[70] Ibid., pp. 68, 73, 75-76.

[71] Ibid., pp. 54, 274 (footnote 32).

[72] Ibid., p. 28.

[73] Ibid., pp. 17, 97.

[74] Ibid., p. 97.

[75] Ibid., p. 110.

[76] Ibid., pp. 67-68.

[77] Ibid., pp. xlii, lx.

[78] Ibid., pp. xliii, xliv.

[79] Ibid., pp. xlvi-xlvii.

[80] Ibid., pp. 23-24, 128.

[81] Ibid., pp. 127-128.

[82] Ibid., p. lxi.

[83] Ibid., pp. 142, 177.

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[86] Ibid., p. 134.

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[88] Ibid., pp. 62, 142-143. The "practically Gestapo methods" quote is from Blumenson, Martin, (ed.), The Patton Papers, 1940-1945, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1974, p. 742.

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[90] Ibid., pp. 57, 64.

[91] Ibid., pp. 64-65.

[92] Ibid., p. xxxv.

[93] Ibid., p. 41.

[94] Bacque, James, Crimes and Mercies: The Fate of German Civilians under Allied Occupation, 1944-1950, 2nd edition, Vancouver, British Columbia: Talonbooks, 2007, p. 45.

[95] Bacque, James, Other Losses: An Investigation into the Mass Deaths of German Prisoners at the Hands of the French and Americans after World War II, 3rd edition, Vancouver: Talonbooks, 2011, pp. 96, 243-244.

[96] Ibid., pp. xli, 148.

[97] Ibid., p. 293 (footnote 26).

[98] Ibid., pp. xxiv, lvi-lvii, 149-150, 177.

[99] The amount of 1,094,250 German POW deaths from the Maschke Commission is shown by Lowe, Keith, Savage Continent: Europe in the Aftermath of World War II, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2012, p. 122.

[100] Bacque, James, Other Losses: An Investigation into the Mass Deaths of German Prisoners at the Hands of the French and Americans after World War II, 3rd edition, Vancouver: Talonbooks, 2011, pp. 181-183.

[101] Ibid., pp. lxii-lxiii.

[102] Bischof, Guenter, "Bacque and Historical Evidence," in Bischof, Guenter and Ambrose, Stephen E., (eds.), Eisenhower and the German POWs: Facts Against Falsehood, Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1992, p. 201.

[103] Bacque, James, Other Losses: An Investigation into the Mass Deaths of German Prisoners at the Hands of the French and Americans after World War II, 3rd edition, Vancouver: Talonbooks, 2011, p. 59.

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Chapter Six

• The German Expellees

One of the great tragedies of the 20th century was the forced expulsion of ethnic Germans from their homes after the end of World War II. The Allies carried out the largest forced population transfer—and perhaps the greatest single movement of people—in human history. A minimum of 12 million and possibly as many as 18.1 million Germans were driven from their homes because of their ethnic background. Probably 2.1 million or more of these German expellees, mostly women and children, died in what was supposed to be an "orderly and humane" expulsion.[1]

One estimate of the Germans expelled runs to 16.5 million: 9.3 million within the 1937 Reich borders and 7.2 million outside. The Germans within the 1937 Reich borders include 2,382,000 East Prussians, 1,822,000 East Pomeranians, 614,000 in Brandenburg east of the Oder, and 4,469,000 Silesians. The Germans outside the 1937 Reich borders include 240,000 in Memel and the Baltic states, 373,000 in Danzig, 1,293,000 in Poland, 3,493,000 in Czechoslovakia, 601,000 in Hungary, 509,000 in Yugoslavia, and 785,000 in Romania. The Russians did not expel many of their 1.8 million Volga Germans; instead, the Volga Germans were predominantly resettled within the Soviet Union.[2]

Historical and Legal Basis for German Expulsions

The mass expulsion of entire populations at the end of armed conflicts was not in the European tradition. With the exception of the Treaty of Lausanne in July 1923, which sanctioned mutual expulsions after the Greek-Turkish war of 1921-1922, European nations did not contemplate or carry out resettlement schemes prior to World War II. The Poles and Czechs, however, were determined to forcibly relocate their minority populations under the auspices of international organizations. These two governments-in-exile, located in London during most of the war, were eager to gain acceptance from the Allies for the forced expulsion of their German minorities.[3]

The Polish and Czechoslovak governments-in-exile found that the Allies were in complete agreement that the Germans should be expelled

from both postwar Poland and the former Sudetenland. Documents from the Russian archives make it clear that Stalin and Molotov were fully informed about the Polish and Czech plans to deport their Germans. The Soviet leaders told the Czechs and Poles that they not only had no objection in principle to the deportations, but that they also thought positively about them.

Stalin unambiguously endorsed the expulsions in a June 28, 1945, conversation with the Czechoslovak prime minister and deputy foreign minister: "We won't disturb you. Throw them out. Now they will learn themselves what it means to rule over someone else." Stalin gave the Polish Communist leader Wladyslaw Gomulka advice on how to get the Germans to leave: "You should create such conditions for the Germans that they want to escape themselves."[4]

Some provisional decisions concerning the expulsion of Germans had been made at the Tehran Conference in December 1943. Stalin wanted to keep the eastern half of Poland which he had acquired pursuant to the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact made with Germany. In order to compensate Poland for her lost territory, East Prussia and perhaps Upper Silesia would be ceded to Poland. Poland would gain back in the west the same amount of territory she lost in the east. Churchill demonstrated to Stalin his thoughts on a Poland shifted westward with three matchsticks. Stalin was pleased with Churchill's demonstration.[5]

Edvard Benes, the president of the Czechoslovak government, justifiably claimed that he had received the blessings of Roosevelt and Churchill for the transfers. Both the American and British governments were sympathetic to the Czechoslovak and Polish cases for expulsion of the Germans and, like the Soviets, had no objection in principle.

Churchill was especially callous on the subject of German expulsions. On Oct. 9, 1944, Churchill remarked to Stalin that 7 million Germans would be killed in the war, thus leaving plenty of room for Germans driven out of Silesia and East Prussia to move into rump Germany. On Feb. 23, 1945, Churchill dismissed the difficulties involved in transferring the German population to the west. Churchill insisted that the transfers would be easy to make since most of the Germans in the territories now taken by the Russians had already left.[6]

The question is: What moral or legal basis would allow the Allies to expel the ethnic Germans from their homes? The forced expulsion of

millions of Germans was a clear violation of the Atlantic Charter signed by the United States and Great Britain in August 1941. The Atlantic Charter had promised in point two that there would be no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned. However, the Sudetenland Germans, East Prussians and Silesians were not asked if they wanted to stay in their 700-year-old homelands. They were thrown out against their will.[7]

British statesmen decided to repudiate the noble principles of the Atlantic Charter. In March 1944, the Earl of Mansfield stated before the British House of Lords: "The Atlantic Charter will not apply to Germany, and therefore there is no reason whatever why we should not contemplate, if not with equanimity, at least without consternation, any unavoidable sufferings that may be inflicted on German minorities in the course of their transference."[8]

Other British statesmen including Churchill made similar statements that the Atlantic Charter did not apply to Germany. During a debate in the House of Commons on Feb. 23, 1944, Anthony Eden expressed his view of the Atlantic Charter: "There are certain parts of the Atlantic Charter which refer in set terms to victor and vanquished alike. Article four does so. But we cannot admit that Germany can claim, as a matter of right on her part, whatever our obligation, that any part of the Charter applies to her."

A British Labour MP later acknowledged on March 1, 1945, before the House of Commons: "We started this war with great motives and high ideals. We published the Atlantic Charter and then spat on it, stomped on it and burnt it, as it were, at the stake, and now nothing is left of it."[9]

The expulsion of ethnic Germans can be viewed in the United States as both a repudiation of the Atlantic Charter and the adoption of the Morgenthau Plan. Section Two of the Morgenthau Plan, which dealt with the "New Boundaries of Germany," states: "Poland should get that part of East Prussia which doesn't go to the USSR and the southern portion of Silesia." However, the drastic territorial changes finalized at the Potsdam Conference on Aug. 2, 1945, went beyond what even Morgenthau had envisioned. It was agreed at the Potsdam Conference that all German land east of the Oder-Neisse rivers that was not under Soviet administration "shall be under the administration of the Polish state."[10]

The Potsdam Conference was held from July 17 to Aug. 2, 1945, to decide how to administer Germany after her unconditional surrender to the Allies. The goals of the conference included the establishment of postwar order, peace treaty issues, and countering the effects of the war. Participants were the United States represented by President Harry S. Truman, the Soviet Union represented by Josef Stalin, and Great Britain represented by Winston Churchill and later Clement Attlee. In a bitter blow to French pride, France was not invited to the Potsdam Conference. Although the Allies had independently agreed on the need to move the Germans out of Eastern Europe, the discussions at Potsdam indicated that the Americans and British had second thoughts on the expulsion of the Germans.[11]

President Truman at Potsdam expressed his concerns about where 9 million Germans would go. Stalin reassured Truman that most of the Germans had already left. Stalin later noted that the Poles had retained some Germans to work in the fields, but that the Poles would expel them once the harvest was in.

Churchill also stated somewhat disingenuously that "I have grave moral scruples regarding great movements and transfers of populations." Churchill then added that perhaps the Germans who had left Silesia should be allowed to go back. Stalin told Churchill that the Poles would hang the Germans if they returned. Stalin also said that the Germans had already been driven out of Czechoslovakia, and that there was no need to contact President Benes about the German expulsion.[12]

Despite the reservations of the Western Allies, at the conclusion of the Potsdam Conference all parties agreed to the transfer of the eastern Germans. The Western Allies could have said no, but they wanted to avoid any breach with the Soviets. Sir Denis Allen, a member of the British delegation, recalls:

We were then all too well aware—and to a degree hard to picture in retrospect—of our ignorance of what was really happening in Eastern Europe and still more of our inability to influence events there.

If experience of the Nazi era and of war had engendered a certain numbness and indifference to human suffering, it had also bred new hope that, against all the odds, the wartime alliance might be consolidated into a workable system of post-war collaboration in Europe and in the world at large. So there was a widely shared determination not to press concern over events

in the East that we could not prevent, to the point where it might maim at birth the Control Council and the United Nations; if hopes were to be frustrated, let it be the Russians and not ourselves who were seen to be responsible.[13]

The Potsdam Conference adopted Article IX of the Potsdam Protocol regarding the German-Polish border and Article XIII regarding the transfer of the Eastern Germans to what was left of Germany. The first paragraph of Article XIII reads: "The three governments having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner."[14]

Article XIII of the Potsdam Protocol was intended to bring the then on-going expulsions under a regulated procedure. According to paragraphs two and three of Article XIII, the Allied Control Council in Berlin was to determine how many Germans were to be resettled. Until then a moratorium on expulsion of the Germans was to be in effect. However, the moratorium was ignored, and the expulsions continued just as before, and during the conference itself.[15]

In Nuremberg the mass deportations perpetrated by the Nazis were included as part of the crimes allegedly committed by the National Socialist government of Germany. On Nov. 20, 1945, Pierre Mounier, assistant prosecutor for France, reproached the accused for having ordered the mass deportations. Mounier stated: "These deportations were contrary to the international conventions, in particular to Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, 1907, the laws and customs of war, the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal laws of all civilized nations, the internal penal laws of the countries in which such crimes were committed, and to Article 6(b) of the charter." France's chief prosecutor at Nuremberg also denounced the mass deportations perpetrated by the Nazis as "one of the horrors of our century."[16]

The Nuremberg court was of the opinion that even in a total war, when a country must fight for its very existence, civil rights and in particular The Hague Convention and its Regulations on Land Warfare place restraints upon those waging war. The mass deportations perpetrated by National Socialist Germany were held to be both a war

crime and a crime against humanity. The irony is that while the Nuremberg trials were in progress, the mass deportation of millions of Germans was occurring under the sanction of the same powers whose prosecutors and judges were condemning the mass deportations perpetrated by the Germans.[17]

Bertrand Russell criticized the expulsion of the Germans in a letter to the London Times:

In Eastern Europe now mass deportations are being carried out by our allies on an unprecedented scale, and an apparently deliberate attempt is being made to exterminate many millions of Germans, not by gas, but by depriving them of their homes and of food, leaving them to die by slow and agonizing starvation. This is done not as an act of war, but as part of a deliberate policy of "peace."

...Are mass deportations crimes when committed by our enemies during war and justifiable measures of social adjustment when carried out by our allies in time of peace? Is it more humane to turn out old women and children to die at a distance than to asphyxiate Jews in gas chambers? Can those responsible for the deaths of those who die after expulsion be regarded as less guilty because they do not see or hear the agonies of their victims? Are the future laws of war to justify the killing of enemy nationals after enemy resistance has ceased?[18]

American historian Ralph Franklin Keeling has commented on the hypocrisy of the Potsdam Agreement:

Potsdam calls for annulment of all Nazi laws which established discrimination on grounds of race and declares: "No such discrimination, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated." Yet these forced migrations of German populations are predicated squarely on rank racial discrimination. The people affected are mostly wives and children of simple peasants, workers, and artisans whose families have lived for centuries in the homes from which they have now been ejected, and whose only offense is their German blood. How "orderly and humane" their banishment has been is now a matter of record.[19]

The Early German Expulsions

For more than three months prior to the Potsdam Agreement, the Polish government was expelling German citizens from what it now called the "Recovered Territories"—a reference to the fact that Poland once ruled Silesia and Pomerania under the Piast dynasty 600 years earlier. Czechoslovakia had been expelling German civilians since mid-May 1945. Although Yugoslavia and Romania had neither asked for nor received permission from the Allies to expel their German citizens, both of these countries soon began large-scale deportations of their German population. While the expulsions of the Germans were crude and disorganized, they were neither spontaneous nor accidental. Instead, the expulsions were carried out according to a premeditated strategy devised by each of the governments concerned well before the end of the war.[20]

The expelling nations relied almost exclusively on the use of terror to transport their German minorities across the frontiers. Except in a very few instances, deportations as a result of mob actions did not cause the German expulsions. Rather, the so-called "wild expulsions" were carried out primarily by troops, police, and militia acting under orders and policies originating at the highest levels of the expelling governments. So chaotic was the process of expelling the German minorities that many foreign observers, and even many people in the expelling countries themselves, mistook the violent events of the late spring and summer of [1945] as a spontaneous process from below. The expelling governments were more than happy to allow the myth of the "wild expulsions" to grow, since this myth enabled them to disclaim responsibility for the atrocities that were essential components of the expulsions.[21]

The worst of the violence in Poland occurred between mid-June and mid-July 1945, particularly in the districts bordering the Oder-Neisse demarcation line, which were designated by the Polish Army Command as a military settlement area. The commander of the Polish Second Army expressed on June 24, 1945, the Polish position on the rapid transfer of the Germans:

We are transferring the Germans out of Polish territory and we are acting thereby in accordance with directives from Moscow. We are behaving with the Germans as they behaved with us. Many already have forgotten how they treated our children, women and old people. The Czechs

knew how to act so that the Germans fled from their territory of their own volition.

One must perform one's tasks in such a harsh and decisive manner that the Germanic vermin do not hide in their houses but rather will flee from us of their own volition and then [once] in their own land will thank God that they were lucky enough to save their heads. We do not forget Germans always will be Germans.[22]

The Germans who were forced to resettle were usually allowed to take only 20 kilograms of baggage with them, and were escorted to the border by squads of Polish soldiers. In late June 1945 at least 40,000 Germans were expelled within a few days. One commentator describes what this meant to the Germans living near the Oder-Neisse line:

The evacuation of individual localities usually began in the early morning hours. The population, torn from their sleep, had scarcely 15 to 20 minutes to snatch the most necessary belongings, or else they were driven directly onto the street without any ceremony. Smaller localities and villages were evacuated at gunpoint by small numbers of soldiers, frequently only a squad or a platoon. Due to the proximity of the border, for the sake of simplicity the Germans were marched on foot to the nearest bridge over the river, driven over to the Soviet side [i.e., into the Soviet Occupation Zone of Germany] and there left to their own fate.[23]

The German expellees were frequently robbed by members of the Polish militia and military units that carried out the expulsions. Food supply became an acute problem, and the uprooted Germans were often destitute and exhausted when they arrived in the Soviet Occupation Zone. The German expellees became easy prey for Soviet occupation troops, who often stole the few belongings the Germans had brought with them. Some Germans were beaten and raped, forced to perform humiliating acts, and some were randomly killed.[24]

Not all of the cross-border traffic of Germans was in a single direction. At the end of the war, many hundreds of thousands of Germans from the Recovered Territories who had fled the Red Army's advance to the west now returned to their homes. The returning Germans did not understand that there was not going to be a return home. The alarming spectacle of the population in the Recovered Territories of Poland actually increasing in the weeks after V-E Day was one of the factors spurring local authorities to quickly proceed with "wild expulsions" of the

Germans. Polish soldiers and government officials used aggressive and often violent measures to prevent the unwanted Germans from returning to their homes.[25]

However great the hazards and miseries of life on the road were for the German expellees, they were usually preferable to the expulsion trains the Polish authorities began to operate. Taking up to two weeks to reach Berlin, the trains were typically not provisioned and lacked the most basic amenities. As a result the death rate on the trains soared. One passenger writes:

In our freight wagon there were about 98 people, and it is no exaggeration to say that we were squeezed against each other like sardines in a can. When we reached Allenstein people started to die, and had to be deposited along the side of the rails. One or more dead bodies greeted us every morning of our journey after that; they just had to be abandoned on the embankments. There must have been many, many bodies left lying along the track….

The train spent more time stopping than moving. It took us more than 14 days to reach the Russian occupation zone. We rarely traveled at night….After a few days we had no more to eat. Sometimes, by begging the Polish driver, we were able to get a little warm water drawn from the engine….The nights were unbearable because of the overcrowding. We could neither keep upright nor sit down, much less lie down. We were so tightly squeezed together that it was impossible not to jostle each other occasionally. Recriminations and quarrels erupted, even attempts to exchange blows in the middle of this human scrum. The very sick suffered the worst. Typhus was widespread throughout the entire transport and the number of deaths grew with each passing day. You can well imagine the state of hygiene that prevailed in the wagon.[26]

A German priest who witnessed the arrival of German expellees at the border described what he saw:

The people, men, women, and children all mixed together, were tightly packed in the railway cars, these cattle wagons themselves being locked from the outside. For days on end, the people were transported like

this, and in Goerlitz the wagons were opened for the first time. I have seen with my own eyes that out of one wagon alone 10 corpses were taken and thrown into coffins which had been kept on hand. I noted further that several persons had become deranged….The people were covered in excrement, which led me to believe that they were squeezed together so tightly that there was no longer any possibility for them to relieve themselves at a designated place.[27]

The worst of the violence appears to have been taken against the German minority in Czechoslovakia. A brief but intense outbreak of revenge-taking occurred across Czechoslovakia in May and June 1945 in response to the determination of German forces to continue fighting up to, and even after, V-E Day. Foreign observers and some Czechs themselves were shocked by the scale, the intensity and the lack of discrimination of the reprisals against German civilians. One writer states:

The end of the occupation was the beginning of the expulsion of German civilians, if they had survived the first hours and days of brutality. Retaliation was blind. An old woman was defenestrated; a member of a visiting German orchestra was beaten to death in the street because he could not speak Czech; others, not all of them Gestapo members, were hanged, doused with gas and lit, as living torches. Enraged mobs roamed through hospitals to find easy victims there. One [of those murdered] was a Czech patient, who happened to be the father of the writer Michael Mares, but his papers listed a Sudeten birthplace. From May until mid-October official statistics listed 3,795 suicides of Germans in Bohemia.[28]

The Ministry of Education, the Military Prison, the Riding School, the Sports Stadium, and the Labor Exchange in Prague were set aside as prisons for German civilians. The Scharnhorst School was the scene of a massacre in which groups of 10 Germans were led down to the courtyard and shot. In Strahov as many as 10,000 to 15,000 Germans were herded into the football stadium. Here the Czechs forced 5,000 prisoners to run for their lives as guards fired on them with machine guns. Some Germans were shot in the latrines. As a general rule all SS men were shot, either by a shot in the back of the neck or to the stomach. Even after May 16, 1945,

when order was meant to be restored, 12 to 20 Germans died daily at the Strahov Stadium. Most of the victims had been tortured first.[29]

The worst atrocities during this period in Czechoslovakia were perpetrated by troops, police, and others acting under color of authority. In a compound at Postoloprty in northern Bohemia, parties of up to 250 Germans at a time were removed and shot by Czechoslovak soldiers on June 5 and 6. The precise number of Germans killed range from a low of 763 (the number of bodies unearthed in 1947) to a high of 2,000. In a similar incident at Kaunitz College in Brno a Czechoslovak investigation found that at least 300 Germans died as a result of torture, shooting, or hanging in May and June 1945.

On June 18, 1945, Czechoslovak troops shot 265 German civilians in the back of the neck and buried them in a mass grave the Germans had first been forced to dig beside a railway station. At Lanskroun, a two-day "People's Tribunal" conducted by a prominent member of Benes's party resulted in 20 people being shot; two hanged; others tortured; and others drowned in the town's fire pool. In the city of Chomutov on the morning of June 9, up to a dozen Germans were tortured to death in a "cleansing operation" conducted by Staff Capt. Karel Prásil on a sports field in full view of sickened Czech passersby.[30]

On May 30, 1945, under threat from a trade union headed by the Communist activist Josef Kapoun, the mayor of Brno agreed to an expulsion action against German civilians that same evening. The first column of expellees was marched off in the general direction of the Austrian frontier. A second group of German expellees, rounded up from neighboring villages and towns, followed them a few hours later. The German expellees, who by now numbered some 28,000, were denied permission to cross into Austria by the Allied occupation authorities. Rather than allowing the Germans to return home, the Brno activists responsible for the expulsion confined them in a collection of impromptu camps in the border village of Pohorelice. Lacking food, water, or sanitary facilities, 1,700 Germans are estimated to have died in the camps.[31] A Red Cross nurse estimates that an additional 1,000 expellees died on the march to the camps.[32]

In light of the euphemistically styled "excesses" of May and June, some Czechoslovak policymakers and Western correspondents began to criticize the Czech actions. For example, F.A. Voigt, longtime diplomatic correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, wrote that the Czechs themselves were adopting "a racial doctrine akin to Hitler's…and

methods that are hardly distinguishable from those of Fascism. They have, in fact, become Slav National Socialists."[33]

The Czechoslovak government, however, never seriously attempted to rein in the agencies over which it exercised control. Czech leaders realized that nothing but the application of force on a massive scale could rid Czechoslovakia of its German population. Too much terror might result in at worst some embarrassment abroad; too little terror would prevent the success of the operation. Benes implicitly acknowledged as much in a speech broadcast on Radio Prague: "We are accused of simply imitating the Nazis and their cruel and uncivilized methods. Even if these reproaches should be true in individual cases, I state categorically: Our Germans must go to the Reich, and they will go there in any circumstances."[34]

The Czechoslovak government introduced numerous measures discriminating against their German minority. Germans could go out only at certain times of day; they were forced to wear white armbands, sometimes emblazoned with an "N" for Nemec or German; they were forbidden from using public transportation or walking on the pavement; they could not send letters or go to the cinema, theater, or pub; and they could not own jewelry, gold, silver, precious stones and other items. They were issued with ration cards, but were not allowed meat, eggs, milk, cheese or fruit, and had restricted times for buying food. The Germans were also sometimes forced to work as slaves on farms, in industry, or in the mines.[35]

For many Germans an aspect of the expulsions was blatant theft. Czech president Edvard Benes is quoted as saying: "Take everything from the Germans. Leave them only a handkerchief to sob into."[36] Benes declared all Germans and Hungarians to be politically unreliable and their possessions were therefore to fall to the Czech state.[37]

The Czech partisans frequently took anything that appealed to them, and sometimes simply moved into a German's house, adopting the former owner's possessions. In 1945 there were many instances of farmworkers appropriating German farms, junior doctors taking over German medical practices, and junior managers taking over German businesses. There were cases of pure opportunism: Czechs who had formerly moved in German circles suddenly became the apostles of Czech nationalism and hunted down former German acquaintances. Once the wilder days were over, the new Czech Republic moved to regulate the plunder of German property so that the booty came to the state.[38]

Throughout the summer of 1945, trains of German expellees continued to pour into Berlin and other German and Austrian cities. The Western journalists who had traveled to Berlin to cover the Potsdam Conference were aghast at the scenes they encountered at the railroad stations, with dead and dying littering the platforms. Charles Bray, German correspondent of the London Daily Herald, described finding four dead Germans on a visit to Stettin Station, with "another five or six… lying alongside them, given up as hopeless by the doctor, and just being allowed to die." Bray discovered the suffering of the German expellees "gave me no satisfaction, although for years I have hoped that the Germans would reap the seeds they had sown."[39]

Several observers compared the fate of the German expellees to the victims of the German concentration camps. Maj. Stephen Terrell of the Parachute Regiment stated: "Even a cursory visit to the hospitals in Berlin, where some of these people have dragged themselves, is an experience which would make the sights in the concentration camps appear normal."[40]

Adrian Kanaar, a British military doctor working in a Berlin medical facility, reported on an expellee train from Poland in which 75 had died on the journey due to overcrowding. Although Kanaar had just completed a stint as a medical officer at the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp, what he witnessed of the expellees' plight so distressed him that he declared his willingness to face a court-martial if necessary for making the facts known to the press. Kanaar declared that he had not "spent six years in the army to see a tyranny established which is as bad as the Nazis."[41]

Gerald Gardiner, later to become lord chancellor of Great Britain, had been a member of a volunteer ambulance unit working with concentration camp survivors. Gardiner stated in regard to the expellee trains arriving in the late summer and autumn of 1945 from the Recovered Territories, "The removal of the dead in carts from the railway stations was a grim reminder of what I saw in early days in Belsen."[42]

Robert Murphy, a career diplomat who had served as Gen. Eisenhower's political advisor and was now the State Department's senior representative in Germany with the rank of ambassador, became concerned about the Allied mistreatment of the German expellees. Murphy states in regard to the German expellees:

In viewing the distress and despair of these wretches, in smelling the odor of their filthy condition, the mind reverts instantly to Dachau and Buchenwald. Here is retribution on a large scale, but practiced not on the Parteibonzen [party leaders], but on women and children, the poor, the infirm. The vast majority are women and children….

Our psychology adjusts itself somehow to the idea that suffering is part of the soldier's contract….That psychology loses some of its elasticity, however, in viewing the stupid tragedy now befalling thousands of innocent children, and women and old people….The mind reverts to other recent mass deportations which horrified the world and brought upon the Nazis the odium which they so deserved. Those mass deportations engineered by the Nazis provided part of the moral basis on which we waged the war and which gave strength to our cause.

Now the situation is reversed. We find ourselves in the invidious position of being partners in this German enterprise and as partners inevitably sharing the responsibility.[43]

An eyewitness report of the arrival in Berlin of a train which had left Poland with 1,000 German expellees aboard reads:

Nine hundred and nine men, women, and children dragged themselves and their luggage from a Russian railway train at Leherte station today, after 11 days traveling in boxcars from Poland.

Red Army soldiers lifted 91 corpses from the train, while relatives shrieked and sobbed as their bodies were piled in American lend-lease trucks and driven off for interment in a pit near a concentration camp.

The refugee train was like a macabre Noah's ark. Every car was jammed with Germans…the families carry all their earthly belongings in sacks, bags, and tin trunks…Nursing infants suffer the most, as their mothers are unable to feed them, and frequently go insane as they watch their offspring slowly die before their eyes. Today four screaming, violently insane mothers were bound with rope to prevent them from clawing other passengers.

"Many women try to carry off their dead babies with them," a Russian railway official said. "We search the bundles whenever we discover a weeping woman, to make sure she is not carrying an infant corpse with her."[44]

The stated rationale during the war for the transfers had been to remove a cohort of dangerous Germans—above all, fit men of military age—who might threaten the security of the countries in which they lived. Instead, it had been women, children, and old men who had been deported, while the fit men had been held back for slave labor.

Earl Ziemke wrote of the expelled Germans: "Only 12% could be classified as fully employable; 65% needed relief. Contrary to agreements made before the movement to keep families together, the countries expelling Germans were holding back the young, able-bodied men. Of the arrivals 54% were women, 21% were children under 14 years, and only 25% men, many of them old or incapacitated."[45]

The period of the "wild expulsions" had involved massive state-sponsored programs of violence, resulting in a death toll of many hundreds of thousands of Germans. Yet it was an episode that escaped the notice of many Europeans and virtually all Americans. Now the Allies would attempt to administer the expulsions in the orderly and humane manner specified by the Potsdam Agreement. As we shall see, the so-called organized expulsions were hardly more orderly and humane than the "wild expulsions" had been.

The Organized German Expulsions

International public opinion was generally relieved by the announcement at Potsdam that the Allies were proposing to assume control of the expulsion process. However, many people were taken aback by the number of Germans proposed to be transferred in such a short period of time.

A New York Times editorial noted that the number of Germans who were to be removed from their homes in seven months was "roughly equal to the number of immigrants arriving in the United States during the last 40 years."[46] Transfers of this nature had never been attempted in human history.

Negotiations to determine when, how many, and to which destinations expellees would be removed were conducted between representatives of the Polish and Chechoslovak governments and the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain. A final agreement was approved on Nov. 20, 1945, by the Allied Control Council (ACC), the occupying countries' temporary governing body for Germany.

The so-called ACC agreement, a skeletal accord less than two pages in length, specified the approximate timing of the expulsions and the number of expellees to be sent to each zone of occupation. The ACC agreement did not create any international machinery for carrying out the transfers or for supervising their execution. In truth, the ACC agreement was an almost meaningless document.[47]

A serious attempt to come to grips with the expulsion problem would be expected to include the appointment of an executive body to conduct and oversee the operation; a description of the means to be used; and the assignment of responsibility for making the necessary preparations for assembly, embarkation, reception, and assimilation of the German expellees. The ACC agreement contained none of these provisions. The primary purpose of the ACC agreement was to reassure an increasingly anxious public that the Allies were finally addressing the expulsion problem, and to deflect further public and media criticism. In this regard, the ACC agreement prevented Robert Murphy from generating an official U.S. protest over the means by which the Poles in particular had been clearing the Recovered Territories of their German population.[48]

The ACC did set up an agency called the Combined Repatriation Executive (CRX) on Oct. 1, 1945. The CRX was designed to impose order on the expulsion process, and it became the closest thing to an international apparatus to cope with the enormous transport challenges the expulsions would involve. The CRX ran into problems when it attempted to determine the start dates for the organized expulsions and the minimum welfare standards to be maintained throughout the operation. The interests of the expelling and receiving countries diverged in both respects, with the expelling countries desiring to both begin the expulsions as soon as possible and retain as much German expellee property as possible.

The organized expulsions rapidly degenerated into a race against time. The expelling governments sought to rid themselves of as many unwanted Germans as possible before the receiving countries called a halt to further transfers. Given the minimal resources dedicated to the expulsion operations, the breakneck pace at which they were conducted, and the expelling countries' ambivalence over whether the efficient removal of the expellees should take precedence over their collective punishment, it could hardly have been expected that the expulsion process would be "orderly and humane."[49]

Numerous journalists, military, and government leaders continued to report problems with the expulsion process. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower telegraphed Washington, D.C. on Oct. 18, 1945, to warn of the dangers of the German expulsions:

In Silesia, Polish administration and methods are causing a mass exodus westward of German inhabitants. Germans are being ordered out of their homes and to evacuate New Poland. Many unable to move are placed in camps on meager rations and under poor sanitary conditions. Death and disease rates in camps [are] extremely high….Methods used by Poles definitely do not conform to Potsdam agreement….Breslau death rate increased tenfold and death rate reported to be 75% of all births. Typhoid, typhus, dysentery, and diphtheria are spreading.

Total number potentially involved in westward movement to Russian zone of Germany from Poland and Czechoslovakia in range of 10 million….No coordinated measures yet taken to direct stream of refugees into specific regions or provide food and shelter….[There exists] serious danger of epidemic of such great proportion as to menace all Europe, including our troops, and probability of mass starvation [on an] unprecedented scale.[50]

Eisenhower's primary concern in sending this telegraph was probably the danger of epidemics in such great proportion as to menace all of Europe, including the Allied troops. Eisenhower had repeatedly stated that he hated the Germans and wanted to be extremely hard on them after the war.[51]

Donald Mackenzie, a New York Daily News correspondent, reports from Berlin:

In the windswept courtyard of the Stettiner Bahnhof, a cohort of German refugees, part of 12,000,000 to 19,000,000 dispossessed in East Prussia and Silesia, sat in groups under a driving rain and told the story of their miserable pilgrimage, during which more than 25% died by the roadside and the remainder were so starved they scarcely had strength to walk.

Filthy, emaciated, and carrying their few remaining possessions wrapped in bits of cloth, they shrank away crouching when one approached them in the railway terminal, expecting to be beaten or robbed or worse. That is what they have become accustomed to expect.

A nurse from Stettin, a young, good-looking blonde, told how her father had been stabbed to death by Russian soldiers who, after raping her mother and sister, tried to break into her own room. She escaped and hid in a haystack with four other women for four days….

On the train to Berlin she was pillaged once by Russian troops and twice by Poles….Women who resisted were shot dead, she said, and on one occasion she saw a guard take an infant by the legs and crush its skull against a post because the child cried while the guard was raping its mother. An old peasant from Silesia said …victims were robbed of everything they had, even their shoes. Infants were robbed of their swaddling clothes so that they froze to death. All the healthy girls and women, even those 65 years of age, were raped in the train and then robbed, the peasant said.[52]

Robert Greer, a Canadian lieutenant, writes of his visit to Berlin in late 1945:

…In driving about [Berlin] on Sunday morning, we came to the Stettiner Bahnhof. It's a complete wreck of course, the great arched glassway broken and twisted. I went down to the ground level and looked. There were people. Sitting on bundles of clothes, crouched by handcarts and little wagons were people…they were all exhausted and starved and miserable. You'd see a child sitting on a roll of blankets, a girl of perhaps four or five, and her eyes would be only half open and her head would loll occasionally and her eyes blink slowly as though she were only half alive. Beside her, her mother apparently, a woman with her head on her outstretched arm in the most terrible picture of despair and exhaustion and collapse I've seen. You could see in the line of her body all the misery that was possible for her to feel…no home, no husband, no food, no place to go, no one to care, nothing, nothing, absolutely nothing but a piece of the floor of the Stettiner Bahnhof and a night of weary hunger. In another place, another woman, sitting with her head in her hands…my God, how often have I sat like that with my stomach sick within me and felt miserable and helpless and hopeless…yet always I had someone to help, or a bed to rest on and a meal to eat and a place to go.

For her there was nothing. Even when you see it it's impossible to believe. What can you do when you have nothing? Where can you go, what can you do, when you have no strength left and hunger is a sickness in your belly? God it was terrible.[53]

Greer saw no men, only women and children. The people Greer described had survived the expulsions in their eastern homelands, where conditions were often even worse. They were wasted, half-dead people.[54]

Anne O'Hare McCormick, special correspondent to The New York Times, reported from Germany on Feb. 4, 1946: "[I]t was also agreed at Potsdam that the forced migration should be carried out 'in a humane and orderly manner.' Actually, as everyone knows who has seen the awful sights at the reception centers in Berlin and Munich, the exodus takes place under nightmarish conditions, without any international supervision or any pretense of humane treatment. We share responsibility for horrors only comparable to Nazi cruelties…."[55]

On Dec. 8, 1945, Bertrand Russell, writing in the New Leader, protested the German expulsions again:

It was agreed at Potsdam that these expulsions should take place "in a humane and orderly manner," but this provision has been flouted. At a moment's notice, women and children are herded into trains, with only one suitcase each, and they are usually robbed on the way of its contents. The journey to Berlin takes many days, during which no food is provided. Many are dead when they reach Berlin; children who die on the way are thrown out of the window. A member of the Friends' Ambulance Unit describes the Berlin station at which these trains arrive as "Belsen over again—carts taking the dead from the platform, etc." A large proportion of those ejected from their homes are not put into trains, but are left to make their way westward on foot. Exact statistics of the numbers thus expelled are not available, since only the Russians could provide them. Ernest Bevin's estimate is 9,000,000. According to a British office now in Berlin, populations are dying, and Berlin hospitals "make the sights of the concentration camps appear normal."[56]

In Czechoslovakia and Poland, foreign diplomats and media representatives were invited to witness the staged conditions of the initial organized expulsions. The Czechoslovak government was most successful in arranging a suitably reassuring spectacle for the observers. The foreign dignitaries who were present at the initial organized expulsion on Jan. 25, 1946, marveled at the effort Czechoslovak authorities took to ensure the safe passage of the German expellees. A week's ration of food was immediately issued to each expellee, with an additional three days' supply of food held in reserve. All passengers were first medically examined by a medical doctor, and the train included a "Red Cross" compartment staffed by German nurses. The Czech commandant overseeing the proceedings confirmed that none of the expellees' possessions had been confiscated, and those who arrived lacking adequate clothing were provided with what they needed by the Czechoslovaks themselves. A British journalist who witnessed another staged Czechoslovak transport found the scene "more like the end of a village garden-party than part of a great transfer of population."[57]

The reality of the organized expulsions from Czechoslovakia was not nearly as favorable as the staged transports indicated. A very large number of German expellees were transported while suffering from infectious diseases contracted in the camps. The Red Army repeatedly complained that the trains from Czechoslovakia were consistently dispatched with insufficient food rations for the journey. The trains were often supplied with unusable, incompatible, or obsolete wagons, making it impossible to transport expellees' baggage. Official reports spoke of systematic pillage of expellees by both military and civilian personnel, and local authorities continued unauthorized expulsions under the guise of "voluntary transfers." Productive individuals were also held in Czechoslovakia in violation of the requirement that families not be separated. The number of able-bodied and skilled workers included in the expulsions was extremely low.[58]

Poland was not nearly as successful in convincing foreign observers that her organized expulsions were orderly and humane. Expulsions from the Recovered Territories in Poland to the British zone of Germany had been given the designation of "Operation Swallow." A correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, who met a transport from Poland on March 3, 1946, found that 250 of the expellees were so seriously ill as to require immediate hospitalization; two of the expellees were dead on arrival. He stated, "In later transports the figures have been higher."

A considerable portion of the expellees from Poland had eaten no food for up to a week. The women bore marks of systematic maltreatment over a long period, with the scars of physical and sexual abuse much in evidence. A British medical officer who examined the German expellees determined that "most of the women had been violated, among them a girl of 10 and another of 16."[59]

Reports of systematic maltreatment of the German expellees from Poland began to flood in from Allied reception centers. Of 4,100 expellees on three Swallow trains, 524 were admitted directly to the hospital. The camp commandant reported that most of the women in these transports were multiple rape victims, as were some of the children.

A British army colonel who met a Polish expellee train in April 1946 reported that nearly all the passengers had been "severely ill treated," exhibiting "deep scars in the skull bone, fingers crippled by ill treatment, fractures of the ribs which were more or less healed, and partly large [sic] bloodshot spots on their backs and their legs. The latter was also seen with women." The British also reported that the Polish authorities consistently failed to provide rations for the expellees during their journey or for the day of their arrival in Germany, as their agreement with CRX obligated them to do.[60]

After only two months of the Polish organized expulsions, the operation had become so chaotic that officials in the reception areas had begun to press for its immediate suspension. Officials in London noted the deplorable condition in which the expellees were arriving was an observable fact with which British authorities in the reception areas were struggling to cope. However, British representatives on CRX did not seek to restrict the intake of expellees to a level that could be accommodated, since such a policy would have prolonged the transfer operation into the indefinite future. Instead, CRX officials agreed to a Polish request at the end of April 1946 to increase the daily rate of transfers from 5,000 to 8,000. This decision eliminated the prospect of imposing a degree of control over the conditions under which the expulsions took place. The result was a perpetual crisis atmosphere, with increased suffering and higher mortality among the German expellees from the Recovered Territories.[61]

The problem of overcrowding of the camps, the trains, and the reception areas was prevalent throughout Operation Swallow's year-long existence. The expulsions from Poland hardly ever followed an orderly pattern. Soviet and Polish employers were often reluctant to part with

their cheap or free German labor, and would often hide their German workers so that they would not be expelled according to plan. A more common problem was Germans who showed up at assembly camps ahead of schedule. Sometimes these Germans were forced to the camps by local Polish authorities or militia units who took matters into their own hands and cleared their districts of Germans. Other Germans, lacking ration cards or means of support, showed up at assembly camps as their only alternative to starvation. Just as often, though, Germans who had already resigned themselves to leaving Poland decided that the sooner they arrived in postwar Germany the better.[62]

The assembly camps themselves were no safe haven for the German expellees. The British ambassador who visited an assembly camp at Szczecin in October 1946 stated, "Since I have been promoted to ambassador I have smelt many nasty smells, but nothing to equal the immense and over-powering stench of this camp." The ambassador advised the camp commandant that this assembly camp at Szczecin should be closed down, fumigated, and repaired.[63]

The assembly camps became centers of hunger and disease, and the resulting mortality was on a significant scale. During the month of January 1947 alone, 52 inmates at the Gumience camp in Szczecin died "mainly through undernourishment but [in] one or two cases…also through frost-bite." Ninety-five inmates died of disease in one month at the Dantesque facility at Swidwin, which lacked water, heat, bedding, intact roofs, and medical supplies. Nearly 3,500 cases of illness were reported in this camp during the same month.[64]

Expulsions from Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia

Since Hungary was an ex-enemy state, the ACC issued directives concerning expulsions rather than engaging in discussions with the interim Budapest government. The first expulsion of Germans from Hungary, the so-called Swabians, was ordered to be made on Dec. 15, 1945, to the American zone. Contrary to the government's plans, the first group of deportees from Hungary had in some cases been given no more than 10 minutes notice of their removal. The system of medical screening prior to departure broke down and was abandoned, and the train took nearly three days to cover the 160 miles between Budapest and its initial stop in Vienna. Since no food had been provided for the journey, the passengers were seriously affected by hunger. Taking all the various

breaches into account, inspectors who met the train in the U.S. zone concluded that the transport had taken place under inhumane conditions.[65]

The expulsion operations from Hungary continued in a disorganized and inhumane manner. The promised transit camps were never built; instead, villages were designated as assembly areas from which expellees could be sent. Trains were routinely dispatched without food for the passengers, and no notice of any kind was provided before the appearance of many transports in the U.S. zone. Only 15 trains, many of which were in deplorable condition, were available for the operation. Gen. Lucius Clay said that "a majority of Swabians arriving in the U.S. Zone are for all intents and purposes destitute and penniless." In a March 1990 resolution, the Hungarian Parliament admitted that the expulsion of the Swabians from Hungary was an "unjust action."[66]

For the two smallest expelling countries, Romania and Yugoslavia, all removals of Germans were by definition "wild expulsions" since the Allies never asked these nations to expel their ethnic Germans into occupied Germany or Austria. Uniquely, the Romanian government never formally demanded expulsion nor issued an expulsion decree against its German minority. In fact, the Romanian government in January 1945 formally protested the first move by the Soviet military authorities to expel Romania's ethnic Germans.

However, the Soviet military required the Romanian government to round up all ethnic German males between the ages of 18 and 45, and females between 18 and 30, for transportation to the Soviet Union as slave laborers. In the predawn hours of Jan. 11, 1945, combined Soviet and Romanian patrols began roundups requiring deportees to be ready within 15 minutes with sufficient food and clothing for 10 days. Up to 75,000 Germans were removed from Romania by these means. Other Germans were taken into internment camps to facilitate the redistribution of their property.[67]

After the Soviets took control of the Romanian government in March 1945, a pair of decrees forfeited ethnic Germans' real property to the state and stripped most ethnic Germans of their Romanian citizenship. The new Romanian government denied the Red Cross the right to extend charitable assistance to the Germans "on the ground that these people had lost Romanian nationality." Romania's Germans were officially classified as illegal immigrants, and ethnic Romanians began living in the Germans' former homes.

The ICRC reported that returning German deportees "generally camp out in the open air or in cellars and sometimes they have nothing to eat but what they can grow in the fields." The ICRC also reported that the Germans who had escaped deportation "have literally been put out into the street….Usually, their houses were given to Gypsies who, often, employ the former owners as domestic servants." Deprived of the means of existence, the Germans were in the position of having been constructively expelled from Romania. By August 1945, substantial numbers of Germans from Romania had made their way to Germany and Austria, most having arrived in a very poor state of health.[68]

Romania was the first expelling country to intern her German minority. By June 1946, so many Germans had been expelled that Romania reported to the Red Cross that all of Romania's internment camps had been closed. The expulsion of the Germans had an adverse effect on Romania's agricultural production. An Allied officer who toured the Romanian countryside where the Germans had been deported found "large areas of valuable agricultural land…just lying idle. Glasshouses producing tomatoes, lettuces and other crops were likewise in a state of abandonment and in some cases would need quite a fair amount of capital to renew and repair the damages caused by the winter frosts."

A Reuters journalist who interviewed the native Romanians of the region in 1946 reported: "[A]ll said that they sympathized with the Saxons [Germans] and were sorry that they had their land property confiscated under agrarian reform, since this land had been given to Gypsies to purchase support for the government, and the Gypsies were very lazy and left the land uncultivated."[69]

The Germans in Yugoslavia were subject to exceptionally brutal treatment and expulsions. They were dispossessed of all their property by law. The internment camps erected for Germans by the Tito government in Yugoslavia were decidedly not mere assembly points for group expulsion; rather, they were consciously and officially recognized as extermination centers for many thousands of ethnic Germans. There was little or no food or medical care in the internment camps, and internees were left to starve to death or perish from rampant disease. The primary purpose of these internment camps appears to have been to inflict misery and death on as many ethnic Germans as possible.[70]

The Tito regime in November 1944 issued an edict that provided for the internment of all Yugoslav Germans except those who had played an active part in the struggle against Nazi occupation. The internment

camps in Yugoslavia for Germans are widely considered to be the worst of all the expelling nations. The British Embassy in Belgrade, which secured the release of a Canadian woman with dual nationality in the summer of 1946, reported that her food ration at the Ridica labor camp "consisted of watery soup, and 200 grams of maize bread, of so rock-like a consistency that it had to be soaked in water to be edible….At the end of January, [she] was transferred to the internment camp at Krusevlje, where work was not compulsory and where consequently the food consisted of two wooden spoonfuls of maize porridge a day and nothing else. In this camp there was a mortality rate, especially among children, as high as 200 a day." The embassy noted that this account was consistent with other reports it had received from various sources concerning the Yugoslav internment camps for Germans.[71]

In a dispatch that was circulated to Attlee's cabinet, the British Embassy in Belgrade reported in 1946 that "conditions in which Germans in Yugoslavia exist seem well down to Dachau standards." The embassy staff added that there was little to be lost by placing these facts before the public "as it will hardly be possible for the position of those that are left in camps to deteriorate thereby." The British Embassy further stated that the "indiscriminate annihilation and starvation" of the Yugoslav Volksdeutsche "must surely be considered an offense to humanity" and warned that "if they have to undergo another winter here, very few will be left."[72]

Yugoslavia had to dissolve several camps—notably Backi Jarak, Sekic, and Filipovo—because their mortality rates were so excessive as to render them no longer viable. The Yugoslav government took initial steps to wind down its internment operations early in 1947. In the process, the Yugoslav government began forcing its remaining German inmates to pay the Yugoslav government money to obtain their release from the camps.

According to British intelligence officers, some German inmates bought their way out of Yugoslav camps by using the services of humantrafficking networks which would pay off the camp authorities. Other German inmates paid the higher price of 1,000 dinars per person to the camp staff, who would conduct groups of about 60 inmates at night to the border. In the summer of 1947, these operations caused the number of Yugoslav Germans illegally crossing into Austria via Hungary to more than double. Rudolfsgnad, the last remaining camp for ethnic Germans in Yugoslavia, closed in March 1948, although many former

inmates still had to perform slave labor in state "enterprises" or farms.[73]

The expulsion of Yugoslavia's ethnic Germans had a long-term adverse effect on Yugoslavia's economy. Tito's vice premier, Edvard Kardelj, later observed to Milovan Djilas that in expelling its ethnic Germans, Yugoslavia had deprived itself of "our most productive inhabitants."[74]

Fate of German Children in Eastern Europe

German children in Eastern Europe suffered major hardships and deprivations prior to and during the expulsion process. From August 1945, the Czech government allocated to German children under the age of six only half the allowance of milk, and less than half the allowance of barley, allocated to their Czech counterparts. German children received no meat, eggs, jam or fruit syrup at all, these being allocated entirely to children of the Czech majority.

One example of the prevailing mood in Czechoslovakia toward German children was expressed by the Prague newspaper Mladá Fronta, which ran a ferocious campaign against British proposals to provide a temporary haven for thousands of starving German children during the winter of 1945-1946. When an announcement was made that the scheme would not go ahead, the newspaper's headline read: "British Will Not Feed Little Hitlerites: Our Initiative Crowned With Success."[75]

In the Recovered Territories, food ration cards were progressively withdrawn from the entire German population. Like their parents, German children found that they were entitled to no rations at all. The head of the Szczecin-Stolczyn Commissariat thus proudly reported that since the end of November 1945, even German children under the age of two had their milk allocation withdrawn from them.

Polish laws designed to protect German children were typically never enforced. For example, a directive issued in April 1945 by the Polish Ministry of Public Security specifying that nobody under the age of 13 was to be detained was never followed. More than two years later, the Polish Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare was complaining that the regulations against imprisoning children in camps continued to be "completely ignored." German children were illegally detained in Polish internment camps as late as August 1949.[76]

German children experienced the worst conditions in the detention centers. Premsyl Pitter, a social worker from Prague, quickly found as he visited the Chechoslovak detention centers that the overwhelming majority of those who needed his aid were ethnic Germans. At a makeshift internment camp in Prague, Pitter discovered at the end of July 1945 "a hell of which passers-by hadn't the faintest notion." More than a thousand Germans, the great majority women and children, were "crowded together in an indescribable tangle. As we brought emaciated and apathetic children out and laid them on the grass, I believed that few would survive. Our physician, Dr. E. Vogl, himself a Jew who had gone through the hell of Auschwitz and Mauthausen, almost wept when he saw these little bodies. 'And here we Czechs have done this in two and a half months!' he exclaimed." Red Cross officials found that the conditions at other Prague camps were no better.[77]

The youngest German children were most vulnerable to the conditions in the detention centers. Their undeveloped immune systems and lack of physical reserves left them particularly vulnerable to starvation and its attendant diseases. A credible account by a female detainee at Potulice in Poland recorded that of 110 children born in the camp between the beginning of 1945 and her eventual expulsion in December 1946, only 11 children were still alive by the later date. A high rate of infant mortality in the camps was also caused by numerous cases in which German children were denied medical care because of their ethnicity.

Investigations by the ICRC found high rates of infant mortality attributable to malnutrition to be widespread in Czechoslovakia. When the ICRC visited a detention center in Bratislava at the end of 1945, it found that every one of the emaciated infants and children was "suffering from hideous skin eruptions" and that conditions were "in general so desperate that it is difficult to find words" with which to comfort the detainees. A journalist from Obzory, who visited one of the Prague detention centers in the autumn of 1945, acknowledged that "mortality has increased to a horrifying degree" among the children. The journalist attributed the high mortality among the infants to the complete absence of infant formula and the fact that the majority of nursing mothers were too emaciated to breastfeed their newborns.[78]

Authorities generally did little to shield children from the harsher aspects of camp life. Germans in Czechoslovakia typically became forced laborers on their 14th birthday, with some districts requiring labor

services of those aged 10 or above. At Mirosov, in Czechoslovakia, the definition of "adult" for forced labor consisted of all inmates above six years of age. Children of 10 years of age and above were also routinely used as forced laborers in Yugoslavia. In September 1945, the ICRC complained that in the Czechoslovak camps the young male guards treated detainees with "the utmost cruelty," with widespread beatings of children as well as adults. Many children were also subject to psychological abuse, and some children were compelled—as at Krusevlje in Yugoslavia—to witness their parents' torture or execution at the hands of camp guards.[79]

The Western Allies did not intervene to help ethnic German children in Eastern Europe since they regarded all Germans as perpetrators of World War II. The policies of the Western Allies and the expelling nations were a violation of their subscription in 1926 to the International Declaration of the Rights of the Child, which stipulated that children were to "be the first to receive relief in times of distress" without taking into account "considerations of race, nationality or creed."

German children were also denied aid from international relief agencies like UNRRA and the International Refugee Organization (IRO) as a matter of policy. Even the UN International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) maintained a discriminatory stance against German children, assigning priority to the children of "victims of aggression" in the provision of aid. The plight of children in the expelling countries was additionally worsened by the expropriation of German religious and charitable organizations, which caused German children in orphanages and facilities for handicapped children to lose their homes. In the long run, the only hope for most German children in the expelling countries was their expeditious removal to Germany.[80]

The Resettlement of Expelled Germans in Germany

The surviving expelled Germans continued to face unimaginable hardships and suffering in Germany. The devastation of Germany by total warfare had demolished its life-sustaining resources. Industrial production in the American zone after the war had gradually risen until it reached a high of about 12% of the old normal. However, with a cut in food rations, the industrial production index had begun to decline again. On May 4, 1946, Brig. Gen. William H. Draper, Jr., the Allied Military Government director of economics, reported that industrial output in the

American zone was “far below that necessary to maintain the minimum standard of living.”[81]

By August 1945, the daily death rate in Berlin had risen from a prewar amount of 150 to 4,000, even though Berlin’s population in August [1945] was significantly smaller than before the war. In the U.S. sector of Berlin, the mortality rate for infants born in the summer of 1945 was 95%. Germany also faced an acute shortage of housing after the war. Even where houses existed, the inadequacy of water or drainage facilities in them was giving rise to the grave danger of epidemics. Because of the high proportion of sick, abused, or infirm expellees, the hospitals and asylums in Germany were full to overflowing. This was the environment into which the Allies proposed to transfer another 7 million to 8 million people.[82]

By September 1945, 45 makeshift reception camps had been set up in Berlin, employing barracks, schools, and any other building not already being used for other purposes. The number of expellees seeking admission to these camps greatly exceeded the spaces available. Thousands of expellees never left the station at which they had arrived, while thousands more set up improvised tent villages in city parks or woods on the outskirts of Berlin. Many expellees died of hypothermia as the weather turned colder, and the sight of corpses of people who had spent their last night outdoors became a common spectacle during the first peacetime winter in Germany. By the end of 1945, 625 camps of various kinds with a total population of more than 480,000 had been established in eastern Germany. The number of camps in the Western zones of Germany ran into the thousands.[83]

Conditions in most of the expellee camps were extremely grim. The records of the occupying authorities and humanitarian bodies are replete with descriptions of overcrowded, unheated, disease-ridden, and even roofless facilities in which expellees languished for months or years. Unemployment was also a problem for the expellees. When German expellees could find work at all, it tended to be poorly paid if not positively exploitative.

As 1946 began drawing to a close, Germany continued to feel the strain of the so-called organized expulsions. Col. Ralph Thicknesse, a senior officer administering Operation Swallow, warned: “At present, we tend to regard occupied Germany as a waste-paper basket with a limitless capacity for the unwanted waste of the world. We are not convinced that this attitude is correct, either economically or politically.”[84]

The Western democracies generally disavowed any responsibility for the suffering that resulted from the German expulsions, which they claimed was entirely the concern of the expelling states or of the Germans themselves. Some officers attached to the Allied Military Government in Germany even stated that mass deaths among expellees were a matter of no great significance compared to the overriding objective of not offending the Soviet Union. For example, Goronwy Rees stated on Nov. 2, 1945:

It is inevitable that millions of Germans must die in the coming winter. It is inevitable that millions of the nomads who wander aimlessly in all directions across Germany should find no resting place but the grave….These facts could only be altered, if at all, by a universal effort of philanthropy which would reverse the result of the war….

The real danger of Germany at the moment is not that millions of Germans must starve, freeze and die during the winter; it is that out of their misery the Germans should create an opportunity for destroying the unity of the Allies who defeated them.[85]

While not in the majority, views like these were far from unusual.

Although most of the German expellees were Catholic, the Vatican conspicuously refrained from protesting their mass expulsion. While individual priests and bishops in the United States and central Europe vigorously condemned mass expulsions as inconsistent with the laws of God, the pope never publicly did so. Nor did the governing body of any other Christian denomination protest the mass deportations of ethnic Germans. The Christian churches were only prepared to give small-scale assistance to the expellees out of existing funds. To mount a larger appeal on behalf of the expelled Germans would have required at least a public announcement on their behalf, and this was something that none of the Christian churches was prepared to do.[86]

Those individuals and nongovernmental organizations that sought to mitigate the ill effects of the German expulsions could make little headway. The Allies insisted that the German expellees be excluded from any form of international protection or assistance. As a result, humanitarian organizations like the Red Cross were frequently

prevented from extending even minimal assistance to the German expellees.

In addition to denying food, clothing, and shelter to the German expellees, Allied policy prevented any organization from representing the expellees to the expelling states or the Allied governments in Germany. Nor was there any agency or organization to which German expellees subject to inhumane treatment could appeal. Because of this Allied policy, advocates for the expellees could do little more than attempt to raise public awareness. While advocates for the expellees enjoyed limited success in this regard, it was never enough to make a difference in the way in which the expulsions were conducted. None of the expelling or receiving governments was ever compelled by the pressure of public opinion to abandon or modify a policy on which they had previously decided.[87]

Freda Utley describes the treatment of the German expellees in Germany:

Many of the old, the young, and the sick died of hunger or cold or exposure on the long march into what remained of Germany, or perished of hunger and thirst and disease in the crowded cattle cars in which some of the refugees were transported. Those who survived the journey were thrust upon the slender resources of starving occupied Germany. No one of German race was allowed any help by the United Nations. The displaced-persons camps were closed to them and first the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and then the International Refugee Organization (IRO) [were] forbidden to succor them. The new untouchables were thrown into Germany to die, or survive as paupers in the miserable accommodations which the bombedout cities of Germany could provide for those even more wretched than their original inhabitants.

How many were killed or died will never be known. Out of a total of 12 million to 13 million people who had committed the crime of belonging to the German race, 4 million or 5 million are unaccounted for. But no one knows how many are dead and how many are slave laborers….

The estimate of the number of German expellees, or Flüchtlinge as the Germans call them, in rump Germany is now 8 million or 9 million. The International Refugee Organization (IRO) takes no account of them, and was expressly forbidden by act of Congress to give them any aid. It is obviously impossible for densely overcrowded West Germany to provide for

them. A few have been absorbed into industry or are working on German farms, but for the most part they are living in subhuman conditions without hope of acquiring homes or jobs.[88]

American aid in the form of the Marshall Plan eventually helped to improve conditions in Germany. The famous "economic miracle" made possible by the Marshall Plan achieved two important goals: rapid economic recovery and the integration of millions of expellees into the German economy. The expellees had many years of pain behind them; now they could rebuild their lives and have a chance to begin anew. Unfortunately, even in 1949 many of the German expellees still had to live in group housing.[89]

Freda Utley writes of the discrimination expellees faced in obtaining adequate housing:

Although the number of displaced persons in Germany is continually diminishing and many of the camps are half empty, the Germans are not allowed either to regain possession of the many houses, barracks, and other buildings occupied by the DP's, or to place their own refugees in them. Exact information is not available since the German authorities are not allowed to enter the DP camps but, according to the estimate of the Bavarian Minister for Refugees, between 24,000 and 28,000 beds are now unoccupied. While this accommodation is wasted the German refugees are crowded into unsanitary huts and other accommodation unprovided with the most elementary comforts and decencies, and frequently have to sleep on the floor.

In the Dachau camp near Munich I found 50 or more people—men, women and children—to each wooden hut 26 x 65 feet in size. There were no partitions, but the inmates were using some of their precious blankets to screen off their cubicles. The huts were cold and damp. It was raining and one woman with a little girl suffering from a bad cold showed me the wall behind their bed where the rain seeped through.

Four hundred people at Dachau shared one washroom and one outdoor latrine and there was no hot water. No one had any linen or sheets, and some had neither shoes nor overcoats.[90]

One positive result of the expulsions is that within an incredibly few years, the German expellees had become effectively integrated into the larger society in both West and East Germany. Instead of becoming terrorists in order to force the return of their homelands, the expellees preferred to take the path of peace and reconstruction. They renounced revenge and retaliation and made a decisive contribution to the West German economic miracle by means of hard work and sacrifice. It should be noted that the expellees' public expression against revenge did not merely stem from a condition of weakness. It has been maintained ever since, and remains as Germany has become a respected political and economic power.[91]

The hard work and sacrifice of the German expellees was duplicated by Germans already living in Germany. With an incredible will and energy, Germans set out to rebuild their country. Admiring the hard work of German women, one American exclaimed: "Did you ever see anything like it! Aren't those German women wonderful?" Another American said: "I used to think that it was only in China you could see women working like that; I never imagined white people could do it. I admire their guts."[92]

However, the fact that the German expellees quickly integrated into German society should not be viewed as a kind of retrospective vindication of Allied policy. The costs of the expulsions were all too apparent. Many hundreds of thousands of German expellees, most of whom were women and children, had lost their lives. Millions more of the expellees were impoverished, without the assets they had lost in the expelling countries necessarily enriching those who took possession of them. The economies of entire regions were disrupted, and the surviving expellees suffered tremendous hardships both during and after the expulsions. Tens of thousands of German women who had been repeatedly raped had to bear the physical and psychological scars for their entire life. The legacy of bitterness, recrimination, and mutual distrust between Germany and her neighbors from the expulsions still lingers to this day.[93]

Closing Thoughts on German Expulsions

Since the German expulsions were not given adequate press coverage, most people in the United States and Great Britain did not know there were any expulsions at all. However, it was undoubtedly

AngloAmerican adherence to the principle of population transfers that made the catastrophe of the German expulsions possible. The Allies had knowingly pursued a policy that would cause great suffering to the expellees, so as to generate an "educational" effect upon the defeated German population. Late in 1947, the ACC asked U.S. officials who had administered the transfers how these transfers might be better managed in the future. The U.S. officials stated that on the basis of their experience with mass expulsions:

We recommend that the Control Council declare its opposition to all future compulsory population transfers, particularly the forcible removal of persons from places which have been their homes for generations, and that the Control Council refuse, in the future, to accept into Germany any persons so transferred, excepting only repatriated German prisoners of war and persons who were formerly domiciled in Germany.

In formulating this recommendation…we have considered the moral and humanitarian aspect of the injustices done to masses of people when an element of a population is forcibly uprooted from long-established homes, has its property expropriated without redress, and is superimposed upon another population already suffering from hunger, insufficient shelter, lack of productive employment and want of social, medical and educational institutions. We have considered that any course of action other than that recommended above would be to invite just condemnation on grounds of economic, social and religious injustices to the persons being transferred, to the present population of Germany and to the populations of nations surrounding Germany.[94]

Albert Schweitzer also expressed strong opposition to the German expulsions. Upon receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo on Nov. 4, 1954, he made an appeal to the conscience of mankind to repudiate the crime of mass expulsions:

The most grievous violation of the right based on historical evolution and of any human right in general is to deprive populations of their right to occupy the country where they live by compelling them to settle elsewhere. The fact that the victorious powers decided at the end of World War II to impose this fate on hundreds of thousands of human beings

and, what is more, in a most cruel manner, shows how little they were aware of the challenge facing them, namely, to reestablish prosperity and, as far as possible, the rule of law.[95]

The fate of the German expellees has been ignored in most universities and high schools. The extreme hardships and suffering the expellees experienced have been pushed aside, if not totally forgotten. People have thus been deprived of an important history lesson: mass expulsions are almost invariably unjust and inhumane. Historian R.M. Douglas states:

The most important lesson of the expulsion of the Germans, then, is that if these operations cannot be carried out under circumstances in which brutality, injustice, and needless suffering are inevitable, they cannot be carried out at all. A firm appreciation of this truth, and a determination to be guided by it at all times and in every situation, however enticing the alternative may momentarily seem, is the most appropriate memorial that can be erected to this tragic, unnecessary, and, we must resolve, never to be repeated episode in Europe's and the world's recent history.[96]

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Chapter Seven

• History's Most Terrifying Peace

Germany's unconditional surrender to the Allies marked the end of a long nightmare for German citizens and the beginning of an uncertain future. Most Germans assumed that as bad as the coming weeks and months might be, the worst of their death and suffering was behind them. However, although World War II was history's most catastrophic and destructive war, the death and suffering of Germans increased after the end of the war. What lay ahead for Germany was, as Time magazine later phrased it, "history's most terrifying peace."[1]

Allies Warn Germany of Terrifying Peace

Numerous writers had warned of the terrible consequences that Germans would face if Germany lost the war. In his widely read book Germany Must Perish, Theodore Kaufman wrote:

This time Germany has forced a total war upon the world. As a result, she must be prepared to pay a total penalty. And there is one, and only one, such total penalty: Germany must perish forever! In fact—not in fancy!…The goal of world-dominion must be removed from the reach of the German and the only way to accomplish that is to remove the German from the world….There remains then but one mode of ridding the world forever of Germanism—and that is to stem the source from which issue those war-lusted souls, by preventing the people of Germany from ever again reproducing their kind.[2]

Kaufman concluded that all German men and women should be sterilized to eliminate Germanism and its carriers.[3] Many leading American journals such as Time magazine and The Washington Post expressed strong support for this genocidal concept.[4]

At the Quebec Conference in September 1944 between Roosevelt and Churchill, the Allied leaders announced the adoption of the Morgenthau Plan. Named after the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry

Morgenthau, the objective of the Morgenthau Plan was to de-industrialize Germany and diminish its people to a pastoral existence once the war was won. The Morgenthau Plan was designed to reduce the military-industrial strength of Germans forever, so that never again could Germany threaten the peace.[5] As many proponents of the Morgenthau Plan knew, adoption of this plan would result in the starvation of many millions of the German population.

The leak of the Morgenthau Plan provided Joseph Goebbels, Hitler's propaganda minister, with strong arguments for a bitter resistance by the Germans. The horrible prospects of eternal slavery, de-industrialization, exile to Siberia, starvation, the break-up of Germany and even sterilization were portrayed to the German people by their leaders. The fear of the consequence of unconditional surrender greatly bolstered German resistance. The Germans fought even when their country had been cut in half and they had no realistic prospect of winning the war.[6]

Until the announcement of the Morgenthau Plan, there was a reasonable possibility that Germany might surrender to American and British forces while holding the Russians at bay in the East. This could have shortened the war by months and could have averted the takeover of East Germany by Communist forces. One commentator has noted that a hidden motive behind the Morgenthau Plan was the potential communization of the defeated nation. The best way to drive the German people into the arms of the Soviet Union was for the United States and Great Britain to stand forth as champions of death and misery in Germany.[7]

The genocidal policy promulgated by the Morgenthau Plan was also the policy of the Soviet Union. Because of the massive death and destruction caused by Germany in the Soviet Union, Germans were guaranteed to receive no mercy should the Red Army win the war. Ilya Ehrenburg, the Soviet chief propagandist, urged the Soviet soldiers to adopt a policy of total and complete extermination. Ehrenburg stated:

The Germans are not human beings….If you have not killed at least one German a day, you have wasted that day….If you cannot kill your German with a bullet, kill him with your bayonet. …If you kill one German, kill another—there is nothing more amusing for us than a heap of German corpses. Do not count days. …Count only the number of Germans killed by you. Kill the German—that is your grandmother's request. Kill the

German—that is your child's prayer. Kill the German—that is your motherland's loud request. Do not miss. Do not let through. Kill.[8]

Ehrenburg remained true to his uncompromising line of hatred and revenge as Soviet troops flooded into Germany. On Jan. 30, 1945, Ehrenburg wrote: "The soldiers who are now storming German cities will not forget how the mothers of Leningrad pulled their dead children on sledges….Berlin has not yet paid for the sufferings of Leningrad."[9]

Ehrenburg's calls for revenge were echoed by Soviet generals in orders to their troops as they prepared for the final onslaught on Germany. When Marshal Zhukov issued his orders on the eve of the Soviet offensive in January 1945, he wrote that "we will get our terrible revenge for everything." The statement issued by Soviet Gen. Ivan Chernyakhovsky to his troops was even more explicit: "There will be no mercy—for no one, just as no mercy was given for us. It is unnecessary to expect that the soldiers of the Red Army will exercise mercy….The land of the fascists must be made into a desert, just like our land that they devastated. The fascists must die, like our soldiers have died."[10]

National Socialist propaganda had repeatedly warned of the dire consequences of unconditional surrender to the Allies. As discussed in the previous two chapters, the fate of the German prisoners of war in the West and the German expellees in the East was even worse than what most Germans had expected. Another instance in which National Socialist propaganda had underestimated the threat of unconditional surrender was the treatment of German women by Allied soldiers.

The Rape of German Women

Stalin sought to ease the fears of the Western Allies concerning Soviet atrocities against the German people by issuing the following order to his troops: "Occasionally there is talk that the goal of the Red Army is to annihilate the German people….It would be foolish to equate the German people and the German state with the Hitler clique. The lessons of history tell us that Hitlers come and go, but the German people, the German state, they shall remain."[11]

Stalin's reasonable sounding words were not followed by his troops. In reality, rape of German women was implicitly condoned by Stalin. Stalin asked Yugoslav Communist leader Milovan Djilas, "Can't he understand it if a soldier who has crossed thousands of kilometers

through blood and fire and death has fun with a woman or takes some trifle?" The Red Army, most of whose soldiers were sex starved after four years of fighting, raped wherever it went.[12]

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, then a young captain in the Red Army, describes the entry of his regiment into East Prussia in January 1945: "For three weeks the war had been going on inside Germany, and all of us knew very well that if the girls were German they could be raped and then shot. This was almost a combat distinction."[13] Solzhenitsyn was a committed opponent of such atrocities and vocally opposed the rape of German women. As a consequence, he was arrested and banished to a gulag.

Some of the other Soviet front line troops shared Solzhenitsyn's attitude toward the proper treatment of German women. Many of these Soviet first echelon troops were more concerned with fighting and survival than with rape and revenge. However, most of the second echelon of Soviet troops were from Asiatic Russia and brought with them attitudes toward conquered people inherited from Genghis Khan. Other second echelon troops were members of penal battalions or were exprisoners from the German concentration camps who had been freed by the Red Army and sent to the front. These soldiers who formed the second wave of troops were regarded even by their comrades as completely merciless.[14]

The savagery of Soviet soldiers was acknowledged by British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery in his Memoirs. Montgomery states: "From their behavior it soon became clear that the Russians, though a fine fighting race, were in fact barbarous Asiatics who had never enjoyed a civilization comparable to that of the rest of Europe. Their approach to every problem was utterly different from ours, and their behavior, especially in their treatment of women, was abhorrent to us."[15]

Russian soldiers continually raped German women as the Red Army advanced through Silesia and Pomerania towards Berlin. The German women were frequently gang raped, often again and again on successive nights. A woman interviewed in Schwerin reported that she had "already been raped by 10 men today." A German officer in East Prussia claims to have saved a few dozen women from a villa where "on average they had been raped 60 to 70 times a day." Another woman in Berlin stated: "Twenty-three soldiers one after the other. I had to be stitched up in a hospital. I never want to have anything to do with any man again."[16]

Churches were frequently used by Russian soldiers to rape German women. A priest from Neisse reports:

The girls, women and nuns were raped incessantly for hours on end, the soldiers standing in queues, the officers at the head of the queues, in front of their victims. During the first night many of the nuns and other women were raped as many as 50 times. Some of the nuns who resisted with all their strength were shot, others were ill treated in a dreadful manner until they were too exhausted to offer any resistance. The Russians knocked them down, kicked them, beat them on the head and in the face with the butt-end of their revolvers and rifles, until they finally collapsed and in this unconscious condition became the helpless victims of brutish passion, which was so inhuman as to be inconceivable. The same dreadful scenes were enacted in the hospitals, homes for the aged, and other such institutions. Even nuns who were 70 and 80 years old and were ill and bedridden were raped and ill treated by these barbarians.[17]

A letter written by a priest smuggled out of Breslau, Germany on Sept. 3, 1945, states:

In unending succession were girls, women and nuns violated. Not merely in secret, in hidden corners, but in the sight of everybody, even in churches, in the streets and in public places were nuns, women and even eight-year-old girls attacked again and again. Mothers were violated before the eyes of their children; girls in the presence of their brothers; nuns, in the sight of pupils, were outraged again and again to their very death and even as corpses.[18]

When Russian soldiers "liberated" Danzig they promptly liberated all the women of their virtue and chastity. A Russian soldier told the Danzig women to seek shelter in the Catholic cathedral to protect them from the rapes. After hundreds of women and girls were securely inside, the Russian soldiers entered and "playing the organ and ringing the bells, kept up a foul orgy through the night, raping all the women, some more than 30 times." A Catholic pastor in Danzig states: "They even

violated eight-year-old girls and shot boys who tried to shield their mothers."[19]

A pastor from Milzig said of the Soviet soldiers: "There were no limits to the bestiality and licentiousness of these troops….Girls and women were rousted out of their hiding places, out of the ditches and thickets where they had sought shelter from the Russian soldiers, and were beaten and raped. Older women who refused to tell the Russians where the younger ones had hidden were likewise beaten and raped."[20]

The following is part of an eyewitness account written by a veteran American newspaperman. He had been taken prisoner by the Germans in Paris and later freed by the Russians with whom he traveled as they swept over eastern Germany to Berlin and beyond:

In the district around our internment camp—the territory comprising the towns of Schlawe, Lauenburg, and Buckow and hundreds of larger villages—Red soldiers during the first weeks of their occupation raped every woman and girl between the ages of 12 and 60. That sounds exaggerated but it is the simple truth.

The only exceptions were girls who managed to remain in hiding in the woods or who had the presence of mind to feign illness—typhoid, dyptheria or some other infectious disease. Flushed with victory—and often with wine found in the cellars of rich Pomeranian land owners—the Reds searched every house for women, cowing them with pistols or tommy guns, and carried them into their tanks or trucks.

Husbands and fathers who attempted to protect their women folk were shot down, and girls offering extreme resistance were murdered.

Some weeks after the invasion, Red "political commissions" began a tour of the countryside ostensibly in search of members of the Nazi Party. In every village the women were told to report for examination of papers to these commissions, which looked them over and detained those with sex appeal. The youngest and prettiest were taken by the officers and the rest left to the mercy of the privates.

This reign of terror lasted as long as I was with the Reds in Pomerania. Several girls whom I had known during my captivity committed suicide. Others died after having been raped by 10 soldiers in

succession….Whenever possible, girls attach themselves to liberated Anglo-American or French prisoners of war for protection against the Russians. Curiously, the Reds seemed to have a special code of honor in this respect—they will take an Allied prisoner's watch but won't touch his girl.[21]

When a German counterattack temporarily recaptured the town of Neustettin, a German soldier describes what he saw in houses where Russian soldiers had raped German women:

Naked, dead women lay in many of the rooms. Swastikas had been cut into their abdomens, in some the intestines bulged out, breasts were cut up, faces beaten to a pulp and swollen puffy. Others had been tied to the furniture by their hands and feet, and massacred. A broomstick protruded from the vagina of one, a besom from that of another….

The mothers had had to witness how their 10- and 12-year-old daughters were raped by some 20 men; the daughters in turn saw their mothers being raped, even their grandmothers. Women who tried to resist were brutally tortured to death.

There was no mercy….

The women we liberated were in a state almost impossible to describe….Their faces had a confused, vacant look. Some were beyond speaking to, ran up and down and moaned the same sentences over and over again. Having seen the consequences of these bestial atrocities, we were terribly agitated and determined to fight. We knew the war was past winning; but it was our obligation and sacred duty to fight to the last bullet.[22]

One mother of two small children in the Upper Silesian town of Steinau described her ordeal at the hands of the Red Army: "A young Russian with a pistol in his hand came to fetch me. I have to admit that I was so frightened (and not just of the pistol) that I could not hold my bladder. This didn't disturb him in the least. You got used to it soon enough and realized there was no point putting up a fight." The woman later went with her heavily pregnant sister to see a Russian doctor, believing that the doctor would be a civilized man. The two women were

raped by the doctor and a lieutenant. The fact that the woman was menstruating was no disincentive to her rape.[23]

German women frequently took steps to make their appearance unattractive to Soviet soldiers. The German women sometimes covered themselves with ashes to make themselves look old, painted on red spots to feign disease, or hobbled around on crutches to appear disabled. One woman in East Pomerania took the precaution of removing her false front tooth to make herself look older. Such precautions rarely worked, and the rape victims ranged in age from tiny children to greatgrandmothers. Some German women kept their small children by them at all times, and sometimes these children provided a disincentive against the Russian attacks.[24]

The Russian rapes caused many German women to commit suicide. The preferred form of suicide was poison, and most Berlin women seem to have been provided with poison before the Red Army arrived. Even when Berlin women were not driven so far as to take their own lives, the rapes inevitably caused disease and unwanted babies. A high percentage of women became infected with venereal disease. Since antibiotics were often unaffordable, eventually the Russians decided to treat the local population themselves. Abortion was a common occurrence, and many abortions were performed without anesthetic. Despite the high incidence of abortion, it is estimated that between 150,000 and 200,000 “Russian babies” were born to German women.[25]

The Soviet soldiers were not the only ones who raped German women. The French Senegalese and Moroccan troops were notorious for committing rape. Police records of Stuttgart show that 1,198 German women were raped by French troops during the French occupation. Dr. Karl Hartenstein, prelate of the Evangelical Church in the city, estimated a higher number of 5,000 rape victims in Stuttgart. In the town of Vaihingen, with a population of 12,000, 500 cases of rape were reported. So it went in other German cities and towns occupied by French troops.[26]

Charles Lindbergh was told by an Army officer that there were over 6,000 cases of rape reported in Stuttgart and that the Germans were crying for the Americans to come in and replace the French. Lindbergh writes: “I had been told that in French-occupied territory it was required that a list of the occupants of every building, together with their ages, be posted outside, on the door, and that both the Senegalese and the French soldiers, drunk at night, would go from door to door until they found girls’

names listed of any age they wished to rape. As we drove through Stuttgart we saw that each main door of the habitable buildings contained such a list—white sheets of paper tacked onto the panel—a column of names, a column of birth dates. And most of the women of Stuttgart show in their faces that they have gone through hell."[27]

In Germany as a whole it is estimated that approximately 2 million German women were raped in the aftermath of the Second World War. This represents more rapes against a defeated enemy than any other war in history.[28]

The arrival of the Red Army in Austria was also accompanied by sexual violence on a large scale. Stalin informed his troops that Austrians had been the first victims of German aggression, and he stipulated that Soviet troops were to behave correctly toward Austrians. However, the Soviet NKVD in Austria admitted that "there have been cases of excesses by individual members of units of the Red Army against the local population." In the Steiermark, for example, thousands of women sought medical help after being raped by Soviet soldiers. In the city of Graz more than 600 cases of rape were reported to police—a number which is probably only a fraction of the total sexual assaults that occurred in the city.[29] In Vienna 87,000 women were reported by doctors and clinics to have been raped.[30]

While a large percentage of American troops deported themselves properly, the record of American troops as a whole in regard to German women is hardly exemplary. Rape charges in the U.S. Army rose to 402 in March and 501 in April 1945, as a result of slackening military resistance.[31] Altogether 487 American soldiers in Germany were tried for rapes allegedly committed in March and April 1945.[32]

One reason there were fewer reports of rape by American soldiers is that desperately hungry German women would have consensual sex in exchange for food or cigarettes. Despite Eisenhower's edict against fraternization with Germans, no orders from above could slow the American soldier's desire to have sex with German women. American newswoman Freda Utley states, "Neither army regulations nor the propaganda of hatred in the American press could prevent American soldiers from liking and associating with German women, who although they were driven by hunger to become prostitutes, preserved a certain innate decency."[33]

American soldiers would offer a basket of food or other presents in order to have sex with the unconditionally surrendered women of Germany. The Christian Century reported on Dec. 5, 1945: "The American provost marshal, Lt. Col. Gerald F. Beane, said that rape represents no problem to the military police because 'a bit of food, a bar of chocolate or a bar of soap seems to make rape unnecessary.' Think that over if you want to understand what the situation is in Germany."[34]

After a visit to the American zone, Dr. George N. Schuster, President of Hunter College, stated: "You have said it all when you say that Europe is now a place where woman has lost her perennial fight for decency because the indecent alone live. Except for those who can establish contacts with members of the armed forces, Germans can get nothing from soap to shoes."[35]

L.F. Filewood stated in the Oct. 5, 1945, issue of the Weekly Review in London: "Young girls, unattached, wander about and freely offer themselves, for food or bed….Very simply they have one thing left to sell, and they sell it….As a way of dying it may be worse than starvation, but it will put off dying for months—or even years."[36]

German women, many with children to feed, were often forced to become slaves to Allied soldiers in order to survive. A British soldier acknowledged: "I felt a bit sick at times about the power I had over the girl. If I gave her a three-penny bar of chocolate she nearly went crazy. She was just like my slave. She darned my socks and mended things for me. There was no question of marriage. She knew that was not possible."[37]

By contrast, the German army behaved very correctly toward the people of occupied territories whose governments were signatories of The Hague and Geneva Conventions. Rape by German soldiers in these territories was strictly forbidden. This has been confirmed by numerous sources and is beyond dispute. For example, after a tour of inspection in which he visited areas where the Germans had been in occupation for four years, Frederick C. Crawford stated in his "Report From the War Front": "The Germans tried to be careful in their dealings with the people….We were told that if a citizen attended strictly to business and took no political or underground action against the occupying army, he was treated with correctness."[38]

Starvation of the Germans

Capt. Albert R. Behnke, a U.S. Navy medical doctor, stated in regard to Germany: "From 1945 to the middle of 1948 one saw the probable collapse, disintegration and destruction of a whole nation….Germany was subject to physical and psychic trauma unparalleled in history." Behnke concluded that the Germans under the Allies had fared much worse than the Dutch under the Germans, and for far longer.[39]

Normal adult Germans in the American and British zones were rationed only 1,550 calories per day. The average official calorie ration for Germans in the French zone was only 1,400 per day. The actual calories received in the American, British, and French zones were often far less than these official amounts, and it was well known that these official ration amounts were not enough to maintain a healthy population. Herbert Hoover told President Truman that "the 1,550 ration is wholly incapable of supporting health."[40] Hoover estimated that 2,200 calories per day "is a minimum in a nation for healthy human beings."[41]

The destruction of the German infrastructure during the war had made it inevitable that some Germans would starve to death before roads, rails, canals, and bridges could be restored. However, even when much of the German infrastructure had been repaired, the Allies deliberately withheld food from Germany. Continuing the policy of their predecessors, U.S. President Harry Truman and British Prime Minister Clement Attlee allowed the spirit of Henry Morgenthau and the Yalta Conference to dictate their policies toward Germany. The result was that millions of Germans were doomed to slow death by starvation.[42]

The Allies had studied German food production during the war, so they knew what to expect once Germany was defeated. The Allies knew that to strip off the rich farmlands of the east and give them to the Poles and Russians deprived Germany of over 25% of her arable land. Germans also starved in the east in 1945 because the Russians confiscated so much food and virtually all the factories. The French forced famine in their zone by the seizure of food and housing. The famine in the French zone went on for years.[43]

The danger of hunger and starvation was slow to abate throughout Germany. The famine that began in Germany in 1945 spread over all of occupied Germany and continued into 1948. This famine was

camouflaged as much as possible by the Allied armies and governments.[44]

Many Germans were prepared to see the Allies as liberating angels at first, but they soon realized that the Allies were adopting policies designed to hurt Germany's recovery. The drastic reduction of fertilizer production under the Morgenthau Plan, for example, hurt Germany's capacity to grow her own food. The use of German prisoners as slave labor in Allied countries subtracted from the labor force needed to bring in the reduced harvest. German prisoners who worked as slave laborers in the United Kingdom and France were horrified upon arriving home to find their families starving.[45]

Unable to feed themselves adequately from home production, the Germans tried desperately to increase production for export. However, the Germans were seriously hampered by the Allied reparation policy, which prevented them from exporting goods to increase the shrunken German food supply. The Allies had decided to take huge reparations amounting to at least 20 billion dollars. Even as late as 1949, 268 factories were removed from Germany in whole or in part. The reduction in exports for food ensured that the German people would keep on starving.[46]

The Allies not only prevented the ICRC from distributing food to German POWs, but they also refused requests by the ICRC to bring provisions into Germany for civilians. In the winter of 1945, ICRC donations to Germany were returned with the recommendation that the donations be used in other parts of war-torn Europe. The return of ICRC donations was made even for Irish and Swiss contributions that had been specifically raised to benefit Germany. It was not until March 1946 that ICRC donations were permitted to reach the American zone in Germany.[47]

The Allies also prevented various private relief agencies from providing food to German civilians. For example, the Swiss Relief Fund started a charity to feed a meal once a day to a thousand Bavarian children for two months. The U.S. zone occupation authorities decided that this aid should not be accepted. One Quaker attempting to provide relief to Germans said, "The U.S. Army made it difficult for relief." In the United Kingdom in October 1945, "even the concept of voluntary aid via food parcels from Britain's civilians was anathema to Whitehall." Such aid to Germany was strictly forbidden.[48]

The Allies adopted additional policies that caused starvation in Germany. Food production and food imports came under specific attack when the German fishing fleet was prevented from going to sea for a year. The Allies also used false accounting to not credit the value of some German exports to the German account, making it impossible for Germans to earn foreign currency to buy food. Simply stated, many valuable goods were stolen from Germans beyond the reparations agreed upon by the Allies.[49]

The German people put up a brave struggle for existence despite the harsh conditions. Malcolm Muir, publisher of Business Week, stated after a five-week tour of Europe, including Germany: "The Germans are making every effort to help themselves….It is not unusual to see a milch cow hitched to a plow, a woman leading the cow and a small boy guiding the plow." However, despite the best efforts of German farmers, the food situation became critical and then catastrophic.[50]

An official of the food branch of the American Military Government made the following report concerning the conditions in Germany:

The greatest famine catastrophe of recent centuries is upon us in central Europe. Our government is letting down our military government in the food deliveries it promised, although what Gen. Clay, Gen. Draper and Gen. Hester asked for and were promised was the barest minimum for survival of the people. We will be forced to reduce the rations from 1,550 calories to 1,000 or less calories.

The few buds of democracy will be burned out in the agony of death of the aged, the women, and the children.

The British and we are going on record as the ones who let the Germans starve. The Russians will release at the height of the famine substantial food stores they have locked up (300,000 to 400,000 tons of sugar, large quantities of potatoes).

Aside from the inhumanity involved, it is so criminally stupid to give such a performance of incredible fumbling before the eyes of the world. It makes all the many hard-working officers of the Office of Military Government, Food and Agricultural Branch, ashamed.[51]

American journalist and radio broadcaster Dorothy Thompson wrote:

The children of Europe are starving. Six years of war, indescribable destruction, and the lunatic policies which have added to the disintegration inherited from the collapse of the Nazi regime have done their work. Germany, and with it Europe, is skidding into the abyss.

The facts are at last being revealed through what has amounted to a conspiracy of silence here….This war was fought by the West in the name of Christian civilization, the Four Freedoms, and the dignity of man against those who were perpetrating crimes against humanity. But policies which must inevitably result in the postwar extermination of tens of thousands of children are also crimes against humanity.[52]

The desperation of the German population for food was observed by Kathryn Hulme, the deputy director of one of Bavaria's many displaced persons camps. She wrote about the scramble for Red Cross packages at the Wildflecken camp: "It is hard to believe that some shiny little tins of meat paste and sardines could almost start a riot in the camp, that bags of Lipton's tea and tins of Varrington House coffee and bars of vitaminized chocolate could drive men almost insane with desire. But this is so. This is as much a part of the destruction of Europe as are those gaunt ruins of Frankfurt. Only this is the ruin of the human soul. It is a thousand times more painful to see."[53]

One survey in the American zone concluded that 60% of the Germans were living on a diet that would lead to disease and malnutrition. By October 1945, random weighing of German adults revealed a falloff of body weight of 13-15%. Children, pregnant women, and the elderly suffered the most. Their diets were lacking sufficient protein and vitamins, and cases of rickets were common among German infants.[54]

The German Central Administration of Health reported the deadly effects of malnutrition:

The people hunger…They are emaciated to the bone. Their clothes hang loose on their bodies, the lower extremities are like the bones of a skeleton, their hands shake as though with palsy, the muscles of the arms

are withered, the skin lies in folds, and is without elasticity, the joints spring out as though broken.

The weight of the women of average height and build has fallen way below 110 pounds. Often women of child-bearing age weigh no more than 65 pounds. The number of still-born children is approaching the number of those born alive, and an increasing proportion of these die in a few days. Even if they come into the world of normal weight, they start immediately to lose weight and die shortly. Very often the mothers cannot stand the loss of blood in childbirth and perish. Infant mortality has reached the horrifying height of 90%.[55]

The German people starved while the Americans around them lived in luxury. American historian Ralph Franklin Keeling wrote:

While the Germans around them starve, wear rags, and live in hovels, the American aristocrats live in often unaccustomed ease and luxury. Their wives must be specially marked to protect them from licentious advances; they live in the finest homes from which they drove the Germans; they swagger about in fine liveries and gorge themselves on diets three times as great as they allow the Germans, and allow "displaced persons" diets twice as great. When we tell the Germans their low rations are necessary because food is so short, they naturally either think we are lying to them or regard us as inhuman for taking the lion's share of the short supplies while they and their children starve.[56]

George Keenan was also outraged by the disparity in living conditions between the Germans and Americans in Germany. Kennan states:

Each time I had come away with a sense of sheer horror at the spectacle of this horde of my compatriots and their dependents camping in luxury amid the ruins of a shattered national community, ignorant of the past, oblivious to the abundant evidences of tragedy all around them, inhabiting the same sequestered villas that the Gestapo and SS had just abandoned, and enjoying the same privileges, flaunting their silly supermarket luxuries in the face of a veritable ocean of deprivation, hunger

and wretchedness, setting an example of empty materialism and cultural poverty before a people desperately in need of spiritual and intellectual guidance.[57]

U.S. Senators & British Humanitarians Protest Policies

Some informed political leaders spoke out against the Allied policy of mass starvation of the German people. In an address before the U.S. Senate on Feb. 5, 1946, Sen. Homer E. Capehart of Indiana said in part:

The fact can no longer be suppressed, namely, the fact that it has been and continues to be, the deliberate policy of a confidential and conspirational clique within the policy-making circles of this government to draw and quarter a nation now reduced to abject misery.

In this process this clique, like a pack of hyenas struggling over the bloody entrails of a corpse, and inspired by a sadistic and fanatical hatred, are determined to destroy the German nation and the German people, no matter what the consequences.

At Potsdam the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics solemnly signed the following declaration of principles and purposes: "It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people."

Mr. President, the cynical and savage repudiation of these solemn declarations, which has resulted in a major catastrophe, cannot be explained in terms of ignorance or incompetence. This repudiation, not only of the Potsdam Declaration, but also of every law of God and men, has been deliberately engineered with such a malevolent cunning, and with such diabolical skill, that the American people themselves have been caught in an international death trap.

For nine months now this administration has been carrying on a deliberate policy of mass starvation without any distinction between the innocent and helpless and the guilty alike.

The first issue has been and continues to be purely humanitarian. This vicious clique within this administration that has been responsible for the policies and practices which have made a madhouse of central Europe has not only betrayed our American principles, but they have betrayed the GIs who have suffered and died, and they continue to betray the American GIs who have to continue their dirty work for them.

The second issue that is involved is the effect this tragedy in Germany has already had on the other European countries. Those who have been responsible for this deliberate destruction of the German state and this criminal mass starvation of the German people have been so zealous in their hatred that all other interests and concerns have been subordinated to this one obsession of revenge. In order to accomplish this it mattered not if the liberated countries in Europe suffered and starved. To this point this clique of conspirators has addressed themselves: "Germany is to be destroyed. What happens to other countries of Europe in the process is of secondary importance."

Sen. Capehart's remarks were interspersed with a mass of supporting evidence.[58]

In an address to the U.S. Senate on Dec. 3, 1945, Sen. James Eastland of Mississippi told of the great difficulty he had encountered in gaining access to the official report on conditions in Germany. Sen. Eastland stated in his speech:

There appears to be a conspiracy of silence to conceal from our people the true picture of conditions in Europe, to secrete from us the fact regarding conditions of the continent and information as to our policies toward the German people….Are the real facts withheld because our policies are so cruel that the American people would not endorse them?

What have we to hide, Mr. President? Why should these facts be withheld from the people of the United States? There cannot possibly be any valid reason for secrecy. Are we following a policy of vindictive hatred, a policy which would not be endorsed by the American people as a whole if they knew true conditions?

Mr. President, I should be less than honest if I did not state frankly that the picture is so much worse, so much more confused, than the American people suspect, that I do not know of any source that is capable of producing the complete factual account of the true situation into which our policies have taken the American people. The truth is that the nations of central, southern, and eastern Europe are adrift on a flood of anarchy and chaos.[59]

Sen. William Langer of North Dakota stated in the U.S. Senate:

History already records that a savage minority of bloody bitterenders within this government forced the acceptance of the brutal Morgenthau Plan upon the present administration. I ask, Mr. President, why in God's name did the administration accept it?…Recent developments have merely confirmed scores of earlier charges that this addlepated and vicious Morgenthau Plan had torn Europe in two and left half of Germany incorporated in the ever-expanding sphere of influence of an oriental totalitarian conspiracy. By continuing a policy which keeps Germany divided against itself, we are dividing the world against itself and turning loose across the face of Europe a power and an enslaving and degrading cruelty surpassing that of Hitler.[60]

Sen. Langer's speech was warmly applauded by the Senate.

The Senate approved a resolution proposed by Sen. Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska to establish a group with a budget to study and report in detail the conditions in Germany. Wherry stated: "Terrifying reports are filtering through the British, French and American occupied zones, and even more gruesome reports from the Russian occupied zone, revealing a horrifying picture of deliberate and wholesale starvation." Wherry criticized the Truman administration for doing nothing despite the pleas for intercession to prevent a major tragedy. Wherry also questioned Governor Lehman, in charge of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), who admitted that the UN aid was not going to the starving Germans. Finally, Wherry said, "The truth is that there are thousands upon thousands of tons of military rations in our surplus stockpiles that have been spoiling right in the midst of starving populations."[61]

Sen. Langer received new information which caused him to speak in the Senate on March 29, 1946, as follows:

[We] are caught in what has now unfolded as a savage and fanatical plot to destroy the German people by visiting on them a punishment in kind for the atrocities of their leaders. Not only have the leaders of this plot permitted the whole world situation to get…out of hand…but their determination to destroy the German people and the German nation, no matter what the consequences to our own moral principles, to our leadership in world affairs, to our Christian faith, to our allies, or to the whole future peace of the world, has become a world

scandal….We have all seen the grim pictures of the piled-up bodies uncovered by the American and British armies, and our hearts have been wrung with pity at the sight of such emaciation—reducing adults and even little children to mere skeletons. Yet now, to our utter horror, we discover that our own policies have merely spread those same conditions even more widely…among our former enemies.[62]

British intellectuals such as Bertrand Russell and Victor Gollancz also worked to publicize the suffering and mass starvation of the German people. Gollancz objected to the contrast he saw between the accommodations and food in the British officers' mess and the miserable, halfstarved hovels outside. In March 1946 the average calories per day in the British zone had fluctuated between 1,050 and 1,591. British authorities in Germany were proposing to cut the rations back to 1,000 calories per day. Gollancz pointed out that the inmates at Bergen-Belsen toward the end of the war had only 800 calories per day, which was not much less than the British proposal.[63]

Gollancz made a six-week tour of the British zone in October and November 1946. In January 1947 Gollancz published the book In Darkest Germany to document what he saw on this trip. Assisted by a photographer, Gollancz included numerous pictures to allay skepticism of the veracity of his reports. The pictures show Gollancz standing behind naked boys suffering from malnutrition; or holding a fully worn and unusable child's shoe; or comforting a crippled, half-starved adult in his hovel. The point was to show that Gollancz had seen these things with his own eyes and had not merely accepted other people's reports. Gollancz also wrote to a newspaper editor: "Youth [in Germany] is being poisoned and re-nazified: we have all but lost the peace."[64]

Starvation Policies End

Despite the efforts of U.S. senators and British humanitarians, the Allied starvation policies continued through 1946 and into 1947. A group of German doctors reported in 1947 that the actual daily calorie ration issued for three months in the Ruhr section of the British zone averaged only 800 per person. Dr. Gustav Stolper, a member of the Hoover Commission fact-finding team, reported that the ration in both the British

and American zones for "a long time in 1946 and 1947 dropped to between 700 and 1,200 calories per day."[65]

U.S. Secretary of War Robert Patterson wrote to U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall concerning the famine in Germany in 1947: "[Our] occupation has no chance of success if these [famine] conditions continue. This state of affairs has been foreseen, and I have urged repeatedly that priority be recognized for food shipments to Germany. The basis for the priority is the prevention of famine in the U.S.-UK zones of Germany."[66]

Germany still operated under the Morgenthau Plan and the Potsdam Agreement. These two programs shared a crucial conceptual flaw: central to both schemes was the paradoxical policy of transforming Germany into an agricultural economy while at the same time depriving Germany of her most valuable agricultural regions and displacing the population of these regions into rump Germany. These policies made it impossible for Germany to feed her population. Germany would have to industrialize to be able to export something to buy a minimum diet for her people. By taking away a quarter of Germany's arable land, the Allies created a situation in which Germany's existence would necessarily be even more dependent on industrialization than before the war.[67]

The economic disruptions caused by Germany's zonal partition also hurt the German economy. The Soviet zone oriented itself more and more toward the East and continued to extract maximum reparations out of its zone. The French zone stagnated because of France's unwillingness to cooperate in any all-German program until the question of the Saar was solved in France's favor. France also feared a revival of Germany's economic strength.[68]

What finally led the Western Allies to a revision of their occupation policy in Germany was the fear of a Communist takeover of Europe. The Western Allies feared that if Germany remained Europe's slum, social unrest would force it into the Communist camp and the rest of Europe would follow. The anti-Communists in Poland had already been forced out of power, with only a few anti-Communists escaping to safety. Similar undemocratic developments were subverting Romania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The Communist parties in France and Italy were gaining strength and had caused several general strikes. Europe was ripe for a Communist takeover, and the Western Allies realized that something needed to be done to stop it.[69]

The threat of a Communist takeover in Europe had long been recognized by Allied leaders. French Marshal Alphonse Juin stated to Gen. George Patton at a dinner in Paris in August 1945: "It is indeed unfortunate that the English and Americans have destroyed the only sound country in Europe—and I do not mean France—therefore the road is now open for the advent of Russian Communism."[70]

Patton himself had warned of the danger of Russian Communism resulting from the destruction of Germany. Patton stated, "What we are doing is to utterly destroy the only semi-modern state in Europe so that Russia can swallow the whole."[71]

After the unsuccessful Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in March 1947, the Western Allies realized the necessity of setting a new course independent of the Soviet Union. George F. Kennan observed, "It was plain that the Soviet leaders had a political interest in seeing the economies of the Western European peoples fail under anything other than Communist leadership." With total economic disintegration in Europe imminent, a new plan was needed to shore up the ailing European economies.[72]

The European Recovery Program, better known as the Marshall Plan, was originally envisaged by U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall to promote the economic recovery of Europe on both sides of the iron curtain. However, the Soviet Union took steps to prevent any of the Eastern European countries from participating in the Marshall Plan. The Soviet Union organized a rival program for recovery in Eastern Europe known as the Molotov Plan. The Soviet-dominated Cominform urged Communists everywhere to help defeat the Marshall Plan, which it described as an instrument for "world domination by American imperialism."[73]

The Marshall Plan withstood the Soviet challenge. For the period from April 3, 1948 to June 30, 1952, the Marshall Plan gave $3.176 billion to the United Kingdom, $2.706 billion to France and $1.474 billion to Italy. Only $1.389 billion went to Western Germany, of which Germany later repaid approximately $1 billion. However, the German economy was helped the most by the aid. One commentator has described the effect of the Marshall Plan on Western Germany:

The effects had been prodigious, equaled in no other European country, although Germany got only a relatively small portion of Marshall

Plan aid. Europe received in all $20 billion from the United States; in 1954 the figures per capita had amounted to $39 for Germany as against $72 for France, $77 for England, $33 for Italy and $104 for Austria. But in Germany the help came at precisely the right time, when the accumulated pressures for both physical and psychological reconstruction had reached a bursting point.[74]

The effect of the Marshall Plan in Germany was almost magical. The German economy was plainly reviving within months; within a year it was expanding faster than any other economy in Europe; and within a decade Germany was close to the richest country in Europe. The growth of Germany's economy put an end to the starvation of the German people. According to Gen. Maurice Pope, who in 1948 was with the Canadian Military Mission in Germany, "conditions improved overnight…[soon] the modest corner grocery store was displaying delicacies of all kinds and at quite reasonable prices."[75]

The Plundering and Destruction of Germany

The devastation of Germany by total warfare cast serious doubt on Germany's postwar ability to survive. Never before in history had a nation's life-sustaining resources been so thoroughly demolished. Returning from victory in Europe, Gen. Omar Bradley stated, "I can tell you that Germany has been destroyed utterly and completely."[76]

Despite soothing words by Allied leaders at Yalta and Potsdam, it soon became evident to the German people that the Allies did not arrive as liberators. Instead, the Allies arrived as conquerors as vengeful, greedy, and ruthless as any who had ever won a war. The plundering and destruction of Germany continued after the end of World War II.

The Red Army began the plundering of Europe as soon as it entered Germany in 1944. The Soviet looting in the Russian zone became prodigious after the end of the war. Factories, refineries, processing mills, and other heavy industries were taken apart and sent east to the Soviet Union to be reassembled. All secondary rail lines, electric and steam locomotives and their rolling stock were sent to the Soviet Union. The plants that were left in Germany were operated by Germans solely for the benefit of the Soviet Union.[77]

The Red Army soldiers joined the Soviet government in pillaging Germany on a massive scale. A woman from Silesia wrote:

The Russians systematically cleared out everything that was for them of value, such as all sewing machines, pianos, grand-pianos, baths, water taps, electric plants, beds, mattresses, carpets, etc. They destroyed what they could not take away with them. Trucks often stood for days in the rain, with the most valuable carpets and articles of furniture in them, until everything was completely spoiled and ruined….

If fuel was required, then whole woods were generally felled, or window-frames and doors were torn out of the empty houses, broken up on the spot, and immediately used for making fire. The Russians and Poles even used the staircases and banisters as firewood. In the course of time, even the roofs of houses were removed and used for heating….Empty houses, open, without window-panes, overgrown with weeds and filth, rats and mice in uncanny numbers, unharvested fields, land which had been fertile, now completely overgrown with weeds and lying fallow. Not in a single village did one see a cow, a horse or a pig….The Russians had taken everything away to the east, or used it up.[78]

The Russians destroyed most of what was not looted. A German woman describes what she saw when she found her way home at the end of the war:

We have been warned by others who have witnessed signs of Russian occupancy to expect bedlam and to abandon our hopeless mission altogether. Thus we expect the worst, but our idea of the worst has not prepared us sufficiently for reality. Shocked to the point of collapse, we survey a battlefield—heaps of refuse through which broken pieces of furniture rise like cliffs; stench gags us, almost driving us to retreat. Ragged remnants of clothes, crushed dishes, books, pictures torn from frames—rubble in every room. We can't look into the dining room because it is locked. Above all, the nauseating stench that emanates from the largest and totally wrecked living room! Spoiled contents ooze from splintered canning jars, garbage of indefinable origin is mixed with unmistakable human excrement, and dried stain of urine discolors crumpled paper and rags. We wade into the dump with care and poke at some of all but unrecognizable

belongings. Overcoming our revulsion, we penetrate to the lower layers and discover unharmed books, loose photographs, bundles of old letters, odd pieces of silverware, an occasional unbroken dish.[79]

Soviet soldiers were awed by the abundance of material goods in Germany. The great number of automobiles, tractors, motorcycles, bicycles, stoves, radios and other common goods was beyond the comprehension of many Soviet soldiers. One Russian soldier commented that there was more to be taken out of one house in Germany than in a typical village in the Soviet Union. Another Soviet soldier admitted: "All of us, officers and men, saw the riches and prosperity of a capitalist country and couldn't believe our eyes. We had never believed there could be such an abundance of goods." This German material abundance was either looted or destroyed by the Red Army.[80]

Even in its ruined state Berlin was the picture of sophistication for the Russians. The Russians stole all of the bicycles they could find. Gramophones, wristwatches, light bulbs, and cigarette lighters were not only new to most Russian soldiers, but prized possessions to be collected. They also confiscated any liquor they could lay their hands on. Anything the Red Army did not steal they destroyed, including valuable antiques, musical instruments, and elegant clothes.[81]

American soldiers also stole from the German people and let German children go hungry. American aviation hero Charles Lindbergh wrote:

At home our papers carry articles about how we "liberate" oppressed countries and peoples. Here, our soldiers use the word "liberate" to describe the method of obtaining loot. Anything taken from an enemy home or person is "liberated" in the language of the G.I. Leica cameras are "liberated" (probably the most desired item); guns, food, art. Anything taken without being paid for is "liberated." A soldier who rapes a German woman has "liberated" her….

German children look in through the window. We have more food than we need, but regulations prevent giving it to them. It is difficult to look at them. I feel ashamed, of myself, of my people, as I eat and watch those

children. They are not to blame for the war. They are hungry children. What right have we to stuff ourselves while they look on—well-fed men eating, leaving unwanted food on plates, while hungry children look on?…There is an abundance of food in the American Army, and few men seem to care how hungry the German children are outside the door.[82]

Reporter William Stoneman of the Chicago Daily News was shocked by the vandalism and looting of American troops. Stoneman, who was stationed with the U.S. 3rd Army, wrote in May 1945:

I have been impressed by the careless manner in which the booty has been handled and the way in which great stocks of foodstuffs have been left to the reckless inroads of looters….

Millions of dollars worth of rare things varying from intricate Zeiss lenses to butter and cheese and costly automobiles are being destroyed because the Army has not organized a system for the recovery of valuable enemy material.

Frontline troops are rough and ready about enemy property. They naturally take what they find if it looks interesting, and, because they are in the frontlines, nobody says anything….

But what frontline troops take is nothing compared to the damage caused by wanton vandalism of some of the following troops. They seem to ruin everything, including the simplest personal belongings of the people in whose houses they are billeted.[83]

American Provost Marshal Lt. Col. Gerald F. Beane was assigned to deal with crimes committed by American soldiers. In an official report released in Berlin in late 1945, Beane stated that larceny and robbery were the crimes most frequently committed by our soldiers. The Chicago Tribune commented on his report:

As to crimes committed against property, the explanation is fairly obvious. No effective steps were taken to discourage looting by the invading armies during the war. Officers and men alike committed this crime and for much the most part went unpunished. It was tolerated under some such

euphemism as souvenir collecting. The habit of stealing, once formed, is difficult to break. The fault, of course, lies with the high command, which permitted the abuse. Col. Beane's pronouncement suggests that the Army is tardily seeking to correct its error.[84]

Foreign workers and displaced persons also frequently plundered German property after the end of the war. Germans stood in fear as foreign workers "passed through the country looting, robbing and murdering." Allied soldiers often looked on as foreign workers plundered German shops—something made easier when curfews were imposed on Germans but not on foreign workers. Displaced persons in Munich, who comprised 4% of the population, were held responsible for threequarters of the crimes committed in the city. A priest in Goerlitz wrote how after the war ended hordes of foreign workers had left the city littered with the debris from their looting.[85]

Theft in Germany after the war was not confined to petty larceny. Whole governments were involved in robbing Germany of anything of value. One Soviet priority was the seizure of important works of art found in Berlin and throughout Germany. This was a fully planned operation, with the artworks stolen by Soviet troops originally planned to be exhibited in a huge museum of war trophies. As world opinion changed against the Soviets after the war, they chose to conceal the artworks in special closed galleries throughout the Soviet Union. Many of the paintings remain hidden to this day.[86]

The British royal family also confiscated its share of German booty. For example, Hermann Goering's yacht, the Karin II, ended up in the hands of the British royal family.[87] The British royal family commissioned Anthony Blunt, a Soviet spy, to travel to Hanover to take possession of the German crown jewels. Although the jewels later had to be returned to their rightful owners, some jewels were never returned.[88]

While the United States did not take German plants and factories, it did take its share of German treasure. Billions of dollars in gold, silver, currency, priceless paintings and artworks were stolen from their hiding places in caves, tunnels, and salt mines throughout Germany and shipped to the United States.[89]

The Plundering of German Brains and Labor

Germany also experienced "mental dismantling" in that hundreds of German scientists were compelled to emigrate by the victors. One U.S. government agency quietly admitted that Operation Paperclip was the first time in history where conquerors had attempted to confiscate the inventive power of a nation. Life magazine added that the real gain in reparations of this war was not in the confiscated factories, gold, or artworks, but in the German brains and the German research results.[90]

The Soviets also attempted to abduct or tempt away scientists and technicians who might be useful to them. The Nobel Prize-winning German physicist Gustav Hertz was taken to the Soviet Union to help them develop nuclear weapons. On Oct. 21, 1945, a large number of skilled German workers, technicians and scientists were sent to the Soviet Union by train. The Western Allies made a weak protest, which the Russians simply ignored.[91]

Millions of Germans were also sent to the Soviet Union to be used as slave labor. The following report was published on June 29, 1945:

German prisoners in Russian hands are estimated to number from 4 million to 5 million. When Berlin and Breslau surrendered, the long gray-green columns of prisoners were marched east downcast and fearful…toward huge depots near Leningrad, Moscow, Minsk, Stalingrad, Kiev, Kharkov, and Sevastopol. All fit men had to march some 22 miles a day. Those physically handicapped went in handcarts or carts pulled by spare beasts….They will be made to rebuild the Russian towns and villages which they destroyed. They will not return home until the work is completed.[92]

Some crippled and ailing Germans who survived the Russian slave labor camps were returned to Berlin, where they were interviewed by American correspondents. German Red Cross women on Sept. 10, 1946, met a 20-car trainload of returning forced laborers from the Soviet Union. A professional nurse told their story:

They had been in the train almost a week traveling about 60 miles from Frankfurt-on-Oder. There had been deaths from starvation, not from starvation just during the ride, but from the hardships of the trip after

months of malnutrition in Russian labor camps. Almost all of the 800 or 900 in the train were sick or crippled. You might say they were all invalids. With 40 to 50 packed in each of those little boxcars, the sick had to sleep beside the dead on their homeward journey. I did not count them but I am sure we removed more than 25 corpses. Others had to be taken to hospitals. I asked several of the men whether the Russian guards or doctors had done anything on the trip to care for the sick. They said "No."

I met only one alert, healthy man in the lot and I have seen him since. He was just a kid of 17. The boy told me that prisoners leaving Russian camps for Germany are searched to prevent any from smuggling mail for their comrades. Therefore, when one of them has been diagnosed as a hopeless invalid, in anticipation of discharge he will memorize the names and addresses of relatives to whom he can report for his fellow prisoners. He said only prisoners in special favor are able to mail postcards to their nearest of kin. This kid of 17 has memorized 80 names and addresses in Berlin of relatives of his prison friends. He found the buildings at most of the addresses in rubble, with the present whereabouts of the former occupants unknown, but he visited all 80 addresses in his first six days in Berlin.[93]

If prisoners released by the Russians as unfit for further forced labor happened to recuperate, they were generally sent back to the Soviet Union for more slave labor. Able-bodied Germans released in the British or American zones and returned to their homes in the Soviet zone were also typically sent to the Soviet Union for slave labor. The slightest disobedience in Russian camps was penalized by such heavy work that a third of the disobeyers died within three weeks from exhaustion. German prisoners being turned over to the Russians often committed suicide or tried to incapacitate themselves in order to avoid being sent to the Soviet slave labor camps.[94]

According to the ICRC, France had 680,000 former German soldiers slaving for her in August 1946. Of this number, 475,000 had been captured by the United States and turned over to the French for forced labor. After 320,000 German prisoners had been delivered, the French returned 2,474 of them to the United States because they were severely malnourished and unfit for work. Associated press photographer Henry Griffin, who had taken pictures of the corpses piled in Buchenwald and Dachau, said of these returned Germans: "The only difference I can see between these men and those corpses is that here they are still breathing."[95]

The ICRC reported that in August 1946 Great Britain was using 460,000 Germans as slave laborers; the United States 284,000; Yugoslavia 80,000; Belgium 48,000; Czechoslovakia 45,000; Luxembourg 4,000; and Holland 1,300. Keeping such large numbers of Germans away from their families was a direct attack against the German home and family. The ICRC condemned the Allied slave labor system:

The United States, Britain, and France, nearly a year after peace, are violating International Red Cross agreements they solemnly signed in 1929.

Investigation at Geneva headquarters today disclosed that the transfer of German war prisoners captured by the American Army to French and British authorities for forced labor is nowhere permitted in the statutes of the International Red Cross, which is the highest authority on the subject in the world.

Although thousands of the former German soldiers are being used in the hazardous work of clearing mine fields, sweeping sea mines, destroying surplus ammunition and razing shattered buildings, the Geneva Convention expressly forbids employing prisoners "in any dangerous labor or in the transport of any material used in warfare…."

"The American delivery of German prisoners to the French and British for forced labor already is being cited by the Russians as justification for them to retain German army captives for as long as they are able to work," an International Red Cross official admitted. "The bartering of captured enemy soldiers by the victors throws the world back to the dark ages—when feudal barons raided adjoining duchies to replenish their human livestock."[96]

Women, children, and the aged were also required by the Allies to perform forced labor. No job was too loathsome or degrading for the conquered Germans to perform. Some work assignments were especially unpleasant, as one woman makes clear: "[A]s a result of the war damage…the toilets were stopped up and filthy. This filth we had to clear away with our hands, without any utensils to do so. The excrement was brought into the yard, shoveled into carts, which we had to bring to refuse pits. The awful part was that we got dirtied by the excrement which spurted up, but we could not clean ourselves."[97]

Another German woman from the Soviet zone added:

We had to build landing strips, and to break stones. In snow and rain, from six in the morning until nine at night, we were working along the roads. Any Russian who felt like it took us aside. In the morning and at night we received cold water and a piece of bread, and, at noon, a soup of crushed, unpeeled potatoes, without salt. At night we slept on the floors of farmhouses or stables, dead tired, huddled together. But we woke up every so often, when a moaning and whimpering in the pitch-black room announced the presence of one of the guards.[98]

As this woman and others make clear, German women could be raped even when performing forced labor for the Allies. As one German woman who worked at planting potatoes said, "If they wanted a girl they just came in the field and got her."[99]

Denazification of Germans

Denazification was an Allied program instigated after the war to punish National Socialist Party members and to remove them from public and semi-public office.

Hypocritically disregarding the horrendous crimes they committed against the Germans, the Allies determined that the National Socialist Party was so criminal that it had to be extinguished.

German leaders in all walks of life had found it necessary or expedient to join the National Socialist Party or one or more of its affiliated organizations once it took control of Germany. Membership in the National Socialist Party expanded rapidly immediately preceding and during the war. Party and nation became so closely identified during the war that to join was to display patriotism; to refuse membership was to invite penalization for disloyalty. The Allied program of denazification set out to ruin the lives of millions of Germans simply because the Allies thought that Germans who joined the National Socialist Party had made a political mistake.[100]

The denazification decrees authorized in the Potsdam Agreement were inconsistent with the Potsdam declaration that "discrimination on

the grounds of…political opinion shall be abolished." Potsdam permanently dissolved the National Socialist Party and its affiliated organizations and institutions. The Potsdam Agreement commanded that "Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions…shall be arrested and interned" and that all lesser Nazis "shall be removed from public and semi-public office and former positions of responsibility in private undertakings."[101]

The chief instrument of denazification was a 12-page questionnaire consisting of 133 questions. As many as 13 million of these questionnaires were printed and handed out either to Germans with questionable pasts or to those seeking employment. While many of the Germans found the questions absurd and comical, the questionnaire still had to be properly completed and returned before a German could return to normal life. A German had to properly complete the form with its "sometimes stupid questions" in order to survive. Otherwise he was out of work and deprived of ration tickets. If he was not careful, he could also be arrested and declared a war criminal.[102]

The Americans were hell-bent on purging National Socialist Party members from German politics. The Americans led the way with denazification, trying 169,282 cases, while the Russians and French tried a total of 18,328 and 17,353 cases, respectively. The British showed less interest in denazification, trying only 2,296 cases in their zone. The Allied denazification process was flawed because there were too many cases and the witnesses were unreliable. The witnesses knew they would be under the microscope themselves, so the most important thing for them was to deny any wrongdoing on their part.[103]

The high number of arrests and tough denazification policy created serious obstacles for the smooth running of postwar Germany. As one American major reported in July 1945, "great difficulty has been encountered in finding competent and politically clean personnel from Civil Administration." Wholesale dismissals as a result of denazification made it difficult for cities and towns throughout Germany to carry on business in an orderly manner. The gaps left by the dismissals were particularly large in the German public school system. In the American zone 65% of all primary school teachers were removed, and most of the remaining teachers were approaching retirement.[104]

The many problems that arose as a result of the denazification process caused Gen. George Patton, at that point military governor of Bavaria, to call for a less rigorous approach. He claimed that trained staff

were being removed from their administrative posts and replaced with less experienced and less capable personnel. Patton asserted: “It is no more possible for a man to be a civil servant in Germany and not to have paid lip service to Nazism than it is for a man to be a postmaster in America and not have paid at least lip service to the Democratic Party or Republican Party when it is in power.”[105] Patton was transferred after his views surfaced in the New York Times. Gen. Eisenhower stuck to a tough denazification program.[106]

For millions of Germans the worst part of the denazification process came after the questionnaire had been completed. After reviewing the questionnaire, Allied intelligence officers would frequently visit German homes for additional examinations and interrogations. Many of these intelligence officers were Jewish refugees who had fled Nazi persecution in the late 1930s with old scores to settle. The additional interrogations were often structured to inflict as much pain and suffering as possible, and often resulted in internment or even death.[107]

The interrogations in the Russian zone were typically brutal and inhumane. A German physician reports his experience of the interrogations at a Russian camp:

The cellars of all the barracks are crammed with people, about 4,000 men and women, many of whom are interrogated every night by the NKVD officials. The purpose of these interrogations is not to worm out of the people what they knew— which would be uninteresting anyway—but to extort from them special statements. The methods resorted to are extremely primitive: people are beaten up until they confess to having been members of the Nazi Party. But the result is almost the opposite of what most of the people probably expect, that is, that those who hadn’t been party members would come off better. The authorities simply assume that, basically, everybody has belonged to the party. Many people die during and after these interrogations, while others, who admit at once their party membership, are treated more leniently.[108]

Even well-known anti-Nazis such as Freddy and Lali Horstmann encountered problems in the Russian zone. Lali records that after the war Russian officers unexpectedly visited their home and searched its contents. Her husband Freddy was taken to the headquarters of the NKVD to be asked a few questions about his work in the Foreign Office. Lali was

told that she could not accompany her husband to the interrogation. The officers repeatedly told Lali that she had nothing to fear. Lali states that she never saw her husband again.[109]

Many Germans also reported abuse in the American zone. Anna Fest registered with the Americans shortly after the end of the war. Fest said that six weeks later members of the American occupation forces came in a car to her home, told her to pack a few things, and be ready in half an hour. Fest stated: "Then it started. Such a feeling of helplessness, when three or four heavily armed military police stand in front of you. You just panic. I cried terribly. My mother was completely beside herself and said, 'You can't do this. She registered just as she was supposed to do.' Then she said, 'If only you'd gone somewhere else and had hidden.' But I consider that senseless, because I did not feel guilty."[110]

Fest said she never was told why she was arrested and received nothing in writing. "That was the way it went with everyone, with no reason given." Fest was moved to several different installations in the weeks following her arrest before being taken to an internment camp in Ludwigsburg to stand trial. She was interrogated in the meantime, and spoke of "very, very bad experiences."

Fest said she was taken to a small hut with two officers and a couple of German shepherd dogs inside. One officer screamed accusations and questions at her. If Fest did not answer "as he wished, he kicked me in the back and the other hit me" with his fist. The door of the hut was left open so that German men standing outside waiting to be questioned had to see and hear it all. "That must have been terrible for them," Fest reminisced. "When I went outside, several of them stood there with tears running down their cheeks. What could they have done? They could do nothing."[111]

Fest had a nervous breakdown shortly after a stay in Dachau. When she recovered she was sent back to the camp at Ludwigsburg to await trial. Fest was eventually acquitted and released on Aug. 28, 1947. She had been a prisoner of the Allies for more than two years.[112]

Ernst von Salomon was arrested and thrown into an internment camp north of Munich with his Jewish girlfriend and other prisoners. The men were promptly beaten and the women raped by the military police while an excited audience of American GIs watched through the window. Von Salomon had his teeth knocked out during his beating. When he picked himself off the floor, his face pouring with blood, von Salomon

gasped to an officer, “You are no gentleman.” The attackers roared with laughter at this remark. “No, no, no! We are Mississippi boys!” the officer proudly responded.[113]

Von Salomon was imprisoned for 18 months in the camp without any charge against him or any interrogation being conducted. When he was finally released he was so emaciated that he looked like a skeleton. Other inmates have confirmed von Salomon’s description of the American internment camps. For example, Karl Blessing, later president of the Bundesbank, reported that he had been treated in exactly the same way.[114]

While denazification efforts were less stringent in the British zone, the British issued directives to their soldiers to keep Germans in their place. One postwar pamphlet issued to British troops reads:

Do play your part as a representative of a conquering power and keep the Germans in their place. Give orders—don’t beg the question. Display cold, correct, dignified curtness and aloofness. Don’t try to be kind—it will be regarded as weakness. Drop heavily on any attempt to take charge or other forms of insolence. Don’t be too ready to listen to stories from attractive women—they may be acting under orders. Don’t show any aversion to another war if Germany does not learn her lesson this time.[115]

The Jewish Brigade, which was part of the British Eighth Army, also murdered many disarmed and defenseless German officers as part of the Allied denazification program. The Jewish Brigade was established not to fight in the war, but to follow behind the British army and kill senior German officers who were typically not guilty of anything except having served in defense of their country. Morris Beckman states in his book The Jewish Brigade: “These were the first post-war executions of selected top Nazis. There were several dozen revenge squads operating; the highest estimate of executions was 1,500. The exact figure will never be known.”[116]

The Allied program of denazification was in practice a program of vengeance against Germany that created hard feelings toward the Allies. Even many Germans who had never joined the National Socialist Party resented denazification. Some Germans after the war repeated the following joke: A man comes into a police station and tells the officer that he wishes to register as a Nazi. The policeman replies that he should have

done that a year and a half ago. The man tells the policeman, "Eighteen months ago I wasn't a Nazi!"[117]

The so-called denazification of Germany was in reality a determined attempt to remove all vestiges of pride in Germans toward their own nation and culture. The program was hypocritically administered by the Allies with a total disregard for justice. Hans Schmidt states in regard to denazification:

If one takes away from a nation and people their sovereignty, their independence; their right to self-determination; their right for justice and truth; their right for an independent, impartial and fair judiciary; their right to be governed by persons (politicians or princelings) that have always the best interests of their own country in mind; their right to retain their own culture; their self-esteem, and even their own currency; their right to defend their blood lines, and finally, their identity, then this folk and nation is condemned to annihilation from this earth.[118]

Review of History's Most Terrifying Peace

The Allied postwar treatment of Germany probably resulted in more German deaths than occurred during the Second World War. While the exact number of casualties will never be known, the number of German military and civilian deaths during World War II is probably at most 6.5 million.[119] The total number of German postwar deaths from 1945 to 1950 almost certainly exceeds this figure.

The Allies were able to conceal their murderous policies toward the Germans since they controlled everything of consequence in Germany. The statistics of German deaths after the war were all under the control of the Allies. There was no independent German government to dispute the Allied figures. The U.S. military governor reports were designed to reflect favorably on the Allied postwar treatment of Germany, and have been widely used ever since to determine our view of Germany's postwar history. These reports showed figures indicating no large number of Germans died either among the expellees or among the resident Germans of the three Western zones from 1945 to 1950.[120]

German deaths after the war can be divided into three groups of people. The first group is the German POWs in both Europe and the Soviet

Union. The second group is the German expellees, and the third group is the Germans already residing in Germany. While no one will ever know how many Germans died from 1945 to 1950, it is certain that the deaths far exceed most traditional estimates. The great majority of these deaths were caused by the lethal policies imposed by the Allies on Germany after the war.

As documented in Chapter Five, a conservative estimate of German deaths in the Allied POW camps is 1.5 million. This includes over 517,000 POW deaths in the Soviet Union, 100,000 POW deaths in Yugoslavia, Poland and other countries, with the remaining POW deaths in U.S. and French camps. The Germans who died in these Allied POW camps suffered miserably from exposure, disease, and slow starvation.

The American and French involvement in this well-documented Allied atrocity is still denied by most historians today.

As discussed in Chapter Six, probably a minimum of 2.1 million German expellees died in what was supposed to be an "orderly and humane" transfer. The estimate of 2.1 million German expellee deaths is acknowledged to be valid by most traditional historians. Notable authorities have estimated a much higher number of German expellee deaths.[121] For example, Konrad Adenauer, the first chancellor of West Germany, estimated that 6 million German expellees died. Adenauer states:

According to American figures a total of 13.3 million Germans were expelled from the eastern parts of Germany, from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and so on. 7.3 million [German expellees] arrived in the eastern zone and the three western zones, most of these in the latter. Six million Germans have vanished from the Earth. They are dead, gone. Most of the 7.3 million who stayed alive are women, children, and old people.[122]

An estimated 5.7 million Germans already residing in Germany died from the starvation policies implemented by the Allies. James Bacque details how this 5.7 million death total is calculated:

The population of all occupied Germany in October 1946 was 65 million according to the census prepared under the ACC. The returning

prisoners who were added to the population in the period October 1946-September 1950 numbered 2,600,000 (rounded), according to records in the archives of the four principal Allies. Births according to the official German statistical agency, Statistisches Bundesamt, added another 4,176,430 newcomers to Germany. The expellees arriving totaled 6 million. Thus the total population in 1950 before losses would have been 77,776,430, according to the Allies themselves. Deaths officially recorded in the period 1946-50 were 3,235,539, according to the UN Yearbook and the German government. Emigration was about 600,000, according to the German government. Thus the population found should have been 73,940,891. But the census of 1950 done by the German government under Allied supervision found only 68,230,796. There was a shortage of 5,710,095 people, according to the official Allied figures (rounded to 5,700,000).[123]

Bacque's calculations have been confirmed by Dr. Anthony B. Miller, who is a world-famous epidemiologist and head of the Department of Preventive Medicine and Biostatistics at the University of Toronto. Miller read the whole work, including the documents, and checked the statistics, which he says "confirm the validity of [Bacque's] calculations." Miller states: "These deaths appear to have resulted, directly or indirectly, from the semi-starvation food rations that were all that were available to the majority of the German population during this time period."[124]

The sum of 1.5 million German POWs, 2.1 million German expellees, and 5.7 million German residents equals the minimum estimate of 9.3 million Germans who died needlessly after the war. This is far more Germans than died during the Second World War. Millions of these Germans slowly starved to death while the Allies withheld available food. The majority of these postwar dead Germans were women, children and very old men. Their deaths have never been honestly reported by the Allies, the German government, or most historians.

The German dead do not tell the entire story of the tragedy that was inflicted on Germany after World War II. Millions of German women who had been repeatedly raped had to bear the physical and psychological scars for the rest of their lives. Millions of German expellees who lost all of their real estate and most of their personal property were never compensated by the Allies. Instead, they had to live in abject poverty in Germany after the expulsion from their homes. Millions of other Germans had their property stolen or destroyed by Allied soldiers.

The Allied postwar treatment of Germany is surely one of the most brutal, criminal, and unreported tragedies in world history.

The few historians who acknowledge the Allied atrocities against Germany usually excuse them on the ground of the ferocious hatred aroused by the race crimes of Hitler.[125] In the next three chapters we will examine the crimes, both real and alleged, committed by Germany during the war. We will also examine some additional crimes committed by the Allies during and after World War II.

Footnotes

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[3] Ibid., pp. 88-89.

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[17] Goodrich, Thomas, Hellstorm: The Death of Nazi Germany, 1944-1947, Sheridan, CO: Aberdeen Books, 2010, p. 84.

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Part III

Actual and Alleged German Atrocities of World War II

Chapter Eight

• The Alleged Genocide of European Jewry

The genocide of European Jewry by National Socialist Germany is widely considered to be the most thoroughly documented event in human history. Tens of thousands of books, magazine, and newspaper articles have been written and numerous criminal trials have been conducted to document the mass extermination of European Jewry. The crimes of Germany against Jews are considered to be so uniquely evil that the term "the Holocaust" has been invented to describe the alleged genocide of European Jewry.

Despite the extensive attention given to the event, revisionist historians have called into question many aspects of the Holocaust story. In particular, it has been shown that: 1) there were no homicidal gas chambers in any of the German concentration camps; 2) Germany did not have a program of genocide against the Jews; and 3) the standard estimate of 6 million Jews who died during World War II is a ridiculous exaggeration.

Scientific Evidence Refuting Homicidal Gas Chambers

In every murder trial the prosecution has the burden of proof to show the cause of death. Scientific evidence is usually the most convincing evidence to show the cause of death because scientific evidence can be verified in an objective manner. Incredibly, in the biggest and most publicized murder trial of all time, the prosecution at the International Military Tribunal produced no autopsy reports or expert reports on the existence and operation of the alleged homicidal gas chambers. Even in the Auschwitz Trial in Frankfurt in the mid-1960s and the Majdanek Trial in Dusseldorf in the late 1970s, the defense never thought to request a report on the alleged murder weapons, which have partly survived today. In all of these trials the prosecution relied almost exclusively on eyewitness testimony to convict the defendants of murder.[1]

It was not until 1988 that a scientific study was conducted concerning the homicidal gas chambers allegedly used in the German concentration camps. In 1988 the Canadian government prosecuted

Ernst Zuendel for the criminal offense of knowingly disseminating false news about "the Holocaust." As part of his defense in this trial, Zuendel commissioned the American gas chamber expert Fred Leuchter to make a scientific examination of the alleged homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz, Birkenau and Majdanek. The resulting Leuchter Report is the first scientific study of the alleged German homicidal gas chambers.[2]

Leuchter, who before this assignment had believed in the existence of the gas chambers and the German genocide of European Jewry, was perhaps the leading expert in the United States on the construction and use of execution equipment. Leuchter had designed and manufactured execution equipment of all types prior to this assignment, including electrocution systems, lethal injection equipment, gallows, and gas chamber hardware. He had worked with most, if not all, of the states in the United States having capital punishment.[3] As a result of his on-site examination of the alleged gas chambers, Fred Leuchter states:

Construction of these facilities further shows that they were never used as gas chambers. None of these facilities was sealed or gasketed. No provision was ever made to prevent condensation of gas on the walls, floor or ceiling. No provision ever existed to exhaust the air-gas mixture from these buildings. No provision ever existed to introduce or distribute the gas throughout the chamber. No explosion-proof lighting existed and no attempt was ever made to prevent gas from entering the crematories, even though the gas is highly explosive. No attempt was made to protect operating personnel from exposure to the gas or to protect other non-participating persons from exposure. Specifically, at Auschwitz, a floor drain in the alleged gas chamber was connected directly to the camp's storm drain system. At Majdanek a depressed walkway around the alleged gas chambers would have collected gas seepage and resulted in a death trap for camp personnel. No exhaust stacks ever existed. Hydrogen cyanide gas is an extremely dangerous and lethal gas, and nowhere were there any provisions to effect any amount of safe handling. The chambers were too small to accommodate more than a simple fraction of the alleged numbers. Plain and simple, these facilities could not have operated as execution gas chambers.[4]

In addition to reporting that the alleged homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz, Birkenau, and Majdanek were structurally unsuitable for gassing, Leuchter researched the chemical properties of the Zyklon B

fumigant. Leuchter found that Zyklon B is a highly toxic compound that, when exposed to air at a temperature greater than 78.3º F (25.7º C), releases deadly hydrogen cyanide gas. The released hydrogen cyanide gas clings to surfaces and reacts chemically with materials containing iron, forming ferrocyanide compounds that have a distinctive blue color called Prussian blue. Since building materials normally contain a certain amount of rust (iron oxide, usually between 1% and 4%), repeated exposure to hydrogen cyanide gas would result in Prussian blue staining on the walls of the alleged gas chambers.[5]

Leuchter took forensic samples from the alleged gas chambers at the visited sites and a control sample from the delousing facility at Birkenau. The samples were analyzed by an independent laboratory in the United States. The laboratory found no significant ferrocyanide compound traces in the samples taken from the alleged homicidal gas chambers, but the samples from the walls of the disinfection chamber had heavy concentrations of ferrocyanide compounds. Leuchter concluded that this result would be impossible if the alleged homicidal gas chambers had been repeatedly exposed to hydrogen cyanide gas.

Leuchter also observed that the delousing chambers were airtight, well made and designed for safety. By comparison the alleged homicidal gas chambers were not airtight, were poorly constructed, and dangerous for the operators. Why would gas chambers designed to kill lice be properly constructed and engineered, while gas chambers designed to kill millions of people be improperly constructed and engineered and dangerous for the operators? Leuchter concludes: “After a thorough examination of the alleged execution facilities in Poland and their associated crematories, the only conclusion that can be arrived at by a rational, responsible person is the absurdity of the notion that any of these facilities were ever capable of, or were utilized as, execution gas chambers.”[6]

Germar Rudolf, a certified chemist, expanded on Leuchter’s work by writing the Rudolf Report in the spring of 1992. The Rudolf Report, which has been updated and revised several times, focused on engineering and chemical aspects of the alleged homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz and Birkenau. Rudolf observed in his on-site examinations that all of the delousing facilities at Auschwitz, Birkenau, and Majdanek have one thing in common: their walls are permeated with Prussian blue. Not only the inner surfaces, but also the outside walls and the mortar between the bricks of the delousing chambers have Prussian blue

staining. Nothing of this sort can be observed in any of the alleged homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz and Birkenau.

Rudolf also took samples from the alleged homicidal gas chambers and the delousing facilities at Auschwitz and Birkenau. Similar to Leuchter's samples, the alleged homicidal gas chambers exhibit only insignificant traces of ferrocyanide residue on the same order of magnitude found in any other building. The samples from the delousing chambers, however, all showed very high ferrocyanide residues. Rudolf determined that if mass execution gassings with hydrocyanic acid had taken place in the alleged homicidal gas chambers, the rooms in the alleged homicidal gas chambers would exhibit similar ferrocyanide residue as the delousing chambers. Therefore, Rudolf concluded that mass gassings with Zyklon B could not have occurred in the alleged homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz and Birkenau.[7]

In March 1992, a prominent Austrian engineer named Walter Lueftl made headlines when a report he had written stated that the stories of mass extermination of Jews in gas chambers at Auschwitz and Mauthausen are impossible for technical reasons and because they are incompatible with observable laws of nature. At the time of his report, Lueftl was a court-recognized expert engineer who headed a large engineering firm in Vienna.

Lueftl stated that although the hydrocyanic acid contained in the Zyklon B can kill quickly and certainly, the handling requirements for Zyklon B rule out any significant use of Zyklon B for the mass killing of people. Lueftl stated that during the ventilation process after a gassing, Zyklon B would still retain approximately 92% of its hydrocyanic acid content, and would thus continue releasing hydrocyanic acid gas. Lueftl asked: How could the gas chamber operators get rid of the remaining Zyklon B from the midst of dead corpses, without lengthy ventilation periods, and without causing mass deaths outside the gas chambers? Lueftl concluded that because of operational and time considerations, quasi-industrial killing using Zyklon B would be impossible.[8]

Lueftl also stated in his report that mass murder with diesel exhaust gasses is a sheer impossibility for reasons of time alone. Lueftl stated that this can be easily proven experimentally, even today, with a few brave men. Therefore, Lueftl concluded that the stories of gas chambers with diesel engines and gas vans at places such as Treblinka can only be disinformation. In his report, Lueftl states: "The laws of nature

apply both to Nazis and anti-fascists. Nobody can be killed with diesel exhaust gas in the manner described [in the Holocaust literature]."[9]

Friedrich Paul Berg, an American engineer, agrees with Lueftl that diesel gas chambers are not an effective means of committing mass murder. Berg states that for any Diesel arrangement to have been even marginally effective for mass murder, it would have required an exceptionally well-informed team of experts to know and do all that was necessary. Berg mentions that even if someone had tried for a time to commit murder with Diesel exhaust, after a few tries it would have become apparent that something better was needed. Berg concludes that the evidence for Diesel gassings in the German concentration camps fails to meet the most basic standards that credible evidence must pass to satisfy reasonable people.[10]

Other scientists have concluded that there were no homicidal gas chambers in the German concentration camps. For example, the late Dr. William B. Lindsey, a research chemist employed for 33 years by the DuPont Corporation, testified in the 1985 Ernst Zuendel trial that he considered mass homicidal gassings in the camps to be technically impossible. Based on his on-site examination of the alleged homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz, Birkenau, and Majdanek, Dr. Lindsey stated: "I have come to the conclusion that no one was willfully or purposefully killed with Zyklon B in this manner. I consider it absolutely impossible."[11]

Several attempts have been made by defenders of the Holocaust story to refute revisionist scientific studies of the alleged homicidal gas chambers. For example, Jean-Claude Pressac, a French pharmacist, wrote a book published by the Beate Klarsfeld Foundation entitled Auschwitz: Techniques and Operation of the Gas Chambers. Pressac's book actually strengthens the revisionist view of the Holocaust story. Both explicitly and implicitly, Pressac discredits countless Holocaust claims and testimonies. Pressac writes: "This study already demonstrates the complete bankruptcy of the traditional [Holocaust] history…a history based for the most part on testimonies, assembled according to the need of the moment, truncated to fit an arbitrary truth and sprinkled with a few German documents of uneven value and without any connection to one another."[12]

Pressac's book, printed on 564 oversize pages, includes hundreds of good-quality reproductions of original German architectural plans and diagrams, photographs taken both during and after the war, and many

documents with translations. Remarkably, in the entire book, Pressac fails to mention anything about the techniques and operation of the German gas chambers. The title of his book is totally false. Revisionists say that since no homicidal gas chambers ever existed in the German concentration camps, Pressac did not write about the techniques and operation of the gas chambers because there was nothing to write about.[13]

The Kraków Institute of Forensic Research also published results in 1994 that attempt to refute the Leuchter Report. The team from the forensic institute claims not to have understood how it was possible for Prussian blue to have formed in walls as a result of their being exposed to hydrogen cyanide gas. The researchers therefore excluded Prussian blue and similar iron cyanide compounds from their analyses, resulting in much lower cyanide traces for the delousing chambers. Their analysis made it practically impossible to distinguish between rooms massively exposed to hydrogen cyanide and those which were not: all would have a cyanide residue of close to zero. The Kraków researchers concluded from their analysis that since the gas chambers and delousing facilities all had the same amount of cyanide residues, humans were gassed in the gas chambers.

Germar Rudolf gave the Kraków researchers irrefutable proof that Prussian blue can be formed in walls exposed to hydrogen cyanide gas, citing a case document in expert literature.[14] The authors of the Kraków report refused to change their report and admit they made a mistake. Rudolf states: "The only 'scientific' attempt to refute Frederick A. Leuchter's most intriguing thesis turns out to be one of the biggest scientific frauds of the 20th century. How desperate must they be—those who try to defend the established version of the Holocaust, i.e., the alleged systematic extermination of Jews in homicidal 'gas chambers,' that they resort to such obviously fraudulent methods?"[15]

Additional Evidence Refuting Homicidal Gas Chambers

In 1979 the U.S. government released wartime aerial photographs of the Auschwitz and Birkenau camps taken on several random days in 1944 during the height of the alleged extermination period. These photographs are so remarkable in their clarity that vehicles and even people can be distinguished in them. Many of these photographs were taken at mid-morning on typical workdays. None of these photos shows

huge pits or piles of bodies, smoking crematory chimneys, masses of Jews awaiting death outside of the alleged gas chambers, or mountains of coke used to fuel the crematoria. All of these would have been visible if Auschwitz and Birkenau had been the extermination centers they are said to have been.

In his book Auschwitz: The End of a Legend, Carlo Mattogno states in regard to Allied aerial photographs taken at Birkenau on May 31, 1944:

It is pointed out also that the aerial photographs taken by the Allied military on 31 May 1944, at the crucial time of presumed extermination, on the day of the arrival at Birkenau of about 15,000 deportees, and after 14 days of intense arrivals (184,000 deportees, averaging 13,000 per day) and with an extermination toll (according to Pressac's hypothesis) of at least 110,000 homicidally gassed, which would have had to average 7,800 per day, every single day for 14 consecutive days; after all of that, the photographs do not show the slightest evidence of this alleged enormous extermination: No trace of smoke, no trace of pits, crematory or otherwise, burning or not, no sign of dirt extracted from pits, no trace of wood set aside for use in pits, no sign of vehicles or any other type of activity in the crucial zones of the courtyard of Crematory V nor in the earth of Bunker 2, nor in Crematories II and III. These photographs constitute irrefutable proof that the story of extermination of the Hungarian Jews is historically unfounded.[16]

German aerial reconnaissance photographs taken in 1944 of the Treblinka camp also cast serious doubts on the widely accepted story that Treblinka was a mass extermination center. Discovered in 1989 in the National Archives in Washington, D.C., these photographs corroborate other evidence indicating that Treblinka was actually a transit camp. The photographs indicate that Treblinka was an extremely small camp. The camp's burial area appears too small to contain the hundreds of thousands of bodies supposedly buried there. Treblinka was not particularly well guarded or isolated. The aerial photographs show that fields where Polish farmers planted and cultivated crops were directly adjacent to the camp perimeter and were cultivated right up to the edge of the camp.[17]

John C. Ball, a geologist with experience interpreting aerial photographs, has reviewed the wartime aerial photos taken of Auschwitz-Birkenau, Treblinka, Belzec, Sobibór, Majdanek, and Babi Yar. Ball concludes: "To this day there is no air photo evidence to support the alleged mass murder of the Jews at any location in Europe occupied by the Germans during World War Two. Further, air photo analysis refutes the claim that the 'Nazis' had intended, at whatever time, to keep events in the alleged extermination camps secret. In many cases the air photos provide clear proof that some of the events attested to by witnesses, such as the destruction of Hungarian Jews or the mass executions at Babi Yar, did not in fact take place."[18]

A detailed forensic examination at the Treblinka camp using sophisticated electronic ground radar has also found no evidence of mass graves. An Australian team headed by Richard Krege, a qualified electronics engineer, carried out an examination at the site of the Treblinka camp. Krege's team used an $80,000 Ground Penetration Radar (GPR) device, which sends out vertical signals that are visible on a computer monitor. GPR devices are routinely used around the world by geologists, archeologists, and police. GPR detects any major disturbances in the soil to a normal effective depth of four or five meters.

For six days in October 1999 the team carefully examined the entire Treblinka site, especially the alleged "mass graves" portion, and carried out control examinations of the surrounding area. Krege's team also carried out visual soil inspections, and used an auger to take numerous soil samples. They found no soil disturbance consistent with the burial of hundreds of thousands of bodies, or even evidence that the ground had ever been disturbed. In addition, the team found no evidence of individual graves, bone remains, human ashes, or wood ashes. Richard Krege concludes from his examination of the site that Treblinka was never an extermination camp.[19]

Startling evidence was also revealed in 1989 when the Soviets released some of the Auschwitz death registry volumes that fell into Soviet hands in January 1945 when the Red Army captured Auschwitz. The death certificates contained in these volumes were official German documents issued by Auschwitz camp doctors upon the death of an inmate. Each death certificate includes the deceased person's full name, profession and religion, date and place of birth, pre-Auschwitz residence, parents' names, time of death, cause of death, and a camp physician's signature. The death registry volumes recorded the deaths of

approximately 69,000 Auschwitz inmates, of which approximately 30,000 were Jewish. Most of the deaths were caused by disease, although some death certificates recorded executions by shooting or hanging. None of the death certificates recorded death by homicidal gassings.[20]

The Auschwitz death registry volumes call into question the existence of homicidal gas chambers. Why would the German authorities record executions by shooting or hanging and not record any by gassing? Also, why did the Soviets suppress the release of these volumes for 44 years? The Auschwitz death registry volumes are totally inconsistent with Auschwitz being a center of mass extermination using homicidal gas chambers.[21]

Another important piece of evidence arguing against the existence of homicidal gas chambers is that the British broke the ultra-secret Enigma code used by the Germans to transmit secret communications. During 1942 and 1943 British intelligence intercepted daily coded messages from Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau, and seven other camps. Every day the Germans recorded the numbers of dead and the manner of death at each camp. The transmissions from Auschwitz mentioned illness as the primary cause of death, but also reported deaths attributable to shootings and hangings. There was no reference to homicidal gassings as a cause of death in any of the decoded messages.[22]

The numbers of dead in the decoded messages from Auschwitz roughly correlate with the numbers of dead recorded in the Auschwitz death registry volumes. Since the Germans made their reports in top-secret transmissions using a supposedly indecipherable code, why would they report deaths from shootings and hangings but not from homicidal gassings? The Germans would have no reason to hide deaths by homicidal gassings in their secret messages if such deaths had actually taken place.

David Cole, a Jewish American, has also produced a very revealing video based on his visit to Auschwitz in September 1992. Wearing a yarmulke and pretending to be a “righteous” Jew wanting to answer those who question the Holocaust story, Cole paid extra for his personal English-language tour guide. The video shows numerous weaknesses of the alleged homicidal gas chamber at Auschwitz: 1) Obvious marks on the walls and floors where apparently walls have been knocked down; 2) Equally obvious holes in the floor where bathroom facilities had been; 3) A flimsy wooden door with a big glass pane in it; 4) A doorway with no door and no fittings for a door leading to the crematorium ovens; 5) A big

manhole right in the middle of the gas chamber; and 6) No Zyklon B staining in the walls. Any reasonable person can tell that the alleged gas chamber shown in the video could not possibly function as a homicidal gas chamber.

In response to David Cole's questions, Cole's tour guide repeatedly states that the gas chamber at Auschwitz was in its original state. Unable to answer all of Cole's questions, Cole's tour guide went to get a woman who was introduced as the supervisor of tour guides for the Auschwitz State Museum. In response to Cole's question, the Auschwitz tour supervisor states that the holes in the ceiling of the alleged gas chamber at Auschwitz were rebuilt after the war. Thus, contrary to statements made by Cole's tour guide, the Auschwitz tour supervisor acknowledges that the alleged gas chamber at Auschwitz is not in its original state.

David Cole next interviewed Dr. Franciszek Piper, the head of archives and the senior curator of the Auschwitz State Museum. Dr. Piper explained in the interview that the gas chamber shown to tourists at Auschwitz is similar to the one that existed in 1941-1942, but not all details are the same so that, for example, there are no gas-tight doors. In other words, the gas chamber is not in its original state but is rather a postwar reconstruction. Cole's video documents that the museum officials deceive tourists by representing that the gas chamber at Auschwitz is in its original state even though the museum officials know better. The postwar reconstruction they show tourists at Auschwitz is worthless as proof of anything. Also, there is not a single wartime document or photograph to confirm what the alleged homicidal gas chamber at Auschwitz looked like.[23]

An additional defect of the alleged homicidal gas chamber at Auschwitz is that it has no mechanism to heat the room to above 78.3º F (25.7° C). Zyklon B crystals will not turn to gas until the temperature reaches at least 78.3ºF. Since the temperature at Auschwitz is less than 78.3º F most of the year, a method of heating the chamber to a temperature above 78.3º is essential for the successful operation of the gas chamber. Especially in winter but also during other times of the year, the increased heat generated from having dozens of people assembled in the gas chamber would not usually heat the temperature in the gas chamber to above 78.3º F.[24]

Defenders of the Holocaust story have sometimes made concessions to Revisionist researchers. In the book Auschwitz: 1270 to

Present, by Robert Jan van Pelt and Deborah Dwork, the two Jewish authors admit that the gas chamber shown to tourists at the main Auschwitz camp is largely a postwar reconstruction built by the Polish government. The authors still allege, however, that there were gas chambers at Birkenau.[25]

There has also been a trend to minimize the importance of the gas chambers in the Holocaust story. In his book Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?: The "Final Solution" in History, Princeton University professor Arno J. Mayer states: "From 1942 to 1945, certainly at Auschwitz, but probably overall, more Jews were killed by so-called 'natural' causes than by 'unnatural' ones."[26] In the same book Dr. Mayer admits that "Sources for the study of the gas chambers are at once rare and unreliable."[27]

In his 2009 book Worse Than War: Genocide, Eliminationism and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen states:

The Germans' extermination of the Jews is infamous precisely for the gas chambers and the so-called assembly-line killing. Yet whatever such death factories' existential horror and significance, these installations were not essential for mass murder. This is so obvious it is astonishing that the gas chambers have been turned into the horror's central aspect, to the longtime neglect and exclusion of so much else (particularly the perpetrators and the victims), as if the gas chambers and technology themselves caused the killing instead of being the incidental implements of people who wanted to kill. Modern technology was unnecessary, and the Germans knew this. They killed their victims overwhelmingly without gassing….[28]

Since the existence of homicidal gas chambers in the German concentration camps has been scientifically disproven, it is understandable that Goldhagen and Mayer would want to minimize the importance of homicidal gas chambers in the alleged genocide of European Jewry.

Eyewitness Testimony of German Genocide of Jewry

Inevitably when anyone questions the genocide of European Jewry, the eyewitness testimony is raised as proof that the genocide happened. However, most of the eyewitness accounts of the Holocaust story have proved to be extremely unreliable.

For example, John Demjanjuk, a naturalized American citizen, was accused by eyewitnesses of being a murderous guard at Treblinka named Ivan the Terrible. Demjanjuk was deported to Israel, and an Israeli court tried and convicted him primarily based on the eyewitness testimony of five Jewish survivors of Treblinka. Demjanjuk's defense attorney eventually uncovered new evidence proving that the Soviet KGB had framed Demjanjuk, and that documents supposedly showing him to be a guard at Treblinka were Soviet forgeries. The Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the eyewitness accounts were not credible and that Demjanjuk was innocent.[29]

Another example of false witness testimony of the Holocaust story occurred in the case of Frank Walus, who was a retired Chicago factory worker charged with killing Jews in his native Poland during the war. An accusation by Simon Wiesenthal that Walus had worked for the Gestapo prompted the U.S. government's legal action. During Walus's trial 11 Jews testified under oath that Walus had murdered Jews during the war. After a costly four-year legal battle, Walus was finally able to prove that he had spent the war years as a teenager working on German farms. An American Bar Association article published in 1981 concluded in regard to Walus's trial that"…in an atmosphere of hatred and loathing verging on hysteria, the government persecuted an innocent man."[30]

It would be impossible for me to discuss every eyewitness account of the Holocaust story. To illustrate the unreliability of eyewitness accounts of the Holocaust story, I will analyze the eyewitness accounts of probably its three most famous survivors: Elie Wiesel, Simon Wiesenthal, and Viktor Frankl.

Elie Wiesel, whose autobiography Night written in 1956 helped him win the Nobel Peace Prize, never mentions homicidal gas chambers in his book. Instead, Wiesel writes that Jews were killed en masse by being thrown alive in burning pits.[31] If there had actually been homicidal gas chambers at Birkenau, one would think that Wiesel would have mentioned the gas chambers in his autobiography. Also, if there had

been burning pits at Birkenau, these would have shown in some of the Allied aerial photographs taken of Birkenau in 1944.

Wiesel also mentions in Night that he had surgery on an infected foot in January 1945. The German authorities at Birkenau gave Wiesel and other hospital patients unfit to travel the option to remain in the camp. Wiesel and his father decided to evacuate Birkenau and travel to Buchenwald with the Germans rather than be liberated by the Russian army.[32] If Birkenau had been a place of mass exterminations, why would Wiesel choose to travel with his supposed killers? Also, why would the German authorities at Birkenau leave behind thousands of witnesses to their genocide if a policy of genocide had actually been in place at Birkenau?

That Wiesel survived his internment at Buchenwald is, of course, the result of a miracle. Wiesel states: "In Buchenwald they sent 10,000 persons to their deaths each day. I was always in the last hundred near the gate. They stopped. Why?"[33] Today no credible historian believes that 10,000 Jews per day were executed at Buchenwald.

A remarkable witness himself, Wiesel assures us that he has met other remarkable witnesses. Wiesel states in one of his books that after Jews were executed at Babi Yar in the Ukraine: "Eyewitnesses say that for months after the killings the ground continued to spurt geysers of blood. One was always treading on corpses."[34] Wiesel repeats this claim later with some embellishment: "Later, I learn from a witness that, for month after month, the ground never stopped trembling; and that, from time to time, geysers of blood spurted from it."[35] This story lacks all credibility. Wiesel does not seem to know that photos taken at Babi Yar shortly after the alleged mass executions of Jews show no indication of any mass grave site or any disturbance of the foliage or ground cover.[36]

Famed Nazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthal also reports a trip to a German camp hospital in his book The Murderers Among Us. Wiesenthal wrote that he tried to commit suicide by cutting his wrists while incarcerated by the Germans. Instead of letting him die, the Germans sent him to the hospital where they nursed him back to health.[37] If the Germans were intent on committing genocide against European Jewry, why would they make the effort to send both Wiesel and Wiesenthal to the hospital to restore their health?

Viktor Frankl's book Man's Search for Meaning has been ranked by the Library of Congress as one of the 20th century's 10 most influential

books in the United States. Frankl describes his experiences at Auschwitz in this book as if he had spent many months there. In reality, Frankl was in Auschwitz only for a few days in October 1944 while in transit from Theresienstadt to a sub-camp of Dachau. Frankl has admitted this to the American evangelist Robert Schuller: "I was in Auschwitz only three or four days….I was sent to a barrack and we were all transported to a camp in Bavaria."[38] Frankl's short time in Auschwitz is substantiated by the prisoner log from the sub-camp of Dachau, Kaufering III, which listed Frankl's arrival on Oct. 25, 1944, six days after his departure from Theresienstadt.[39] Thus, Frankl's descriptions of his long stay at Auschwitz in Man's Search for Meaning are false and inaccurate.

The unreliability of eyewitness testimony of the Holocaust story has also been commented on by some historians. Jewish historian Samuel Gringauz criticized what he called the "hyperhistorical" nature of most Jewish survivor testimony. Gringauz wrote that "most of the memoirs and reports are full of preposterous verbosity, graphomanic exaggeration, dramatic effects, overestimated self-inflation, dilettante philosophizing, would-be lyricism, unchecked rumors, bias, partisan attacks and apologies."[40]

Shmuel Krakowski, archives director of Israel's Yad Vashem Holocaust Center, confirmed in 1986 that more than half of the testimonies of Jewish survivors on file there are unreliable. Krakowski said that many survivors, wanting to be a part of history, may have let their imaginations run away with them. He stated that many of the testimonies on file at Yad Vashem were later proved to be inaccurate when locations and dates could not pass an expert historian's appraisal. Krakowski commented on the Jewish survivor testimony, "Many were never in the places where they claimed to have witnessed atrocities, while others relied on secondhand information given them by friends or passing strangers."[41]

Although seldom mentioned in the press, numerous eyewitnesses have reported that they did not see any evidence of genocide in the German concentration camps. One of the first to dispute reports of German genocide was Paul Rassinier. Rassinier was a French professor of history who was arrested during the war for resistance activities, which included helping to smuggle Jews into neutral Switzerland. Rassinier stated that although he suffered greatly during the war in the Buchenwald and Dora concentration camps, he never saw any evidence of homicidal gas chambers or any program to exterminate the Jews. After reading

sensationalized accounts that he knew were false, Rassinier felt it was his ethical duty to tell the truth about the camps and refute the false claims being made in the world's press.

Rassinier wrote extensively about his own experiences and observations in the German camps. He also began to research the entire issue of German genocide against the Jews during the war. Rassinier concluded that the death toll in the camps was far lower than alleged. He also concluded that the deaths in the camps were not caused by a German program of genocide,[42] but rather primarily by the poor conditions of the camps attributable to the economic collapse of Germany during a devastating war. Rassinier had nothing to gain personally from taking his unpopular position, and after suffering greatly in the German concentration camps, he then suffered intense persecution in postwar France for his courageous writings after the war.

Thies Christophersen was another witness who said that the alleged genocide of Jews during the war never happened. Christophersen supervised about 300 workers, many of them Jewish, at Auschwitz from January to December 1944. On a number of occasions during this period he visited Birkenau where allegedly hundreds of thousands of Jews were being gassed to death. In a memoir first published in Germany in 1973, The Auschwitz Lie, Christophersen wrote that during the time he was at Auschwitz he did not notice the slightest evidence of mass gassings. In March 1988 at the Ernst Zuendel trial in Toronto, he also successfully answered numerous pointed questions by the prosecuting attorney about his experiences at Auschwitz.

After The Auschwitz Lie was published, Christophersen received thousands of letters and calls. He wrote in regard to these letters and calls:

Many of those who contacted me can confirm my statements, but are afraid to do so publicly. Some of those are SS men who were brutally mistreated and even tortured in Allied captivity. I also immediately contacted those who claimed to know more about mass gassings. My experiences were precisely the same as those of French professor Paul Rassinier. I have not found any eyewitnesses. Instead, people would tell me that they knew someone who knew someone else, who talked about it. In most cases the alleged eyewitnesses had died. Other supposed eyewitnesses would quickly begin to stammer and stutter when I asked a few precise

questions. Even Simon Wiesenthal had to finally admit before a Frankfurt district court that he was actually never in Auschwitz. All of the reports I have heard about are contradictory. Everyone seemed to tell a different story about the gas chambers. They couldn't even agree about where they were supposed to have been located. This is also true of the so-called scholarly literature, which is full of contradictions….[43]

Another eyewitness who did not see any evidence of genocide of the Jews is Dr. Wilhelm Staeglich. Dr. Staeglich, a German judge, visited Auschwitz several times during the Second World War as a German orderly officer of an Anti-aircraft Detachment. Dr. Staeglich published the following account of his visits to Auschwitz:

On none of these visits did I see gassing installations, crematoria, instruments of torture, or similar horrors. The camp gave one the impression of being well-kept and very well-organized. The camp reminded me of the German Labor Front camp in which I served out my six-month stretch in the Labor Service, except that Auschwitz was, of course, considerably larger….None of the inmates behaved as though they were in fear of mistreatment, let alone death.

On the later point, one encounter with inmates especially sticks in my memory. As some comrades and I were standing near the camp one evening, we caught sight of a big gang of inmates returning to camp from work in the industrial plants. They were escorted by a relatively small contingent of SS-men—mostly older people—and seemed to be thoroughly undisciplined.

They talked loudly among themselves, laughing all the while. Two or three inmates dropped out of line when they spotted us, opened their flies, and made water. Although this gesture could have been interpreted as a sign of contempt for German men in uniform, the SS guards ignored it completely. Later, whenever I heard that mortal terror prevailed in the concentration camps, I had to recall this incident. That is hardly the way people who are in constant fear of death behave.[44]

Another credible eyewitness is the Austrian-born Canadian Maria Van Herwaarden, who was interned at Birkenau starting in 1942. Van Herwaarden testified at the 1988 Ernst Zuendel trial that she saw nothing at Birkenau that resembled mass murder. She did testify, however, that

many of the inmates at Birkenau died of typhus and some inmates committed suicide.[45] No prosecution witnesses were called during this trial because the prosecution knew of no survivors who could withstand cross examination by Zuendel's defense attorney.

The Nuremberg Trials

The genocide of European Jewry has been given legitimacy by the numerous trials conducted by the Allies after the Second World War. The first trial held in Nuremberg, from 1945 to 1946, officially known as the International Military Tribunal (IMT), is by far the most important of these trials. The governments of the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France tried the most prominent surviving German leaders as war criminals in this trial. In addition, the United States government alone conducted 12 secondary Nuremberg trials from 1946 to 1949. Similar trials were also conducted in other locations by Great Britain, West Germany, the United States, and Israel, including the highly publicized trial in Israel of Adolf Eichmann.

The Allies gave special attention to the alleged extermination of 6 million Jews at the Nuremberg trials. For example, chief U.S. prosecutor Robert H. Jackson declared in his opening address to the tribunal: "The most savage and numerous crimes planned and committed by the Nazis were those against the Jews….It is my purpose to show a plan and design to which all Nazis were fanatically committed to annihilate all Jewish people….The avowed purpose was the destruction of the Jewish people as a whole….History does not record a crime ever perpetrated against so many victims or one ever carried out with such calculated cruelty."[46]

Sir Hartley Shawcross, the chief British prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials, echoed Justice Jackson's sentiments in his final address to the tribunal: "There is one group to which the method of annihilation was applied on a scale so immense that it is my duty to refer separately to the evidence. I mean the extermination of the Jews. If there was no other crime against these men, this one alone, in which all of them were implicated, would suffice. History holds no parallel to these horrors."[47] Shawcross also stated in his closing address that "more than 6 million" Jews were killed by the Germans, and that "murder [was] conducted like some mass production industry in the gas chambers and the ovens of Auschwitz, Dachau, Treblinka, Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Majdanek and Oranienburg."[48]

Although the Nuremberg trials had an appearance of fairness in a courtroom setting, they were organized not to dispense impartial justice, but for political purposes. The victorious Allies had control over the judges, prosecution, defense, and execution of the surviving German leaders. Our Western concept of justice relies on the impartial administering of the law. Such justice is not possible when the judges are the political enemies of the accused, and when the accused are prosecuted for acts of war that the Allies themselves had committed.

Some leading Allied figures acknowledged that the Nuremberg trials were organized primarily for political purposes. Norman Birkett, a British alternate judge at the Nuremberg Tribunal, stated in a private letter in April 1946 that "the trial is only in form a judicial process and its main importance is political."[49] Chief U.S. prosecutor Robert H. Jackson stated that the Nuremberg Tribunal "is a continuation of the Allied war effort against Germany."[50] Judge Iola T. Nikitchenko explained the Soviet view of the Nuremberg Tribunal: "The fact that the Nazi leaders are criminals has already been established. The task of the tribunal is only to determine the measure of guilt of each particular person and mete out the necessary punishment—the sentences."[51]

The mostly political nature of the Nuremberg trials is also indicated by Nahum Goldmann in his book The Jewish Paradox. Goldmann, president of the World Jewish Congress (WJC), admits that the idea of the Nuremberg Tribunal and German reparations originated with WJC officials. Only after persistent efforts by WJC officials were Allied leaders persuaded to accept the idea of the Nuremberg trials.[52] Also, the WJC made sure that Germany's extermination of European Jewry was a primary focus of the trials, and that the defendants would be punished for their involvement in Germany's extermination process.[53]

Iowa Supreme Court Justice Charles F. Wennerstrum, who served as the presiding judge in the Nuremberg trial of German generals, resigned his appointment in disgust at the proceedings. He criticized the one-sided handling of evidence in the trials. Wennerstrum said that selection of the evidence in the trials was made by the prosecution from the large tonnage of captured German records. Wennerstrum stated: "If I had known seven months ago what I know today, I would never have come here. The high ideals announced as the motives for creating these tribunals have not been evident."[54]

Justice Wennerstrum also said that Jews dominated the staff of the Nuremberg courts and were more interested in revenge than justice.

He stated: "The entire atmosphere is unwholesome….Lawyers, clerks, interpreters, and researchers were employed who became Americans only in recent years, whose backgrounds were embedded in Europe's hatreds and prejudices."[55] Wennerstrum left the Nuremberg trials "with a feeling that justice has been denied."

U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone said of Justice Robert Jackson, who left the U.S. Supreme Court to lead the IMT tribunal: "Jackson is away conducting his high-grade lynching party in Nuremberg. I don't mind what he does to the Nazis, but I hate to see the pretense that he is running a court and proceeding according to the common law. This is a little too sanctimonious a fraud to meet my old-fashioned ideas." Stone wondered on another occasion "whether, under this new [Nuremberg] doctrine of international law, if we had been defeated, the victors could plausibly assert that our supplying Britain with 50 destroyers was an act of aggression…."[56]

U.S. Sen. Robert A. Taft courageously denounced the Nuremberg trials in an October 1946 speech: "The trial of the vanquished by the victors cannot be impartial no matter how it is hedged about with the forms of justice." Taft went on to state:

About this whole judgment there is a spirit of vengeance, and vengeance is seldom justice. The hanging of the 11 men convicted will be a blot on the American record which we will long regret. In these trials we have accepted the Russian idea of the purpose of the trials—government policy and not justice—with little relationship to Anglo-Saxon heritage. By clothing policy in forms of legal procedure, we may discredit the whole idea of justice in Europe for years to come.[57]

Several U.S. congressmen also denounced the Nuremberg trials. For example, John Rankin of Mississippi declared: "As a representative of the American people I desire to say that what is taking place in Nuremberg, Germany is a disgrace to the United States….A racial minority, two and a half years after the war closed, are in Nuremberg not only hanging German soldiers but trying German businessmen in the name of the United States."[58] Rep. Lawrence H. Smith of Wisconsin stated: "The Nuremberg trials are so repugnant to the Anglo-Saxon principles of justice that we must forever be ashamed of that page in our

history….The Nuremberg farce represents a revenge policy at its worst."[59]

Gen. George Patton was also opposed to the war crimes trials. In a letter to his wife he wrote: "I am frankly opposed to this war criminal stuff. It is not cricket and it is Semitic. I am also opposed to sending POWs to work as slaves in foreign lands, where many will be starved to death."[60] Among many others expressing similar views, U.S. Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas wrote: "I thought at the time and still think that the Nuremberg trials were unprincipled. Law was created ex post facto to suit the passion and clamor of the time."[61]

U.S. Rear Adm. H. Lamont Pugh, former Navy surgeon general and commanding officer of the National Naval Medical Center, wrote concerning the Nuremberg trials, "I thought the trials in general bordered upon international lunacy." Even Robert Jackson wrote in a letter dated Oct. 12, 1945, to President Harry Truman: "[The Allies] have done or are doing some of the very things we are prosecuting the Germans for. The French are so violating the Geneva Convention in the treatment of [German] prisoners of war that our command is taking back prisoners sent to them. We are prosecuting plunder and our allies are practicing it. We say aggressive war is a crime and one of our allies asserts sovereignty over the Baltic states based on no title except conquest."[62]

Allied prosecutors also used torture to help convict the defendants at Nuremberg and other postwar trials. A leading example of the use of torture to obtain evidence at the Nuremberg trials is the confession of Rudolf Hoess, who was a former commandant at Auschwitz. Hoess's testimony at the Nuremberg trial was probably the most important and striking evidence presented there of a German extermination program. Hoess said that more than two and a half million people were exterminated in the Auschwitz gas chambers, and that another 500,000 inmates had died there of other causes.[63] No defender of the Holocaust story today accepts these inflated figures, and other key portions of Hoess's testimony at Nuremberg are widely acknowledged to be untrue.

In 1983 the anti-Nazi book Legions of Death by Rupert Butler showed that Sgt. Bernard Clarke and other British officers tortured Rudolf Hoess into making his confession. The torture of Hoess was exceptionally brutal. Neither Clarke nor Butler finds anything wrong or immoral in the torture of Hoess. Neither of them seems to understand the importance of their revelations. Clarke and Butler prove that Hoess's

testimony at Nuremberg was obtained by torture, and is therefore not credible evidence in proving a program of German genocide against European Jewry.[64]

Widespread reports of torture at the American-run trials at Dachau resulted in a formal investigation of the alleged abuses. The Simpson Army Commission officially confirmed the charges of gross abuse against the German defendants. They found that the German defendants at Dachau were routinely tortured with savage beatings, kicking of testicles, months of solitary confinement, burning splinters under fingernails, starvation, and threats of family reprisals. Investigators pretending to be priests were used to obtain false confessions. Low ranking defendants were promised that their "confessions" would be used only against their former superiors; however, these defendants found that their "confessions" were used against them when they were later tried. High ranking defendants were also falsely assured that by accepting responsibility themselves they would protect their former subordinates from prosecution.[65]

Pennsylvania judge Edward Van Roden was a member of the Simpson Army Commission that investigated the methods of torture used at the Dachau trials. In the Jan. 9, 1949, Washington Daily News and in the Jan. 23, 1949, London Sunday Pictorial he told of some examples of the use of torture at Dachau: "[T]he investigators would put a black hood over the accused's head and then punch him in the face with brass knuckles, kick him and beat him with rubber hoses….All but two of the Germans, in the 139 cases we investigated, had been kicked in the testicles beyond repair."[66]

Much of the proof offered today by historians of the genocide of European Jewry is the "confessions" extracted by torture at the war crime trials. Among the most celebrated cases, Rudolph Hoess, Hans Frank, Julius Streicher, Hans Fritsche, Oswald Pohl, Franz Ziereis, and Josef Kramer were all subject to torture. Obviously, no "confession" obtained under torture would be considered credible evidence in a court of law.

In addition to torturing defendants into making confessions, some defendants did not live to see the beginning of their trials. For example, Richard Baer, the last commandant of Auschwitz, adamantly refused to confirm the existence of homicidal gas chambers at Auschwitz. Baer died in June 1963 under mysterious circumstances while being held in pretrial custody. An autopsy performed on Baer at the Frankfurt-am-Main University School of Medicine stated that the ingestion of an odorless,

non-corrosive poison could not be ruled out as the cause of his death. The Auschwitz Trial in Frankfurt, Germany began almost immediately after Baer's death. With Baer's death the prosecutors at the Auschwitz Trial were able to attain their primary objective—to reinforce the gas chamber myth and establish it as an unassailable historical fact.[67]

We also now know that many of the witnesses at the main IMT trial gave false testimony. One of the best examples is the three witnesses at Nuremberg who testified that Germans were responsible for the mass execution of Polish officers at Katyn. Today everybody agrees that the Soviet Union and not Germany was responsible for the Katyn Forest massacres.[68]

False witnesses were also used at most of the later Allied war crime trials. Stephen F. Pinter served as a U.S. Army prosecuting attorney at the American trials of Germans at Dachau. In a 1960 affidavit Pinter said that "notoriously perjured witnesses" were used to charge Germans with false and unfounded crimes. Pinter stated, "Unfortunately, as a result of these miscarriages of justice, many innocent persons were convicted and some were executed."[69]

Joseph Halow, a young U.S. court reporter at the Dachau trials in 1947, later described some of the false witnesses at the Dachau trials:

[T]he major portion of the witnesses for the prosecution in the concentration-camp cases were what came to be known as "professional witnesses," and everyone working at Dachau regarded them as such. "Professional," since they were paid for each day they testified. In addition, they were provided free housing and food, at a time when these were often difficult to come by in Germany. Some of them stayed in Dachau for months, testifying in every one of the concentration-camp cases. In other words, these witnesses made their living testifying for the prosecution. Usually, they were former inmates from the camps, and their strong hatred of the Germans should, at the very least, have called their testimony into question.[70]

An embarrassing example of perjured witness testimony occurred at the Dachau trials. U.S. investigator Josef Kirschbaum brought a former concentration camp inmate named Einstein into the court to testify that the defendant, Menzel, had murdered Einstein's brother.

Menzel, however, foiled this testimony—he had only to point to Einstein's brother sitting in the court room listening to the story of his own murder. Kirschbaum thereupon turned to Einstein and exclaimed, "How can we bring this pig to the gallows, if you are so stupid as to bring your brother into the court?"[71]

Nevertheless, many defenders of the Holocaust story maintain that the 42-volume Trial of the Major War Criminals (The Blue Series) supplies a massive compilation of damning evidence against Germany's National Socialist regime. In his book Made in Russia: The Holocaust, Carlos Porter confronts the evidence directly by reproducing page after page from the Blue Series. Porter shows that many of the charges made at Nuremberg are so bizarre that most defenders of the Holocaust story have long since let them lapse. In addition to killing Jews in homicidal gas chambers, the Germans at Nuremberg were accused of:

• Building special electrical appliances to zap inmates to death with mass electrical shocks;

• Killing 20,000 Jews in a village near Auschwitz with an atomic bomb;

• Forcing prisoners to climb trees and then killing the prisoners by cutting down the trees;

• Killing 840,000 Russian prisoners at the Sachsenhausen concentration camp using a pedal-driven brain-bashing machine, and then burning the bodies in four mobile crematories;

• Torturing and executing people at the Yanov camp in Russia in time to music created by a special orchestra selected from among the prisoners, and then shooting every member of the orchestra;

• Grinding the bones of 200 people at one time as described in documents and photographs that have disappeared;

• Making lampshades, handbags, driving gloves for SS officers, book bindings, saddles, house slippers, etc. out of human skin;

• Killing prisoners and concentration camp inmates for everything from having soiled underwear to having armpit hair; and

• Steaming people to death like lobsters in steam chambers at Treblinka.

After this incredible survey of Nuremberg atrocity evidence, Carlos Porter provides numerous examples of improper prosecution tactics at Nuremberg. The defendants at Nuremberg were rarely able to confront their accusers, since affidavits from witnesses who had been deposed months before sufficed. The prosecution made it difficult for the defense lawyers to have timely access to the documents introduced into evidence by the prosecution. Also, photocopies and transcripts were usually submitted into evidence instead of the original German documents, which in many cases seemed to have disappeared. Finally, the defense had access only to those documents which the prosecution considered material to the case. The defense had no right to review the tons of remaining documents that might help them defend their clients.[72]

The defendants at Nuremberg were often shocked by the evidence presented to substantiate the genocide of European Jewry. For example, Hans Frank, the wartime governor of German-ruled Poland, testified that he had not known of a program of mass killings against the Jews during the war. However, when asked if he had participated in the annihilation of the Jews, Hans Frank stated: "I say yes…particularly after hearing the testimony of the witness Hoess, my conscience does not allow me to throw the responsibility on these minor people….A thousand years will pass and still this guilt of Germany will not have been erased."[73] This last sentence has been repeatedly quoted in books and articles about the National Socialist period. It does not prove that Germany had a program of genocide against the Jews. It only shows that Hans Frank believed the false testimony from Rudolf Hoess that had been criminally obtained through the use of torture.

Contrary to what is often claimed or insinuated, none of the defendants at the Nuremberg trials stated that they knew anything of an extermination plan of Jews during the war. Hermann Goering, Hans Frank, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Albert Speer, Gen. Alfred Jodl, and the other Nuremberg defendants all denied knowing anything of an extermination policy against European Jewry. While such testimony is often dismissed as lying, the categorical and consistent nature of their testimony, sometimes by men who assumed they would be hanged, suggests that they were telling the truth.[74]

No Order, Plan, Budget or Organization for Genocide

Originally the Holocaust story assumed that Germany had a plan or program for exterminating the Jews. In the 1961 edition of his book The Destruction of European Jews, Raul Hilberg wrote that in 1941 Hitler issued two orders for the extermination of the Jews.[75] However, even though the Allies captured most of Germany's government and concentration camp records intact, no order or plan has ever been found to exterminate European Jewry.

In the revised 1985 edition of Hilberg's book, all references to such extermination orders from Hitler were removed. Exterminationist historian Christopher Browning, in a review of the revised edition of The Destruction of European Jews, wrote: "In the new edition, all references in the text to a Hitler decision or Hitler order for the 'Final Solution' have been systematically excised. Buried at the bottom of a single footnote stands the solitary reference: 'Chronology and circumstances point to a Hitler decision before the summer ended.' In the new edition, decisions were not made and orders were not given."[76]

When asked in 1983 how the extermination of European Jewry took place without an order, Raul Hilberg replied:

What began in 1941 was a process of destruction not planned in advance, not organized centrally by any agency. There was no blueprint and there was no budget for destructive measures. They were taken step by step, one step at a time. Thus came about not so much a plan being carried out, but an incredible meeting of minds, a consensus—mind reading by a far-flung bureaucracy.[77]

On Jan. 16, 1985, under cross-examination at the first Ernst Zuendel trial in Toronto, Raul Hilberg confirmed that he said these words.[78] Thus, Hilberg states that the genocide of European Jewry was not carried out by a plan or order, but rather by an incredible mind reading among farflung German bureaucrats.

Other historians have acknowledged that no document of a plan by Germany to exterminate European Jewry has ever been found. In his well-known book on the Holocaust, French-Jewish historian Leon Poliakov states that "the campaign to exterminate the Jews, as regards its

conception as well as many other essential aspects, remains shrouded in darkness." Poliakov adds that no documents of a plan for exterminating the Jews have ever been found because "perhaps none ever existed."[79] British historian Ian Kershaw states that when the Soviet archives were opened in the early 1990s: "Predictably, a written order by Hitler for the 'Final Solution' was not found. The presumption that a single, explicit written order had ever been given had long been dismissed by most historians."[80]

The lack of an order from Hitler to exterminate European Jewry has divided Holocaust historians into "intentionalists" and "functionalists." The intentionalists believe that there was a premeditated policy of extermination secretly ordered by Hitler, while the functionalists believe that Germany's wartime extermination policy evolved at lower levels as the war progressed. The crucial point to remember in this controversy is that despite the fact that the Allies captured many tons of German documents, no one has found any documentary evidence of a wartime order, plan, or program by Germany to exterminate Europe's Jews.

Evidence also exists that the German authorities responsible for the camps ordered measures to reduce deaths of inmates due to disease. On Dec. 28, 1942, SS officer Richard Gluecks, who was the head of the camp administration office, sent a directive to commandants of the concentration camps. It ordered that "camp physicians must use all means at their disposal to significantly reduce the death rate in the various camps…. The camp doctors are to see to it that the working conditions at the various labor sites are improved as much as possible." The directive also stressed that "the Reichsfuehrer SS [Heinrich Himmler] has ordered that the death rate absolutely must be reduced."[81] Gluecks followed up his directive in January of 1943 by informing the concentration camp commandants, "As I have already pointed out, every means must be used to lower the death rate in the camps."[82]

German camp administrator Oswald Pohl, in an order dated Oct. 26, 1943, gave specific measures to ensure the health and productivity of the internees of the camps. A copy of the order was sent to Himmler. Pohl began by stating the importance of the camps in the war effort. In addition to stressing the importance of proper nutrition, clothing, and rest, Pohl specified that ill prisoners were to receive a special diet to help restore their health.[83] While such directives were not always implemented as ordered, such directives did help to lower the death rates in the camps.

Such orders are inconsistent with a plan to commit genocide against European Jewry.

Many defenders of the Holocaust story claim that the Wannsee conference held on Jan. 20, 1942, was the start of a program to systematically exterminate Europe's Jews. The documentary evidence of this meeting shows that no extermination program existed; instead, the German policy was to evacuate the Jews to the east. Israeli Holocaust historian Yehuda Bauer has declared, "The public still repeats, time after time, the silly story that at Wannsee the extermination of the Jews was arrived at."[84] Likewise, Israeli Holocaust historian Leni Yahil has stated in regard to the Wannsee conference, "[I]t is often assumed that the decision to launch the Final Solution was taken on this occasion, but this is not so…."[85]

Defenders of the Holocaust story also inevitably quote speeches from Adolph Hitler, Joseph Goebbels, and Heinrich Himmler or writings from Hitler, Goebbels, and Hans Frank to prove that Germany had an extermination program against Jews during the war. Utterances by Hitler such as "…The world war is here, the annihilation of Jewry must be the necessary consequence" and "[N]ow that the German people have lost another 160,000 dead on the Eastern Front, the originators of this bloody conflict will have to pay for it with their lives" are quoted to prove that Germany had a program to exterminate European Jewry.[86]

In this regard, it should be noted that bloodthirsty and inflammatory statements were also made by the Allies during the war. In a war in which many millions of people were killed, emotions ran high and highly provocative and heated statements were made by supposedly responsible people on both sides of the war. Such statements do not prove that Germany had a program of extermination against the Jews. Instead, these statements reflect the German leaders' belief that world Jewry had started World War II and must be defeated.

It should also be noted that defenders of the Holocaust story claim that the Germans took extreme measures to preserve the secrecy of their extermination program. This is why no one has ever found an order, plan, budget, or organization by Germany to exterminate European Jewry. It is untenable and absurd to think that German leaders would be stupid enough to make written and public statements about their genocide of European Jewry when they were taking extreme measures to hide their extermination of the Jews.

Horrific Scenes at German Concentration Camps

When U.S. and British troops entered German concentration camps at the end of World War II, they discovered huge piles of dead bodies and emaciated and diseased surviving inmates. The horrific scenes were filmed and photographed for posterity by the U.S. Army Signal Corps. Prominent newsmen and politicians were flown in to Germany to see the harrowing evidence at the camps for themselves. Films of the horrific scenes at the camps were made mandatory viewing for the vanquished populace of Germany, so that their national pride would be destroyed and replaced with feelings of collective guilt.

Nothing has been more effective in establishing the reality of the Holocaust story in the minds of Americans than these terrible scenes encountered by troops at the German concentration camps. Today many state laws make viewing films of these awful scenes of the German camps mandatory for school children. Proponents of showing these graphic films to school children say that the trauma induced from watching these films is necessary to teach our children about the dangers of racism and anti-Semitism.

What school children and the general public are not told is that most of the inmates in these camps died of natural causes. When American and British forces took control of the German concentration camps, they were followed by military personnel charged with documenting evidence of German war crimes. One of these was Dr. Charles P. Larson, a leading American forensic pathologist, who performed autopsies at Dachau and its sub-camps. At Dachau Dr. Larson performed about 25 autopsies a day for 10 days and superficially examined another 300 to 1,000 bodies. He autopsied only those bodies that appeared to be questionable. Dr. Larson stated in regard to these autopsies at Dachau:

Many of them died from typhus. Dachau's crematoriums couldn't keep up with the burning of the bodies. They did not have enough oil to keep the incinerators going. I found that a number of the victims had also died from tuberculosis. All of them were malnourished. The medical facilities were most inadequate. There was no sanitation….

A rumor going around Dachau after we got there was that many of the prisoners were poisoned. I did a lot of toxicological analysis to determine the facts and removed organs from a crosssection of about 30 to 40 bodies and sent them into Paris to the Army's First Medical

laboratory for analysis, since I lacked the proper facilities in the field. The reports came back negative. I could not find where any of these people had been poisoned. The majority died of natural diseases of one kind or another….[87]

Dr. Larson did report that a number of inmates had been shot at some of the German camps and that the living conditions in the camps were atrocious. The average daily caloric intake of the inmates was far short of requirements, thus accounting for the extreme emaciation of many of the inmates. However, since Dr. Larson's autopsy reports were inconsistent with a program of extermination or genocide, they were not introduced into evidence at the Nuremberg trials.

Dr. John E. Gordon, M.D., Ph.D., a professor of preventive medicine and epidemiology at the Harvard University School of Public Health, was with U.S. forces at the end of World War II. Dr. Gordon determined that disease, and especially typhus, was the No. 1 cause of death in the German camps. Dr. Gordon explained the causes for the outbreaks of disease and typhus as follows:

Germany in the spring months of April and May [1945] was an astounding sight, a mixture of humanity traveling this way and that, homeless, often hungry and carrying typhus with them….

Germany was in chaos. The destruction of whole cities and the path left by advancing armies produced a disruption of living conditions contributing to the spread of disease. Sanitation was low grade, public utilities were seriously disrupted, food supply and food distribution was poor, housing was inadequate and order and discipline were everywhere lacking. Still more important, a shifting of population was occurring such as few times have experienced.[88]

Dr. Russell Barton, an English physician who later became an American psychiatrist, entered Bergen-Belsen with British forces as a young medical student on May 2, 1945. Dr. Barton's first impression of the camp was one of horror; some inmates were dead and piled up outside the huts, others were in various stages of dying, disease and dehydration. Barton examined the camp's well-equipped kitchens and found record books listing the food that had been cooked and distributed going back to 1942. Dr. Barton determined from his examination of the camp records that there had been no deliberate policy of starvation at Bergen-Belsen.

Dr. Barton made inquiries with inmates, including Jewish doctors, who told him that Bergen-Belsen had not been too bad until the autumn of 1944. Then, as the Russian armies were advancing, the inmates said they had been given the choice of remaining in the camps about to be overrun by the Soviets or being repatriated back to Germany. Many chose to return to Germany. As a result, from the autumn of 1944 to early 1945, some 53,000 people were moved into Bergen-Belsen, which had room for only 3,000 inmates. The overcrowding was extreme and the staff at the camp resented it. Josef Kramer, the commandant of Bergen-Belsen, and Dr. Fritz Klein, the medical doctor at the camp, didn't know what to do with the huge influx of inmates. Dr. Barton concluded that the horrific conditions at Bergen-Belsen were attributable to overcrowding and the collapse of the German economy at the end of the war rather than to an intentional program of extermination.[89]

Dr. Barton's testimony is consistent with statements from Violette Fintz, a Jewish woman who had been deported to Auschwitz in mid1944, then to Dachau, and finally to Bergen-Belsen in early 1945. Fintz compared conditions in the various camps:

Belsen was in the beginning bearable and we had bunks to sleep on, and a small ration of soup and bread. But as the camp got fuller, our group and many others were given a barracks to hold about 700 lying on the floor without blankets and without food or anything. It was a pitiful scene as the camp was attacked by lice and most of the people had typhus and cholera. …Many people talk about Auschwitz—it was a horrible camp. But Belsen, no words can describe it….From my experience and suffering, Belsen was the worst.[90]

Bergen-Belsen is typical of the other German camps. The sharp increase in the number of deaths at the camps in 1945 was due to disease and overcrowding rather than an extermination program. The woeful scenes on liberation of the camps were not typical of camp conditions throughout their existence. By the end of the war as many as two or three inmates were sleeping on a single plank, three tiers to a bunk, in packed wooden barracks. Ill clothed and ill fed, exposed to virulent epidemics, camp inmates were dying in horrifying numbers throughout the last months of the war. [91]

The fate of Anne Frank, who is known around the world for her famous diary, is typical of many Jews who died in German camps during the war. Anne and her father were first deported from the Netherlands to Auschwitz in September 1944. Anne's father contracted typhus at

Auschwitz and was sent to the camp hospital to recover. He was one of thousands of Jews who remained at Auschwitz when the Germans abandoned the camp in January 1945. He survived the war and died in Switzerland in 1980.

In the face of the advancing Soviet army, Anne Frank was evacuated to Bergen-Belsen, where she died of typhus in March 1945. While Anne Frank's fate was tragic, her story is not consistent with a German plan of extermination against the Jews. Along with thousands of others at Bergen-Belsen, Anne died from a typhus epidemic and not from a German plan to commit genocide against European Jewry.

The Allies were no more effective in stopping deaths in the camps than the Germans had been. For example, there were some 55,000 to 60,000 inmates in Bergen-Belsen when the British took control of the camp. Despite the best efforts of the British, almost 14,000 inmates died at Bergen-Belsen in the months following the British takeover.[92] Likewise, at Dachau, the death rate remained high in the month after the Americans liberated the camp.[93] The high death rates in these camps were primarily caused by typhus and other diseases rather than an extermination program on the part of the Allies.

After the war, it was claimed that Dachau and other camps liberated by the Allies in western Germany had homicidal gas chambers. In fact, the U.S. Army produced a propaganda film supporting the notion that Dachau had a gas chamber. The Army film narrator states in this film: "Hanging in orderly rows were the clothes of prisoners who had been suffocated in a lethal gas chamber. They had been persuaded to remove their clothing under the pretext of taking a shower for which towels and soap were provided."[94] Today it is no longer claimed that anyone ever died in a gas chamber at Dachau.[95]

Defenders of the Holocaust story have conceded that there were no gas chambers or extermination camps in Germany. We are now told that homicidal gassings and extermination camps were located solely in Poland, in areas captured by the Soviet Union and made offlimits to Western investigators. As Dr. Martin Broszat of the Institute for Contemporary History stated in a 1960 letter to the German weekly Die Zeit: "Neither in Dachau nor in Bergen-Belsen nor in Buchenwald were Jews or other prisoners gassed."[96] Simon Wiesenthal has also stated in 1975 and again in 1993 that "there were no extermination camps on German soil."[97]

Historical Context and Perspective of Alleged Genocide

Jewish leaders have directed anger toward the ICRC, the Vatican, and Allied governments and their officials for not doing anything to stop the alleged genocide of European Jewry. A review of the historical record shows that these organizations did nothing because they were not aware of a program of mass extermination against European Jewry.

The ICRC visited and inspected all of the major German concentration camps right up to the end of the war. The Germans even asked for Red Cross assistance in controlling the epidemics at the camps, and let the ICRC deliver approximately 1,112,000 packages with a total weight of 4,500 tons to individual inmates. In response to a U.S. State Department request, the ICRC responded in a formal letter to the State Department dated Nov. 22, 1944, that the ICRC found no evidence of mass murder of concentration camp inmates.[98]

The ICRC also made two highly publicized visits to Theresienstadt in Czechoslovakia. The ICRC reports were relatively favorable in both cases. The ICRC reported that this Jewish concentration camp had stores, cultural centers, an orchestra, Jazz music ensembles, a bank for the people, and even cafes the inmates could frequent. The ICRC delegate who visited Theresienstadt the second time in the spring of 1945 was George Dunant, who was in close contact with Jewish representatives. Dunant would have been eager to report an extermination policy of Jews if such a program had existed in the camp.[99]

The Vatican and Pope Pius XII have also been criticized for not speaking up forthrightly against the extermination of the Jews. The far-flung nature of the Catholic Church's operations would have guaranteed that the Vatican would have known about the genocide of the Jews if it had occurred. Despite strong pressure put on the Vatican by the Allies, the Vatican never made an unequivocal condemnation of the extermination of the Jews even after the Germans had been driven out of Rome and even after Germany's defeat.[100] The Vatican made no such unequivocal condemnation because it did not believe that Germany had a program of mass extermination of European Jewry.

Numerous books have also been written criticizing the Allies for not attempting to stop the mass extermination of Jews in the German concentration camps. The Allies made no effort in this regard because their intelligence sources uncovered no evidence of an extermination program against European Jewry. As previously discussed, during 1942

and 1943 British intelligence intercepted daily coded messages from Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau, and seven other German camps. None of these messages made reference to an extermination program against Jews. Also, the surveillance photographs of Auschwitz-Birkenau taken in 1944 during the alleged extermination of Hungarian Jews showed no visual evidence of an extermination program in progress. Thus, the Allies did not believe the mass extermination claims, and consequently made no effort to interfere in the operations of the German concentration camps.

Jewish organizations in the U.S. and other Allied nations also never undertook a sustained, unified effort to rescue European Jewry during the war.[101] There was also little resistance on the part of Jews in Europe during the war to their deportations to the German concentration camps. Thus, like the ICRC, the Vatican, and the Allied governments, Jewish organizations and the Jews of Europe did not act as if they knew of a German program of genocide against European Jewry. Obviously, the mass murder of millions of Jews occurring over a period of several years could not have happened without these organizations having knowledge of the extermination program. These organizations did nothing to stop the alleged genocide of European Jewry because no German program of genocide occurred during the war.

The Holocaust story also claims that virtually all Jews who were too sick to work were immediately killed. The documentary evidence, however, indicates that a high percentage of the inmates at Birkenau were disabled. Oswald Pohl, in a secret report to Heinrich Himmler dated April 5, 1944, stated that there were 67,000 inmates in the entire Auschwitz-Birkenau camp complex, of which 18,000 were unable to work. In Birkenau there were a total of 36,000 inmates, of whom "approximately 15,000 are unable to work."[102] Such high percentages of disabled inmates at Auschwitz-Birkenau are not consistent with a program of mass extermination.

Many of the most outlandish claims have also been quietly dropped by defenders of the Holocaust story. For example, it was claimed at the Nuremberg trials that the Germans made soap from the bodies of Jews. The judges at Nuremberg stated in their verdict that "in some instances attempts were made to utilize the fat from the bodies of the victims in the commercial manufacture of soap."[103] In April 1990, officials at Israel's Yad Vashem Holocaust Center admitted that the human soap stories were not true. Yad Vashem archives director Shmuel Krakowski stated: "Historians have concluded that soap was not made

from human fat. When so many people deny that the Holocaust ever happened, why give them something to use against the truth?"[104]

The stories of human lampshades being made from human skin have also been quietly dropped by defenders of the Holocaust story. Gen. Lucius Clay, military governor of the U.S. zone of occupied Germany, stated in regard to the case of Ilse Koch, "There is no convincing evidence that she selected inmates for extermination in order to secure tattooed skins or that she possessed any articles made of human skin."[105] Years later in an interview Gen. Clay stated about the material used in the lampshades: "Well, it turned out actually that it was goat flesh. But at the trial it was human flesh. It was almost impossible for her to have gotten a fair trial."[106]

Did 6 Million Jews Die in World War II?

The allegation that 6 million Jews died in World War II is today widely considered to be an established historical fact. For example, the Encyclopedia Judaica states, "There can be no doubt as to the estimated figure of some 6 million victims."[107] The U.S. Holocaust Museum in Washington, D.C., is described in its information sheet as a "living memorial to the 6 million Jews and millions of other victims of Nazi fanaticism who perished in the Holocaust." However, an analysis of the 6 million Jewish wartime deaths shows that this figure is not the result of any careful investigation, research, or calculation.

The figure of 6 million Jewish wartime deaths was apparently first used by Martin H. Glynn, the governor of New York. Glynn made a speech entitled "The Crucifixion of Jews Must Stop!" that was printed in The American Hebrew magazine published by the American Jewish Committee. In this speech Glynn reported on the holocaust of 6 million Jewish men and women who were dying due to the awful tyranny of war and a bigoted lust for Jewish blood. Glynn's speech was printed on Oct. 31, 1919. The allegation was that 6 million Jews had died in the Great War.[108]

The number of 6 million appeared again on Jan. 4, 1945, when the Jewish chief of Soviet atrocity propaganda, Ilya Ehrenburg, stated that this is the number of Jews that had died in World War II.[109] How Ehrenburg came up with this number fully four months before the end of the war is anyone's guess. Immediately after the end of the war in June

1945, some Zionist leaders were also able to state that 6 million Jews had died during the war. These Zionist leaders made this statement even though the chaos in Europe at the time made any definitive demographic studies impossible.[110]

The figure of 6 million Jews who died in World War II reappeared at the IMT in Nuremberg. The number of 6 million used at the IMT is based primarily on the hearsay evidence given by the written deposition of German SS-bureaucrat Wilhelm Höttl.[111] The verbal but never cross-examined testimony of Dieter Wisliceny, who said that 5 million Jews died, is also used to substantiate the figure of 6 million.[112] These two men claimed that they heard these statements from Adolf Eichmann, but Eichmann later disputed that he ever made these statements.[113] Thus, the prosecution's claim at the IMT that 6 million Jews died in World War II is based solely on hearsay evidence from two German SS-bureaucrats seeking exemption from punishment whose only source later said that he never made the statement.

Stephen F. Pinter, who was a U.S. War Department attorney stationed in Germany after the war, disputed the claim that millions of Jews were murdered by Germany. In a statement made in 1959, he wrote: "From what I was able to determine during six postwar years in Germany and Austria, there were a number of Jews killed, but the figure of a million was certainly never reached. I interviewed thousands of Jews, former inmates of concentration camps in Germany and Austria, and consider myself as well qualified as any man on this subject."[114]

The eyewitness testimony of Jewish survivors of the German concentration camps is often cited to establish the genocide of 6 million European Jews by Germany. However, the New York Jewish publication Aufbau documents that on June 30, 1965, 3,375,000 inmates, the vast majority of whom were Jewish, had survived the German camps and were receiving reparations from Germany. [115] How could there be 3,375,000 survivors of the German concentration camps receiving reparations from Germany 20 years after the war was over if Germany had mass murdered 6 million Jews? Norman Finkelstein, the author of The Holocaust Industry, quotes his mother as asking, "If everyone who claims to be a Holocaust survivor actually is one, who did Hitler kill?"[116]

As of January 1984, there were 4.39 million successful individual restitution claims under the terms of the German Federal Compensation Law (BEG) of 1953 and 1956. This law provides monetary compensation

to individuals who were "persecuted for political, racial, religious or ideological reasons" by the wartime German government. The great majority of these successful restitution claims were from Jews. Raul Hilberg estimates that about two-thirds of the allowed claims had been from Jews.[117] Using Hilberg's conservative estimate would mean that over 2.9 million Jews had received BEG restitution claims by January 1984.

The number of 2.9 million Jewish claimants understates the number of Jews who survived World War II because as of 1985 Jews in Poland, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, and Czechoslovakia were not eligible for BEG restitution. Also, some European Jews who survived World War II died before the German BEG restitution law was enacted in 1953. The Atlanta Journal and Constitution newspaper estimates that only half of the Jewish "Holocaust survivors" around the world in 1985 had received restitution under the BEG.[118] If this 50% estimate is accurate, it would mean that approximately 5.8 million European Jews survived German persecution during World War II. Such a large number of surviving Jews is not consistent with a German program of genocide against European Jewry.

The Holocaust story also originally claimed that about 4 million Jews died at Auschwitz-Birkenau. As late as 1988, on page 19 of the official Auschwitz State Museum Guidebook, the official figure of 4 million Jews killed at Auschwitz-Birkenau is affirmed. The 4 million Jews who perished at Auschwitz-Birkenau had also been used by the Soviet State Extraordinary Commission for the Investigation of Nazi Crimes, the Supreme National Tribunal in Poland, and the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. The estimate of 4 million Jews who died at Auschwitz-Birkenau was based on the evidence of hundreds of surviving prisoners and the opinion of experts.

Scholars such as Israeli Holocaust expert Yehuda Bauer and Dr. Franciszek Piper decided around 1989 to lower the Auschwitz-Birkenau death count. Dr. Piper states in his book Auschwitz: How Many Perished, "Altogether, a total of about 1,100,000 Jews ended up in AuschwitzBirkenau in the years 1940-1945."[119] The number of approximately 1 million Jews who died at Auschwitz-Birkenau is most often used as the official figure today, although some researchers such as Jean-Claude Pressac use much lower estimates. By dramatically lowering the figures, the camp curators were in effect admitting that the Communists and other officials had fabricated numbers that were too

inflated to be believable. The 4 million Jewish deaths at Auschwitz-Birkenau had to be lowered to approximately 1 million in order to maintain the credibility of the Holocaust story.

Since the figure of 6 million Jews who died in German camps is based on the 4 million Jews who died at Auschwitz-Birkenau, one would think that the 6 million Jewish deaths in the German camps should be lowered to about 3 million. However, the official number of Jews dying in German concentration camps remains at 6 million even though this is now obviously an overstated number.[120]

Another factor making impossible the official number of 6 million Jews dying in German camps is the fact that thousands of corpses could not possibly have been cremated every day at Auschwitz-Birkenau as is commonly claimed. Ivan Lagacé, manager of a large crematory in Calgary, Canada, testified at the 1988 Ernst Zuendel trial that based on his experience it would have only been possible to cremate a maximum of 184 bodies a day at Birkenau. Lagacé stated that the claim that the 46 retorts at Birkenau could cremate over 4,400 bodies in a day was "ludicrous," "preposterous" and "beyond the realm of reality."[121]

The book The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry by Walter Sanning is probably the most scholarly study ever written of 20th century Jewish demography, especially in its analysis of World War II related Jewish population changes. Sanning bases his study almost exclusively on Allied, Zionist, and pro-Zionist West German sources. His analysis includes evidence given by the wartime U.S. assistant secretary of state, the Institute of Jewish Affairs, the American Jewish Year Book, official census publications, and the pro-Zionist Institute for Contemporary History in Munich. Sanning keeps his book as free of emotion as possible in order to contribute to a genuine discussion underlying the charge of German genocide.

While it would be impossible for anyone to give an exact number of Jews who died in the German camps during World War II, The Dissolution of Eastern European Jewry proves that not anywhere close to 6 million Jews died during the war. Sanning calculates that the worldwide losses suffered by Jews during the Second World War are in the neighborhood of 1.25 million.[122] He estimates that 15,967,000 Jews were alive in 1941 before the German invasion of the Soviet Union, and that the Jewish population was reduced to approximately 14,730,000 after the war.[123]

Importantly, Sanning shows that many of these Jewish losses were caused not by the direct impact of the war or by a program of German genocide, but by Soviet barbarism. Sanning states that hundreds of thousands of Jews lost their lives during the Soviet deportation to the east or in the Siberian labor and concentration camps. Sanning concludes that the food supply, shelter, and clothing provided to the Jewish inmates of the Soviet camps was woefully inadequate, and that medical attention was almost completely lacking.[124] Sanning's conclusion is supported by Jewish historian Gerald Reitlinger, who states: "In southern Siberia the death-rate was very high for…Jews."[125] According to Sanning's analysis, more Jews died in Soviet camps than died in German camps during the Second World War.

Closing Thoughts on Alleged Genocide of European Jewry

Revisionist historians agree that Germany persecuted Jews during World War II. National Socialist Germany saw Jews as being an influential force behind international Communism, and therefore considered Jews to be a potential danger to the war effort. Consequently, Jews were sent to concentration camps, forced to live in ghettos, conscripted for labor, stripped of their rights, and suffered extreme hardships. Unfortunately, many Jews died in the German concentration camps during World War II.

However, Germany did not conduct a program of genocide against European Jewry during the war. As we have seen, the existence of homicidal gas chambers in the German concentration camps has been disproven with scientific evidence. Tons of German wartime documents were captured by the Allies, and not a single one of them refers to a policy or program of extermination. Likewise, the British broke the ultra-secret Enigma code used by the Germans to transmit secret communications. During 1942 and 1943 British intelligence intercepted daily coded messages from Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Dachau, and seven other camps. None of these secret transmissions refers to homicidal gas chambers or a German program of genocide.

The horrific scenes encountered by U.S. and British troops when they entered German concentration camps at the end of World War II have been used to prove a German policy of extermination of the Jews. As gruesome as these scenes were, it was soon discovered that most of the deaths in the German camps were caused by disease and other natural

causes. None of the autopsy reports shows that anyone died of poison gas. Also, contrary to publicized claims, no researcher has been able to document a German policy of extermination through starvation in the German camps. The virtual collapse of Germany's food, transport, and public health systems and the extreme overcrowding in the German camps at the end of the war led to the catastrophe the Allied troops encountered when they entered the camps.

Although the Nuremberg and later trials attempted to prove a German policy of genocide against European Jewry, the trials were organized not to dispense impartial justice, but for political purposes. Crucial witnesses such as Rudolf Hoess were tortured into making confessions, and witnesses were hired to give false testimony. The evidence produced at the Nuremberg trial to prove the number of 6 million Jews who died during World War II is based solely on hearsay evidence from two German SS bureaucrats. As we have seen, the number of Jewish survivors of the German camps makes impossible either the number of 6 million Jews who died during the war or a German policy of genocide against European Jewry.

Some Jewish scholars have had the courage to criticize the blatant fabrications of the defenders of the Holocaust story. Dr. Norman Finkelstein, whose parents suffered in German concentration camps, states that "much of the literature on Hitler's Final Solution is worthless as scholarship. Indeed, the field of Holocaust studies is replete with nonsense, if not sheer fraud."[126] Finkelstein also states, "Given the nonsense churned out daily by the Holocaust industry, the wonder is why there are so few skeptics."[127]

While I know that Germany did not have a program of genocide against European Jewry, I am equally certain that the inmates in the camps suffered tremendous hardships. This point was driven home to me in 1999 when I met a Jewish lady who had spent her early childhood years in four different German camps during the war. She barely survived Bergen-Belsen, where she contracted typhoid and was very close to death when the British army took control of the camp. Her experiences in the camps had been so traumatic that she still had major psychological damage from her internment 54 years after the war was over. However, if Germany had conducted a program of genocide against European Jewry, she would have been executed since as a little Jewish girl she was too young to contribute to the German work effort. She was living proof both that Germany did not have a program of genocide against European

Jewry, and that living conditions in the German concentration camps were extraordinarily harsh.

Footnotes

[1] Rudolf, Germar, "Some Technical and Chemical Considerations about the 'Gas Chambers' of Auschwitz and Birkenau," in Gauss, Ernst (ed.), Dissecting the Holocaust: The Growing Critique of Truth and Memory, Capshaw, AL: Thesis and Dissertations Press, 2000, p. 337.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Leuchter, Fred A., "The Leuchter Report: The How and the Why," The Journal of Historical Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, Summer 1989, p. 133.

[4] Ibid., p. 139.

[5] Rudolf, Germar, "A Brief History of Forensic Examinations of Auschwitz," The Journal of Historical Review, Vol. 20, No. 2, March/April 2001, p. 7.

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Chapter Nine

• Crimes Committed in German Concentration Camps

National Socialist Germany established an immense camp system before and during World War II comprising at least 43 different types of camps. By the end of the war there were over 1,000 camps with an estimated maximum number of 715,000 prisoners in the camp system.[1] In the previous chapter we established that Germany did not use concentration camps during World War II to commit genocide against European Jewry. In this chapter we will examine some of the crimes that were committed in the German concentration camps during and after World War II.

Obviously, it would be impossible to know about and report every crime that was committed in the German concentration camps. I will instead attempt to include a substantial representative portion of the crimes that were committed, including crimes committed by the Germans, the Allies, and inmates in the camps. Our examination will show that while numerous crimes were committed by Germany in its concentration camps, most of the deaths of the camp inmates occurred from natural causes.

Medical Experimentation at Dachau

The onset and escalation of World War II provided the rationalization for most of Germany's illegal human medical experimentation. Animal experimentation was known to be a poor substitute for experiments on humans. Since only analogous inferences could be drawn from animal experiments, the use of human experimentation during the war was deemed necessary to help in the German war effort. Applications for medical experimentation on humans were usually approved on the ground that animal tests had taken the researcher only so far. Better results could be obtained by using humans in the medical experiments.[2]

The Dachau concentration camp was used as a center for medical experimentation on humans involving malaria, high altitudes, freezing and other experiments. This has been documented at the so-called Doctors' Trial at Nuremberg, which opened on Dec. 9, 1946, and ended on

July 19, 1947. Also, Dr. Charles P. Larson, one of America's leading forensic pathologists, was at Dachau and conducted autopsies, interviews, and a review of the remaining medical records to determine the extent of the medical experimentation at the camp.

The malaria experimentation at Dachau was performed by Dr. Klaus Karl Schilling, who was an internationally famous parasitologist. Dr. Schilling was ordered by Heinrich Himmler in 1936 to conduct medical research at Dachau for the purpose of specifically immunizing individuals against malaria. Dr. Schilling admitted to Dr. Larson that between 1936 and 1945 he inoculated some 2,000 prisoners with malaria. The medical supervisor at Dachau would select the people to be inoculated and then send this list of people to Berlin to be approved by a higher authority. Those who were chosen were then turned over to Dr. Schilling to conduct the medical experimentation.[3]

At the Doctors' Trial in 1947 it was determined that Dr. Schilling's experiments were directly responsible for the deaths of 10 prisoners.[4] Dr. Charles Larson stated in his report concerning Dr. Schilling:

It was very difficult to know where to draw the line as to whether or not Dr. Schilling was a war criminal. Certainly he fell into that category inasmuch as he had subjected people involuntarily to experimental malaria inoculations, which, even though they did not produce many deaths, could very well have produced serious illness in many of the patients. He defended himself by saying he did all this work by order from higher authority; in fact, Himmler himself.

In my report, I wrote: "In view of all he has told me, this man, in my opinion, should be considered a war criminal, but that he should be permitted to write up the results of his experiments and turn them over to Allied medical personnel for what they are worth. Dr. Schilling is an eminent scientist of world-wide renown who has conducted a most important group of experiments; their value cannot properly be ascertained until he has put them into writing for medical authorities to study. The criminal acts have already been committed, and since they have been committed, if it were possible to derive some new knowledge concerning immunity to malaria from these acts, it would yet be another

crime not to permit this man to finish documenting the results of his years of research."

But my attempt to save Dr. Schilling's life failed. Our High Command felt it had to make a public example of him—most of the other high-ranking Nazis connected with Dachau had already been executed—and made his wife watch the hanging. I did everything I could to stop it. I implored our military government not to pass sentence on him until he'd had a fair hearing, because I was just beginning to win his confidence, and get through to him. Looking back, I am sure that the execution of Dr. Schilling deprived the world of some very valuable scientific information— no matter how distasteful his research and experimentation may have been.[5]

Dr. Charles Larson concluded in regard to Dr. Schilling: "Dr. Schilling, who was 72 [actually 74], should have lived. He never tried to run. He stayed in Dachau and made a full statement of his work to me; he cooperated in every way, and was the only one who told the truth."[6]

The defense in the Doctors' Trial at Nuremberg submitted evidence of doctors in the United States performing medical experiments on prison inmates and conscientious objectors during the war. The evidence showed that large-scale malaria experiments were performed on 800 American prisoners, many of them black, from federal penitentiaries in Atlanta and state penitentiaries in Illinois and New Jersey. U.S. doctors conducted human experiments with malaria tropica, one of the most dangerous of the malaria strains, to aid the U.S. war effort in Southeast Asia.[7] Although Dr. Schilling's malaria experiments were no more dangerous or illegal than the malaria experiments performed by U.S. doctors, Dr. Schilling had to pay for his malaria experiments by being hanged to death while his wife watched. The U.S. doctors who performed malaria experiments on humans were never charged with a crime.

Germany also conducted high-altitude experiments at Dachau. Dr. Sigmund Rascher performed these experiments beginning Feb. 22, 1942, and ending around the beginning of July 1942.[8] The experiments were performed in order to know what happened to air-crews after the destruction of their pressurized cabins at very high altitudes. In this instance, airmen would be subjected within a few seconds to a drop in pressure and lack of oxygen. The experiments were performed to investigate various possible life-saving methods. To this end a low-pressure chamber was set up at Dachau to observe the reactions of a human being thrown out at extreme altitudes, and to investigate ways of

rescuing him.[9] The victims were locked in the chamber, and the pressure in the chamber was then lowered to a level corresponding to very high altitudes. The pressure could be very quickly altered, allowing Dr. Rascher to simulate the conditions which would be experienced by a pilot freefalling from altitude without oxygen.

Dr. Rascher received authority to conduct these high altitude experiments when he wrote to Heinrich Himmler and was told that prisoners would be placed at his disposal. Dr. Rascher stated in his letter that he knew the experiments could have fatal results. According to Walter Neff, the prisoner who gave testimony at the Doctors' Trial at Nuremberg, approximately 180 to 200 prisoners were used in the high altitude experiments. Approximately 10 of these prisoners were volunteers, and about 40 of the prisoners were men not condemned to death. According to Neff's testimony, approximately 70 or 80 prisoners died during these experiments.[10] A film showing the complete sequence of an experiment, including the autopsy, was discovered in Dr. Rascher's house at Dachau after the war.[11]

Dr. Rascher also conducted so-called freezing experiments at Dachau after the high-altitude experiments were concluded. These freezing experiments were conducted from August 1942 to approximately May 1943.[12] The purpose of these experiments was to determine the best way of warming German pilots who had been forced down in the North Sea and suffered hypothermia.

Dr. Rascher's subjects were forced to remain outdoors naked in freezing weather for up to 14 hours, or the victims were kept in a tank of ice water for three hours, their pulse and internal temperature measured through a series of electrodes. Warming of the victims was then attempted by different methods, most usually and successfully by immersion in very hot water. It is estimated that these experiments caused the deaths of up to 80 or 90 prisoners.[13]

Dr. Charles Larson strongly condemned these freezing experiments. Dr. Larson states:

A Dr. Raschau [sic] was in charge of this work and…we found the records of his experiments. They were most inept compared to Dr. Schilling's, much less scientific. What they would do would be to tie up a prisoner and immerse him in cold water until his body temperature reduced to 28 degrees centigrade (82.4 degrees Fahrenheit), when the poor soul

would, of course, die. These experiments were started in August, 1942, but Raschau's [sic] technique improved. By February, 1943 he was able to report that 30 persons were chilled to 27 and 29 degrees centigrade, their hands and feet frozen white, and their bodies rewarmed by a hot bath….They also dressed the subjects in different types of insulated clothing before putting them in freezing water, to see how long it took them to die.[14]

Dr. Rascher and his hypothermia experiments at Dachau were also not well regarded by German medical doctors. In a paper titled "Nazi Science—The Dachau Hypothermia Experiments," Dr. Robert L. Berger states:

Rascher was not well regarded in professional circles…and his superiors repeatedly expressed reservations about his performance. In one encounter, Professor Karl Gebhardt, a general in the SS and Himmler's personal physician, told Rascher in connection with his experiments on hypothermia through exposure to cold air that "the report was unscientific; if a student of the second term dared submit a treatise of the kind [Gebhardt] would throw him out." Despite Himmler's strong support, Rascher was rejected for faculty positions at several universities. A book by German scientists on the accomplishments of German aviation medicine during the war devoted an entire chapter to hypothermia but failed to mention Rascher's name or his work.[15]

Dr. Rascher also experimented with the effects of Polygal, a substance made from beet and apple pectin, which aided blood clotting. He predicted that the preventive use of Polygal tablets would reduce bleeding from surgery and from gunshot wounds sustained during combat. Subjects were given a Polygal tablet and were either shot through the neck or chest, or their limbs were amputated without anesthesia. Dr. Rascher published an article on his experience of using Polygal without detailing the nature of the human trials. Dr. Rascher also set up a company staffed by prisoners to manufacture the substance.[16] Dr. Rascher's nephew, a Hamburg doctor, testified under oath that he knew of four prisoners who died from Dr. Rascher's testing Polygal at Dachau.[17]

Obviously, Dr. Rascher's medical experiments constitute major war crimes. Dr. Rascher was arrested and executed in Dachau by German authorities shortly before the end of the war.[18]

Phlegmons were also induced in inmates at Dachau by intravenous and intramuscular injection of pus during 1942 and 1943. Various natural, allopathic and biochemical remedies were then tried to cure the resulting infections. The phlegmone experiments were apparently an attempt by National Socialist Germany to find an antibiotic similar to penicillin for the infection.[19] All of the doctors who took part in these experiments were dead or had disappeared at the time of the Doctors' Trial at Nuremberg. The only information about the number of prisoners used and the number of victims was provided by a nurse, Heinrich Stöhr, who was a political prisoner. Stöhr stated that seven out of a group of 10 German subjects died in one experiment, and that in another experiment 12 out of a group of 40 clergy died.[20]

Official documents and personal testimonies indicate that physicians at Dachau performed many liver biopsies when they were not needed. Dr. Rudolf Brachtl performed liver biopsies on healthy people and on people who had diseases of the stomach and gallbladder. While biopsy of the liver is an accepted and frequently used diagnostic procedure, it should only be performed when definite indications exist and other methods fail. Apparently some physicians at Dachau performed liver biopsies simply to gain experience with its techniques. These Dachau biopsies violated professional and ethical standards since they were often conducted in the absence of genuine medical indication.[21]

Dr. Charles Larson's forensic work at Dachau indicated that only a small percentage of the deaths in the camp were due to medical experimentation on humans. The profile of the prisoner population that his autopsies projected showed that most of the victims died from natural causes; that is, of disease brought on by malnutrition and filth caused by the war. In his depositions to Army lawyers, Dr. Larson made it clear that he could not indict the whole German people for the National Socialist medical crimes. Dr. Larson sincerely believed that although Dachau was only a short ride from Munich, most of the people in the city had no idea what was going on inside Dachau.[22]

Dr. Larson's conclusions are reinforced by the book Dachau, 1933-1945: The Official History by Paul Berben. This book states that the total number of people who passed through Dachau during its existence is well in excess of 200,000.[23] The author concludes that while no one

will ever know the exact number of deaths at Dachau, the number of deaths is probably several thousand more than the quoted number of 31,951.[24] This book documents that approximately 66% of all deaths at Dachau occurred during the final seven months of the war.

The increase in deaths at Dachau was caused primarily by a devastating typhus epidemic which, in spite of the efforts made by the medical staff, continued to spread throughout the camp during the final seven months of the war. The number of deaths at Dachau includes 2,226 people who died in May 1945 after the Allies had liberated the camp, as well as the deaths of 223 prisoners in March 1944 from Allied bombings.[25] Thus, while illegal medical experiments were conducted on prisoners at Dachau, Berben's Dachau clearly shows that the overwhelming majority of deaths of prisoners at Dachau were from natural causes.

Medical Experimentation at Other German Camps

National Socialist Germany performed a number of illegal medical experiments in other concentration camps during the war. Sulfonamide drug experiments were performed on camp inmates because of heavy German casualties on the Eastern Front from gas gangrene and the death of Reinhard Heydrich from a gas gangrene infection which developed after his attempted assassination. The experiments were designed to test the effectiveness of the sulfonamide drugs. The man in charge of these experiments was Dr. Karl Gebhardt, who was the head of the SS clinic in Hohenlychen.[26] Dr. Gebhardt stated that he performed these experiments in order to clear himself of suspicion that he contributed to the death of Heydrich by failing to treat Heydrich's wound infection with sulfonamides.[27]

Sulfonamide drug experiments were performed on 20 male prisoners from Sachsenhausen at the end of July 1942. Beginning July 20, 1942 until August 1943, sulfonamide drug experiments were also performed on 74 Polish women in the women's concentration camp at Ravensbrueck. All of the women at Ravensbrueck experienced extreme pain from the experiments. Five women died from the effects of the experimental operations, and six women were later executed by shooting. Almost all of the women who survived suffered from physical injuries and trauma, either as a direct result of the experiments, or because of the total lack of post-operative care at the time. The experiments left well

documented scars on most of the women.[28] The sulfonamide experiments were not successful and were not necessary since similar results could have been achieved by the treatment of wound infections incurred by German soldiers during the normal course of the war.[29]

The same Polish women at Ravensbrueck who underwent sulfonamide experiments were also forced to undergo experiments aimed at improving the rehabilitation rate of injured soldiers. These experiments involved muscle and nerve regeneration as well as the transplantation of bones. Muscles and nerves, sections of bone, arms and shoulder blades, and legs cut off at the hip were all removed from healthy concentration camp inmates. An attempt was then made to transplant these body parts to other victims. These attempts often resulted in death, with mutilation, disability, and extreme pain resulting for those who lived.[30]

Dr. Fritz Fischer, a defendant in the Doctors' Trial at Nuremberg, stated in his affidavit that after applying anesthetics, incisions were made at the outer side of the upper leg. Muscle was removed, the wound was closed, and then a cast applied. After a week the wound was split open and more muscle was removed.[31] Prisoner Dr. Zofia Maczka testified that the muscle experiments consisted of many operations always on the same spot on the upper or lower part of the leg. As additional pieces of muscle were cut out after each operation, the legs got thinner and weaker. Dr. Maczka also stated that during nerve operations parts of nerves were removed.[32]

Dr. Maczka testified at the Doctors' Trial that "special operations" were performed on mentally ill prisoners. She stated: "amputations of the whole leg (at the hip joint) were carried out, or on others, amputation of the whole arm (with the shoulder blade) were carried out. Afterward the victims (if they still lived) were killed by means of Evipan injections and the leg or arm was taken to Hohenlychen…. Ten such operations, approximately, were carried out." The affidavit of Gustawa Winkowska corroborated Dr. Maczka's testimony that whole limbs of inmates were transplanted and that the experimental subjects were later killed.[33]

Prisoner Dr. Zdenka Nedvedova-Nejedlá worked at Ravensbrueck from Aug. 19, 1943, until May 1945. In her affidavit concerning medical operations on inmates, she stated:

Operations were performed on one Yugoslav, one Czech, two Ukrainian, two German, and about 18 Polish women, of whom six were operated on by force in the bunker with the help of SS men. Two of them were shot after their operation wounds had healed. After operations, no one except SS nurses was admitted to the persons operated on. Whole nights they lay without any assistance and it was not permitted to administer sedatives even against the most intensive post-operational pains. From the persons operated on, 11 died or were killed….[34]

These experimental procedures on the women at Ravensbrueck caused incredible suffering during surgery and the post-operative periods.[35] The experiments were cruel and inhumane and constitute major war crimes rivaling those of Dr. Rascher.

The high rate of jaundice infections with hepatitis epidemica among German soldiers during the Russian campaign made research into the cause of this disease a military priority. Opinions at the time differed on whether jaundice was caused by a bacterium or a virus. Dr. Arnold Dohmen, a bacteriologist and medical officer, wanted to demonstrate that the causal agent for jaundice was the same as the causal agent for human hepatitis epidemica. Dohmen selected 11 Jewish children at Auschwitz, and then traveled to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp to conduct the experiments. Dohmen told the children that he wanted to test a vaccine against hepatitis that had been produced in a laboratory, and in October 1943 Dohmen gave an injection to each of the children. It is not known if any of the children suffered any ill effects at this point.[36]

In September 1944, Dohmen returned to Sachsenhausen to carry out his hepatitis experiments. The experiments were significantly more intense than the previous year, and Dohmen monitored and controlled all the examinations, injections and blood tests. Fortunately, the children do not seem to have suffered any mid- or long-term organic effects as a direct result of the experiments. However, since none of the children, their parents, or their legal guardian had consented to the tests, the experiments were a violation of civil liberties and medical ethics.[37]

By the fall of 1943, strategic bombing raids conducted by the Western Allies on the German civilian population had left thousands of men, women, and children suffering from various degrees of phosphorous burns. To alleviate the enormous suffering of the German population, it became essential to develop new therapeutic drugs and

methods of treatment for phosphorous burns and other burn injuries. Dr. Erwin Ding-Schuler conducted the incendiary bomb experiments at Buchenwald between Nov. 19 and Nov. 25, 1943. The purpose of these experiments was to test the effectiveness of the drug R-17 for fresh phosphorous burns. Also, two ointments used as a follow-up treatment in cases of phosphorous burns were tested.[38]

Dr. Ding-Schuler selected five prisoners from Germany and the Netherlands who were deliberately burned with phosphorous material from a British incendiary bomb. Witnesses recalled that the burns were very severe, and that the victims suffered excruciating pain and injury for at least two months. Other tests were conducted in which burning was allowed for 30 to 60 seconds. It took up to six weeks for healing to occur in these experiments. All of the defendants in the Doctors' Trial were acquitted from involvement in the incendiary bomb experiments.[39] It should be noted that while these phosphorous burn experiments constitute a war crime, the Allied bombing raids conducted on the German civilian population that created the need for these experiments constitute a far greater war crime.

In the fall of 1941, Germany faced the threat of a serious typhus epidemic. At least 10,000 German soldiers were already suffering from typhus, and typhus was brought into Germany itself from prisoner of war and military transports. Especially in the overcrowded concentration camps, there was considerable danger of inmates contracting typhus. Since many of the concentration camp inmates worked outside the camps in factories, typhus began to spread to the civilian population as the inmates came into contact with civilians. A safe and effective typhus vaccine was needed to prevent the spread of typhus throughout all of Germany.[40]

As head of virus research at Buchenwald, Dr. Ding-Schuler gave orders beginning in 1941 to conduct typhus experiments on hundreds of prisoners. The typhus experiments at Buchenwald tested the efficacy of typhus sera of different origins. Healthy inmates were inoculated and then infected with typhus to determine the effectiveness of the vaccine. At the same time, a control group of prisoners was not vaccinated but infected with typhus. By the end of 1944 there had been 24 series of documented typhus experiments at Buchenwald. According to data in Dr. Ding-Schuler's diary, at least 729 inmates were experimented on with typhus, and at least 154 inmates died as a result of these experiments. Dr.

Ding-Schuler was never tried for his crimes because he committed suicide after the war.[41]

Typhus experiments on humans were also conducted at the Natzweiler concentration camp from November 1943 until two months before the camp was liberated by the French army in November 1944. Dr. Eugen Haagen of the Reich University of Strasbourg initiated these experiments. The Buchenwald typhus experiments had been conducted solely by an internal group within the SS, but Dr. Haagen had the backing of the chief of the Air Force Medical Service, the Reich Research Council, the Reich leader SS, the SS Main Economic and Administrative Office, and the Institute for Military Scientific Research of the Waffen-SS. No journal comparable to Dr. Ding-Schuler's diary was discovered at Natzweiler. Our knowledge of the character and extent of the typhus tests at Natzweiler thus remains incomplete.[42]

Germany also used human inmates in the concentration camps to find an effective pharmaceutical treatment for burns caused by mustard gas. Experiments on humans were conducted at Sachsenhausen, Natzweiler, and other concentration camps throughout the war. In November 1942, Dr. August Hirt and Wolfram Sievers conducted experiments at the Natzweiler concentration camp in which they deliberately inflicted wounds on camp inmates and applied mustard gas to the wounds. Other inmates were forced to inhale gas, take it internally in liquid form, or be injected with the gas. It is estimated that approximately 220 Russian, Polish, Czech and gypsy inmates were used in these experiments without their consent, and approximately 50 of the subjects died from these experiments.[43]

The Doctors' Trial at Nuremberg also documented that German doctors conducted two experiments with poison in the Buchenwald concentration camp. In the first experiment in December 1943, poison was added to the noodle soup consumed by four Russian prisoners without their knowledge. German doctors stood behind a curtain to watch their reactions. All four Russian prisoners survived the poison, but they were later strangled on hooks on the wall in a crematorium at Buchenwald so that autopsies could be performed on their bodies.

The second poison experiment at Buchenwald was conducted in the summer of 1944. In this experiment five Russian inmates were shot in the upper part of the left thigh with bullets that contained crystallized poison. The thighs of two of the inmates were cleanly shot through and no effect of the poison was observed. The other three inmates all died

within 129 minutes after entry of the poisoned bullets in their bodies. The defense for Dr. Joachim Mrugowsky at the Doctors' Trial argued that the Russians were using poisoned bullets, and this made it necessary for Dr. Mrugowsky to conduct these experiments to find out how much time would be available to administer antidotes to the poison. Dr. Mrugowsky was found guilty by the Nuremberg court and sentenced to death by hanging.[44]

Sterilization experiments were conducted from March 1941 to January 1945 at Auschwitz, Ravensbrueck, and other camps. Rudolf Brandt described the purpose of the sterilization experiments in his affidavit:

Himmler was extremely interested in the development of a cheap and rapid sterilization method which could be used against enemies of Germany, such as Russians, Poles and Jews. One hoped thereby not only to defeat the enemy but also to exterminate him. The capacity for work of the sterilized persons could be exploited by Germany, while the danger of propagation would be eliminated. As this mass sterilization was part of Himmler's racial theory, particular time and care were devoted to these sterilization experiments. Surgical sterilization was of course known in Germany and applied; this included castration. For mass application, however, this procedure was considered as too slow and too expensive. It was further desired that a procedure be found which would result in sterilization that was not immediately noticeable.[45]

Dr. Clauberg developed further a method of sterilization of women. This method was based upon the injection of an irritating solution into the uterus. Clauberg conducted widespread experiments on Jewish women and gypsies in the Auschwitz concentration camp. Several thousand women were sterilized by Clauberg in Auschwitz.[46]

X-ray experiments were also conducted on inmates at Auschwitz to determine their effectiveness in sterilizing the prisoners. At least 100 Poles, Russians, French, and other POWs were used as involuntary subjects in these experiments.[47]

During the Doctors' Trial at Nuremberg, Dr. Karl Brandt and the other defendants were infuriated at the moral high ground taken by the U.S. prosecution. Evidence showed that the Allies had been engaged in

illegal medical experimentation, including poison experiments on condemned prisoners in other countries, and cholera and plague experiments on children.

The U.S. prosecution flew in Dr. Andrew Ivy to explain the differences in medical ethics between German and U.S. medical experiments. Interestingly, Dr. Ivy himself had been involved in malaria experiments on inmates at the Illinois State Penitentiary. When Dr. Ivy mentioned that the United States had specific research standards for medical experimentation on humans, it turns out that these principles were first published on Dec. 28, 1946. Dr. Ivy had to admit that the U.S. principles on medical ethics in human experimentation had been made in anticipation of Dr. Ivy's testimony at the Doctors' Trial.[48]

Food and Salt Water Experimentation at German Camps

Germany's food experiments in the concentration camps coincided with the progressively worsening military situation that impacted the health and welfare of German soldiers and undermined the morale of the civilian population. Germany had already undergone a major cut in food rations on April 6, 1942, and this had caused disquiet among the civilian population.[49] However, the greatest shock for the German population in the entire war came with the surrender of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad. The catastrophe at Stalingrad at the end of January 1943 sent Hitler's inner circle into overdrive to avoid military defeat and to feed Germany's civilian and prison population.

On Aug. 12, 1942, Himmler instructed Oswald Pohl to organize experiments on nutrition in the concentration camps. The goal of the experiments was to identify the cheapest and most beneficial form of nutrition needed by active laborers in the camps. A dietary supplement, cheap and readily available, was needed to supplement the inmates' food. Dr. Ernst-Guenther suggested brewer's yeast, which could be provided without taxing the civilian food supply. Oswald Pohl favored a mold-infused egg white incorporated into a vegetable sausage allegedly made from cellulose.[50]

Beginning in the summer of 1943, approximately 450 prisoners at Mauthausen were fed with Östliche Kostform (Eastern Nutrition), a kind of artificial pâté made of cellulose remnants. As a result, many of the prisoners suffered from severe stomach and gastrointestinal problems.

In December 1943, Oswald Pohl decided to conduct a massive three month nutrition experiment on prisoners in the concentration camps of Dachau, Buchenwald, and Sachsenhausen. At the same time, 150 prisoners at Mauthausen were again fed with Östliche Kostform, and 220 prisoners at Mauthausen were used as a control group. A total of 116 prisoners participating in these experiments eventually died. A West German judicial inquiry after the war concluded that it was impossible to determine whether the death of the prisoners had occurred as a result of the experiment, or because the prisoners had been suffering from general exhaustion and malnutrition.[51]

The Luftwaffe had also been concerned since 1941 with the problem of shot-down airmen who had been reduced to drinking salt water. Sea water experiments were performed at Dachau to develop a method of making sea water drinkable through desalinization. Between July and September 1944, 44 inmates at Dachau were used to test the desirability of using two different processes to make sea water drinkable. The subjects were divided into several groups and given different diets using the two different processes.[52] During the experiments one of the groups received no food whatsoever for five to nine days. Many of the subjects became ill from these experiments, suffering from diarrhea, convulsions, foaming at the mouth, and sometimes madness or death.[53]

Shootings and Executions at German Camps

Numerous prisoners were shot and executed in the German concentration camps. Among the most prominent victims were the Berlin brothers Erich Sass and Franz Sass, probably the most famous professional criminals in the Weimar Republic. They had been repeatedly charged with crimes by the Weimar police, but time and again had managed to escape punishment by the courts.

On Jan. 27, 1940, they finally received sentences in a penitentiary of 13 and 11 years, respectively, for crimes they committed during the Weimar years. However, Heinrich Himmler was not satisfied with these sentences, and he ordered the brothers' execution. On March 27, 1940, Erich and Franz Sass were taken to the Sachsenhausen concentration camp and shot to death. Their execution was promptly reported in the German press.[54]

German citizens who refused to fight in the war or who undermined the war effort were also sometimes executed in the concentration camps. On Sept. 3, 1940, Reinhard Heydrich informed the Gestapo branches of the "Basic Principles for Maintaining Internal Security During the War," which stated, among other things:

Any attempt to undermine the unity of the German people and its determination to fight must be ruthlessly suppressed. In particular, any person who expresses doubts about the victory of the German nation or questions the justification for the war is to be arrested….The chief of the Security Police must then be informed without delay and a decision requested on the further treatment of the arrested persons, since the ruthless liquidation of such elements may be ordered at a high level.[55]

In his speech on Dec. 11, 1941, Adolf Hitler declared war on the United States and made it clear that anyone who undermined the war effort would die. Hitler states in regard to the duty of every German to fight for Germany's survival:

But whoever tries to shirk this duty has no right to be regarded as a fellow German. Just as we were pitilessly hard in the struggle for power, so also will we be just as ruthless in the struggle for the survival of our nation. During a time in which thousands of our best men, the fathers and sons of our people, have given their lives, anyone in the homeland who betrays the sacrifice on the front will forfeit his life. Regardless of the pretext with which an attempt is made to disrupt the German front, undermine the will to resist of our people, weaken the authority of the regime, or sabotage the achievements of the homeland, the guilty person will die.[56]

In this regard, several well-known members of the German resistance, including Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Adm. Wilhelm Canaris, were hanged in Flossenbuerg camp on April 9, 1945.[57] Max Schlichting, a coal worker who had briefly been a member of the Communist Party in the Weimar Republic, was sentenced to death for merely expressing to a soldier in a public restroom his doubts that

Germany would win the war. Schlichting was quickly condemned to death and executed on March 24, 1945.[58]

Some of the executions in the concentration camps were unquestionably legal under German law. Georg Elser, for example, was shot in the Dachau concentration camp on April 9, 1945, for his attempted assassination of Adolf Hitler on Nov. 8, 1939. Elser had attempted to assassinate Hitler with a bomb, but was unsuccessful because Hitler finished his speech early and left the building before the bomb exploded. The bomb killed at least seven persons and wounded 63 others. Elser's execution was legal based on his mass murder of seven innocent people.[59]

German concentration camps were also sometimes used to execute participants in anti-German partisan activities. For example, 236 supporters and providers of safe houses for the parachutists who assassinated Reinhard Heydrich in 1942 were taken to the Mauthausen concentration camp and executed.[60]

Heinrich Himmler also made it clear that any prisoner attempting to escape a concentration camp was to be shot. Himmler stated in his speech to Wehrmacht officers in January 1937: "The camps are surrounded with barbed wire, with an electric fence. If anybody enters a banned zone or goes where he is not supposed to, he will be shot. If anybody makes even the slightest attempt to flee from his workplace, for example while working on a moor or on building a road, he will be shot."[61]

Himmler's instructions were strictly enforced. On March 9, 1944, a group of 53 Soviet prisoners at Mittelbau-Dora attempted to escape after killing a few SS guards. All of the Soviet prisoners were hunted down and brutally murdered. The SS then allegedly began to liquidate other mostly Russian and Polish prisoners in mass executions: 57 on March 11 and 30 each on March 21 and 22, plus smaller numbers on other days. At least once, the overhead crane that erected the V-2s for vertical checkout was used to hang prisoners.[62]

The book Dachau, 1933-1945: The Official History by Paul Berben documents certain executions performed at Dachau during the war. The book provides the names of 31 Russian officers shot on Feb. 22, 1944, and 90 Russian officers shot on Sept. 4, 1944, at the crematorium in Dachau.[63] The book also documents executions of an additional 135 inmates at Dachau during the war.[64]

It should be noted that the Soviet prisoners who were shot in the German concentration camps would have been sent back to the Soviet Union. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed to repatriate "without exception and by force if necessary" all former Soviet prisoners of war. Stalin himself had publicly warned that "in Hitler's camps there are no Russian prisoners of war, only Russian traitors, and we shall do away with them when the war is over."[65]

Many of the Soviet prisoners at German camps who were to be repatriated to the Soviet Union after the war begged to be shot on the spot rather than be delivered into the hands of the Soviet NKVD. Other Soviet prisoners at German camps committed suicide so as not to be tortured and executed by the Soviets. A shock force of 500 American and Polish guards was required at Dachau to forcibly repatriate the first group of Soviet prisoners to the Soviet Union. What followed is described in a report submitted to Robert Murphy:

Conforming to agreements with the Soviets, an attempt was made to entrain 399 former Russian soldiers who had been captured in German uniform, from the assembly center at Dachau on Saturday, January 19 [1946].

All of these men refused to entrain. They begged to be shot. They resisted entrainment by taking off their clothing and refusing to leave their quarters. It was necessary to use tear-gas and some force to drive them out. Tear-gas forced them out of the building into the snow where those who had cut and stabbed themselves fell exhausted and bleeding in the snow. Nine men hanged themselves and one had stabbed himself to death and one other who had stabbed himself subsequently died; while 20 others are still in the hospital from self-inflicted wounds. The entrainment was finally effected of 368 men who were sent off accompanied by a Russian liaison officer on a train carrying American guards. Six men escaped en route.[66]

The report ended: "The incident was shocking. There is considerable dissatisfaction on the part of the American officers and men that they are being required by the American government to repatriate these Russians."[67] Thus, for most Soviet prisoners of war, being shot in a German concentration camp was far preferable to being tortured and executed on their return to the Soviet Union.

Other Crimes Committed at German Camps

In October 1940, Hitler ordered that concentration camp inmates and convicts be used to neutralize and dispose of Allied bombs which had not detonated. Work in the bomb squads was extremely dangerous for the largely untrained prisoners, and many prisoners were blown to pieces by the bombs. It is impossible to know how many prisoners were killed in these operations during the war. The Reich Ministry of Justice stated that more than 3,000 bombs had been defused by July 1942, and that 27 prisoners were already dead from these operations. Fatalities were certainly much higher in the following years as the Allied air attacks intensified. Since most prisoners did not volunteer for this extremely dangerous assignment, the use of inmates to defuse Allied bombs which had not detonated should constitute a war crime.[68]

Some German commandants were corrupt and were dealt with by German authorities. For example, Karl Koch, the first commandant of Buchenwald, ran Buchenwald from 1937 until early 1942 when he was transferred to Majdanek. Koch was a brutal and greedy administrator who enriched himself with valuables stolen from the inmates. Together with Dr. Waldemar Hoven and the Communist underground camp organization, Koch murdered many inmates to cover up his thefts. Koch was eventually charged by an SS court with committing murder and theft, and was found guilty and executed.[69]

The SS punished many additional of its members for their conduct while serving in the concentration camps. Two German Commandants at Herzogenbusch, Karl Chmielewski and Adam Gruenewald, were placed on trial and found guilty of the deaths of prisoners as a result of their brutality. Chmielewski ended the war as an inmate in the Dachau concentration camp, and later received a life sentence of hard labor after the war. Gruenewald received a sentence of 15 years but was then pardoned, and died in battle at the end of the war. The SS tried a total of 700 staff members throughout the course of the Third Reich because of improper conduct toward inmates.[70]

A category of political prisoners labeled NN (abbreviation of Nacht und Nebel—night and fog) were imprisoned pursuant to a decree dated Dec. 7, 1941. People who had not been tried but who were deemed a threat to Germany were dispatched to prisons or to concentration camps and subjected to particularly severe treatment. Field Marshall Wilhelm Keitel justified their imprisonment due to an increase in the number of attacks by Communists and other elements

hostile to Germany in occupied Europe following the start of the Russian campaign. These NN prisoners were forbidden any correspondence with family or friends; they would disappear into “night and fog.”[71]

One of the principal NN camps was Natzweiler-Struthof in Alsace, which was designed to make suspected resistance fighters disappear from public awareness. The Germans used prisoners throughout the Natzweiler-Struthof camp system as slave laborers to produce arms and to construct underground manufacturing facilities. Dr. August Hirt also performed medical experiments on Jews and gypsies within the camp. The camp was evacuated in early September 1944 and was first discovered by the Allies on Nov. 23, 1944.[72]

At the end of April 1944, a total of 5,289 NN prisoners were held in German penal institutions.[73] Beginning in late 1944, several thousand NN prisoners were transported to the concentration camps. For example, from October 1944 onward, about 1,600 French, Belgian, and Dutch prisoners were transferred from penal institutions to the GrossRosen concentration camp in Lower Silesia. The NN prisoners arrived in a weakened state, and by the time Gross-Rosen was evacuated in early 1945 a large number of the NN inmates were reportedly dead.[74]

The German military collapse at the beginning of 1945 led to the worst conditions and treatment of concentration camp inmates during the war. Conditions in the concentration camps deteriorated drastically as the number of prisoners grew and supplies dried up. As the Allied armed forces advanced into Germany, the Germans evacuated the concentration camps and prisons to prevent the inmates from being freed. Typically the camps were evacuated just weeks and even days before the camps were liberated by the Allies. Prisoners were often put on trains in the dead of winter without adequate food or sanitation facilities, and many prisoners were forced to march long distances in freezing weather to another camp. The result was the death of tens of thousands of prisoners from starvation, freezing to death, disease, and shooting by guards on what became death marches to the new German concentration camps.[75]

The working conditions of the prisoners in the German concentration camps also worsened dramatically during the last months of the war. Particularly dreadful were the conditions in the Mittelbau-Dora camp complex near Nordhausen, where prisoners had been forced to work in huge underground tunnels assembling V-1 flying bombs and

V2 rockets. Between mid-January and mid-February 1945 the number of prisoners at the main Mittelbau-Dora camp increased by 50%. The housing provision was primitive, and death due to undernourishment and disease was common.[76] When the U.S. Third Army liberated Nordhausen on April 11, 1945, it came upon 3,000 corpses and more than 700 barely surviving inmates. Already subject to starvation and disease, the prisoners had also suffered numerous casualties from American bombings the week before.[77]

Albert Speer acknowledged that the living conditions for inmates working on the V-2 rocket had been atrocious. Speer states: "The conditions for these prisoners were in fact barbarous, and a sense of profound involvement and personal guilt seizes me whenever I think about them. As I learned from the overseers after the inspection was over, the sanitary conditions were inadequate, disease rampant; the prisoners were quartered right there in the damp caves, and as a result the mortality among them was extraordinarily high."[78]

Mauthausen in Austria was another German concentration camp in which the working conditions were horrible. The camp was located near a quarry which was a principal supplier of paving stones for Vienna and other cities. Stone cutting and hauling is a strenuous occupation in the best of circumstances, but at Mauthausen the work was especially arduous. Most of the labor in the quarry was done with pick and axe, and prisoners hauled heavy chunks of granite on their backs up 186 steps that connected the camp to the quarry. Conditions at Mauthausen got even worse after the evacuation of Auschwitz, when thousands of Hungarian Jews were sent to Mauthausen and its sub-camps. Marched through the winter without adequate clothing and food, prisoners who survived to enter Mauthausen were usually in desperate physical and psychological condition.[79]

Mauthausen also spawned an especially brutal system of close to 50 sub-camps. The major sub-camps were Gusen and Ebensee. In addition to quarry work, inmates at Gusen built underground armament factories for the production of machine guns and other weaponry, as well as fuselages for Messerschmidt aircraft. Ebensee was created in 1943 to provide labor for the construction of underground factory tunnels. Both subcamps in 1945 became end-destinations for dying transported workers from other camps. By the end of the war conditions at Mauthausen and its satellite camps were so bad that every day hundreds

of prisoners died from exhaustion, starvation, dehydration, typhus, and other diseases.[80]

Although some inmates in the German concentration camps were beaten, the incidence of beatings could vary greatly from camp to camp. For example, Anna Fest, who involuntarily joined the SS in the fall of 1944, said that she saw German guards beat female inmates at the Ravensbrueck concentration camp. She was warned to stay seated and look away to avoid getting in trouble. Fest also says that in 1945 some of the guards at a work camp in Soemmerda would not allow local townspeople to give food to obviously hungry prisoners.[81]

Fest was transferred in late 1944 from Ravensbrueck to a work camp near Allendorf under the jurisdiction of Buchenwald. She described the Allendorf camp commandant, SS-Hauptscharfuehrer Arthur Wuttke, as being a very humane person. Fest's account is in accord with the anti-Nazi book The Work Slaves of Nobel Dynamite, which also ascribes to Wuttke "a certain humanity." Quoting documents provided by the Red Cross, this book says "with few exceptions, all the Hungarian women survived the slave work in Allendorf."[82]

National Socialist Germany also discriminated against Jehovah's Witnesses because of their pacifist religious beliefs. Since the Jehovah's Witnesses steadfastly rejected military service during the war, an estimated 6,000 of them were arrested and forced to live in the concentration camps. Hundreds of Jehovah's Witnesses died in camps and prisons due to abuse, overwork, and sometimes outright execution.[83]

Some German camps reportedly had devices used to torture inmates. These were used both by Germans during the war and by the Allies after the war. Robert Murphy states: "On another occasion we were informed that a Nazi torture camp, equipped with devices to extort confessions, was still operating under American auspices. A zealous American intelligence officer had found out how effectively Nazi devices persuaded Nazis to confess their own misdeeds, and he was chagrined when ordered to close down this establishment."[84]

Crimes Committed by Communist Inmates at Buchenwald

In addition to crimes committed by Germans, many of the crimes committed against Buchenwald inmates were by the underground

Communist camp organization that gained almost total control of Buchenwald after 1943. This situation was reported in a U.S. Army intelligence document dated April 24, 1945, entitled Buchenwald: A Preliminary Report. The confidential report noted that as large numbers of inmates began arriving at Buchenwald during the war, the understaffed SS had to turn over an ever larger share of camp administration to the inmates themselves. By 1943 the well-organized and disciplined Communist inmate organization had obtained almost total control of Buchenwald's internal operation. The report states:

The trusties had wide powers over their fellow inmates. At first they were drawn almost exclusively from the German criminals. This period lasted until 1942. But gradually the Communists began to gain control of this organization. They were the oldest residents, with records of 10-12 years in the concentration camps….They clung together with remarkable tenacity, whereas the criminal elements were simply out for their own individual welfare and had little group cohesiveness. The Communists maintained excellent discipline and received a certain amount of direction from outside the camp. They had brains and technical qualifications for running the various industries established at the camp.

Their advances were not made without resistance from the criminals, but gradually the criminals were eliminated from power, partly by intimidation, partly with the aid of the SS. Numbers of the criminals were killed by beatings, hangings, or injections of phenol [carbolic acid]into the heart or of air or milk in the veins. The injections were a specialty of the camp doctor, who became a partisan of the Communist faction.

Besides the top positions in the trusty organization, there were a number of key Communist strongholds in the administration of the camp. One was the food supply organization, through which favored groups received reasonable rations while others were brought to the starvation level. A second was the hospital, staffed almost exclusively by Communists. Its facilities were largely devoted to caring for members of their party….Another Communist stronghold was the Property Room….Each German trusty obtained good clothing and numerous other valuables. The Communists of Buchenwald, after 10 or 12 years in concentration camps, are dressed like prosperous business men. Some affect leather jackets and little round caps reminiscent of the German navy, apparently the uniform of revolution.[85]

As a result of all this: “The trusties, who in time became almost exclusively Communist Germans, had the power of life and death over all other inmates. They could sentence a man or group to almost certain death….The Communist trusties were directly responsible for a large part of the brutalities committed at Buchenwald.”[86]

The report states that Dr. Waldemar Hoven, the Buchenwald physician, had been a Communist ally who killed numerous criminal and anti-Communist political prisoners with lethal injections. The SS tried and convicted Dr. Hoven for murder, but he was reprieved after 18 months in jail because of the wartime shortage of doctors. The Communists tried to protect Dr. Hoven after the war; however, he was sentenced to death by a U.S. military tribunal and executed in 1948.[87]

The report mentions that the Communists in Buchenwald killed large numbers of Polish inmates who refused to submit to their rule. The Communists also forced French inmates to give up thousands of Red Cross parcels. Communists in Buchenwald maintained close relations with the well-organized underground Communist Party on the outside. The report states: “From Buchenwald an inmate went out regularly to establish contact with a Communist courier bringing news and instructions. Bound by his loyalty to the party, the contact man never made use of his opportunity to escape personally.”[88]

The Communist Buchenwald inmates had a military organization that had three machine guns, 50 rifles, and a number of hand grenades. Ernst Federn, a Jewish former Buchenwald inmate, explained after the war how the Communist camp organization eliminated opponents and undesirables. Federn recalled that Emil Carlebach, the leader of the Jewish section of the Communist camp organization, “declared quite frankly that for him only his [Communist] friends counted, that everybody else might as well perish.” Federn reported that he witnessed Carlebach order one murder and commit another murder while Federn was an inmate at Buchenwald.[89]

Similarly, an Englishman who spent 15 months in Buchenwald reported after the war that the Communist camp organization did not consider non-Communist Jewish inmates particularly worth trying to keep alive.[90]

Allied Crimes Committed Upon Liberation of German Camps

Dachau was liberated on April 29, 1945, by the I Company of the Third Battalion, 157th Infantry Regiment, 45th (Thunderbird) Division, which was part of the Seventh Army of the United States. [91] Soldiers who liberated Dachau saw a trainload of dead bodies, horrific scenes of sick and dying prisoners, piles of dead bodies strewn around the camp, and smelled a stench in the air from the rotting dead corpses. A soldier writing home about what he had seen at Dachau states: "No matter how terrible, revolting or horrible any newspaper reports are about Dachau; no matter how unreal or fantastic any pictures of it may seem, believe me, they can never halfway tell the truth about this place. It is something I will never forget."[92]

It was in this environment that American troops committed the mass murder of the German guards at Dachau. The German roll call morning report of April 29, 1945, stated that 560 German guards were stationed at Dachau on the day it was liberated by American troops. This figure of 560 was reported by Lt. Heinrich Skodzensky and a Swiss Red Cross official when they attempted to surrender the camp to American forces. Almost all of the 560 German guards at Dachau were murdered by the end of the day.[93]

About 10 SS guards managed to escape by disguising themselves as inmates. However, they were quickly discovered and either shot, beaten to death, or taken prisoner. Approximately another 10 soldiers at Dachau were shot in the guard towers while attempting to man machine guns. Along with perhaps 20 more guards who tried to resist or escape, they are the only guards who can be classified as killed in combat. All of the remaining 520 guards at Dachau were murdered in one way or another.[94]

Escaped or released inmates seeking revenge executed approximately 40 guards. The inmates used weapons obtained from American soldiers or taken from fallen SS troops to kill the German guards. [95] Jack Hallett, one of Dachau's liberators, stated in regard to these executions: "Control was gone after the sights we saw, and the men were deliberately wounding guards that were available and then turned them over to the prisoners and allowing them to take their revenge on them. And, in fact, you've seen the picture where one of the soldiers gave one of the inmates a bayonet and watched him behead the man. It was a pretty gory mess. A lot of the guards were shot in the legs so they couldn't move."[96]

Approximately another 122 German guards were shot on the spot by American forces. This number includes Lt. Skodzensky, the newly arrived camp commander who was stationed at Dachau while recovering from wounds sustained at the Russian front. Eventually the situation was brought under control and the 358 surviving guards were rounded up and herded into an enclosed area and placed under guard. However, a machine gunner from M Company nicknamed “Birdeye” lost control and used a .30 caliber machine gun to murder 12 more German soldiers. This left 346 surviving German guards at Dachau.[97]

Lt. Jack Bushyhead was left in charge to guard the remaining German prisoners. Acting with what he believed to be compelling justification, Bushyhead lined up the remaining German guards along a high brick wall and disposed of them with bursts of machine gun fire. He then allowed three or four liberated inmates the satisfaction of completing the execution.

First Lt. Howard A. Buechner later asked Bushyhead why he had allowed the mass murder of the remaining German guards. Bushyhead, who was an American Indian, said that he and his ancestors had always known discrimination, persecution, and injustice without retribution. When in Dachau he saw death and atrocities far beyond human comprehension, he became an instrument of vengeance. Bushyhead claimed full responsibility for the murder of the German guards at Dachau.[98]

Accusations were drawn up against at least four officers and five enlisted men for the murder of the German guards at Dachau. Bushyhead was accused of violating the rules of the Geneva Convention, which protect prisoners of war regardless of atrocities they may have committed. The following is a report of how Gen. Patton handled the illegal American execution of the Dachau guards:

After a brief interchange, Patton ordered every officer, who had participated in the Dachau investigation to report to his office. He also demanded that they bring every document and photograph which they had collected. He then asked if they had placed every scrap of evidence in his hands. When assured that nothing had been withheld, he dumped all the papers into a metal wastebasket, asked for a cigarette lighter and personally applied the flame to the documents. The charges against Lieutenant Bushyhead had been dismissed. But, of greater importance, with

this act, the written records of the executions at Dachau were stricken forever from the annals of military history. The incident would remain alive only in the minds of men, and here it was buried for more than 40 years. Officially, the hour of the avenger had never occurred.[99]

The court martial charges were dropped, and all records of the mass murder of the German guards at Dachau were destroyed. Patton had decided that to pursue the matter further would have led to adverse publicity. One of the tragedies of this episode is that most of the German guards who were killed were a hastily assembled group of replacements for guards who had fled Dachau. These replacement guards at Dachau were innocent of wrongdoing.[100]

Similar to Dachau, the U.S. troops who liberated Buchenwald saw horrific scenes of sick and dying prisoners with piles of dead bodies strewn around the camp. Following the takeover of Buchenwald by American troops on April 11, 1945, approximately 80 German guards and camp functionaries were murdered. Most of these deaths occurred when inmates brutally beat the Germans to death with the aid and encouragement of U.S. soldiers.[101] Approximately 20 to 30 American soldiers took turns beating six young German guards to death.[102] Buchenwald inmates were also allowed to use U.S. jeeps to drive to Weimar, where they looted and randomly killed German civilians.[103] None of the murdered German civilians at Weimar had been responsible for any crimes committed at the Buchenwald camp.

The British troops who liberated Bergen-Belsen on April 15, 1945, also lost no time mistreating the SS camp personnel. Most of the German guards were beaten with rifle butts, kicked, stabbed with bayonets, shot, or worked to death.[104] The British liberators in an act of revenge expelled the residents of the nearby town of Bergen, and then permitted the camp inmates to loot the houses and buildings. Much of the town of Bergen was set on fire.[105] As with the vandalized and murdered civilians at Weimar, none of the residents at Bergen was responsible for any crimes committed at the Bergen-Belsen camp.

British journalist Alan Moorehead described the treatment of some of the camp personnel at Bergen-Belsen shortly after the British takeover of the camp:

As we approached the cells of the SS guards, the [British] sergeant's language became ferocious….The sergeant unbolted the first door and…strode into the cell, jabbing a metal spike in front of him. "Get up," he shouted. "Get up. Get up, you dirty bastards." There were half a dozen men lying or half lying on the floor. One or two were able to pull themselves erect at once. The man nearest me, his shirt and face splattered with blood, made two attempts before he got on to his knees and then gradually on to his feet. He stood with his arms stretched out in front of him, trembling violently.

"Come on. Get up," the sergeant shouted [in the next cell]. The man was lying in his blood on the floor, a massive figure with a heavy head and bedraggled beard…."Why don't you kill me?" he whispered. "Why don't you kill me? I can't stand it anymore." The same phrases dribbled out of his lips over and over again. "He's been saying that all morning, the dirty bastard," the sergeant said.[106]

As at Dachau, none of the Allied soldiers who committed atrocities at Buchenwald or Bergen-Belsen was ever punished for their crimes.

Postwar Crimes Committed in Allied-Run Camps

The Allies continued to operate Germany's existing concentration camps after World War II. Additional camps to intern ethnic Germans were established in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The existence and operation of these postwar camps is a matter of major historical significance. While the population of the German concentration camp system had grown from approximately 21,000 at the outbreak of the war to a record peak of over 700,000 at the beginning of 1945, it is possible the number of Germans incarcerated across Europe in similar camps by the end of 1945 might have been even higher.[107]

The concentration camps at Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen, Muehlberg, Fuerstenwalde, Liebe-Roze, Bautzen, and others were taken over by the Russian Gulag Archipelago. Thus, for example, the camp at Buchenwald was transformed into "Special Camp No. 2" and was operated by the Soviet Union until 1950.[108] Conditions at the camps under Soviet control were atrocious. The camps were labeled "special" because the Soviets insisted that the internees be cut off completely from the civilian population.[109] Even Gen. Merkulov, the Soviet official in

charge of the concentration camps in Germany, acknowledged the severe lack of order and cleanliness, particularly at Buchenwald.[110]

One former inmate described his five years in the Soviet-run Buchenwald camp in these words:

People were mere numbers. Their dignity was consciously trampled upon. They were starved without mercy and consumed by tuberculosis until they were skeletons. The annihilation process, which had been well tested over decades, was systematic. The cries and groans of those in pain still echo in my ears whenever the past comes back to me in sleepless nights. We had to watch helplessly as people perished according to plan—like creatures sacrificed to annihilation.

Many nameless people were caught up in the annihilation machinery of the NKVD after the collapse of 1945. They were herded together like cattle after the so-called liberation and vegetated in the many concentration camps. Many were systematically tortured to death. A memorial was built for the dead of the Buchenwald concentration camp. A figure of death victims was chosen based on fantasy. Intentionally, only the dead of the 1937-1945 period were honored. Why is there no memorial honoring the dead of 1945 to 1950? Countless mass graves were dug around the camp in the postwar period.[111]

While no one can know the exact number of deaths and inmates at Buchenwald, it is reasonably certain a higher percentage of inmates died under Soviet control than under German control. Viktor Suvorov estimates that 28,000 people were imprisoned by the Soviets at Buchenwald from 1945 to 1950, of whom 7,000 (25%) died. By comparison, he estimates that 250,000 people were imprisoned by the Germans at Buchenwald from 1937 to 1945. Of that number, he estimates that 50,000 (20%) died. The Soviet Buchenwald had a higher estimated death rate than the German Buchenwald.[112]

Suvorov's estimates of deaths at Soviet-run Buchenwald are probably understated. Some sources estimate that at least 13,000 and as many as 21,000 persons died in Soviet-run Buchenwald.[113] Also, a detailed June 1945 U.S. government report of German-run Buchenwald put the total deaths at a lower amount of 33,462, of whom more than 20,000 died in the chaotic final months of the war. These total deaths

include at least 400 inmates killed in British bombing raids.[114] Thus, the death-rate percentage at the Soviet-run Buchenwald versus the German-run Buchenwald is probably substantially higher than Suvorov's estimates.

Russian estimates show a total of 122,671 Germans passed through Soviet-run camps in the Soviet Zone after the end of the war. Of this total, officially 42,889 Germans died, or approximately 35%. The Soviet statistics probably underestimate the true number of dead in the Soviet-run camps. American military intelligence units and Social Democratic Party groups in the late 1940s and 1950s estimate that a much higher total of 240,000 German prisoners passed through Soviet-run camps in the Soviet zone. Of these, an estimated 95,643 died, or almost 40%.

In these revisions there were 60,000 prisoners at Sachsenhausen, where 26,143 died; 30,600 prisoners at Buchenwald, where 13,200 did not survive; and 30,000 prisoners at Bautzen, where 16,700 died. The higher death counts are supported by discoveries of numerous mass graves of Germans buried near the Soviet-run camps.[115]

No one has ever been punished for the deaths and mistreatment of German inmates in the postwar Soviet-run camps. The hundreds of thousands of visitors who visit the Buchenwald campsite each year only see museums and memorials dedicated to the "victims of fascism." There is nothing at Buchenwald to remind visitors of the thousands of Germans who perished miserably in Buchenwald after the war when the camp was run by the Soviet Communists.[116]

Many of the Germans in Poland were also sent to the former German concentration camps. In March 1945, the Polish military command declared that the entire German people shared the blame for starting World War II. Over 105,000 Germans were sent to labor camps in Poland before their expulsion from Poland. The Polish authorities soon converted concentration camps such as Auschwitz-Birkenau, Łambinowice (called Lamsdorf by its German occupants) and others into internment and labor camps. In fact, the liberation of the last surviving Jewish inmates of the Auschwitz main camp and the arrival of the first ethnic Germans were separated by less than two weeks.

When the camps in Poland were finally closed, it is estimated that as many as 50% of the inmates, mostly women and children, had died from ill treatment, malnutrition, and diseases.[117]

In a confidential report concerning the Polish concentration camps filed with the Foreign Office, R.W.F. Bashford writes: "[T]he concentration camps were not dismantled, but rather taken over by new owners. Mostly they are run by Polish militia. In Swietochlowice, prisoners who are not starved or whipped to death are made to stand, night after night, in cold water up to their necks, until they perish. In Breslau there are cellars from which, day and night, the screams of victims can be heard."[118]

At Lamsdorf in Upper Silesia, a camp population of 8,064 Germans was decimated through starvation, disease, hard labor, and physical mistreatment. Lamsdorf was initially built by Germany to house Allied prisoners of war. A surviving German doctor at Lamsdorf recorded the deaths of 6,488 German inmates in the camp after the war, including 628 children.[119]

A report submitted to the U.S. Senate dated Aug. 28, 1945, reads: "In 'Y' [code for a camp, from the original document], Upper Silesia, an evacuation camp has been prepared which holds at present 1,000 people….A great part of the people are suffering from symptoms of starvation; there are cases of tuberculosis and always new cases of typhoid. …Two people seriously ill with syphilis have been dealt with in a very simple way: They were shot….Yesterday a woman from 'K' [another camp] was shot and a child wounded."[120]

Zgoda, which had been a satellite camp of Auschwitz during the war, was reopened by the Polish Security Service as a punishment and labor camp. Thousands of Germans in Poland were arrested and sent to Zgoda for labor duties. The prisoners were denied adequate food and medical care, the overcrowded barrack buildings were crawling with lice, and beatings were a common occurrence. The camp director, Salomon Morel, told the prisoners at the gate that he would show them what Auschwitz had meant. A man named Guenther Wollny, who had the misfortune of being an inmate in both Auschwitz and Zgoda, later stated, "I'd rather be 10 years in a German camp than one day in a Polish one."[121]

A notable element of the postwar Polish camp system was the prevalence of sexual assault as well as ritualized sexual humiliation and punishment suffered by the female inmates. The practice at Jaworzno, as reported by Antoni Bialecki of the local Office of Public Security, was to "take ethnically German women at gunpoint home at night and rape

them." The camp functioned as a sexual supermarket for its 170-strong militia guard contingent.

The sexual humiliation of female prisoners in the Polish camp at Potulice had become an institutional practice by the end of 1945. Many of the women were sexually abused and beaten, and some of the punishments resulted in horrific injuries. The sexual exploitation of women in Polish-run camps contrasts to the experience of women in German-run concentration camps. Rape or any other form of sexual mistreatment was an extremely rare occurrence at German concentration camps and severely punished by the authorities if detected.[122]

The ICRC attempted to send a delegation to investigate the atrocities reported in the Polish camps. It was not until July 17, 1947, when most Germans had either died or had been expelled from the camps, that Red Cross officials were finally allowed to inspect a Polish camp. Yet even at this late date there were still a few camps the Red Cross was not allowed to investigate.[123]

Jewish journalist John Sack has confirmed the torture and murder of German prisoners in postwar Polish camps operated by the Office of State Security. Most of the camps were staffed and run by Jews, with help from Poles, Czechs, Russians, and concentration camp survivors. Virtually all of the personnel at these camps were eager to take revenge on the defeated Germans. In three years after the war, Sack estimates that from 60,000 to 80,000 Germans died in the office's camps.[124]

Efforts to bring perpetrators in Polish camps to justice were largely unsuccessful. Czeslaw Geborski, director of the camp at Lamsdorf, was indicted by the Polish authorities in 1956 for wanton brutality against the German prisoners. Geborski admitted at his trial that his only goal in taking the job was "to exact revenge" on the Germans. On Oct. 4, 1945, Geborski ordered his guards to shoot down anyone trying to escape a fire that engulfed one of the barracks buildings; a minimum of 48 prisoners were killed that day. The guards at Lamsdorf also routinely beat the German prisoners and stole from them. German prisoners in Lamsdorf died of hunger and diseases in droves; guards recalled scenes of children begging for scraps of food and crusts of bread. Geborski was found not guilty despite strong evidence of his criminal acts.[125]

The Theresienstadt concentration camp in Czechoslovakia was used by Germany during the war to intern many of Germany's, Austria's, and Czechoslovakia's most famous or talented Jews. On May 24, 1945, the

Czech government decided to use the Theresienstadt camp to imprison 600 Germans from Prague. Within the first few hours of their arrival between 59 and 70 of the 600 Germans were brutally beaten to death. Two hundred more of the Germans were reported to have died from torture and beatings within the next few days. The camp commandant, Alois Prusa, took great pleasure in the beatings, and reportedly used at least one of his daughters to assist him in killing the German inmates. Prusa and his assistant told the remaining surviving Germans that they would never leave the camp.[126]

Torture appears to have been the rule in Czech-run Theresienstadt. Guards at Theresienstadt used a variety of instruments for beating and lashing their victims: steel rods sheathed with leather, pipes, rubber truncheons, iron bars and wooden planks. One woman in Theresienstadt observed and still remembers the screams from a female SS member forced to sit astride an SA dagger. Dr. E. Siegel, a Czech-speaking medical doctor working for the Red Cross, was also subject to extensive torture in Theresienstadt. Dr. Siegel thought the guards were ordered from above to commit their acts of torture, because the methods used in all Czech camps were broadly similar.[127]

Much of the savagery at Theresienstadt stopped when Prusa was replaced by a Maj. Kálal.[128] However, one secret Soviet report said that the German inmates at Theresienstadt repeatedly begged the Russians to stay at the camp. The report states: “We now see the manifestations of hatred for the Germans. They [the Czechs] don’t kill them, but torment them like livestock. The Czechs look at them like cattle.” The horrible treatment at the hands of the Czechs led to despair and hopelessness among Czechoslovakia’s ethnic Germans. According to Czech statistics, 5,558 Germans committed suicide in 1946 alone.[129]

Czech author Dr. Hans Guenther Adler, a Jew who was imprisoned during the war in the Theresienstadt concentration camp, confirms that conditions in Czech-run Theresienstadt were deplorable for Germans after the war. Adler writes:

Certainly there were those among them who, during the years of occupation, were guilty of some infraction or other, but the majority, among them children and adolescents, were locked up simply because they were German. Just because they were German? That phrase is frighteningly familiar; one could easily substitute the word “Jew” for “German.” The rags

given to the Germans as clothes were smeared with swastikas. They were miserably undernourished, abused….The camp was run by Czechs, yet they did nothing to stop the Russians from going in to rape the captive women."[130]

After the war, the Red Cross reported that the sexual abuse of female inmates in Czech-run camps was pervasive and systematic. A foreign observer of one Czech camp noted that the women were "treated like animals. Russian and Czech soldiers come in search of women for purposes which can be imagined. Conditions there for women are definitely more unfavorable than in the German concentration camps, where cases of rape were rare." In another Czech camp, the Czech and Soviet soldiers would "take away the prettiest girls, who would often disappear without trace."

Jean Duchosal, secretary general of the ICRC, reported that girls were often raped at the Matejovce camp in Slovakia, and that beatings were daily occurrences. The same was true of the Czech-run camp of Patrónka. A Prague police report of June 1945 mentioned that Revolutionary Guards were in the habit of "exposing women's body parts and burning them with lighted cigarettes."[131]

A common feature of most Czech-run camps was the provision of so little food to camp inmates as to make not merely malnutrition but actual starvation largely a function of the length of incarceration. The Czech government in 1945 and 1946 contrived as a matter of policy to ensure that there would be no improvement in the food rations provided to ethnic German inmates, regardless of the availability of food. For example, none of the 4.5 tons of food the Red Cross delivered to the Hagibor camp shortly before Christmas 1945 was issued to the inmates, despite the fact that malnutrition-related deaths were occurring at a rate of three per day. Richard Stokes, the prominent British Parliament member, visited Hagibor in September 1946 and calculated the daily food ration at Hagibor to be "750 calories per day, which is below Belsen level."[132]

The Red Cross found that published regulations regarding the dietary requirements of inmates in Czech-run camps were almost invariably ignored. Pierre W. Mock, head of the ICRC delegation in Bratislava, calculated the daily caloric intake of prisoners at Petrzalka I camp at 664 per person during the third week of October 1945. The daily

caloric intake had declined to 512 per person when Mock returned to the Petrzalka I camp in the last week of December 1945. At Nováky, a former German concentration camp, Mock found the milk and bread ration to be woefully inadequate to feed the population of more than 5,000.

A Red Cross visitor at the Hradistko camp near Prague was informed by the guard in charge of food distribution that the inadequate food ration issued to the inmates was fixed by law and unchangeable. The guard also told the Red Cross visitor that the few Czech children at Hradistko received twice as much food as the German inmates. A social worker attempting to ameliorate the worst elements of the Czechoslovak camp system confidentially advised the British Foreign Office in February 1946 that the Czech government would not permit relief supplies to be distributed to the needy German civilian inmates.[133]

German prisoners at Svidník camp in Czechoslovakia were also forced to clear away mine fields. Strong protests by the delegation of the ICRC at Bratislava eventually succeeded in having this practice stopped.[134] In addition, the ICRC sent a general memorandum to the Prague government on March 14, 1946, stating that its duty was to carry out the German expulsions as humanely as possible. In view of the unsatisfactory condition of the camps, the ICRC was of the opinion that provisional internment of Germans in Czechoslovakia should be ended as soon as possible.[135]

Thus, the German prisoners in postwar Soviet, Polish, and Czech concentration camps were subject to brutal treatment resulting in the loss of many tens of thousands of lives. Their treatment was possibly worse than the treatment of prisoners at German-run concentration camps during World War II.

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Chapter Ten

• Crimes Committed by Germany During World War II

Traditional historians usually characterize National Socialist Germany as a barbaric, vile, uncivilized, and criminal regime. For example, one historian states that in 1945, "Nazism was not only exposed to the German people as a catastrophic failure on its own terms, but was also revealed to all as an assault on civilized values."[1] Another historian states, "The liberation of Europe will always inspire us, for it contains a multitude of heroic and noble acts, and was at its core an honorable struggle to emancipate millions of people from a vile and barbaric regime."[2]

Since World War II was the bloodiest conflict in human history, it would be impossible to know about and report every crime that was committed by Germany during the war. I will instead attempt to include a brief overview of a substantial representative portion of the crimes, both real and imagined, that were committed by Germans during the war. I will also explain why Germany invaded so many countries during World War II.

Death of Soviet Prisoners of War in German Captivity

The Soviet Union was not a party to The Hague Conventions. Nor was the Soviet Union a signatory of the Geneva Convention of 1929, which defined more precisely the conditions to be accorded to prisoners of war. Germany nevertheless approached the ICRC immediately after war broke out with the Soviet Union to attempt to regulate the conditions of prisoners on both sides. The ICRC contacted Soviet ambassadors in London and Sweden, but the Soviet leaders in Moscow refused to cooperate. Germany also sent lists of their Russian prisoners to the Soviet government until September 1941. The German government eventually stopped sending these lists in response to the Soviet Union's refusal to reciprocate.[3]

Over the winter Germany made further efforts to establish relations with the Soviets in an attempt to introduce the provisions of The Hague and Geneva Conventions concerning POWs. Germany was rebuffed again. Hitler himself made an appeal to Stalin for prisoners' postal

services and urged Red Cross inspection of the camps. Stalin responded: "There are no Russian prisoners of war. The Russian soldier fights on till death. If he chooses to become a prisoner, he is automatically excluded from the Russian community. We are not interested in a postal service only for Germans."[4]

British historian Robert Conquest confirms that Stalin adamantly refused to cooperate with repeated German attempts to reach mutual agreement on the treatment of POWs by Germany and the Soviet Union. Conquest writes:

When the Germans approached the Soviets, through Sweden, to negotiate observance of the provisions of the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war, Stalin refused. The Soviet soldiers in German hands were thus unprotected even in theory. Millions of them died in captivity, through malnutrition or maltreatment. If Stalin had adhered to the convention (to which the USSR had not been a party) would the Germans have behaved better? To judge by their treatment of other "Slav submen" POWs (like the Poles, even surrendering after the Warsaw Rising), the answer seems to be yes. (Stalin's own behavior to [Polish] prisoners captured by the Red Army had already been demonstrated at Katyn and elsewhere. German prisoners captured by the Soviets over the next few years were mainly sent to forced labor camps.)[5]

The ICRC soon became aware of the Soviet government's callous abandonment of Soviet soldiers who fell into German hands. In August 1941, Hitler permitted a Red Cross delegation to visit the German camp for Soviet POWs at Hammerstadt. As a result of this visit, the Red Cross requested that the Soviet government send food parcels to the Soviet POWs. The Soviet government adamantly refused. It replied that sending food in this situation and under fascist control was the same as making presents to the enemy.[6]

In February 1942, the ICRC told Molotov that Great Britain had given permission for the Soviet Union to buy food for captured Soviet prisoners in her African colonies. Also, the Canadian Red Cross was offering a gift of 500 vials of vitamins, and Germany had agreed to collective consignments of food for POWs. The Red Cross reported: "All these offers and communications from the ICRC to the Soviet authorities remained unanswered, either directly or indirectly." All other appeals by

the ICRC and parallel negotiations undertaken by neutral or friendly nations met with no better response.[7]

The Soviet refusals to accept aid came as a surprise to the Red Cross. The Red Cross had not read Order No. 270, which was published by Stalin on Aug. 16, 1941. This order states in regard to captured Soviet POWs:

If…instead of organizing resistance to the enemy, some Red Army men prefer to surrender, they shall be destroyed by all possible means, both ground-based and from the air, whereas the families of the Red Army men who have been taken prisoner shall be deprived of the state allowance and relief. The commanders and political officers…who surrender to the enemy shall be considered malicious deserters, whose families are liable to be arrested [the same] as the families of deserters who have violated the oath and betrayed their Motherland.[8]

Order No. 270 reveals Stalin's great hatred for Soviet soldiers captured by German forces. It also reveals the danger to innocent children and relatives of Soviet POWs. Hundreds of thousands of Russian women and children were murdered simply because their father or son had been taken prisoner. Given Stalin's attitude, the German leaders resolved to treat Soviet prisoners no better than the Soviet leaders were treating captured German prisoners.[9]

The result was disastrous for surrendered Russian soldiers in German camps. Captured Red Army soldiers had to endure long marches from the field of battle to the camps. Prisoners who were wounded, sick, or exhausted were sometimes shot on the spot. When Soviet prisoners were transported by train, the Germans usually used open freight cars with no protection from the weather. The camps also often provided no shelter from the elements, and the food ration was typically below survival levels. As a result, Russian POWs died in large numbers in German camps. Many Russian survivors of the German camps described them as "pure hell."[10]

One German officer describes the conditions for captured Russian POWs in the German camps:

The abject misery in the prisoner-of-war camps had now passed all bounds. In the countryside one could come across ghost-like figures, ashen gray, starving, half naked, living perhaps for days on end on corpses and the bark of trees….I visited a prison camp near Smolensk where the daily death rate reached hundreds. It was the same in transit camps, in villages, along the roads. Only some quite unprecedented effort could check the appalling death toll.[11]

By one estimate, 5,754,000 Russians were captured by Germany during World War II, of whom 3.7 million died.[12] Another source estimates that perhaps 3.1 million Soviet POWs died in German captivity. The starvation of Russian soldiers in German camps stiffened the resistance of the Red Army, since soldiers would rather fight to the death than starve in agony as German captives. As knowledge of German policies spread, some Soviet citizens began to think that Soviet control of their country was perhaps preferable to German control.[13]

The death of millions of Russian POWs in German captivity constitutes one of the major war crimes of the Second World War. However, much of the blame for the terrible fate of these Soviet soldiers was due to the inflexibly cruel policies of Josef Stalin. A major portion of the Soviet POWs who died from hunger could have been saved had Stalin not called them traitors and denied them the right to live. By preventing the ICRC from distributing food to the Soviet POWs in German captivity, Stalin needlessly caused the death of a large percentage of these Soviet POWs.

A Red Army sergeant who was captured by the Germans when his unconscious body was dug out from the ruins of Odessa later joined Gen. Andrei Vlasov's Russian Liberation Army. The sergeant bitterly complained of the Soviet Union's betrayal of its POWs:

Tell me, why did the Soviet government forsake us? Why did it forsake millions of prisoners? We saw prisoners of all nationalities, and they were taken care of. Through the Red Cross they received parcels and letters from home; only the Russians received nothing. In Kassel I saw American Negro prisoners, and they shared their cakes and chocolates with us. Then why didn't the Soviet government, which we considered our own, send us at least some plain hard tack?…Hadn't we fought? Hadn't we defended the Government? Hadn't we fought for our country? If Stalin refused to have

anything to do with us, we didn't want to have anything to do with Stalin![14]

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn also complained of the shameful betrayal of Soviet soldiers by the Russian Motherland. Solzhenitsyn wrote:

The first time she betrayed them was on the battlefield, through ineptitude….The second time they were heartlessly betrayed by the Motherland was when she abandoned them to die in captivity. And the third time they were unscrupulously betrayed was when, with motherly love, she coaxed them to return home, with such phrases as "The Motherland has forgiven you! The Motherland calls you!" and snared them the moment they reached the frontiers. It would appear that during the one thousand one hundred years of Russia's existence as a state there have been, ah, how many foul and terrible deeds! But among them was there ever so multi-millioned foul a deed as this: to betray one's own soldiers and proclaim them traitors?[15]

German Reprisals Against Soviet Commissars and Partisans

On June 6, 1941, before the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler gave the Commissar Order to execute the political commissars captured with Soviet units. In the language of Hitler's Commissar Order, the Soviet commissars were the "originators of the barbaric, Asiatic fighting methods" that the enemy practiced. Denied combat status by the terms of this order, the commissars were to either be shot by the troops or turned over to the SS to suffer the same fate. Thus, the commissars were ordered liquidated not because of any crime they had committed, but because of their function in the Soviet political system.[16]

The Germans used special mobile formations called the Einsatzgruppen designed to carry out the Commissar Order and to crush partisan activity in the Soviet Union. The Germans formed four Einsatzgruppen units each having between 500 to 800 men per unit. The Einsatzgruppen generally had a good working relationship with the army since they freed up army security forces for front-line action. The exact number of people killed by the Einsatzgruppen will never be known, but

there is no question the Einsatzgruppen murdered large numbers of Soviet commissars and partisans during the war.[17]

Partisan warfare has traditionally been considered illegal, since it undermines the convention of uniformed armies directing violence against each other rather than against civilian populations. Soviet partisan warfare was extremely brutal and capable of severely disrupting German military planning. Because German forces were always limited and always in demand at the front, German military and civilian authorities were all the more fearful of the disruptions partisans could bring. Consequently, German army officers were trained to take a severe line against partisan activity in the Soviet Union.[18]

The combat of Soviet partisans in forests and swamps was regarded by German troops as the most dangerous of all types of warfare—favoring the hunted rather than the hunter. The partisans almost always killed captured German soldiers, frequently after inflicting brutal torture. The German anti-partisan forces operated in an extremely unpleasant environment that made the German units resent the partisans whose activities had caused them to be there. In summer huge swarms of flies and mosquitos made life miserable; in winter frostbite and trench foot were rampant.[19]

Letters from German soldiers reveal the danger of partisan warfare. A letter from German Cpl. Hans Bruening illustrates how the wooded areas of the Soviet Union were especially effective locations for partisan warfare:

[The forests are teeming with danger.] Any snipers who fall into our hands are of course shot; their bodies lie everywhere. Sadly, though, many of our own comrades have been lost to their dirty methods. We're losing more men to the bandits than in the fighting itself.

Hardly any sleep to be had. We're awake and alert almost every night; you have to be in case they attack suddenly. If the sentry drops his guard just once it could be over for all of us. Traveling alone is out of the question.[20]

German Cpl. Erich Stahl wrote: "These are dangerous swine, and no soldier is safe from them. The danger is there wherever you go and

wherever you stay…and you only breathe out when you've come back from your post unhurt….If the Moon's not out, you stay awake at your post like an ox."[21]

German Pvt. Hans Schroeder described how Soviet partisan activity killed two Germans on June 19, 1942: "Two of our comrades in first company tragically lost their lives….Though we kept watch, a partisan still was able to creep up to one of our houses. A grenade chucked in through the window, and it was done….We took revenge straight away, and rightly. I used to think one should act humanely, but this subhumanity just isn't worth it."[22]

The German High Command recognized both the importance and difficulty of combating partisans as the war progressed. Anti-partisan activity was originally handled by the army, but in October 1942 responsibility for anti-partisan activity was transferred to the SS. In January 1943 Hitler declared that the Geneva Convention and the traditional rules of chivalry did not apply in anti-partisan activity. Hitler also decreed that German soldiers could not be brought to trial for atrocities committed during anti-partisan operations. The result was extraordinarily vicious fighting in which no quarter was given and none was expected in return.[23]

Probably the most ruthless anti-partisan German unit was Sonderkommando Dirlewanger, which was named for and led by Oskar Dirlewanger. During anti-partisan operations, Dirlewanger frequently rounded up women and children left behind in partisan villages and marched them through minefields protecting guerrilla positions. This technique killed and maimed many innocent people. In another tactic, Dirlewanger would fly a light observation aircraft over suspected Russian villages. If he received gunfire he would later return in a ground action, set fire to the entire hamlet, and kill all the inhabitants. Prisoners were not taken in these punitive operations. Dirlewanger would also sometimes publicly hang captured Soviet partisans to discourage partisan activity.[24]

The Cossacks, a perennial enemy of the Bolsheviks, provided tens of thousands of their soldiers to the German army during World War II. The Cossacks also aided the Germans in hunting down Soviet partisans in the rear areas of their operations. Soviet partisans were ruthlessly killed in these anti-partisan activities.[25]

Other German anti-partisan warfare in the Soviet Union was also extremely harsh and brutal. One of the hardest hit areas was Belorussia, which struck an American journalist as "the most devastated country in Europe." In Belorussia, German figures indicate that the average ratio of Belorussians to Germans killed was 73 to 1. This statistic gives some indication of the scale of violence that the civilian population suffered. A total of 345,000 civilians in Belorussia are estimated to have died as a result of German anti-partisan operations, together with perhaps 30,000 partisans.[26]

By late 1942 the Soviet partisan movement was growing increasingly active, dangerous, and widespread. Virtually no civilian regardless of age or sex was beyond suspicion. Simultaneously, Germany's need for foodstuffs and labor from occupied Soviet territories was increasingly desperate. Since the partisans themselves controlled ever-larger amounts of arable land, German anti-partisan activity often involved depriving the partisans of food and shelter. The German army used the captured partisan food and livestock for its benefit, while Soviet citizens were increasingly required to perform forced labor. The result was the uprooting and evacuation of much of the Soviet population.[27]

The increasing likelihood of ultimate German defeat in 1943 caused Soviet partisan activity to mushroom. As partisan activity increased, the German anti-partisan warfare became even harsher and more desperate. Partisans and the local populations that supported them had to be hit hard and fast. The result in many cases was the wholesale destruction of villages, murder, and the effective enslavement of much of the civilian population.[28]

Regardless of how destructive German sweeps were in a given area, Soviet partisan forces almost always reemerged. Most partisan units survived the attacks in some form, and the Germans could never keep sufficient troops in place to secure an area for any length of time. Often the methods employed to reduce Soviet partisan activity had the opposite effect because surviving peasants joined the partisans to avenge their family and friends. Also, some Soviet citizens felt they had no alternative except to join the partisans if they themselves wanted to stay alive.[29]

Soviet partisan warfare against Germany became increasingly barbaric and murderous. In February 1943, 596 German prisoners were killed and many of them mutilated by partisans at Grischino. A German judge who interrogated witnesses and survivors of this atrocity remembers: "You have no idea how much trouble the commanders and

company chiefs had…to restrain the German soldiers from killing every Russian prisoner of war of the Popov Army. The troop was very bitter and angry. You cannot imagine the vehemence of the soldiers after they had seen what had happened."[30]

German anti-partisan activity resulted in a horrific loss of civilian and partisan lives as well as the destruction of many Russian villages. However, the Soviet partisans' sabotage operations effectively tied up increasing numbers of German troops and prevented the Germans from ever feeling secure on Russian soil. By the time the bulk of Russian territory had been liberated in early 1944, a large and effective Soviet guerrilla movement had emerged. Stalin's support had allowed the Soviet partisans to survive the German anti-partisan reprisals and grow into an effective fighting force that helped the Soviet Union win the war.[31]

German Anti-Partisan Reprisals in Czechoslovakia

On May 27, 1942, two Czech partisans ambushed Reinhard Heydrich's vehicle as he was traveling from Prague to Berlin. While Heydrich lay critically wounded in a hospital, National Socialist leaders became enraged and ethnic Germans had to be restrained from attacking Czech citizens and establishments. Heydrich's death on June 4, 1942, ensured that reprisals would be forthcoming. [32]

Immediately after Heydrich's funeral on June 9, 1942, Hitler ordered the complete annihilation of the Bohemian village of Lidice. Lidice was targeted partly because Heydrich's assassins had allegedly received support from the village's inhabitants. Within hours German police units surrounded the village, and the male inhabitants were herded on to a farm and successively shot in groups of 10. A total of 172 men were murdered in Lidice on June 9, 1942, and all of the buildings were burned to the ground. The women of Lidice were deported to the Ravensbrueck concentration camp while their children underwent racial screening to see if they were Germanizable. An additional 27 men from Lidice were later murdered, making a total of 199 men executed from Lidice.[33]

The Lidice killings made the front page of newspapers around the world. Shortly after the destruction of the village, several communities in the United States, Mexico, Peru and Brazil renamed their towns and villages "Lidice" in honor of the murdered villagers. Books and movies were made to remember the dead at Lidice, and U.S. war posters called

on Americans to "Remember Pearl Harbor and Lidice." Of all the sites of German reprisals, Lidice became a household word and possessed the greatest propagandistic value to the Allies.[34]

Heydrich's two assassins were eventually surrounded and killed on June 18, 1942. With the help of local informants, Gestapo agents eventually rounded up most of the remaining Communist and Czech resistance members.

All 33 of the adults in the village of Lezáky were also murdered when Gestapo agents found in Lezáky the transmitter of the underground radio team that had been parachuted into the protectorate alongside Heydrich's two assassins. The children in Lezáky were handed over to German authorities and the village's buildings reduced to rubble. In addition to those killed in Lidice and Lezáky, 3,188 Czechs were arrested and 1,327 were sentenced to death during the reprisals that summer. Close to 4,000 people with relatives among the exiles were rounded up and placed in concentration camps or ordinary prisons.[35]

The plot to assassinate Heydrich was launched by Allied intelligence agencies in London. Heydrich's assassination was not a spontaneous act of resistance as claimed by Allied propaganda. In fact, leaders of the domestic Czech resistance had warned Edvard Benes that killing Heydrich would be a catastrophe. The Czech resistance leaders stated:

The assassination would not be of least value to the Allies, and for our nation it would have unforeseeable consequences. It would threaten not only hostages and political prisoners, but also thousands of other lives. The nation would be the subject of unheardof reprisals. At the same time it would wipe out the last remainders of any resistance organization. It would then be impossible for resistance to be useful to the Allies. Therefore we beg you to give the order through Silver A [parachute team] for the assassination not to take place. Danger in delay; give the order at once.[36]

The Czech resistance leaders were prophetic in their warning. Benes and the Allies had hoped that the anticipated brutal German reprisals would lead to a more general uprising of the Czech population against German rule in Czechoslovakia. However, the wave of terror that followed Heydrich's assassination served as a powerful deterrent to

resistance activity. The Czech partisan underground was almost completely wiped out in the weeks after Heydrich's death, and was never to recover for the rest of the war.

Contrary to plans, the War Office in London noted a "dying enthusiasm" for further resistance within the Czech population. The Czech armaments industry remained one of the strongest and most reliable pillars of the German war effort. The brutal German reprisals had effectively ended Czech partisan activity until Germany's unconditional surrender at the end of the war.[37]

German Reprisals and Atrocities in Poland

Both Germany and the Soviet Union were guilty of major atrocities against Polish citizens during and after their conquest of Poland. However, in the case of Germany, many of their atrocities were reprisals for crimes committed by the Polish government against ethnic Germans in Poland. Poland's reign of terror had forced Germany to invade Poland to end the atrocities against Poland's ethnic Germans.

The Germans shot civilian hostages in Bydgoszcz, burned synagogues, and conducted operations similar to Lidice in numerous Polish villages and towns. German reprisals often included public executions and hangings of Polish citizens to discourage partisan activities. Germany also commenced resettlement schemes beginning in West Prussia, where 750,000 Polish citizens were expelled to make way for Germans transferred from the Baltic states. In 1942-1943, Germany cleared over 300 villages in central Poland as part of an additional resettlement scheme.[38]

Germany also used brutal measures to quash two uprisings in Poland during the war. The first uprising occurred in the Warsaw Ghetto in April 1943 and is today commonly called the Ghetto Uprising. The Ghetto Uprising had no realistic chance of military success, and some 40,000 civilians were either killed on the spot or deported to German concentration camps.[39]

The second uprising began in Warsaw on Aug. 1, 1944, and was a much larger and bloodier insurrection. Commonly referred to as the Warsaw Rising, it was the biggest military action undertaken by any of the wartime resistance movements. Receiving reports that Soviet tanks were visible on the horizon and believing that liberation was imminent,

Polish insurgent leader Gen. Bór-Komorowski used his 35,000-man Home Army to fight the Germans in Warsaw. The Home Army had expected to receive assistance from both the Red Army and the Western Allies; instead, it received almost no aid from either.[40]

German SS units were assigned to end the uprising. The German plan was to recapture Warsaw district by district, killing or at least driving out Polish citizens from every block and every house. In this manner the insurgents would be compressed into an ever constricting perimeter, with no insurgents to the German rear once they took a district. The Luftwaffe also played a role in the fighting, and attacks by Stukas caused major damage.

Since the Red Army stayed on the sidelines and offered no help to the Home Army, by Sept. 26, 1944, it was obvious to everyone that the Warsaw Rising had failed. Polish representatives signed a capitulation agreement on Oct. 2, 1944.[41] Some believe that Stalin refused to help the Polish Home Army because it was as adamantly anti-Communist as it was antifascist. It was advantageous for the Soviets to let the German and Polish forces kill each other off and then have the Red Army move in.[42]

It is difficult to assess overall casualties for the Warsaw Rising. Probably 9,700 men of the Home Army were killed in action with an additional 6,000 missing and presumed dead. The largest number of casualties was among the Polish civilians, with over 150,000 civilians estimated to have been killed during the fighting. German losses were also high. An estimated 10,000 German troops were killed and 7,000 missing and presumed dead.[43]

The German SS units had inspired fear and terror in the Polish population as a result of the slaughter of large numbers of civilians during the Warsaw Rising. The SS Dirlewanger unit appears to have been the worst culprit in the murder of innocent civilians. Even SS-Gen. Hermann Fegelein, speaking to Hitler about the Dirlewanger Regiment during the Warsaw Rising, said: “My Fuehrer, they are real low-lifes.”[44]

SS-Panzergrenadier Hans Schmidt expresses his view of Germany’s actions during the Warsaw Rising:

For the Poles to start the August 1944 uprising in their capital city at the very moment when the German soldiers of the eastern front were in a desperate defensive battle with the Red Army proved a great

miscalculation. It bears remembering that the numerous marshaling yards around Warsaw were the major railroad connections between the Reich and the eastern front, and these connections had to be held at all costs. Consequently the German reprisals against both the partisans as well as against the general population supporting the underground fighters were both swift and brutal. The inner city of Warsaw was largely destroyed during the ferocious battles that lasted for two months. To make a special issue, as the Poles seem to do even to this day, of the fact that the Germans leveled the inner city of Warsaw during the uprising is ludicrous. By that time most German inner cities had been destroyed, and the Allies had even attacked targets in Rome and Paris, something the German High Command had always avoided. Considering everything, there was no reason for the High Command to go easy on the residents of the Polish capital.[45]

German Anti-Partisan Reprisals in Other Countries

Numerous other anti-partisan activities were conducted by Germany during the war. Italian partisan activity assumed impressive proportions in the northern part of Italy after Mussolini's collapse in 1943. However, the Italian partisan activity developed at a time and place where the Germans were well positioned to contest its growth. In March 1944, for example, a partisan attack on a German column marching through Rome caused many German casualties. The Germans shot 335 hostages in a nearby abandoned quarry—the so-called Fosse Ardeatine—in a massacre that still provokes heated debates today.[46]

German anti-partisan reprisals continued in Italy through the summer of 1944. Between Sept. 29 and Oct. 5, 1944, the SS Panzer Division "Reichsfuehrer-SS" perpetrated a massacre at the Italian village of Marzabotto. The reprisal at Marzabotto was several times the size of the one at Lidice, and was one of the worst German atrocities committed in Western Europe during the war. The Germans continued antipartisan attacks in the winter months from 1944-1945 by employing three whole divisions to harry the Italian partisans and demolish their infrastructure. An estimated 40,000 partisans were killed in these anti-partisan operations.[47]

French resistance activity began to increase toward the end of the war. Since Allied leaders planned to invade Europe on the coast of France, French partisans received substantial weaponry and supplies to aid the

Allied invasion. By June 6, 1944, French partisans had received enough arms through airdrops to fully equip 20,000 resisters, and partially equip another 50,000. Large stocks of guns, ammunition, and explosives were in the hands of the partisans for a do-ordie effort to assist the Allied invasion.

Partisans began a flurry of subversive activity when the first wave of Allied troops landed in Normandy. French partisans performed delaying actions to keep German troops from reaching Normandy, buying time for the Allies to gain a foothold on the beaches. The most notable delaying action was against the SS Panzer Division "Das Reich," which was speeding north to meet the invasion. This panzer division became so frustrated from the partisan activity that it launched reprisals that massacred all of the men, women, and children in the village of Oradoursur-Glane. The Germans then razed all of the buildings in the village, adding it to their list of villages obliterated from anti-partisan reprisals.[48] An estimated 642 villagers were murdered in this atrocity.[49]

When the commander of the "Der Fuehrer" Regiment heard about the murders at Oradour-sur-Glane, he became furious and planned to initiate court-martial proceedings. However, the battalion commander who ordered this atrocity perished in battle at Normandy before he could be brought to justice. The atrocity at Oradour-sur-Glane led to a reduction in French resistance activity, as many partisan leaders decided that further acts of sabotage and assassination carried too high of a price.[50]

German reprisals against anti-partisan activity were also brutal in Greece. Since the Germans in Greece did not have occupying forces large enough to take full control of all areas, terror against the civilian population was deemed necessary to discourage resistance. In December 1943, German troops rounded up all of the men found in the mountain town of Kalavryta and shot them. This massacre of at least 500 men was a reprisal for the kidnapping and murder of German soldiers by Greek partisans. Waffen-SS soldiers did not even spare women and children in later anti-partisan reprisals the following spring in central Greece.[51]

Other regions in the Balkans also experienced severe German anti-[partisan reprisals. For example, a partisan attack on a German unit in Serbia prompted the Germans on October 20-21, 1941, to round up nearly 10,000 men in the town of Kragujevac and shoot 2,300 of them in batches. Another 1,736 men were executed in the town of Kraljevo. The shock of these German atrocities caused many Serbs to cease partisan

operations to avoid inflicting further reprisals on the civilian population.[52]

German anti-partisan reprisals were effective in reducing partisan activity in most places in Western Europe during the war. German reprisals against partisan activity frequently prevented opposition from surfacing over much of occupied Europe, and broke up opposition when it became visible. There were few places in Western Europe where the Germans were overwhelmed by partisan activities for very long. Only in the Soviet Union did German anti-partisan reprisals fail.[53]

While German anti-partisan units committed numerous atrocities during the war, it should be noted that the partisan activities against Germany were also illegal, brutal, and barbaric. Gen. Alfred Jodl summarized the German position regarding anti-partisan warfare in his closing address at the Nuremberg trial: "In a war like this, in which hundreds of thousands of women and children were killed by saturation bombing and in which partisans used every—and I mean every—means to their desired end, tough methods, however questionable under international law, do not amount to crimes of morality or conscience."[54]

Why Germany Invaded Norway and Denmark

The question is often asked: If Hitler wanted peace, why did he invade so many countries? We have already analyzed in previous chapters why Germany invaded or took control of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union. In the case of the Soviet Union, Germany's invasion was clearly a preemptive strike that prevented the Soviet Union from conquering all of Europe. We will analyze in this section why on April 9, 1940, Germany invaded the peaceful nations of Norway and Denmark.

Germany had no plans to invade Norway or Denmark when World War II began. Hitler considered it advantageous to have a neutral Scandinavia. On Aug. 12, 1939, in a conversation with Italian Foreign Minister Ciano, Hitler stated that he was convinced none of the belligerents would attack the Scandinavian countries, and that these countries would not join in an attack on Germany. Hitler's statement was apparently sincere, and it is confirmed in a directive on Oct. 9, 1939.[55]

Hitler eventually became convinced of the need for a preemptive strike to forestall a British move against Norway. Adm. Erich Raeder in a routine meeting with Hitler on Oct. 10, 1939, pointed out that the establishment of British naval and air bases in Norway would be a very dangerous development for Germany. Raeder stated that Britain would be able to control the entrance to the Baltic, and would be in a position to hinder German naval operations in the Atlantic and the North Sea. The flow of iron ore from Sweden would end, and the Allies would be able to use Norway as a base for aerial warfare against Germany.[56]

In a meeting on Dec. 18, 1939, Hitler let it be known that his preference was for a neutral Norway, but that if the enemy tried to extend the war into this area, he would be forced to react accordingly. Hitler soon had convincing evidence that Britain would not respect Norwegian neutrality. German naval intelligence in February 1940 broke the British naval codes and obtained important information about Allied activities and plans. The intercepts indicated that the Allies were preparing for operations against Norway using the pretext of helping Finland. The intercepts confirmed Adm. Raeder's fears about British intentions.[57]

Both Britain and France believed that the threat of Germany losing badly needed iron ore would provoke Germany into opening up military operations in Scandinavia. However, Britain and France had somewhat different objectives. Britain believed that German operations could be challenged effectively and successfully by the Allies, resulting in quick military victories for the Allies in a war that had stagnated. France wanted to open a new front in order to divert German attention and resources from her border. Both Britain and France felt the maritime blockade of Germany would become more effective once Norway was conquered, especially if they succeeded in severing the flow of iron ore to Germany. They were willing to accept great military and political risks to this end.[58]

German intelligence reports continued to indicate that the Allies would invade Norway even after the conclusion of peace between Finland and the Soviet Union. On March 28, 1940, the Germans learned about the decision taken by the Allied Supreme War Council to mine Norwegian waters. A diplomat's report on March 30, 1940, indicated that the Allies would launch operations in northern Europe within a few days. British mining operations in Norwegian territorial waters began on April 8, 1940. Although no armed clashes with Norwegian forces took place, the

British mining operations were a clear violation of Norway's neutrality and constituted an act of war.[59]

Germany's decision to invade Denmark was based on the plan of Gen. Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, who concluded that it would be desirable to occupy Denmark as a "land bridge" to Norway. Denmark quickly surrendered to German forces on April 9, 1940.[60] The campaign in Norway lasted 62 days and unfortunately resulted in a substantial number of casualties. Most sources list about 860 Norwegians killed. Another source estimates the number of Norwegians killed or wounded at about 1,700, with another 400 civilians estimated to have died during the campaign. Norway also effectively lost her entire navy, and her people experienced increased hardships during Germany's five-year occupation.[61]

The German invasion of Norway on April 9, 1940, was made to preempt Britain's invasion of Norway. The Germans achieved most of their objectives in what must be viewed as a stunning military success. The occupation of Norway complicated British blockade measures and cracked open the door to the Atlantic for possible interference with British supplies coming from overseas. The air threat to Germany by a British presence in Norway was also avoided, as was the possibility of Sweden falling under the control of the Allies. Most importantly, Germany's source of iron ore was secure, and the German navy was able to remove some of the limitations imposed on it by geography.[62]

British hopes that quick victories could be achieved by enticing the Germans into an area where they would confront enormous British naval superiority were not realized. The hoped-for British victories in Norway turned into a humiliating defeat. The French objective of reducing the threat to her homeland by opening a new theater of war was also not achieved. A protracted war in Norway and the consequent drain on German resources did not materialize. The only major advantage to the Allies was a hardening of public opinion against Germany in neutral countries, especially in the United States.[63] Most people did not know that Germany's invasion of Norway and Denmark had preempted an invasion of Norway by Allied forces.

Why Germany Invaded France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg

On May 10, 1940, Germany invaded Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg as the only viable pathway into France, which was Germany's primary goal. Since their declaration of war on Germany, both Great Britain and France had been building up their military forces in preparation for an all-out offensive against Germany. A combined British/French army of 500,000 men was being organized for an invasion of Germany as soon as the Allied military build-up was ready. Britain and France had also been conducting a relentless naval campaign against Germany which included a naval blockade against German ports.[64]

Since France's heavily fortified Maginot Line blocked a German invasion across the German/French border, Germany had to invade the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg to get into France. Germany's occupation of the Low Countries was thus a result of her need to bypass the Maginot Line, and not a result of Germany's desire to conquer the world. Germany had tried to avoid war with both Britain and France. However, Britain and France had rejected all German peace offers, making it necessary for Germany to invade France and the Low Countries.[65]

Germany's invasion of the Netherlands unfortunately resulted in a substantial loss of life. The Dutch in a four-day battle tried to wipe out the German paratroops and glider-borne infantry that landed at Rotterdam and The Hague. German bomber squadrons had already taken off to relieve the pressure on paratroops at Rotterdam on May 14, 1940, when word arrived that the Dutch were capitulating. Only half of the German bombers could be recalled—the rest dropped nearly 100 tons of bombs on Rotterdam, resulting in the death of 900 people. Holland formally surrendered the next day.[66]

With 22 divisions at its command, the Belgian army put up a tougher fight than the Dutch. However, it too was overwhelmed, and Belgium formally surrendered to Germany on May 28, 1940, without consulting the British or French. French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud was said to have been "white with rage" on hearing the news of Belgium's capitulation. Some 10,500 Dutch and Belgian soldiers are estimated to have been killed in the conflict. Luxembourg didn't have an army and did not fight the German invasion.

France quickly fell to Germany primarily because French intelligence failed to predict how the German invasion would take place.

The strongest German force pushed through the Ardennes while smaller German forces fought Allied troops in the north. The Allied armies were soon surrounded by German divisions on three sides, with the sea on the fourth. Philippe Pétain, who had replaced Reynaud as prime minister of France, announced on June 17, 1940, that it was time to stop the fighting and sue for peace. Approximately 120,000 French soldiers were killed or reported missing in the conflict, with 1.5 million French troops taken prisoner by the Germans.[67]

Similar to Germany's invasion of Norway and Denmark, the German invasion of France and the Low Countries was primarily preemptive in nature. Germany had no designs on Britain or France and wanted above all else to avoid war. It was Britain and France that had declared war on Germany, and it was Britain and France that had ignored all German peace overtures. Hitler had even offered German military assistance if needed by the British empire, and had made repeated attempts to establish friendly relations with Britain, all of which were spurned. Germany's only viable option was to attack France and continue with a war it had never wanted.[68]

Germany Invades Greece, Crete, North Africa, Yugoslavia

Keeping the lid on simmering tensions in the Balkans was a high priority for Germany during the war. Hitler told Italian Foreign Minister Ciano on July 20, 1940, that he attached "the greatest importance to the maintenance of peace in the Danube and Balkan regions." The Germans were eager to prevent disturbance in the region, both to prevent further Soviet encroachment and to retain German access to oil from Romania. Impulsive Italian action against Yugoslavia could lead to Soviet intervention, and Italian action against Greece could let in the British through the back door.[69]

In August 1940, German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop twice repeated to Italian Ambassador Dino Alfieri that Hitler wanted to keep peace in the Balkans. Despite these and other German warnings, Mussolini decided to attack Greece from occupied Albania on Oct. 28, 1940. The Greek army was deemed to be weak, and Mussolini had expected a swift victory. Instead, the Greek forces fought valiantly, helped by good organization, knowledge of difficult terrain, and the superior motivation of troops protecting their homeland. The Italian campaign

rapidly proved to be a fiasco, and what was supposed to have been an easy victory turned into a humiliation for Mussolini's regime.[70]

Within little over a week the Italians were forced to halt their offensive in Greece, and by the time another week had passed they were being pushed back over the Albanian border by a Greek counterattack. The Italian front finally stabilized about 30 miles within Albania. To make matters worse, the Italian fleet anchored at Taranto in southern Italy was severely damaged by a British torpedo attack in November 1940. Half of the Italian warships were put out of action, and Italian dreams of empire sank along with the ships. The balance of naval power in the Mediterranean was decisively altered with this highly successful attack.[71]

The military situation in Greece could only be remedied with German help. This was a situation that both Mussolini and Hitler had hoped to avoid. Hitler had wanted the Balkans to remain quiet, but he could not ignore the threat now posed by intensified British military involvement in Greece. Hitler eventually decided in March 1941 that a major military operation would be necessary to evict the British from the whole of the Greek mainland. The German invasion of Greece to bail out Mussolini's ill-fated invasion resulted in Greece's surrender on April 23, 1941.[72]

Hitler in his last testament in 1945 states his displeasure with Italy's attack on Greece: "But for the difficulties created for us by the Italians and their idiotic campaign in Greece, I should have attacked Russia a few weeks earlier."[73] Hitler had unquestionably wanted Greece and the other Balkan countries to stay neutral during the war.

The remaining Greek, British and other Allied forces as well as the Greek government and king retreated to Crete. German airborne forces landed in Crete on May 20, 1941, and quickly seized control of the main airfields. A chaotic evacuation of British forces began on May 26, 1941, but more than 11,000 British troops were captured and nearly 3,000 British soldiers and sailors killed. The whole operation was a disaster for Great Britain. Churchill and his advisors conceded it had been a mistake to send troops to Greece in the first place.[74]

Italian military incompetence was also the reason Hitler had to send troops to north Africa. Italy's attempt to invade British-held Egypt from the Italian colony of Libya in December 1940 had been repulsed by a well-trained Anglo-Indian force of 35,000 men. Britain took 130,000

Italian prisoners and captured 380 tanks in this conflict. In April 1941, a force of 92,000 Italian and 250,000 Abyssinian soldiers was defeated at the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa by 40,000 British-led African troops. The Allies took control of Addis Ababa and the whole northeast part of Africa after this conflict.

Gen. Erwin Rommel arrived in Africa on Feb. 12, 1941, with the assignment to rescue the situation in north Africa. Appointed to head the newly formed Afrika Korps, Rommel was told to prevent any further Italian collapse in Libya. Building on his previous experience of combined air and armored warfare, Rommel's troops took the key Libyan seaport of Tobruk in June 1942 and forced the British back deep into Egypt. Rommel was within striking distance of the Suez Canal, threatening a major British supply route with the potential to gain access to the vast oilfields of the Middle East.[75]

Difficulties in supplying his troops by either land or sea eventually weakened Rommel's position in north Africa. The British stood their ground at El Alamein, and the Allies recaptured Tobruk in November 1942. Rommel returned to Germany on sick leave in March 1943. Defeat in north Africa was complete when 250,000 Axis troops, half of them German, surrendered to the Allies in May 1943.[76] The German invasion of north Africa had been designed to shore up Italian forces and later to possibly disrupt British oil supplies and gain access to Middle East oil. Germany's participation in north Africa was not about German territorial expansion.

The German invasion of Yugoslavia was in response to an unexpected military takeover of that country. On the night of March 26-27, 1941, a group of Serb officers executed a coup and established military control of the Yugoslav government. Hitler stated in regard to the Yugoslavia coup: "Although Britain played a major role in that coup, Soviet Russia played the main role. What I had refused to Mr. Molotov during his visit to Berlin, Stalin believed he could obtain indirectly against our will by revolutionary activity. Without regard for the treaties they had signed, the Bolshevik rulers expanded their ambitions. The [Soviet] treaty of friendship with the new revolutionary regime [in Belgrade] showed very quickly just how threatening the danger had become."[77]

The coup in Yugoslavia divided an already politically unstable country and provoked the Germans to denounce the illegitimate new government. Germany attacked Yugoslavia on April 6, 1941, and quickly defeated the Yugoslav military in 12 days. The defeat of Yugoslavia was

made easier because Yugoslavia was not a nationally unified country, and large portions of its population did not support the new government. The Yugoslav army's feeble resistance resulted in only 151 German fatalities during the brief campaign.[78]

The Malmédy Incident

On Dec. 17, 1944, the men of the First SS Panzer Division allegedly murdered over 80 American prisoners of war at Malmédy during the Battle of the Bulge. The so-called Malmédy Massacre was widely broadcast by Allied media as proof of German wickedness. However, a review of the facts shows that the Germans did nothing wrong during this incident.

The First SS Panzer Division under the command of Col. Jochen Peiper ran into a column of nearly 200 American soldiers belonging to Battery B, 285th Field Observation Battalion. The Americans surrendered after about 10 minutes of fighting. The Americans were disarmed (but probably not body searched), told to assemble in a clearing beside the road, and were lightly guarded by a few Germans in two vehicles, a half-track and probably a VW Schwimmwagen. Since Col. Peiper had orders to reach a certain destination by a given time, the bulk of the German force continued on its way almost without interruption.

Once the German tanks and other vehicles were out of sight, the Americans far outnumbered the handful of Germans guarding them. Some of the Americans attempted to escape into the nearby forest, knowing that American-occupied Malmédy was only a few thousand yards away. Complete chaos broke loose as a result. The German guards fired at the escapees. Other Americans, who had heard U.S. propaganda stories of the SS massacring their prisoners, believed that their end was near and also tried to flee. A few other American prisoners pulled out handguns they had hidden, or grabbed rifles that were still lying around, and fired back at the German guards.[79]

The main German force entered the area a few minutes after some of the Americans had made their escape. The Americans surrendered again to the Germans after several minutes of shooting. This time the captured American prisoners were more heavily guarded and marched back east into captivity. In the three firefights that occurred during the Malmédy incident, it is today estimated that fewer than 70 American

soldiers lost their lives. The Germans had done nothing wrong in this encounter. The German guards had every right to shoot at the American prisoners attempting to escape, even though pandemonium broke out that caused additional American deaths. Germany did not commit an illegal atrocity at Malmédy.[80]

The German Foreign Office investigated the Malmédy incident and submitted its official answer to the Swiss legation on March 8, 1945: "The German military authorities ordered that an immediate inquiry be made as soon as they heard in enemy radio reports about the alleged shooting of 150 American prisoners of war in the Malmédy area; the inquiry has established that the report is not true. Pursuant to the memorandum of the Swiss legation, new investigations were carried out by the German troops that had been engaged in the Malmédy areas during the period in question. These investigations have similarly established that American prisoners of war have not been shot. The report that 15 so-called survivors allegedly made to the State Department is therefore false."[81]

An unfortunate consequence of the Malmédy incident was an increase in German POWs killed by Americans. Allied atrocities such as the murder of POWs at Biscari, Italy on the orders of Gen. Patton had already occurred during the war. However, as a result of the incredible Allied hate propaganda concerning Malmédy, untold numbers of mostly very young Waffen-SS soldiers were subsequently shot by American soldiers after their capture. Having interviewed many former American soldiers since 1950, Hans Schmidt estimates that Allied soldiers murdered thousands of Waffen-SS POWs because of the Malmédy incident.[82]

The effect of Allied hate propaganda on the treatment of captured German POWs after the Malmédy incident is confirmed by an American soldier: "American feelings toward Germans hardened into vindictive hate. Chances of survival for newly caught German POWs diminished greatly."[83] Most American wartime memoirs also mention that the shooting of German POWS after Malmédy, while officially frowned upon, was common.[84]

Sagan Prisoner of War Incident

Stalag Luft III was a Luftwaffe-run prisoner of war camp during World War II located near the Lower Silesia town of Sagan. The camp is best known for an attempted prisoner escape that took place there by tunneling. On March 24, 1944, on a moonless night 76 Allied prisoners escaped from the camp to initial freedom. However, 73 of the 76 escaping prisoners were later captured by the Germans. Hitler initially wanted all recaptured prisoners to be shot as an example to other prisoners not to attempt an escape from the camp. German military leaders argued against executions as being a violation of the Geneva Convention. Hitler eventually ordered Heinrich Himmler to execute 50 of the recaptured prisoners.

The Sagan incident was one of the German war crimes tried at the Nuremberg trials. British prosecutor David Maxwell Fyfe effectively cross-examined Hermann Goering about the execution of the 50 Allied airmen who had escaped from Sagan prison camp. Goering could not deny that their execution was a violation of the Geneva Convention.[85]

Starvation of Dutch Civilians

Living conditions in Holland by the start of 1944 had become almost intolerable. The Dutch economy had been stripped bare by Germany for its war effort, and children were beginning to show signs of malnutrition from food shortages. The Germans flooded large swathes of the country in anticipation of an Allied invasion. Allied bombing of dykes in Holland also devastated thousands of additional acres. Reckless air bombardment of Dutch cities by British and American bombers resulted in the death of civilians as well as the destruction of property. For example, an Allied air attack on Feb. 22, 1944, on Nijmegen killed 500 civilians, injured several hundred more, and left one-third of the center of the town in ruins. British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden said that such loss of life and damage to property was “part of the price of liberation.”[86]

By October 1944 the Dutch economy was on the verge of total collapse. The only hope was shipment of aid from Sweden or food drops by plane into occupied Holland. A small Swedish relief effort was eventually instigated in January 1945 that created a great boost for the morale of the hungry Dutch. However, by April 1945 the Swedes had been

able to deliver only 20,000 tons of food and supplies. While extremely welcome, this was not nearly enough aid to feed 3.5 million starving Dutch people.[87]

On April 12, 1945, the German Reich commissioner in the Netherlands, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, met with the leaders of the Dutch underground to negotiate a separate peace and allow aid to Holland. This led to a meeting on April 28, 1945, between Allied representatives and German officials that established designated drop zones for air supply of food and other aid. The next day low flying Allied aircraft dropped 500 tons of supplies on four drop zones to begin the massive relief effort. The German guns were silent, and no Allied aircraft were lost.

On April 30, 1945, the terms of a truce were negotiated between U.S. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith and Seyss-Inquart. The Allied and German officers broke into working parties and carefully set out the precise arrangements by which roads, ports, and air lanes would immediately open to humanitarian aid convoys. Allied airdrops in Holland delivered 7,000 tons of food and supplies over the next nine days, while trucks and ships carried in thousands of tons of additional aid. The Dutch finally were receiving the food and supplies they so desperately needed.[88]

The suffering of the Dutch people did not cease with their liberation. A long period of recovery lay ahead. A thorough survey of the western Netherlands carried out by the G-5 section of SHAEF after the war stated:

Hospitals are overcrowded with patients in the preliminary stages of starvation, i.e., suffering from hunger edema. Instances of this are 15,000 cases in Amsterdam and 10,000 in Haarlem. It is, however, clear that the number of patients in hospitals, large though it is, does not accurately reflect the state of the community. In driving through the poorer quarters of both Amsterdam and Rotterdam it was evident that many of the people in the streets and more especially those visible inside the houses were really in need of a course of hospital treatment to enable them to recover from the effects of a long period of malnutrition.[89]

The commonly agreed upon figure for deaths due to starvation and related illnesses during the war in the Netherlands is 16,000.[90] However, some sources estimate that 22,000 Dutch starved to death

during the war.[91] Seyss-Inquart was tried, convicted, and hanged at Nuremberg for actions "which were committed in the occupation of the Netherlands." The tribunal acknowledged, "It is also true that in certain cases Seyss-Inquart opposed the extreme measures used by…other agencies, as when he was largely successful in preventing the [German] army from carrying out a scorched earth policy."[92] However, the tribunal convicted Seyss-Inquart for depriving the Dutch of food in order to further the German war effort.

One of the reasons for the Dutch famine was the Allied refusal to adopt a plan by Herbert Hoover to provide relief to Holland and Belgium. Under Hoover's plan the food would be sent by the ICRC in its own ship, guarded through the journey to Belgium by neutral observers, and then eaten by children in the presence of supervisors. The Germans also agreed to match pound for pound everything rounded up for the Dutch people under Hoover's plan. Hoover's proposal would have resulted in no gain to the Germans.

Churchill and other Allied leaders rejected Hoover's plan and deprived the people in Belgium and Holland of much needed food. Hoover wrote: "There were no insurmountable difficulties in carrying out such relief [to Holland] except the attitudes of the British and American governments. There was ample food surplus in countries overseas from Europe. Shipping was available without diminishing the transportation of the Allies." No disadvantage to the Allied war effort would have resulted from adopting Hoover's plan. Thus, by refusing Hoover's relief plan, the Allies bear major responsibility for the starvation that occurred in Holland during the war.[93]

The Dutch were also deprived of food when British and American authorities on Nov. 2, 1944, refused to allow Red Cross ships to travel the Rhine from Switzerland to Holland. The Dutch had asked for and the Germans had already agreed to this operation. Eisenhower refused because his war plan called for the bombing of bridges over the Rhine. Moreover, Eisenhower claimed that "the prompt manner in which the Germans agreed to allow supplies to move on the Rhine is actuated, we believe, by their desire to keep the river open for their own purposes."[94] Eisenhower's refusal to allow aid from the Red Cross with Germany's approval is another reason the Dutch starved during the war. Eisenhower deprived the Dutch of food in order to further the Allied war effort.

Starvation of Greek Civilians

When the German army took control of Greece in April 1941, German supply officers seized large quantities of olive oil, rice, oranges, lemons, and other foodstuffs. As tired and hungry German troops entered Athens, they began to demand free meals in restaurants and loot houses and passers-by of their belongings. Soon hunger and malnutrition were prevalent in Greece. While the Italians began to send in extra supplies to Greece to alleviate the situation, Germany refused to follow suit, arguing that this would jeopardize the food situation in Germany.[95]

Although Greece was predominantly a rural country, it produced mainly cash crops such as olive oil, tobacco and currants. Greece was dependent on the annual import of 450,000 tons of American grain for one-third of its food, but the British blockade of occupied Europe cut Greece off from all imports. In the summer of 1941, the Red Cross, the U.S. government, and groups within Great Britain all argued that it was imperative that the British government revise its blockade policy and allow food aid to reach Greece. Churchill initially refused to lift the blockade. Hoover described Churchill as "a militarist of the extreme school who held that incidental starvation of women and children was justified."[96]

The famine in Greece was on such a vast scale that Churchill eventually allowed food aid for Greece through the blockade. This was the only significant exception Churchill made to the blockade against occupied Europe during the war. In January 1942 shipments of wheat were allowed through the blockade, and from April 1942 regular cargoes of wheat and other foodstuffs where allowed to enter Greek ports.

The food imported from the Allies was never enough to feed the Greek people. Although the Allied food imports halted the large-scale urban famine, the Greeks continued to die of starvation. The German army denied food aid to villagers in those areas where Greek partisans were active, and in 1943 and 1944 much of the Greek countryside starved. By one estimate half a million Greeks died from hunger and associated diseases during World War II.[97] Another historian estimates that 300,000 Greeks died of starvation during the German occupation.[98]

The starvation of so many Greek civilians was one of the great tragedies of World War II. The Greek famine was caused by a combination of factors. First, Italy's ill-advised invasion of Greece expanded the war

into a region that should have remained peaceful throughout the war. Second, Germany's initial confiscation of food and later refusal to supply food meant that famine would stalk the Greeks. Finally, Great Britain's initial refusal to end its blockade of imports into Greece caused unnecessary starvation in a country dependent on imported food.

Starvation of Russian Civilians

It was Germany's policy to live off the land in the Soviet Union from the very beginning of its invasion. German commanders knew that supply lines to the eastern front would be stretched to the breaking point. The few arterial roads running east would be of little use, and many of the main Soviet roads petered out into gravel tracks. The Soviet rail network would be difficult to use since its rail gauge was wider than the German rail gauge. Also, Soviet troops were expected to inflict heavy damage on the rail lines as they retreated. In order to relieve the inevitable congestion on the remaining railways, the German army decided to live off the Soviet land with very little food brought in from Germany.[99]

It was never intended that German army units should routinely plunder Soviet villages. However, German supply officers soon realized that the policy of living off Soviet land was getting out of hand. German soldiers often extracted foodstuffs from the Soviet civilian population without misgivings. Soviet villagers were frequently driven from their homes and their possessions stolen, with German troops sometimes indulging in the senseless slaughter of livestock. Moreover, the German army was never able to extract sufficient quantities of food from the Soviet Union to cover all of its food needs.[100]

Many peasants in the Ukraine initially welcomed the Germans as liberators who could free them from the tyranny of Soviet rule. The Ukrainian peasants were hoping the Germans would dismantle the Soviet collectives and reintroduce private ownership of farmland. However, Germany missed a valuable opportunity when it failed to disband the detested collectives, and agricultural production from Ukraine and other areas of the Soviet Union proved to be a disappointment during the war.[101] The result was a lack of food sufficient to feed both the German army and the Soviet civilian population.

By the winter of 1941-1942, the German army was fighting on an ever lengthening front with supply lines stretching up to 1,000 miles over

mostly unpaved roads. The German supply troops could not get enough food through to the men at the front. Underfed and weakened by exhaustion and malnourishment, the German troops soon contracted typhus and other diseases. The National Socialist leadership determined that occupied Russian territories must be made to release their food stocks with no regard for the consequences of the indigenous population. It was now German policy that the Russian civilian population should starve before the German troops.[102]

The siege of Leningrad, which lasted from August 1941 to January 1944, is the best known example of starvation in the Soviet Union during the war. It developed because the Soviets refused to withdraw from Leningrad to more defensible lines, and because Hitler refused to permit an all-out onslaught of the city. The resulting military stalemate gradually reduced Leningrad's civilian population by starvation, bombing, cold and disease. Estimates of the dead in Leningrad range from half a million to a million people. Their deaths were caused by the lack of concern of both Stalin and Hitler to the plight of Leningrad's innocent civilians.[103]

Soviet agriculture went to the brink of collapse throughout the war. With the nation's best agricultural land lost to the Germans until 1943, Soviet farmers struggled to feed the Soviet Union's vast army and people. Large numbers of civilians died of starvation in Soviet cities such as Kiev and Kharkov. However, collectivization in the Soviet Union enabled the government to extract virtually every ounce of food from Soviet farms, and to almost be able to feed its army and industrial workers during the war. The Soviet Union was fortunate that the climate remained favorable for farming during the period from [1941] to 1945. The drought that hit the Soviet Union in 1946 would have produced widespread famine during the war and would have seriously undermined the Soviet war effort.[104]

Looting of Art and Other Valuables

World War II historians correctly state that National Socialist Germany looted paintings, sculptures and other valuables from the nations it conquered. Private foundations such as Hitler's Sonderauftrag Linz, Alfred Rosenberg's Einsatzstab-Rosenberg, and Joachim von Ribbentrop's Special Service Battalion were established to administer the loot. Some of the museums that were plundered include those in Prague, Warsaw, Amsterdam, Paris, Rome, Kiev, and Florence. Four palaces

outside Leningrad lost 34,000 items, and Warsaw alone reported 13,512 missing works of art. Germany also acquired gold reserves valued at $621 million at wartime prices from Austria, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy.[105]

It is important to remember that Germany was not alone in practicing looting. All of the major Allied nations looted German art and other valuables after the war. For example, many years after the war German art treasures and other valuables would turn up in the United States. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 also revealed the colossal and secret cache of art housed in the Trophy Museum in the Moscow suburbs. This museum, which had never been opened to the public, was crammed to the ceiling with valuable art and other items that had been written off as missing. Most of the items in the Trophy Museum had never even been unpacked, let alone catalogued.[106]

A major reason for the German confiscation of French art is that Germany felt that France had taken too much from it in the Versailles Treaty and earlier times. The American journalist William Shirer noted in his diary, "Germany does not consider the Franco-German accounts as settled yet." The Germans made a detailed list of all works of art and valuable objects that were smuggled out of Germany after 1919. Hitler decided to erase the last vestiges of the Versailles Treaty and begin the recovery of the treasures stolen by France from the German nation.[107]

It should also be noted that Germany legitimately purchased a large percentage of its art in Europe. Hitler and Hermann Goering had carefully separated buying operations in France, Italy, the Low Countries, and other nations in Europe. Hitler appointed Hans Posse as his primary agent to buy valuable paintings throughout the European continent. Posse purchased 475 paintings his first year in 1941, and by 1945 he had purchased an incredible 8,000 paintings on Hitler's behalf.[108]

Probably never before in history had works of art been so important to the leaders of a political movement. Hitler was primarily focused on purchasing art for museums in Germany and in building a center for Germanic art in his hometown of Linz, Austria.[109] Goering, who had accumulated more than 1,000 paintings and sculptures by the end of the war, seemed to be motivated primarily by personal greed.[110]

The German Euthanasia Program

Influenced by the writings of eugenicists, Hitler considered it necessary for Germany's racial health and military effectiveness to eliminate mentally and genetically defective citizens. On July 14, 1933, the National Socialist regime introduced compulsory sterilization for Germans thought to be suffering from hereditary weaknesses. Some 360,000 Germans had been sterilized by the time World War II broke out. Abortion on eugenic grounds was also legalized in 1935. It was not until the outbreak of the Second World War, however, that National Socialist Germany fully implemented its euthanasia program.[111]

The first official German euthanasia occurred when Gerhard Herbert Kretschmar was killed on July 25, 1939. This boy was born on Feb. 20, 1939, and was blind, lacked one leg and part of one arm, and seemed to be an idiot. The child's parents contacted the Chancellery of the Fuehrer and requested the child be put to sleep. After seeing documents and photographs of the child, Hitler instructed Dr. Karl Brandt to investigate the matter and consult with the child's pediatricians. Once all of the doctors agreed that the diagnosis corresponded with the conditions outlined in the parents' petition, Brandt authorized the killing of the child.[112] An estimated 5,000 German children were euthanized during the war.[113]

In August 1939 Hitler let it be known to his close associates that he approved any measure which could be seen as delivering handicapped patients from pain and suffering. Probably in the late autumn or winter of 1939, Hitler backdated a document to Sept. 1, 1939, that authorized the euthanasia program. The authorization states: "Reich Leader Bouhler and Dr. Med Brandt are charged with the responsibility of enlarging the powers of specific physicians, designated by name, so that patients who, on the basis of human judgment, are considered incurable, can be granted mercy death after the most careful assessment of their condition."[114]

German doctors determined that carbon monoxide gas was the most painless and humane way to euthanize people. The use of carbon monoxide gas therefore became the standard technique to kill people in the adult euthanasia program, with the first killings probably beginning in January 1940. Richard von Hegener observed that patients would lose consciousness within two to three minutes of the gas entering the room. Within five minutes all of the patients had fallen into a "kind of sleep." The gas was left running for half an hour before a physician, protected by a

gas mask, entered the room, examined the bodies, and pronounced that all of the patients were dead.[115]

The German euthanasia program, code-named "Action T-4," was conducted at former hospitals taken over exclusively for use as killing centers, as well as at hospitals that continued their previous functions. Each hospital was responsible for killing patients from a specific region of Germany. The patients were normally killed in groups of 15 to 20, although occasionally many more people were crowded into the gas chambers. By one estimate, 80,000 adults were euthanized at six different hospitals in Germany during the war.[116]

By August 1941, public pressure on the National Socialist regime to end the euthanasia program was mounting. Public knowledge of the euthanasia program and the growing criticism from churches, the judiciary, and the state bureaucracy were among the key factors in bringing an end to the first phase of the euthanasia operation. Church leaders, and especially Bishop Clemens August Graf von Galen, made it internationally known that National Socialist Germany was killing handicapped children and adults on an unprecedented scale. In a sermon on Aug. 3, 1941, Galen openly attacked the hypocrisy and the economic rationale for killing handicapped people. Instead of punishing Galen, Hitler ordered a stop to the euthanasia program on Aug. 24, 1941.[117]

Despite Hitler's order to stop the euthanasia program, a second phase of the program developed later in the war. In the period between 1941 and 1944, an estimated 35,000 patients were evacuated and deported from various mental institutions to make room for physically ill and wounded soldiers and civilians. Thousands of these evacuated mental patients were euthanized. Mentally ill patients were also now killed in their own institutions without being transferred. The number of patients to be euthanized was not centrally organized, but was at the discretion of the relevant asylum director.[118]

The euthanasia operation intensified in 1944, and more and more patients became victims of the killing program. Allied air raids and failing communication lines made it difficult for any centralized control of the euthanasia operation. The German euthanasia program continued primarily because of a lack of hospital space and beds. Compared to the millions of German soldiers and civilians who had died in the war, the fate of thousands of mental patients who added nothing to the war effort seemed of little importance. Unlike in 1940 and 1941, after five years of

war the opposition to the euthanasia program from the churches, the judiciary, and the general population had greatly diminished.[119]

Although Hitler had authorized the euthanasia program in a document backdated to Sept. 1, 1939, there was no official law allowing euthanasia because Hitler thought such a law would feed opposition to the program. The entire project was kept secret to the greatest extent possible. In this regard, doctors falsified every death certificate to cover up the killing program. The key principle in choosing the false cause of death was medical credibility: assigning a disease consistent with a patient's medical history that he or she could have contracted. Designated causes of death could include almost anything—infectious diseases, pneumonia, stroke, heart attack, or diseases of other major organs. This falsification of medical records indicates that the German euthanasia program was an illegal operation that had to be kept secret from the general public to maintain its existence.[120]

The use of carbon monoxide gas chambers in the German euthanasia program is a well-documented reality. Their use constitutes a crime against the German people. However, traditional historians improperly state that the use of carbon monoxide gas chambers in the adult euthanasia program was a precursor to the use of homicidal gas chambers in the German concentration camps. As discussed in Chapter Eight, no documentary or forensic evidence exists that homicidal gas chambers were ever used in the German concentration camps.

One revisionist historian states in regard to the lack of documentary evidence of the existence of homicidal gas chambers in German concentration camps:

The German authorities kept astonishingly detailed records of every aspect of camp affairs. Remarkably, though, there is no contemporary documentary evidence of homicidal gassings or of a policy of mass extermination in the camps. Not a single contemporary German document mentions or even refers to killings of Jews in gas chambers. Nor are there any contemporary plans or diagrams of extermination gas chambers. There is similarly no documentary proof that any of the various rooms or buildings said to have been execution gassing facilities were, in fact, ever used as such.[121]

National Socialist Jewish and Racial Discrimination

Although not a crime, it is a fact that Adolf Hitler made numerous disparaging remarks about Jews throughout his political career. Typical is this passage from Mein Kampf: "The life which the Jew lives as a parasite thriving on the substance of other nations and states has resulted in developing the specific character which Schopenhauer once described when he spoke of the Jew as 'The Great Master of Lies.' The kind of existence which he leads forces the Jew to the systematic use of falsehood, just as naturally as the inhabitants of northern climates are forced to wear warm clothes."[122]

Jewish organizations were greatly offended by such statements and wasted no time in attempting to undermine Hitler's National Socialist regime. In March 1933 they called for a worldwide boycott of unlimited duration of German-manufactured goods. The German government countered on April 1, 1933, with a half-day boycott of Jewish stores inside Germany. It was the latter act that made headlines all over the world as proof of "Nazi brutality," while the far more extensive and harmful Jewish boycott of German goods that lasted for years was hardly ever mentioned.[123]

Hitler, who blamed Jews for causing many of Germany's economic problems, took over a nation that had been totally impoverished through war and inflation. He was determined to end the adverse Jewish influence on the German economy. In April 1933 Hitler passed a new law preventing Jews from holding jobs as civil servants. This law caused well over 1,000 Jews in academic posts to begin looking for positions abroad.[124] Other laws discriminating against Jews were later passed, and before long Jews had vanished from government offices, schools, higher education and other public domains. These National Socialist policies helped the German economy to flourish, and by the beginning of 1938 Germany had by far the best economy in the world.

German economic success was a major reason why Jewish leaders used Winston Churchill to agitate for war against Germany. Churchill was financially supported by the anti-German group "The Focus," whose membership included mostly wealthy British and American Jews.[125] Gen. Robert E. Wood stated at a Senate committee that Churchill had said to him in November 1936, "Germany is getting too strong, and we must smash her." Churchill also stated in the year 1936, "We will force Hitler into war, whether he wants it or not."[126] Churchill

was an exceptional orator and writer, and he was an effective agent in stirring up British public opinion against Germany.

Hitler also believed that Jewish leaders controlled U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Soviet Union. Hitler mentions the Jewish control of Roosevelt and the Soviet Union in his speech on Dec. 11, 1941, declaring war on the United States:

The circle of Jews around Roosevelt encouraged him [to divert attention to foreign policy]. With Old Testament vindictiveness they regarded the United States as the instrument which they and he could use to prepare a second Purim against the nations of Europe, which were increasingly anti-Jewish. So it was that the Jews, in all of their satanic baseness, gathered around this man, and he relied on them.

We know the power behind Roosevelt. It is the same eternal Jew that believes that his hour has come to impose the same fate on us that we have all seen and experienced with horror in Soviet Russia. We have gotten to know the Jewish paradise on Earth first hand. Millions of German soldiers have personally seen the land where this international Jewry has destroyed and annihilated people and property. Perhaps the president of the United States does not understand this. If so, that only speaks for his intellectual narrow-mindedness.[127]

Hitler is correct that Roosevelt was surrounded by Jewish advisors. Jewish historian Lucy Dawidowicz noted, "Roosevelt himself brought into his immediate circle more Jews than any other president before or after him." A partial list of Jews surrounding Roosevelt include: Bernard Baruch, Felix Frankfurter, David E. Lilienthal, David Niles, Louis Brandeis, Samuel I. Rosenman, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Benjamin V. Cohen, Rabbi Stephen Wise, Francis Perkins, Sidney Hillman, Herbert H. Lehman, Jesse I. Straus, Harold J. Laski, Charles E. Wyzanski, Samuel Untermyer, Edward Filene, David Dubinsky, Mordecai Ezekiel, Abe Fortas, Isador Lubin, Harry Dexter White (Weiss), David Weintraub, Nathan G. Silvermaster, Harold Glasser, Irving Kaplan, Solomon Adler, Benjamin Cardozo, Anna Rosenberg, and numerous others, almost to the exclusion of gentile advisers. As a consequence, Roosevelt was surrounded by a milieu of Jewish hate and hostility toward Germany. [128]

Hitler is also correct that Jews had taken control of the Soviet Union. Capt. Montgomery Schuyler, a U.S. Army intelligence officer in Russia during its revolutionary period, stated in a report dated June 9, 1919: "A table made up in 1918, by Robert Wilton, correspondent of the London Times in Russia, shows at that time there were 384 commissars including two Negroes, 13 Russians, 15 Chinamen, 22 Armenians and more than 300 Jews. Of the latter number 264 had come from the United States since the downfall of the imperial government." Thus, the "Russian Revolution" had only 13 ethnic Russians and more than 300 Jews in its top governing body of 384 members.[129]

British intelligence reports also confirm that Jews controlled the Communist revolution in the Soviet Union. The first sentence in a lengthy British intelligence report dated July 16, 1919, states: "There is now definite evidence that Bolshevism is an international movement controlled by Jews." Even Winston Churchill, in an article appearing in the Illustrated Sunday Herald on Feb. 8, 1920, wrote: "There is no need to exaggerate the part played in the creation of Bolshevism and in the actual bringing about of the Russian Revolution by these international and for the most part atheistical Jews."[130]

Hitler's Final Solution to the Jewish problem was to force every Jew to leave Germany. Such a policy was highly discriminatory and unfair to the majority of Germany's Jews. However, since Jews were the driving force behind communism, Hitler felt that Jews had to be driven out to eliminate their subversive influence on Germany. Also, Hitler and many commentators believed that Germany's economic program could not have succeeded by leaving intact the Jewish power structure in Germany.[131]

Forced population transfers have been codified as a crime against humanity in the statute of the International Criminal Court.[132] Hitler's forced expulsion of Jews from Germany would thus constitute a crime under current international law. It should be noted, however, that more than 20 times as many ethnic Germans were expelled from their homelands after World War II as there were Jews in Germany when Hitler became chancellor of Germany. These ethnic Germans also lost essentially all of their possessions and were exported under brutal conditions in which millions of them died. The fate of the German expellees constitutes a far greater crime under current international law than Hitler's attempted forced expulsion of Jews from Germany.

While National Socialist Germany did practice racial discrimination, it is a myth that Germany claimed to be the "master race." Hitler never made any such claim or used any term remotely resembling "master race." Instead, Hitler used the term "Aryan" to represent all the Germanic peoples of Europe, including the British, Dutch, Swedes, Norwegians, Swiss, and all other European people of Germanic origin.[133] The term "master race," so dearly beloved by anti-Germans, was never even used in SS training.[134]

The Western press also made every effort to invent racial controversies in Germany when none existed. At the 1936 Berlin Olympics, numerous newspapers wrote that Hitler had snubbed Jesse Owens, a black, after Owens had won an Olympic gold medal. When Owens was asked how it felt to be snubbed by the Fuehrer, Owens said: "When I passed near the chancellor he arose, waved his hand at me and I waved back at him. I think the writers showed bad taste in criticizing the man of the hour in Germany."[135] Jesse Owens felt that he had been treated well by everyone at the 1936 Berlin Olympics.

Other nations involved in World War II also practiced discrimination against their minorities. An average of 100,000 Jews per year had left Poland from 1933 to 1938 to escape discrimination. This compares to 25,000 to 28,000 Jews per year who left Germany during the same period. Poland passed a large number of additional anti-Jewish laws on March 29, 1938, the extremity of which was a good indication of Polish hatred of the Jews. The Poles sought to encourage the emigration of the greatest possible number of Jews from Poland at the least possible cost.[136] The United States also practiced racial discrimination against black people, with Jim Crow laws in the Deep South being especially discriminatory.

British leaders also made extremely racist public statements. Lord Halifax, the chief British architect of war against Germany, said in his first speech to the House of Commons that the British people were a "superior race" within an empire which comprised more than a quarter of the world's population. There is no record that Halifax ever recanted or made public apologies concerning his maiden speech to the British Parliament.[137]

Winston Churchill stated to U.S. Vice-President Henry Wallace in May 1943 that America and Great Britain should not be apologetic about Anglo-Saxon superiority because Anglo-Saxons are superior.[138]

Finally, legal sterilization and eugenics were performed in other nations besides Germany. Approximately 36,000 legal sterilizations had been performed in the United States by 1941, and Denmark, Norway, and other countries had laws allowing sterilization.[139] Thus, the United States, Great Britain, Poland and other European nations had no legitimate basis to act as if Germany's racial and eugenic discrimination was unique in the world.

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Epilogue

• Creation of the Modern World

World War II was supposedly fought to stop fascist aggression and to create democratic institutions in the liberated nations of Europe. However, within a remarkably short period after the end of the war, the Soviet Union ruthlessly subjected Eastern Europe to its totalitarian control. The Red Army brought Moscow-trained secret policemen into every Soviet occupied country, put local Communists in control of the national media, and dismantled youth groups and other civic organizations. The Soviets also brutally arrested, murdered, and deported people whom they believed to be anti-Soviet, and enforced a policy of ethnic cleansing.[1]

On March 5, 1946, less than 10 months after the defeat of Germany, Winston Churchill made his dramatic Iron Curtain speech in Fulton, Missouri. Churchill states in this speech: "A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory….The Communist parties, which were very small in all these Eastern states of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control."[2] Churchill thus acknowledged that the Soviet Union was obtaining control of Eastern Europe. A war allegedly fought for democracy and freedom had turned into a nightmare for the people of the Eastern European nations.

World War II's Historical Legacy

The end of World War II inexorably led to the start of the Cold War. Germany's mortal enemy during the war—the Soviet Union— soon became the enemy of every nation in the free world. However, even after exposure of the evil nature of the Soviet Union, historians continued to write that Germany bore sole responsibility for starting World War II. History is written by the victors, and the victors did everything possible to make their actions look good. As Churchill famously stated in the late 1940s, "History will be kind to me because I intend to write it."[3]

Powerful vested historical interests organized to frustrate and hide the truth concerning the origins of World War II. The methods followed by the various groups interested in blacking out historical truth

fell into four main categories: 1) excluding revisionist historians from access to public documents which were freely available to establishment historians; 2) intimidating publishers from publishing revisionist books and articles; 3) ignoring or obscuring revisionist publications; and 4) smearing revisionist authors and their books. As a result, history became the chief intellectual casualty of World War II.[4]

In the West, the archives have been managed to present a version of history acceptable to the established authority. Documents and photographs damaging to the Allies have conveniently disappeared from the archives. As one American professor states: "In my 30 years as a scholar of American history, I have never known the archives to appear to be so much of a political agency of the executive branch as it is now. One used to think of the archivist of the United States as a professional scholar. Now he has become someone who fills a political bill." The cover-up goes on to the present day.[5]

Historians who questioned the official version of the origins of World War II placed in jeopardy both their professional reputation and their livelihood. In this regard, Harry Elmer Barnes wrote:

In all essential features, the United States has moved over into the Nineteen Eighty-Four pattern of intellectual life. But there is one important and depressing difference. In Nineteen Eighty-Four, Orwell implies that historians have to be hired by the government and forced to falsify facts. In this country, today, and it is also true of most other nations, the professional historians gladly falsify history quite voluntarily, and with no direct cost to the government. The ultimate and direct cost may, of course, be a potent contribution to incalculable calamity….

A state of abject terror and intimidation exists among the majority of professional American historians whose views accord with the facts on the question of responsibility for the Second World War. The writer of this review has published a brief brochure on "The Struggle Against the Historical Blackout," which endeavors to set forth a few of the salient facts about the attempts to suppress the truth in this matter. Several leading publicists have written the author stating that, on the basis of their personal experience, it is an understatement of the facts. Yet, the majority of the historians to whom this has been sent and are personally known to the author to share his views have feared even to acknowledge the receipt or possession of the brochure. Only a handful have dared to express approval

and encouragement. It is no exaggeration to say that the American Smearbund, operating through newspaper columnists, radio commentators, pressure-group intrigue and espionage, and academic pressures and fears, has accomplished about as much in the way of intimidating honest intellectuals in this country as Hitler, Goebbels, Himmler, the Gestapo and the concentration camps were able to do in Nazi Germany.[6]

Harry Elmer Barnes wrote that the dogma surrounding Hitler's sole responsibility for starting World War II is unprecedented in modern history. Barnes said: "It is unlikely that there has been any vested interest in dogma, opinion and politics since the birth, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ equal in intensity to that built up around the allegation that Hitler was solely responsible for the outbreak of war in 1939."[7]

The Allied atrocities associated with World War II also became a dangerous topic to examine too thoroughly. Only atrocities committed by the Germans were subjected to intensive investigation and given worldwide publicity. Historians have disputed or ignored many atrocities committed by the Allies during and after World War II.[8]

For example, traditional historians have dismissed James Bacque's research which documents that approximately 1 million German POWs were murdered in American and French camps after the war. One historian who disputes Bacque's work states: "He placed responsibility for these supposed deaths firmly at the feet of the American leadership, whom he accused of pursuing a deliberate policy of revenge, and then concealing the 'truth' beneath layers of creative accounting. Bacque's claims not only called into question the strongly held American belief that they had fought a moral war, but effectively accused American leaders of crimes against humanity."[9]

As discussed in Chapter Five, the evidence is overwhelming that the Western Allies murdered many hundreds of thousands of Germans in their POW camps. American leaders were guilty of enormous crimes against the German people after the end of World War II. The United States also did not fight a moral war against Germany. President Roosevelt misled the American public into supporting the war, and prolonged the war with his policy of unconditional surrender. Eisenhower and American military leaders also intentionally allowed the

Soviet Union to take over Eastern Europe, thereby subjecting its people to the terrible tyranny of Soviet rule.

In a complete absurdity, a $120 million American taxpayer-funded memorial to Dwight Eisenhower has been officially announced. How Eisenhower has ended up as a national hero is a testament to the power of carefully crafted historical propaganda. Eisenhower personally oversaw the deliberate mass murder of hundreds of thousands of German POWs who were starved to death or died of disease and exposure. He should be remembered as a major war criminal rather than as an American national hero.[10]

The Historical Blackout Gets Worse

Barnes, who died in 1968, did not foresee that the historical blackout would become even worse in regard to the Holocaust story. Initially relatively little was written about the alleged genocide of European Jewry. For example, three of the best-known works on World War II history are Gen. Eisenhower's 559-page Crusade in Europe, Winston Churchill's six-volume The Second World War (4,448 pages total), and Gen. de Gaulle's three-volume Mémoires de guerre (2,054 pages total). Published from 1948 to 1959, these books in 7,061 pages of writing make no mention of anything related to the Holocaust story.[11]

Most of what was written about the Holocaust story was primarily based on eyewitness testimony from Jewish survivors of the German camps. The historical blackout forces sought to intimidate German eyewitnesses from writing about their observations in the German concentration camps. When Thies Christophersen published The Auschwitz Lie in 1973, he was charged with "popular incitement," "contempt against the state," and defamation of the Jews. Christophersen spent a year in prison even though the charge of popular incitement was eventually dropped. All Christophersen had done was to write about his experiences while he was working in Auschwitz in 1944.[12]

German Judge Wilhelm Staeglich later published an account of his Auschwitz observations in the October 1973 issue of the magazine Nation Europa. Staeglich's public challenge to the official version of life at Auschwitz brought forth severe reprisals from the German government. Staeglich was induced to resign his job as a judge in Hamburg, his health having been affected by a harassment campaign against him. German

authorities also attempted to deprive Staeglich of his pension, eventually settling on a 20% reduction in his pension over a five-year period. Finally, in a crowning absurdity, Staeglich was deprived of the doctoral degree he had earned at the University of Goettingen in 1951.[13]

Prematurely retired, Staeglich worked for several years on an extensive study of the evidence supposedly substantiating systematic murder by gassing at Auschwitz. The book resulting from his study, Der Auschwitz Mythos, disputes the various "proofs" offered for the Auschwitz myth and is a damning analysis of the postwar trials staged by the Allies. The publication of Der Auschwitz Mythos in West Germany in 1979 caused the defenders of the Holocaust story to censor Staeglich's book. Nevertheless, all but seven of the 10,000 copies of the first edition of Der Auschwitz Mythos had been sold by the time the book was ordered seized by the German government.[14]

Staeglich wrote in 1984 concerning the intellectual subservience and guilt inculcated in most Germans since the end of WWII:

We Germans, in spite of the repeated assurances to the contrary of our puppet politicians, are politically and intellectually no longer a sovereign nation since our defeat in the Second World War. Our political subservience, which is apparent in the fact of the breaking up of the Reich and the incorporation of the individual pieces into the extant power blocs of the East and of the West, has had as its consequence a corresponding intellectual subservience. Escape from this intellectual subservience is prevented primarily by the guilt complex inculcated in most Germans through the "reeducation" instituted in 1945. This guilt complex is based primarily on the Holocaust Legend. Therefore for we Germans the struggle against what I have called the "Auschwitz Myth" is so frightfully important.[15]

Germany passed laws soon after the publication of Staeglich's book making it a felony to dispute any aspect of the Holocaust story. Similar laws were eventually passed in the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Israel, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Switzerland, and the European Union.[16] The obvious question is: What kind of historical truth needs criminal sanctions to

protect it? The Holocaust story would not need criminal sanctions to protect it if it was historically accurate.

European scholars who have questioned the Holocaust story have suffered tremendous hardships. For example, French revisionist Dr. Robert Faurisson lost his professorship in 1991, has been viciously beaten by thugs who were never caught or prosecuted, and has been the defendant in numerous lawsuits. Faurisson believes that revisionist historians are up against a religion. Faurisson said: "The belief in the Holocaust is a religion. We have to fight against this religion, but I don't know how to fight a religion. Revisionists can look at demographic figures, historical documents, forensic evidence, etc., but there is no example in history of reason destroying a religion."[17]

Revisionists have also been persecuted in countries where questioning the Holocaust story is still legal. Canadian revisionist Ernst Zuendel was tried in 1985 and 1988 in Toronto, Canada for the alleged crime of knowingly publishing false news. All Zuendel had ever done was publicly dispute the Holocaust story. Even though Zuendel won both cases on appeal, he continued to be attacked and persecuted in Canada. In 1995 his Toronto residence was the subject of an arson attack resulting in over $400,000 of damages. Zuendel was also the recipient of a parcel bomb that was defused by the Toronto Police bomb squad.

Zuendel later moved to rural Tennessee to live with his American wife Ingrid Rimland. In February 2003 Zuendel was arrested in Tennessee for alleged immigration violations and deported back to Canada. Zuendel was forced to spend over two years in solitary confinement in a Toronto jail cell even though he was never charged with a crime. Zuendel was deported to Germany in March 2005 where he was tried and convicted of inciting racial hatred and defaming the memory of the dead. Zuendel spent five years in prison in Germany.

Zuendel's persecution illustrates the power of the historical blackout forces. Zuendel wrote from his Toronto jail cell: "The media and educational system have dumbed the people down to a level hitherto unknown in the civilized world. They are modern-day zombie populations, led around by the nose—mentally so manipulated that they cannot think straight, much less act in their own self-interest, either as individuals or as societies and states. Both in spirit and in reality, they have become the tax-paying cash cows and playthings of an alien oligarchy."[18]

Some people in the United States have been forced to abandon their revisionist work even though U.S. citizens enjoy the First Amendment right to free speech. For example, David Cole, whose parents are both Jewish, was very effective in the 1990s in promulgating revisionist viewpoints. He was so effective that the Jewish Defense League threatened him into recanting his views. In January 1998 Cole changed his name to David Stein to protect himself, and he became publicly known as a right-wing Hollywood Republican. In May 2013 Cole was exposed by a former friend and is now using his original name again. Hopefully his right to free speech will be respected in the future.

Traditional historians and academics are all forced to uphold the Holocaust story to keep their jobs. Most historians write as if all aspects of the Holocaust story are well documented and irrefutable. For example, one historian who laments the outlawing of Holocaust revisionism states: "The Holocaust is an incontestable fact."[19] However, as outlined in Chapter Eight, major aspects of the Holocaust story are easily contestable. It is a felony in many European countries to question the Holocaust story because major aspects of the Holocaust story are easy to disprove.

Defenders of the Holocaust story have also taken extreme measures to prosecute perpetrators of the alleged extermination. John Demjanjuk, for example, was found not guilty by the Israeli Supreme Court in 1993 of being Ivan the Terrible at Treblinka. Demjanjuk returned to his home in Cleveland, Ohio and looked forward to a peaceful retirement after spending years on death row in Israel. Unfortunately, in 2001 Demjanjuk was charged again on the grounds that he had instead allegedly been a guard named Ivan Demjanjuk at the Sobibór camp in Poland.

On May 11, 2009, Demjanjuk was deported from Cleveland to be tried in Germany. On May 12, 2011, Demjanjuk was convicted by a German criminal court as an accessory to the murder of 27,900 people at Sobibór and sentenced to five years in prison. No evidence was presented at Demjanjuk's trial linking him to specific crimes. Instead, Demjanjuk was convicted under a new line of German legal thinking that a person who served at an alleged death camp can be charged as an accessory to murder because the camp's sole function was to kill people. No proof of participation in a specific crime is required. Demjanjuk died in Germany before his appeal could be heard by a German appellate court.[20]

This new line of German legal thinking is breathtaking in its unfairness. It incorrectly assumes that some German concentration

camps were used for the sole purpose of exterminating people when, in fact, none of them was. Moreover, this proposed German law finds a person guilty merely for being at a certain camp. People can be found guilty of a crime even when no evidence is presented that they committed a crime. The Simon Wiesenthal Center has been looking to help prosecute and convict other elderly German guards under this line of German legal thinking.[21]

The Holocaust story is being used to increasingly restrict free speech. Moshe Kantor, president of the European Jewish Congress, spoke at the International Holocaust Remembrance Day at the European Parliament ceremony in Brussels on Jan. 27, 2014. Kantor rejected free speech arguments over what he called the worldwide spread of anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism is "not an opinion—it's a crime," he said. Kantor apparently wants to criminalize any speech, symbols, or gestures that Jews consider to be anti-Semitic.[22]

Successful Guilt Campaign in Germany

Upon Germany's unconditional surrender in May 1945, the Allies initiated a highly successful campaign to brainwash Germans and make them feel guilty about their actions during World War II. The Allied perpetual campaign of negative publicity has prevented an objective analysis of Germany's involvement in the war. The fact that the Allies forced Germany into World War II has been almost totally removed from public discussion.

Friedrich Grimm, a renowned German authority on international law, was shown samples of new leaflets printed soon after the war in German to be distributed by the Allies throughout Germany. Describing German war crimes, the leaflets were the first step in the reeducation program designed for Germany. Grimm suggested to an Allied officer that since the war was over, it was time to stop the libel. The Allied officer replied: "Why no, we're just getting started. We'll continue this atrocity campaign, we'll increase it till no one will want to hear a good word about the Germans anymore, till whatever sympathy there is for you in other countries is completely destroyed, and until the Germans themselves become so mixed up they won't know what they're doing!"[23]

Guilt pervades Germany as a result of the Allied propaganda campaign. German guilt is so powerful that it has caused the German

government to make enormous reparations and offer humble apologies to the Allies, while ignoring the atrocities committed by the Allies against the German people after the war. Millions of German expellees have paid reparations to survivors of the German concentration camps even though these German expellees had their land and personal possessions stolen from them. German schoolchildren are repeatedly taught about crimes committed by National Socialist Germany, with little or nothing ever taught about their ancestors' tragic sufferings after the war.[24]

German children are taught from early childhood to view the Third Reich as solely bad, wrong, criminal and despicable. In the spring of 2001, Anna Rau, the 17-year-old daughter of German president Johannes Rau, was interviewed by a German TV station. Anna Rau discussed what was taught in school about history:

As to the question what we are learning in school when history is taught, I can answer simply with the term National Socialism. Nothing else seems to matter. Everything about the Second World War really gets on my nerves. It is always the same. They start with Hitler, then we talk about Anne Frank, and on the day when we should take a walk in the forest, we have to go and see the movie Schindler's List instead. And this continues when we go to church where in place of learning our religious confirmation instructions we are taught more about the "Holocaust." The final result is obviously that we just don't want to hear about that stuff anymore. It drains us emotionally, and eventually leads to callousness.[25]

Most people have heard of the National Socialist book burning. It happened on May 10, 1933, when mostly pornographic and anti-German literature was publicly set afire. Few people realize that the Allies removed and then destroyed no fewer than 34,635 titles of books and brochures from German libraries and bookstores after they conquered Germany. This is many times more books destroyed by the Allies than were destroyed by National Socialist Germany. Even today books doubting the Holocaust story can lead to a house search and confiscation of the incriminating literature, with fines and jail time meted out to the owner of the books.[26]

The destruction of large sections of German literature was part of the Allied reeducation program for Germany. Hans Schmidt describes his experience of the Allied treatment of Germans after World War II:

As far as the German people were concerned, the victors wanted only a malleable mass of dispirited, destitute, hungry, cowering and defenseless Teutons who knew the way to physical survival was to placate every whim of the victors. A still proud German was (always!) immediately branded a…Nazi; worse than a criminal….

I still vividly remember that soon after our defeat the victors set about to destroy all traditions and institutions that represented Germany. They did this under the spurious concept encased into even more spurious laws "to free the German people from militarism and National Socialism." Absolutely no organization except the Roman Catholic Church was allowed to continue functioning: not even the Red Cross, nor any other charitable organization, no public or private administration, no bank, no newspaper or magazine, no radio station—the list went on….

To me personally it was also disturbing to see that all well-known traditional publications (newspapers and magazines) had been forced out of existence, and new firms with new names appeared on the horizon. In addition all that which we consider part of a nation's historic tradition was purposely destroyed, eradicated or forbidden in Germany, usually under the guise of an alleged de-militarization. Memorials to our fallen soldiers of long ago wars disappeared, the monuments to Kaisers and kings were removed from their pedestals and melted down, and time-honored memorial days could not be found on the new calendars. Instead, many of the current memorial days in the Bundesrepublik are days where the Germans have to pay obeisance to the victors. To this day it is a rarity to find memorials to the dead heroes of World Wars I and II on German soil. Instead, traitors, deserters and anti-German Germans and others…are being honored. When Germans want to see and admire the changing of the guard at a grave for the unknown soldier, or pay homage to the war dead, they have to travel to Paris, London, Warsaw, Moscow or Washington.[27]

It is against the law in present-day Germany to praise the Third Reich in any form or manner. The showing of a swastika is a criminal offense in Germany. German National Socialists who acted admirably during World War II cannot be praised, and many honorable Germans have had their graves desecrated.[28]

Rudolf Hess, for example, was not allowed to stay buried in his chosen Bavarian town of Wunsiedel. Hess, who died in Spandau prison on Aug. 17, 1987, took the risk of flying to Scotland to negotiate peace with Great Britain. The town of Wunsiedel became the scene of pilgrimages for

people who wanted to honor Hess for his courageous effort. On July 20, 2011, Hess's grave was reopened and his remains were exhumed and then cremated. His ashes were scattered at sea, and his gravestone which bore the epitaph "I took the risk" was destroyed.[29] Apparently it is now hoped that Hess's courageous effort to negotiate peace with Great Britain will be forgotten by history.

There have been numerous other instances when the graves of German war heroes were officially desecrated or destroyed. In the summer of 2003, Maj. Walter Nowotny's remains were removed from the grave of honor at the Vienna Central Cemetery where they had been placed soon after the 24-year-old pilot crashed in November 1944. An article in the July 13, 2003, edition of the British Sunday Telegraph noted that the Luftwaffe hero's remains had been removed from a plot of honor to a pauper's grave.[30]

The Allied charge of bellicosity of the German people that justifies such desecration does not accord with the facts. Pitirim Sorokin in his book Social and Cultural Dynamics shows that from the 12th century to 1925 the percentage of years in which leading European powers have been at war is as follows: Spain, 67%; Poland and Lithuania, 58%; Greece, 57%; England, 56%; France, 50%; Russia, 46%; Holland, 44%; Austria, 40%; Italy, 36%; and Germany, 28%. Sorokin concludes that Germany has had the smallest percentage of years at war of leading European countries. [31]

Germany Still Militarily Occupied

President Truman joined Gens. Eisenhower and Bradley on July 20, 1945, to watch the American flag officially being raised over the U.S. sector of Berlin. Speaking without notes, Truman told the American soldiers: "We are not fighting for conquest. There is not one piece of territory or one thing of a monetary nature that we want out of this war."[32]

It is possible that President Truman believed these words when he spoke them. However, billions of dollars in gold, silver, currency, priceless paintings and artworks were stolen from Germany and shipped to the United States. More importantly, German patents and trademarks, completed drawings of German technological advances, and tons of secret documents were stolen by the Allies. Hundreds of German scientists were

compelled to immigrate to the United States. As one U.S. government agency admitted, “Operation Paper-Clip” was the first time in history wherein conquerors attempted to bleed dry the inventive power of an entire nation.[33]

The United States did provide financial assistance to Germany via the Marshall Plan. However, the Marshall Plan assistance was mostly a loan, and this loan was paid back in full with interest in the succeeding years. By one estimate the United States confiscated 10 times more German national wealth than the entire amount of Marshall Plan assistance.[34] Another writer estimates that the Americans took from Germany at least 20 times the amount the Germans received under the Marshall Plan.[35]

The Allies also retained control of the German government. Few Americans are aware that no peace treaty concluding World War II was ever signed between Germany and the Allies. The German government from the end of World War II until today has always been a vassal government of the United States. Germany to this day has also always been militarily occupied by the United States. Tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers are stationed in Germany not so much because of the strategic necessities of NATO, but because powerful interests want to make certain that Germany does not “go it alone.” U.S. troops will stay in Germany for as long as they are needed to maintain control of Germany.[36]

Although Germany claims to be a democracy in which the will of the people counts, there is no realistic chance that a truly independent party could take power through the election process in Germany. The present German constitution imposed on Germany in 1949 by the victorious Allies ensures that a genuinely patriotic party having the true interests of the German people at heart will never come to power. Treaties later imposed upon Germany by the Allies also require that Germany accept even the most egregious occupation laws as still binding. The German government could not expel the U.S. troops even if it wanted to.[37]

The brainwashing and reeducation of the Germans will probably not cease until the last U.S. soldier and CIA agent leave German soil. They are not stationed in Germany to safeguard the interests of the people of the United States or of Germany. Instead, they are there to suppress freedom of expression regarding important topics in Germany. The ultimate goal is to destroy the great cultural nation of Germany through

the falsification of history and the deliberate estrangement of German values in a controlled pseudo-democratic system.[38]

Footnotes

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